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Introduction
In 2010 the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) proposed a comprehensive 
development strategy entitled Time for equality: closing 
gaps, opening trails (ECLAC, 2010). From a rights-based 
perspective, development is treated as an indivisible, 
rights-based process in which synergies are created 
between a macroeconomy that pushes back the frontiers of 
growth as an engine of employment and social inclusion; 
productive development that drives greater convergence 
between sectors and labour-market stakeholders to create 
a more diversified, innovation- and knowledge-intensive 
production matrix; a territorial matrix that links territories 
and narrows gaps in both production and well-being; a 
focus on social rights aimed at employment protection, the 
promotion of decent work, redistributive public transfers 
and the expansion of social safety nets; and a fiscal 
covenant that creates public policy space for promoting 
productive development with greater social equality by 
expanding and restructuring the tax burden.
We talk about equality because what is at stake 
in the proposal is not just equal access but also equal 
ownership of rights. An integral approach not only seeks 
equal opportunities for skill development but also strives 
for clear public policies on employment and productive 
development as a way to reduce the tremendous segregation 
in these sphere that has marked the Latin American and 
Caribbean region’s recent past. The region’s structural 
heterogeneity (a subject often addressed by ECLAC and 
revisited in contemporary terms in Time for equality) 
generates productivity gaps that in turn open up divides in 
access to labour rights, well-being, fair wages, a political 
voice, symbolic recognition and information.
This edition of Social Panorama looks at the links 
in the chain of inequalities identified in Time for equality 
that concern the education and skills development stage of 
the life cycle. A substantial portion of this edition, then, 
deals with the youth and child population and considers 
how differences created and consolidated during this 
stage of life entrench the intergenerational reproduction 
of poverty and inequality. The focus is on the life cycle 
and on the reproduction of unequal opportunities for 
sustainable social mobility over an individual’s lifetime. 
From this viewpoint, the document examines the situation 
of the population aged 0-29 and its internal dynamics, 
future prospects and ties to other age groups.
Accordingly, this edition of Social Panorama pinpoints 
gaps in educational attainment and learning during the 
formative years, highlighting the need for the State to 
play a more significant role and for public transfers to 
narrow these gaps. It also examines how socio-economic 
background helps perpetuate inequality in education on the 
supply side. A structural, integral approach for achieving 
equality such as ECLAC is proposing as a road map for 
development in the region is not enough to close these 
gaps in skills and learning.
To attain this goal, the State must play an active role in 
the areas of production and labour because self-regulated 
markets have historically proven to work against productive 
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convergence, employment and labour protection and 
to impede the narrowing of gaps in labour income 
and access to well-being. To truly close gaps in skills, 
learning and educational outcomes, education must be 
articulated with a labour market geared towards inclusion 
and equality, a fiscal covenant with a larger tax burden 
enabling the State and public policy to play a clear role 
in drawing on productivity gains (in which education is 
key) to redistribute assets and ensure universal access 
to social safety nets.
In this context, the overarching message is that 
position on the social scale is more than the sum of 
personal circumstance, effort and decisions. There is a 
structure of opportunities provided by States, markets, 
families and communities that are largely beyond the 
individual’s control and that colour prospects for social 
mobility and access to well-being. 
Almost everything that the State, the market and the 
community provide for a child during infancy is filtered 
and redistributed by the family. As the child progresses in 
the life cycle towards adolescence and young adulthood, 
his or her direct ties to the State, the market and the 
community grow stronger. This edition of Social Panorama 
argues, among other things, that in Latin America the 
State and its transfer and regulatory mechanisms fall 
short of the mark in addressing inequalities of origin. 
In other words, the start in life for the children of Latin 
America depends a good deal on family circumstances. 
Families, in turn, depend a good deal on the market and 
receive little support from the State. The lack of robust 
transfer systems targeting families with children; limited 
coverage, care and protection by the State during infancy; 
low penetration of preschool systems; short school days; 
the system’s inability to retain students during secondary 
school; and the lack of support for young people and young 
adults as they become autonomous: these are all factors 
that dramatically limit the prospects for future social 
mobility for children born into lower-income sectors.
The following chapters look at these dynamics from 
the viewpoints of poverty and inequality, spending and 
social policy, the educational system and its achievements 
and limitations, and intergenerational transfer systems 
—both those originating with the State and those that are 
provided through families. The closing chapter recaps 
the lessons learned from the chapters on specific areas; it 
sets forth public policy proposals and estimates their cost 
and potential coverage and impacts. The proposals should 
be seen as a search for a social protection and promotion 
system that safeguards children and adolescents from risk 
and offers channels for greater lifelong mobility.
As in previous editions, chapter I discusses recent 
trends in poverty and income distribution in Latin 
America and the relationship between these trends and 
an individual’s life cycle. The data show that despite the 
economic crisis and the widespread fall in GDP in 2009, there 
was virtually no increase in poverty rates in the region and 
indigence rates rose only slightly. Among the contributing 
factors were the maintenance of real wages thanks to low 
inflation and policies geared towards preventing massive job 
losses, along with a slight improvement in the distributive 
structure of income. The positive trend in access to basic 
services and education has held.
For young people living in poverty, an early start towards 
emancipation is crucial. Teenage motherhood is highly 
concentrated in the poor population, making it far more difficult 
to escape poverty throughout life. In addition, the proportion 
of individuals who neither study nor work is higher among 
women than among men and among young people from 
lower-income strata than among those from higher-income 
groups. This situation calls for comprehensive policies that, 
together, tackle issues involving reproductive paths, school 
drop-out rates and vulnerability to exclusion.
Subjectively, demoscopic data suggest that national 
life-satisfaction averages in the countries of the region are 
far higher than to be expected on the basis of gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita. The gaps in this subjective 
well-being indicator are smaller than expected given the 
widespread distributive inequality in Latin America, where 
life dissatisfaction is higher among individuals over 60 years 
of age living in the worst socio-economic conditions, among 
17-to-29-year-olds with children and among individuals 
without a stable partner. 
Chapter II highlights the role of education as one of 
the State’s best tools for reversing the intergenerational 
reproduction of inequality and decoupling an individual’s 
social background from future well-being outcomes. But 
the region has not turned the education system into a driver 
of equal opportunity. While there have been significant 
advances in education in recent decades, expanding access 
has also led to greater supply-side segmentation in attainment 
and in quality. The social and cultural disadvantages that 
burden lower-resource students as they enter the educational 
system are compounded by access to lower-quality education 
services than are available to students with more resources. 
This reinforces the inequality of their learning paths. 
In a context of unequal access to educational opportunities, 
the link between education and employment reproduces 
—and can even worsen— social inequalities. And there is 
a new factor that is ever more critical for acquiring skills: 
connectivity and the quality of access to and use of digital 
technologies. This poses the dilemma of a widening digital 
divide versus growing digital convergence, where there is 
considerable scope for action by educational systems.
Education policy must dovetail with other social 
promotion and protection measures if inequality in the 
intergenerational transmission of educational opportunities is 
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to be successfully reversed. Some key intervention factors 
in the field of education are: expanding early childhood 
education coverage; extending the primary school day; 
improving access to and use of digital technologies at 
State schools; supporting families through conditional 
cash transfer programmes and extending these to young 
people in secondary school; coordinating the job training 
system; and reconciling education quality at the upper 
level with expanding access to excluded sectors.
Chapter III looks at recent trends in social spending. 
Over the past two decades the countries of the region 
have put significant effort into increasing the resources 
available for implementing social policies. Almost all areas 
of social spending have increased in absolute and relative 
terms alike, except for a few items and periods. Much of 
this effort has run concurrently with economic growth as 
available resources expanded. Overall budget increases, 
especially for the social sectors, have outpaced GDP growth, 
but minor GDP contractions have also led to larger than 
necessary budget cuts. To counteract this trend, most of the 
countries of the region decided to step up public spending 
(temporarily so far) to address the effects of the global 
financial crisis. Many of these measures are geared towards 
cushioning the impact of the crisis on the real economies 
and curbing rising unemployment and poverty.
The social sectors seeing the largest increases in 
government funding were social security and assistance, 
followed by education. A portion of social assistance seeks 
to check the intergenerational reproduction of poverty and 
so targets the younger generations. However, spending on 
education primarily targets children and young people, 
and the resources involved are substantial. Spending per 
student is up sharply.
Chapter IV examines the system of public and 
private transfers and how these are distributed between 
generations. These transfers centre on age groups that 
tend to consume more than they produce: children and 
young people, and older adults. This brings into play the 
National Transfer Accounts (NTA) system, a new approach 
to measuring aggregate flows of economic resources 
between age groups over time. These accounts include 
flows associated with transfers and capital accumulation, 
distinguishing those passing through public institutions 
from those in the private sphere.
The assessment reveals the low level of consumption 
among children and young people in Latin America, 
associated with scanty public investment in these groups. 
Indeed, as a percentage of labour income, the countries 
of the region spend about the same on older persons as 
do Japan, the countries of Europe, and the United States. 
But their investment in children and young people is half 
that of the developed countries. The proportion of family 
transfers to children and young people is far higher in 
Latin America, while that of public transfers is markedly 
lower. This calls for the public sector to be far more active 
in ensuring adequate investment in skills-building and in 
protecting children and young people from risk.
Although the usual focus is on gaps between socio-
economic strata, this chapter centres on gaps between 
generations and in intergenerational transfers. Rethinking 
the intergenerational distribution of public transfers is 
essential, not only to check the reproduction of inequality 
throughout the life cycle but also to prepare for the rapid 
ageing of the population.
In short, the high concentration of poverty in the 
early stages of life, the low level of public transfers 
targeting children and young people and the segmentation 
of educational attainments and learning (combined with 
the structural core of an unequal production matrix and 
labour market) are among the factors that explain, in 
part, the persistent inequality in our countries. To address 
these issues, chapter V proposes a life-cycle approach 
calling for measures that fall into three broad groups. 
One set of measures involves cash transfers to vulnerable 
households with children aged 0-14 to improve the odds 
that the family will have an appropriate environment for 
child socialization (nutrition, housing, clothing). Another 
calls for funding for policy measures covering the current 
cost of incorporating into the educational system those 
members of the early childhood, preschool, primary, 
lower secondary and upper secondary age groups who 
are not covered. The last group of measures envisions 
another set of cash transfers for employment and training 
services targeting young people in the process of becoming 
emancipated adults (15-24 years of age).
This chapter sets out the results of simulations showing 
the costs and impacts of the measures proposed. Starting 
with the impacts, it explains how a transfer system for the 
population living in vulnerable households would have a 
decisive effect on poverty in the countries. It also spells 
out the significant gains in terms of incorporating into the 
educational system those children and young people who 
are currently outside it. As for costs, the chapter concludes 
that the additional current expense of incorporation into 
the educational system is viable for the vast majority of 
the countries of the region. Costs increase when taken 
together with cash transfers to vulnerable sectors. Over 
a 10-year horizon, in most of the countries the additional 
revenues from economic growth (and possible expansion 
of the tax burden) could cover the additional cost of such 
measures by 2014 or earlier. Nonetheless, there is still a 
group of four countries (Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua 
and the Plurinational State of Bolivia) that would not be 
able to achieve coverage by the end of the period. This 
calls for a greater effort to secure international cooperation 
resources in line with these clearly defined goals.
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Summary
Poverty, inequality and life cycle
 Poverty and inequality: crisis and recovery
Per capita GDP in Latin America and the Caribbean fell 
by 3% in 2009 in the midst of a generalized international 
crisis. This contraction impacted most of the countries of 
the region, especially the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico and Paraguay. Unlike prior 
crises, though, this time public policy was paramount in 
dampening the impact on labour and social conditions.
The poverty rate in the region stood at 33.1% in 2009, 
with 13.3% of the population living in extreme poverty or 
indigence. These figures translate into 183 million poor 
and 74 million living in indigence (see figure 1). Poverty 
worsened only slightly compared with 2008, equivalent to 
an increase of 0.1 percentage points. This shows that the 
countries are in a position to (and are inclined to) act far 
more decisively to contain the social impacts of the crisis 
than they have been during past crises. Extreme poverty 
posted a somewhat larger increase: 0.4 percentage points. 
The number of poor and indigent rose by 3 million.
Figure 1 
LATIN AMERICA: POVERTY AND INDIGENCE, 1980-2010 a
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the relevant countries.
a  Estimate for 18 countries of the region, plus Haiti. The figures above the bars are the percentage and total number of poor persons (indigent plus non-indigent poor).
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These figures point to relatively positive results over 
the past few years. Compared with 2002, when poverty 
and indigence rates were the highest since 1990, both 
indicators are down sharply —by 10.9 percentage points 
for poverty and 6.1 percentage points for indigence.
There is information available for assessing poverty 
and indigence trends between 2008 and 2009 for nine 
countries. In six of them, poverty clearly dropped during 
the period. In the Dominican Republic and Uruguay 
(data for urban areas), the poverty rate fell by more 
than 3 percentage points; Brazil, Panama, Paraguay and 
Peru recorded declines between 0.9 percentage points 
and 2.2 percentage points. Slightly smaller poverty rate 
decreases were posted in Colombia and Ecuador (at the 
national level, but not for urban areas).1 In 2009, the 
indigence rate came down considerably in Colombia, 
the Dominican Republic, Panama, Peru and Uruguay 
and declined slightly in Brazil and Paraguay. Among the 
countries for which information is available, only Costa
1 For Colombia, this edition of Social Panorama is reporting a new 
set of official poverty estimates issued by the country for 2002 to 
2009. Therefore, the figures might not coincide with those published 
in previous editions. 
Rica showed an appreciable deterioration in poverty and 
indigence indicators in 2009, with rises of 2.5 percentage 
points and 1.4 percentage points, respectively.
The latest figures available for Argentina, Chile and 
El Salvador show poverty trends over a broader period. 
Between 2006 and 2009, poverty and indigence rates in 
Argentina (urban areas) dropped at the rate of 3.2 percentage 
points and 1.1 percentage points per year, respectively. In 
Chile, poverty declined slightly between 2006 and 2009, 
with the indigence rate remaining basically unchanged.2 
Poverty and indigence rates in El Salvador held steady 
between 2004 and 2009.
These figures can also be used to evaluate the progress 
the countries are making towards achievement of target 1.A 
of Millennium Goal One: to halve, between 1990 and 2015, 
the proportion of people living in extreme poverty. Despite 
the setback in 2008 and 2009, Latin America is well on the 
way to achieving target 1.A. With 72% of the target deadline 
elapsed the region is 82% of the way to fulfilling it.
2 Estimates published herein commonly differ from official poverty 
figures issued by the countries because of differing methodological 
approaches. For Chile, the figures shown diverge for the first time 
from the country’s official estimates. With the change in methodology 
introduced by ECLAC in 2007, the indigence line was adjusted to 
reflect changes in the food component of the consumer price index 
(CPI). The part of the line that corresponds to non-food spending was 
adjusted to reflect changes in the CPI for all other goods and services 
instead of using the same deflator for both lines as in the past.
Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PERSONS LIVING IN POVERTY AND INDIGENCE, AROUND 2002, 2008 AND 2009
(Percentages)
Country
Around 2002 Around 2008 2009
Year Poverty Indigence Year Poverty Indigence Year Poverty Indigence
Argentina a 2002 45.4 20.9 2006 21.0 7.2 2009 11.3 3.8
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2002 62.4 37.1 2007 54.0 31.2 … … …
Brazil 2001 37.5 13.2 2008 25.8 7.3 2009 24.9 7.0
Chile 2000 20.2 5.6 2006 13.7 3.2 2009 11.5 3.6
Colombia b 2002 54.2 19.9 2008 46.1 17.9 2009 45.7 16.5
Costa Rica 2002 20.3 8.2 2008 16.4 5.5 2009 18.9 6.9
Dominican Republic 2002 47.1 20.7 2008 44.3 22.6 2009 41.1 21.0
Ecuador a 2002 49.0 19.4 2008 39.0 14.2 2009 40.2 15.5
El Salvador 2001 48.9 22.1 2004 47.5 19.0 2009 47.9 17.3
Guatemala 2002 60.2 30.9 2006 54.8 29.1 … … …
Honduras 2002 77.3 54.4 2007 68.9 45.6 … … …
Mexico 2002 39.4 12.6 2008 34.8 11.2 … … …
Nicaragua 2001 69.4 42.5 2005 61.9 31.9 … … …
Panama 2002 36.9 18.6 2008 27.7 13.5 2009 26.4 11.1
Paraguay 2001 61.0 33.2 2008 58.2 30.8 2009 56.0 30.4
Peru c 2001 54.7 24.4 2008 36.2 12.6 2009 34.8 11.5
Uruguay a 2002 15.4 2.5 2008 14.0 3.5 2009 10.7 2.0
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 2002 48.6 22.2 2008 27.6 9.9 … … …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the relevant countries.
a  Urban areas.
b  Figures from the Misión para el empalme de las series de empleo, pobreza y desigualdad (MESEP), the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) and the National 
Planning Department (DNP) of Colombia.
c  Figures from the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) of Peru.
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The variations in poverty and indigence rates are 
due to the interaction of rising average individual income 
(growth effect) with changes in how that income is 
distributed (distribution effect). The growth effect was 
predominant in five of the countries in which poverty 
declined in 2009 (Argentina, Chile, Dominican Republic, 
Peru and Uruguay). In another five (Brazil, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Panama and Paraguay) the decline was due 
mainly to the distribution effect. A clear worsening of 
distribution was behind the increasing poverty rate in 
Costa Rica, while the slight increase in the poverty rate 
in El Salvador was caused above all by falling average 
income (see table 2).
A look at the period from 2002 to 2009 shows that 
poverty reduction was due to complementarity between 
growth effects and distribution effects. Both effects 
contributed to the outcome in countries where the poverty 
rate came down by 7 percentage points or more, with 
the growth effect accounting for 41% to 80% and the 
distribution effect accounting for 20% to 59%.
In 2009, changes in poor household income were 
triggered mainly by rising or falling labour income. In 
most of the countries reviewed, average labour income 
in poor households increased in real terms, except in 
Chile, Costa Rica and Ecuador. 
While some countries posted no significant 
worsening of the employment rate, this was the variable 
most affected by the crisis. Falling employment rates 
were a relevant factor in declining labour income in 
Chile and Costa Rica and also affected labour income 
trends in Brazil and the Dominican Republic. In some 
cases, worsening employment rates were offset by a 
rise in labour income per employed person and, in 
other cases, by an increase in the proportion of active 
persons in the household. Four of the countries with the 
sharpest increase in labour income in poor households 
were Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Panama and 
Peru. In Colombia, Paraguay and Uruguay, an increase 
in the number of active persons was the key factor 
(see figure 2).
Figure 2 
LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES): ANNUAL VARIATION IN TOTAL 































































































Labour income Transfers Other income Total income Poverty rate
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the relevant countries.
a  Countries in order of annual variation in poverty rate. The period 2008 refers to 
the latest survey available between 2006 and 2008. The percentage of population 
analysed is the same for both periods and refers to the poverty rate in 2008. YL = 
labour income; E = number of employed; EAP = economically active population; 
WAP = working-age population; N = total population.
b  Urban areas.
Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES): CHANGES IN POVERTY RATES AND CONTRIBUTION OF GROWTH 
AND DISTRIBUTION EFFECTS, 2008-2009 a
(Percentages)
Year Poverty Effect Contribution to total variation
Beginning Ending Beginning Ending Variation Growth Distribution Growth Distribution
Argentina b 2006 2009 21.0 11.3 -9.7 -9.7 0.0 100 0
Uruguay 2008 2009 13.7 10.4 -3.3 -2.1 -1.2 65 35
Dominican Republic 2008 2009 44.3 41.1 -3.2 -5.7 2.5 >100 <0
Chile 2006 2009 13.7 11.5 -2.2 -1.5 -0.7 70 30
Paraguay 2008 2009 58.2 56.0 -2.2 0.1 -2.3 <0 >100
Peru 2008 2009 36.2 34.8 -1.4 -2.1 0.7 65 35
Panama 2008 2009 27.7 26.4 -1.3 -0.5 -0.8 44 56
Brazil 2008 2009 25.8 24.9 -0.9 0.6 -1.5 <0 >100
Ecuador 2008 2009 42.7 42.2 -0.5 0.6 -1.1 <0 >100
Colombia 2008 2009 46.1 45.7 -0.4 0.8 -1.2 <0 >100
El Salvador 2004 2009 47.5 47.9 0.4 0.7 -0.3 >100 <0
Costa Rica 2008 2009 16.4 18.9 2.5 -1.3 3.8 <0 >100
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the relevant countries.
a  Countries in order of total variation in poverty rate, expressed in percentage points. The period 2008 refers to the latest survey available between 2006 and 2008.
b  Urban area.
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The distribution of income in the countries of Latin 
America is known as one of the most unequal in the world; 
this has not changed over the past four decades. Broadly, 
the income share of the four poorest deciles averages 
less than 15% of total income, with the wealthiest decile 
accounting for about one third of the total. The income 
received by the wealthiest 20% of the population is, on 
average, 19.3 times more than for the poorest quintile.
In most of the countries the concentration of wealth 
has started to trend down in recent years. Between 2002 
and the latest estimate available, the gap between extreme 
distribution quintiles narrowed in 14 of 18 countries; the 
Gini coefficient fell at least 5% in 11 countries. Only in 
the Dominican Republic and Guatemala (to 2006, the 
date of the latest data available) did distribution worsen 
during the period (see figure 3).
Figure 3 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): GINI COEFFICIENT OF 















































































































2002 Most recent year
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the relevant countries.
a  The year of the survey used differs from country to country. The period 2002 
corresponds to the latest survey available between 2000 and 2002, and the period 
2009 represents surveys available between 2006 and 2009.
b  Urban area.
Latin America has habitually issued figures that 
may be equated to the multidimensional poverty index, 
applying the unmet basic needs method. This method 
scores basic deprivation among the population for such 
factors as housing, access to potable water and sanitation 
and education. In line with the need for a complementary 
way to measure poverty, the trend in living conditions is 
evaluated using an approach similar to the unmet basic 
needs method. Persons with two or more deprivations in 
the subject fields are considered poor.
The results show a wide range of multidimensional 
poverty indicators that is, broadly speaking, similar to 
the outcomes from a monetary measure of poverty. The 
countries with the highest multidimensional poverty rates 
(Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia) are also those with the highest monetary 
poverty rates. At the other extreme, Chile, Costa Rica 
and Uruguay (urban areas) are the countries with the 
lowest multidimensional poverty rates and the lowest 
monetary poverty rates.
Over the past decade, practically all of the countries 
of the region recorded lower multidimensional poverty 
rates, with drops of more than 10 percentage points in 
six cases (see figure 4). The decline in multidimensional 
poverty was not confined to some countries where rates 
were below 10% (which is to be expected because some 
of the indicators used are probably at the minimum 
threshold level).
Figure 4 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): MULTIDIMENSIONAL 















































































































2000 Most recent year
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the relevant countries.
a  The year of the survey used differs from country to country. The period 2000 
corresponds to the latest survey available in 2000, and the period 2009 represents 
the latest surveys available between 2006 and 2009.
b The surveys available around the year 2000 do not support a comparable estimate 
of multidimensional poverty.
c  Urban areas.
The evidence confirms the trend towards improving 
living conditions. However, it should be borne in mind that 
this assessment of multidimensional poverty is bound by 
the specific material deprivation indicators that household 
surveys conducted in the region can quantify. To make 
better use of the multidimensional approach requires 
combining the evaluation of material deprivations with 
an assessment of deprivation in other components of 
well-being. To do so requires improving the sources of 
information currently available.
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 Fertility rates, early emancipation and poverty
In monetary terms, child poverty in Latin America declined 
significantly between 2000 and 2009. But poverty still 
affects a higher proportion of children and adolescents, 
calling for a better understanding of the factors behind 
child poverty.
Early fertility can be a key factor in the reproduction 
of poverty among children. Earlier fertility and higher 
lifetime fertility place a heavy childraising burden on 
households, forcing them to distribute scarce resources 
among a large number of children and making it harder 
for mothers to participate in the labour market. Poor 
children develop at a disadvantage in terms of health and 
access to the education system. This erodes their human 
capital and contributes to the reproduction of poverty in 
the long run.
In Chile and Uruguay (two of the four countries where 
the poverty rate among children aged 0-5 has come down 
the most), the fertility rate for poor mothers aged 15-24 
decreased more than for all mothers in the same age group. 
On the other hand, Argentina (the second most successful 
in reducing child poverty) saw the fertility rate for the 
youngest poor mothers decline less than for all mothers. 
In Panama, which ranks fourth in reducing child poverty, 
the fertility rate for poor mothers aged 15-24 increased. 
Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): TRENDS IN CHILD AND ADOLESCENT MONETARY POVERTY RATE AND 
















Argentina -54 -26 -33 -48 -7 -54
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) -14 -23 -30 -9 -17 -14
Brazil -25 -27 -53 -28 -19 -25
Chile -74 -63 -57 -74 -57 -74
Colombia -7 -19 -24 -6 -13 -7
Costa Rica -15 -46 -54 -15 -33 -15
Ecuador -21 -37 -51 -21 -25 -21
El Salvador -11 -39 -39 -7 -23 -11
Guatemala -7 -10 -16 -6 -4 -7
Honduras -8 -46 -49 -8 -29 -8
Mexico -9 -37 -49 -16 -34 -9
Nicaragua -10 -43 -48 -8 -25 -10
Panama -28 13 -19 -37 -7 -28
Paraguay 17 -23 -27 11 -22 17
Uruguay -45 -33 -31 -45 -41 -45
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) -11 -38 -53 -16 -29 -11
Latin America c -20 -31 -40 -21 -24 -33
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  Changes in fertility rates for poor and non-poor mothers were calculated considering a constant overall poverty rate at the value for 1990. The results were very similar to those 
shown in table 1.
b  The term “mothers” refers to all women identified as female heads of household or spouses of the head of household.
c  Simple averages.
In four of the five countries with the largest drops in the 
poverty rate for children aged 0-5 (Argentina, Brazil, Chile 
and Uruguay) the simple average decline in the fertility 
rate for poor mothers aged 15-24 was 37%, compared 
with 27% for the countries that were least successful at 
decreasing the child poverty rate (Colombia, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico and Paraguay). These calculations did 
not include Panama among the countries with the largest 
drops in the child poverty rate.
In short, reproductive outcomes can have a long —and 
lasting— impact in terms of poverty for mothers and their 
children. This calls for policies targeting current and future 
mothers and their children. Among such policy instruments 
are (a) postponing the age at which motherhood is initiated; 
(b) improving access to information on reproduction 
control; (c) retaining women in the education system; 
(d) improving the quality of education; and (e) making 
institutions available to provide care for young children, 
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thus giving mothers more time for their own education 
or for participating in the labour market. 
Early initiation of the emancipation process, that is, 
the process of leaving the family of origin, entering the 
labour market and forming one’s own household, is a 
crucial milestone in the lives of poor young people.3 
In countries with less education coverage and less 
advanced demographic transition, there are marked 
differences in school attendance rates for 15-year-olds by 
income quintile. For the highest-income quintile the rate 
is 95%; for the poorest quintile it is only 75%. In none of 
the age groups between 15-29 does labour participation 
for women in the poorest quintile reach 50%. Conversely,
3 Emancipation is the path from dependency to autonomy, or the 
transition from youth to the shouldering of the roles and responsibilities 
of adulthood.
some 80% of the 29-year-old women in the wealthiest 
quintile participate in the labour market (see figure 5). 
The data on young people who neither study nor 
work raise a red flag for the risk of poverty and social 
exclusion. Disaffiliation from key institutions is more 
frequent among women than among men and for young 
people from lower-income strata than for their peers at 
the other extreme of the distribution. 
In the less developed countries of the region, young 
women in the higher strata who neither study nor work 
but surely perform traditional domestic tasks outnumber 
their peers in more developed countries by more than 
three to one.
Figure 5 
EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA (SIMPLE AVERAGES): EMANCIPATION INDICATORS 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  El Salvador 2004, Guatemala 2006, Honduras 2007 and Nicaragua 2005.
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 Subjective well-being, living conditions and life cycle:  
 Latin America and the Caribbean and other regions  
 of the world
Figure 6 shows the findings of a study linking national 
average life satisfaction and GDP per capita in countries 
of Latin America and in other regions for the period from 
1981 to 2008. National life satisfaction averages in our 
region are far higher than what would be expected on 
the basis of per capita GDP; they are comparable with 
national averages for countries in Western Europe, North 
America and Oceania.
In Latin America, the life satisfaction gap by income 
bracket is greater for individuals aged 60 and older, 
where middle- and lower-income groups report a level 
of satisfaction that is far lower than for higher-income 
groups. This pattern is similar to the one found in Eastern 
Europe and unlike that of the more developed countries, 
where individuals in lower-income households show a 
U curve for degree of life satisfaction over their entire 
life cycle (see figure 7), life satisfaction increases after 
age 60 and the satisfaction gap between groups with 
different income levels narrows substantially at that 
stage of the life cycle. This difference between regions 
probably has to do with the fact that the more developed 
countries have more universal systems to protect older 
persons (greater pension and health care coverage for 
lower-income sectors). It is not the same thing to age 
with protection (thanks to either self-funded pensions 
or a welfare state) than to age in a precarious economic 
situation without social protection.
Figure 6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (20 COUNTRIES) AND 
OTHER REGIONS OF THE WORLD: LIFE SATISFACTION  
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from the database of the World Values 
Survey [online] http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org and Latinobarómetro, 2007 
for satisfaction level; and World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) 
[online] http://data.worldbank.org/indicator, for GDP per capita.
a  Average values on a life satisfaction scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is very unsatisfied and 10 
is very satisfied, and in per capita GDP logarithms). North America, Oceania and Western 
Europe: Andorra, Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United States. Eastern 
Europe: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine and former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Asia: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, China, Georgia, Hong Kong (Special Administrative 
Region of China), India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey and 
Viet Nam. Africa: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
Latin America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay. 
Figure 7 
LATIN AMERICA (11 COUNTRIES) AND OTHER REGIONS OF THE WORLD: LIFE SATISFACTION 
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Lowest income group Middle group Highest income group
Aged 17-29 Aged 30-44 Aged 45-59 60 and older
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from the World Values Survey [online] http://www.
worldvaluessurvey.org.
a  Average values on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is very unsatisfied and 10 is very satisfied. Latin America: Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. Eastern Europe: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation and Ukraine. Continental Europe: France, Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland. English-speaking countries: Australia, 
Great Britain, United States and New Zealand. Nordic countries: Finland, Norway and Sweden.
In the region, being married, being in a shared living 
arrangement and having a partner are associated with higher 
levels of life satisfaction. In Latin America, childless 17-
to-29-year olds report the highest level of life satisfaction, 
similar to their counterparts in industrialized countries. 
But young people who have one or more children or are 
single parents have far lower levels of life satisfaction 
than their counterparts in developed countries, as do 
married couples in the same age bracket with one or more 
children (see figure 8). As figure 8 shows, Nordic countries 
report the highest levels of life satisfaction among young 
couples with children. Tellingly, these are countries with 
the supports and incentives for maternity and paternity 
that are characteristic of a welfare state.
Figure 8 
LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES) AND OTHER WORLD REGIONS: LIFE SATISFACTION BY MARITAL STATUS  
AND NUMBER OF CHILDREN, AGES 17-59, 1981-2008 a
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from the World Values Survey 1981-2008 [online] http://
www.worldvalueswurvey.org/.
a  Average values on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is very unsatisfied and 10 is very satisfied. Latin America: Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. Eastern Europe: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation and Ukraine. English-speaking countries: Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States. Nordic countries: 
Finland, Norway and Sweden.
Figure 7 (concluded)
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Education and the intergenerational reproduction of 
inequality and exclusion: realities and challenges 
in Latin America
Education is at the core of all the developmental stages 
of the life cycle discussed in this edition of Social 
Panorama. It is the main tool at the disposal of States 
to dissociate an individual’s social background from the 
well-being he or she can attain throughout life. But the 
region has not harnessed the education system as a driver 
of equal opportunity. Advances in coverage, access and 
progression through education cycles in recent decades 
have caused stratification in learning and attainment 
within educational systems.
Any look at the life cycle must take into account 
education cycles, too, so preschool education is coming to 
the forefront of public policy in the region because of its 
positive impact on subsequent stages. Access to preschool is 
uneven in the region; some countries have nearly universal 
enrolment while in others enrolment is in the area of 30%. 
While socio-economic inequalities do not seem to affect 
attendance rates towards the end of the preschool cycle 
(three to five years of age), household surveys provide 
some evidence that inequalities are greater at younger ages. 
Moreover, there are marked differences in access between 
urban and rural areas and for indigenous groups.
Access to primary education is virtually universal, but 
efforts should focus on timely progression and completion 
of this cycle for the most neglected social groups, as 
shown in figures 9A and 9B. 
The ratios for access to and timely progression through 
the secondary cycle are markedly lower than for primary 
education and vary more widely from country to country. The 
net attendance rate for the secondary level is 88%, versus 
97% for the primary level. Young people approaching the 
upper secondary cycle already have opportunities to enter 
the labour market. This acts as a disincentive to staying 
in school, especially if students face adverse economic 
or academic conditions or problems with integration or 
identity formation. In addition to heterogeneity among 
countries, there are ever more pronounced differences 
within countries: between rural and urban areas, poor 
and non-poor students, different socioeconomic strata 
and indigenous and non-indigenous groups, as well as 
other discriminating factors (see figure 10).
Figure 9 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): SCHOOL LAG AMONG 
CHILDREN AGED 9-11 AND PRIMARY EDUCATION 
COMPLETION, YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 15-19, 
TOTAL POPULATION, BY SEX AND INCOME 
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A. Educational lag B. Completion rate
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of the Information System on Educational Trends in Latin America 
(SITEAL), Statistical Summary I, National Totals, October 2008, and special 
tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective 
countries.
a  Children who are two or more years behind the grade they should be in for their age.
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Figure 10  
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): POPULATION AGED 
20-TO-24 WITH COMPLETE SECONDARY EDUCATION, 

































Income quintile Rural areas
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the respective countries.
a  The data for indigenous and non-indigenous young people refer to eight countries 
and correspond to 2007.
Access to the final cycle of post-secondary education 
is generally reserved for a relatively small portion of the 
region’s young people. Only 8.3% of young people aged 
25-29 have completed at least five years of post-secondary 
education (typical length of time for a university degree 
programme). There is marked stratification by per capita 
income quintile: for every 27 young persons from high-
income strata (fifth quintile) who complete five years 
of post-secondary studies only one lower-income (first 
quintile) one does. 
Among the factors of inequality, household socio-
economic status and the head of the household’s level of 
formal education underlie disparate results in learning 
outcomes and progression through the education system. 
This shows that the educational system is not performing 
one of its principal functions: that of decoupling children’s 
and young people’s attainments from the dissimilar 
backgrounds they carry into the system. This situation 
is compounded by access to education services that vary 
widely in quality. Social patterns are not reproduced by 
any single institution alone but rather by the institutional 
structure as a whole, where the education system combines, 
above all, with family life and the immediate community 
environment. Household attributes are still the basic cause 
of differences in learning outcomes.
The social and cultural disadvantages that burden 
lower-resource students as they enter the educational 
system are compounded by access to lower-quality 
education services than are available to students with more 
resources. This reinforces the inequality of their learning 
paths. Over the past few decades, expanding access to the 
educational system for traditionally excluded sectors has 
come with greater segmentation of supply and a sharp 
increase in out-of-pocket expenses and the number of 
private schools.
Segmentation, then, is not just in years of schooling 
but also in effective learning. Figure 11 shows the 
distribution of academic performance for 15-year-old 
students in science, by economic, social and cultural 
status. Most students in the first and second income 
quartiles in the countries of Latin America perform below 
level 2, meaning that they have not developed the basic 
competencies for performance in this area. By way of 
contrast, learning outcomes also differ among students 
from different quartiles in OECD countries, but the vast 
majority achieve the basic expected level of competency 
(level 2 and higher).
Figure 11 
LATIN AMERICA (SIX COUNTRIES): PERFORMANCE ON THE 
PISA SCIENCE ASSESSMENT FOR 15-YEAR-OLD STUDENTS, 
BY FAMILY ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of microdata from the PISA 2006 survey.
a  The distribution of performance levels in Latin America and in the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) refers to the simple average of 
average weighted national achievement levels of the countries participating in the 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2006 (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay).
While attainment and learning in the formal 
educational system are very (and increasingly) important 
for full participation in the economy, society and 
political life, full access to and use of information and 
telecommunications technologies (ICT) is becoming 
a requisite for social inclusion. The digital divide 
exacerbates gaps in learning, in broadened communication, 
in social networks, in access to productive employment 
and in having a voice in society; digital convergence 
clearly helps narrow them. The school system is key 
for achieving mass access and providing training in 
and access to new digital technologies. But efforts to 
27Social Panorama of Latin America • 2010
work through the schools to counteract the market-
driven digital divide (reflected in the gap between 
households in high and low socio-economic strata) 
have not closed those gaps nor achieved much in the 
area of digital convergence.
The disparity in skills development is linked not 
only to educational attainment but also, later on, to 
self-regulated labour markets that are true factories of 
segmentation in terms of productivity, access to welfare 
and full enjoyment of social entitlements. Hence, structural 
inequality (which is reproduced through the production 
structure, markets and institutions) combines with 
intergenerational inequality where gaps are reinforced 
throughout life and are passed from one generation to 
the next.
This calls for an integral approach that encompasses 
structures, institutions and the life cycle. And it highlights 
the importance of education to prepare individuals for 
fuller participation in all spheres of society throughout 
their adult lives. One of these spheres, although not the 
only one, is labour market. ECLAC has conclusively 
documented that in most of the countries of the region, 
individuals who do not complete secondary education 
are exposed to a high degree of social vulnerability 
because they will tend to receive a poor labour income 
in exchange for their educational credentials, and they 
will be at high risk for living in poverty and becoming 
“dispensable” (excluded) if they must engage with 
self-regulated labour markets in the absence of 
minimum guarantees or labour rights. Only a complete 
secondary education will, according to the “rates of 
return approach”, keep an individual at a “prudent 
distance” from the poverty line. Figure 12 shows how 
important it is to extend higher education coverage to 
young people who historically have had no access to 
it, in order to reduce the gaps in life prospects that are 
cemented during youth.4
4 We do not argue here that the role of education is exclusively or even 
primarily that of ensuring that competitive labour markets yield a 
rate of return for years of schooling. We merely seek to illustrate 
the importance of democratizing educational opportunities in order 
to enable individuals to exercise their positive freedom, that is, to 
carry out their life projects thanks to having, among other things, the 
timely opportunity to develop their skills. Such skill development 
is necessary, but it is not enough. The labour markets take in young 
people on the other side of the door (not in the world of education 
but in the world of work), so these markets should be subject to 
regulatory policies and receive guidance for ensuring the full force 
of labour rights and social protections. The State has an essential role 
to play in keeping differences in education attainment from dooming 
those without them to exclusion. Productivity gains, then, should 
not be seen as a return on learning but rather as a way for society to 
work through the State and the tax system to redistribute resources 
and extend social protections to the most disadvantaged sectors.
Figure 12 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): MONTHLY LABOUR 
INCOME FOR THE EMPLOYED POPULATION AGED 15-29, 30-64, 
AND 15 AND OVER, BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION a































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the relevant countries.
a  The length of education cycles was defined in accordance with the 1997 International 
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).
Education policy must mesh with other social promotion 
and protection efforts if the intergenerational reproduction of 
educational opportunities is to be reversed. Key intervention 
factors within the education system are:
(i) Extending early childhood education coverage. 
Publicly-funded institutional care for children under six 
has well-documented benefits. Such care facilitates the 
integration of women into the labour market, fosters 
their autonomy and increases household resources. 
For the young cohort, it provides an opportunity 
for young mothers, giving them more free time to 
continue studying and avoid breaking their own 
education cycle. In-school meals and health care, as 
well as early stimulation, offset deficiencies at home. 
Such care also has a positive effect on a child’s future 
development: it is essential for cognitive, psychomotor 
and attention-span development and activity levels 
and has a substantial impact on the child’s prospects 
in subsequent education cycles.
(ii) Extending the primary school day. Advances in current 
pedagogical models and the education needs of the 
modern world are making longer school days increasingly 
important. An extended school day would be expected 
to change the ratio between time spent on working and 
time for rest, increasing pedagogical work for pupils 
at school and decreasing the time spent on homework. 
This is especially important for students who lack an 
educational climate at home and whose environment 
does not provide appropriate stimulus or support for 
learning. A full school day also has positive externalities 
for families, easing concerns about out-of-school care 
(including meals) and preventing risky behaviour.
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(iii) Incorporating digital technologies into education as a 
critical opportunity in the battle for equity. Defining 
the criteria for choosing the models for incorporating 
information and communication technologies into 
teaching practices should be subordinated to State goals 
for education in each country. One of the priorities for 
the States of Latin America (and for those in charge of 
their educational systems) is to make universal access 
to computer skills a key tool in the effort to dissociate 
social background from learning attainments. This 
is seen as an essential step in reducing poverty and 
inequality and in enhancing social integration.
(iv) Providing support for families through conditional 
cash transfer programmes. It is important to test 
instruments and strategies that help keep students in 
the system during this cycle of schooling, that is, that 
foster sustained, timely school progression. Conditional 
cash transfer programmes are one of the pillars that 
the countries have built over the past two decades in 
order to encourage lower-income families to buy into 
keeping their children in the educational system. Such 
programmes have the virtue of improving, however 
marginally, the monetary resources available to poor 
households, preventing drop-outs for opportunity 
cost reasons (staying in school is part of the transfer 
programme contract). However, primary education 
is approaching universal coverage and the drop-out 
rate for young people in vulnerable families is higher 
at the secondary level (at this age the opportunity 
cost of lower family income is higher). This makes 
it essential to extend benefits for school-age children 
throughout the secondary cycle.
(v) Coordinating the job training system. The path leading 
young people to the world of work is, as we have 
seen, highly segmented by educational attainment 
levels. The formation of competencies in the 15-20 
age group is essential for successful entry into the 
labour market with meaningful opportunities for the 
future. Government action is therefore required to 
target this area of education and link this supply of 
education services to the production sector.
(vi) Reconciling higher education quality with expanding 
access to excluded sectors. The higher education 
system in Latin America and the Caribbean has 
expanded and grown substantially over the past few 
decades. Coverage is still very limited, though, and 
it is concentrated in the medium- and high-income 
levels. Ensuring greater equality of opportunities 
at this level calls for policies that offset the lack of 
monetary resources and of time among young people 
graduating from secondary school who need to work 
to survive or help their families.
Public social spending in Latin America: general trends 
and investment in capacity-building for 
new generations
Progressive recognition of the importance of public social 
spending as an instrument for channelling resources to 
the poorest population segment and of the importance of 
social development as a driver of economic development 
has led the region’s countries to gradually increase 
this category of spending. Thus, social spending rose 
from 12.2% of GDP in 1990-1991 to 18.0% in 2007-
2008, substantially increasing its budget share in the 
process from just under 45% to about 65% of overall 
public spending.
There are clear differences between countries, however, 
in the macroeconomic priority they give to social spending, 
which ranges from less than 8% of GDP in Ecuador, 
Guatemala and Peru (central government) to over a fifth 
of GDP in Argentina, Brazil, Cuba and Uruguay. The 
differences between countries are also due to their respective 
levels of wealth. Differences in countries’ development 
levels and tax burdens and thence in their general and 
specifically social public budgets are the source of large 
disparities in funding levels (see figure 13).
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Figure 13 
LATIN AMERICA (21 COUNTRIES): EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL SPENDING RELATIVE TO GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
































































































































NFPS PS GG BCG CG
Simple average (21 countries)
2007-2008                                    14.2
2004-2005                                    12.8
2000-2001                                    12.4
1997-1998                                     11.3
1994-1995                                     11.0
1990-1991                                      9.5
Weighted average (21 countries) 
2007-2008                                          18.0
2004-2005                                          15.9
2000-2001                                          15.5
1997-1998                                           14.7
1994-1995                                           14.4
1990-1991                                           12.2
18.0
12.2































































































































NFPS PS GG BCG CG
1990-1991 1994-1995 1997-1998 2000-2001 2004-2001 2007-2008
Weighted average
2007-2008                885
2004-2005                691
2000-2001                642
1997-1998                 601
1994-1995                 557
1990-1991                440   
Simple average
2007-2008                666     
2004-2005                506
2000-2001                466
1997-1998                 421 
1994-1995                380
1990-1991                 315
440
880
B. Social spending per capita
(dollars at constant 2000 prices)
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social expenditure database.
Note:  NFPS = non-financial public sector; PS = public sector; GG = general government; BCG = budgetary central government; CG = central government.
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 The procyclical nature of social spending relative to 
 economic growth 
Although the region’s countries have steadily increased 
their public budgets, particularly where social spending is 
concerned, in most cases these have fluctuated for reasons 
generally determined by local economic developments.
However, social spending is less sensitive to the 
economic cycle than the overall budget, as figure 14 
shows. For all its procyclicality, then, social spending 
has been better protected against economic fluctuations 
than non-social public budget items. It is to be expected 
that some specific spending items will be countercyclical, 
like those that finance emergency programmes at times 
of crisis and rising poverty, as these tail off in periods 
of economic growth. Others are more stable, such as 
social security, while others again can be expected to 
expand along with the economy to a reasonable degree 
that avoids macroeconomic imbalances or any tendency 
towards deficit spending.
Figure 14 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): ANNUAL 
CHANGE IN PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING, TOTAL PUBLIC 

















































Annual change in GDP
Annual change in public social spending
Annual change in total public spending
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social 
expenditure database.
a  Weighted averages. The 2009 expenditure figures are estimates based on information 
from seven countries.
 Expenditure trends during the financial crisis
Faced with the 2008 financial crisis, the region’s countries 
implemented measures of various kinds. Unlike those taken 
on other similar occasions, they set out not to shrink spending 
but to expand it. Measures of this kind encompassed the areas 
of monetary and financial policy, fiscal policy, exchange-rate 
and foreign trade policy, sectoral policies, employment and 
social policies and multilateral finance. Broadly speaking, 
the measures were aimed, first, at restoring confidence and 
making financial markets operational again and, second, at 
strengthening domestic demand for goods and services.
The most commonly used fiscal measures in the 
countries have included cutting taxes, increasing tax benefits 
and subsidies and raising or bringing forward expenditure. 
In the social and production sectors, considerable extra 
resources have been put into house building, water and 
sanitation, support for small and medium-sized enterprises 
and the agricultural sector (easier credit and repayment 
terms), enhanced employment policies (unemployment 
insurance, recruitment subsidies, job creation programmes) 
and social programmes, especially conditional cash transfer 
programmes (which currently command resources equivalent 
to 0.4% of the region’s GDP and cover some 20% of the 
population of Latin America and the Caribbean).
The data available for seven countries show that even 
as GDP declined in absolute terms in most of them, they 
all continued to increase their social spending. A number 
had already raised social spending in 2008, and five of the 
seven countries made a still greater effort in 2009 (Brazil, 
Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama). Although 
the others also increased their social spending, they did 
so more slowly than in 2008 (see figure 15).
Figure 15 
LATIN AMERICA (SEVEN COUNTRIES): CHANGES IN PUBLIC 
SPENDING, SOCIAL SPENDING, NON-SOCIAL SPENDING AND 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social 
expenditure database.
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 Social investment at early ages: growing progressive 
 spending on education
Investing in the capacities and capabilities of the new 
generations is vital to produce a more productive working-
age population for the coming decades, something that 
will be essential to keep pace with the demographic 
transition and the steady rise in the proportion of older 
adults in Latin American and Caribbean societies. It is 
also important to have a more productive working-age 
population because of the impetus given to economic 
growth by the incorporation of know-how and innovation 
into the production system. Complemented by policies 
to promote social and employment rights, this is also a 
positive element for social protection systems.
Education is unquestionably at the core of the 
investment needed in the capacities and capabilities of 
the new generations. Education budgets have increased 
substantially as a share of GDP over recent decades. 
While the region’s GDP almost doubled between 1990 
and 2008 (growing by 3.4% a year and 84% over the 
whole period), the absolute expansion of public-sector 
education spending was 5% a year, or 140% over the 
whole period. The number of public-sector students in 
the region increased by almost 29 million in this time to 
a total of 91.2 million primary and secondary students 
in publicly run schools (with 18.5 million at privately-
funded schools), while spending per student increased 
from US$ 312 to US$ 710 (see figure 16).5
The majority of the countries increased their spending 
by the most between 2000 and 2008. The exceptions are 
Chile, Mexico, Panama and Paraguay, which made the most 
increases in the 1990s. This is mainly because efforts to 
increase coverage were concentrated in the earlier period 
in most of the countries: on average, coverage increased 
by about 14 percentage points between 1990 and 2000, 
compared with a further 5 percentage points between 
2000 and 2008. This meant that much of the extra public 
education spending went on incorporating new students. 
Since the progress of the 1990s (and earlier decades), extra 
spending has mainly gone into improving the conditions 
that directly or indirectly affect the education process: 
better infrastructure, equipment, teaching material and 
teacher pay, among other things.
Public spending on education is a vital State 
tool for promoting greater equality of opportunity 
5 The figures do not include secondary school students who are 
behind their age group (generally aged 18 or over).
throughout the education cycle, and for closing gaps 
in attainment by level between households of different 
socio-economic origins. There is telling evidence that 
the more the child and youth population is incorporated 
into the different levels of education, and the more 
progression into the higher cycles is universalized, the 
greater the egalitarian redistributive effect of education 
spending will be.
Figure 16 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PUBLIC SPENDING PER 
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENT a
































0 500 1 000 1 500 2 000 2 500
Nicaragua
Ecuador






Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of data from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS) and ECLAC/
Organization of Ibero-American States for Education, Science and Culture 
(OIS), “Metas Educativas 2021: estudio de costos”, Documentos de proyecto, 
No. 327 (LC/W.327), Santiago, Chile [online] http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/
xml/0/40520/metas-educativas-2021.pdf, 2010.
a  Ranked in order of spending per student in 2008.
Nothing has a greater egalitarian effect than policies 
which achieve universal coverage. Figure 17 is very 
suggestive here. It shows that increased coverage at the 
different levels of education is associated with a more 
redistributive impact for spending at those levels.
What policy implications does this have? The great 
mistake would be to think, as the tendency was under the 
paradigm of the Washington Consensus and the wave of 
reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, that public spending 
on education needs to be reduced at those levels where 
coverage is lower (such as university education) so that 
this spending can be transferred to levels with greater 
coverage (such as primary or lower secondary). What strict 
analysis of the data shows is quite the opposite, i.e., that 
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the great challenge from a rights and equality perspective is 
to promote progression right through the education cycles 
for those socio-economic sectors that do not at present 
go on to higher levels, thereby democratizing access to 
upper secondary and post-secondary education.
Meanwhile, the withdrawal of the State from the higher 
levels of education (upper secondary and post-secondary) 
has another very negative affect from a rights standpoint, 
as it leaves these levels at the mercy of private-sector 
provision, which segments access and quality depending 
on families’ ability to pay for the service. This has a clear 
regressive effect in terms of the way opportunities are 
distributed by people’s socio-economic conditions of 
origin. To put it another way, it is precisely the existence 
of public-sector higher education that gives lower-income 
sectors a chance of real social mobility. Consequently, 
public-sector efforts need to be oriented towards ensuring 
that a larger and larger proportion of low-income students 
continue their post-secondary studies, and towards increasing 
the progressiveness of spending at this level.
Figure 17 
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION SPENDING BY INCOME STRATUM 
AND COMPARISON WITH PER CAPITA INCOME a
(Percentages)
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of the household surveys in the countries and data from the 
United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (UNESCO) Institute of Statistics (UIS). 
a  Simple averages.
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The generational economy, transfer systems and 
inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean
 The generational economy
The previous chapters, especially the one on education, 
have underlined differences in educational achievement 
among children and young people from different socio-
economic levels and their substantial impact on the 
intergenerational reproduction of inequalities throughout 
life. This chapter completes the picture, with an analysis of 
differences between generations. It considers how public 
and private transfers target two stages in the life cycle: 
children and young people, and older persons. The most 
striking bias in Latin America in comparison with other 
regions of the world concerns the greater relative scale 
of public transfers to the older population. 
The life cycle includes two major periods of economic 
dependency when consumption exceeds labour output; 
one at the beginning, the other at the end (see figure 18). 
There are variations, but most of the consumption needs 
of children and older persons are met through large flows 
of resources from the working-age population. Some of 
these flows are direct, as in the case of parents providing 
for their children. Others are more indirect, such as 
transfers through governments, charitable organizations 
and other economic and social institutions. Some situations 
are more complex, like those involving savings from 
labour income. The total of all these flows constitutes 
the generational economy.
Despite the major implications of intergenerational 
transfers for economic growth and for combating inequality 
and poverty, those transfers have not been exhaustively 
analysed. The national transfer accounts system provides 
the first comprehensive approach to overall measurement 
of aggregate financial flows between age groups and 
across time. The system includes flows relating to capital 
accumulation and to transfers, distinguishing those passing 
through public institutions from those in the private sphere. 
They estimate all aggregate flows in accordance with 
the System of National Accounts of the United Nations. 
Estimates are mostly based on analyses of household 
surveys relating to income, spending, assets, the workforce 
and transfers, in addition to detailed administrative records 
from various government bodies.6
Figure 18 
COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE GLOBAL NATIONAL 
TRANSFER ACCOUNTS PROJECT: AVERAGE LABOUR 
INCOME AND AVERAGE PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION 
COMPARED WITH PER CAPITA LABOUR INCOME IN 
THE 30-49 AGE GROUP, AROUND 2000 a
(Percentages)
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason, “National Transfer Accounts 
Version 1.0”, Berkeley, Center for the Economics and Demography of Aging, 
University of California/East-West Center, October 2010.
a Uses the simple average of 22 economies participating in the global national 
transfer accounts project: in Latin America: Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico and 
Uruguay. In Asia: China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, Republic of Korea 
and Thailand. In Africa: Kenya and Nigeria. In Europe: Austria, Finland, Germany, 
Hungary, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden; and the United States. Per capita income 
includes private and public consumption. Per capita labour income includes fringe 
benefits and self-employed income.
6 For further details on the national transfer accounts system, see 
http://www.ntaccounts.org 
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 National transfer accounts: Latin America  
 in the worldwide context 
Consumption profiles by age vary widely among the 
countries participating in the global national transfer 
accounts project. In the middle-income countries there 
is very little variation in consumption during adult 
life, whereas children’s consumption is a little lower 
than that of the average adult (see figure 19). In the 
high-income economies, children’s consumption is 
relatively high in comparison with the middle-income 
countries (between 15% and 33% during the first 15 
years of life), and consumption levels rise as people 
get older (at age 85, for example, consumption in the 
high-income economies is around 25% higher than 
at age 45). This is due partly to lower investment in 
capacity-building in the middle-income countries, 
and partly to the greater coverage of public pensions 
systems and higher spending on health care for older 
persons in the high-income economies.
Figure 19 
COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE GLOBAL NATIONAL 
TRANSFER ACCOUNTS PROJECT: PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION 
BY AGE GROUP IN MIDDLE- AND HIGH-INCOME ECONOMIES 
COMPARED WITH PER CAPITA LABOUR INCOME IN THE 30-49 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason, “National Transfer Accounts 
Version 1.0”, Berkeley, Center for the Economics and Demography of Aging, 
University of California/ East-West Center, October 2010.
a  Per capita consumption in middle-income countries is calculated as a simple average 
of Brazil, Chile, China, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines, Thailand 
and Uruguay. Per capita consumption in high-income economies is calculated as a 
simple average of Austria, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan Province of China and United States.
In the countries participating in the global national 
transfer accounts project there is also considerable 
variation in typical ages of entry to and exit from the 
labour market. In most of the high-income countries, 
young people tend to stay longer in full-time education, 
and labour income is higher among older workers. As 
for the period during which labour income exceeds 
consumption, the countries of Latin America (aside 
from Uruguay) are those with the shortest periods 
of economic independence, varying from around 20 
years in Brazil and Mexico to 28 years in Chile and 
Costa Rica. 
In the framework of the national transfer accounts 
system, three main mechanisms can be identified for 
reallocations between age groups and generations: public 
transfers, family (private) transfers, and asset-based 
reallocations. Public transfers generally come from the 
working-age population, since the taxes it pays often 
exceed the benefits it receives. Children and older persons 
are generally net beneficiaries of public transfers. Health 
care is the main source of these transfers to children under 
five; in the 5-15 age group, State education is the main 
component. As for older persons, as might be expected, 
social security and health care account for almost all 
public transfers. 
However, there is great diversity between countries 
in terms of taxation and public spending policies. For 
example, net transfers received by children and young 
people in relation to average labour income vary from 6% 
in China to 29% in Finland. In the case of older persons, 
this variation goes from -2% in Thailand —showing that 
older persons in that country pay more in taxes than they 
receive in benefits— to 87% in Brazil, where a wide-
reaching pensions programme has been implemented, 
including non-contributory pensions.
Corroborating the results for consumption, the 
countries of Latin America show relatively low levels 
of public investment on children and young people. 
In Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica, this low investment 
is combined with high levels of public transfers to 
older persons. As a percentage of labour income, 
States in Latin America spend about the same on older 
persons as Japan, the United States and the European 
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governments, but they invest half as much on children 
and young people.7 
Family transfers are the main source of support for 
consumption by children and young people in Asian 
countries and territories (between 67% and 76%, except 
for Japan), and in the Latin American countries (69% 
to 79%). In high-income countries, family transfers are 
lower in relative terms (43% to 57%), owing to more 
significant public-sector investment. 
In the case of older persons, labour income is a major 
source of consumption, especially in countries in Asia. In
7 When considering these results, it should be borne in mind that the 
sample of countries taking part in the global national transfer accounts 
project for Latin America excludes the region’s poorest countries, where 
the public sector plays a minor role in supporting the consumption 
both of children and young people and of older persons.
European countries, however, older persons’ labour income 
makes up only a small fraction of consumption. The Latin 
American countries are between the two extremes, with 
labour income varying from 18% in Brazil to 26% in 
Mexico as percentages of older persons’ consumption.
As in Europe, net public transfers are the main source 
of support for older persons in Latin America.8 In most of 
the countries participating in the global national transfer 
accounts project (including those in Latin America), net 
family transfers are downward, from older persons to 
younger family members.
8 Except in the case of Mexico, where income in the form of assets, 
particularly State property assets, represents the main source 
of support.
 Public transfers by age and educational level in 
 Brazil and Chile
Compared with other emerging regions, Latin America 
has a relatively large public sector and a rapidly-ageing 
population, combined with one of the world’s highest 
levels of inequality in income distribution. Despite growing 
interest in public transfers as a means of combating 
poverty and inequality, transfers by age group and 
socio-economic level are not often studied concurrently. 
The analysis presented below moves forward in that 
regard, investigating the incidence of public spending 
by age group and socio-economic level (defined as the 
educational level of the head of household) in Brazil and 
Chile, by sectoral composition (education, health care 
and social security).9
In both countries, a greater proportion of public 
transfers targets older persons, and families account 
for most of the transfers to children and young people.. 
This pattern holds at all socio-economic levels but is 
significantly stronger at the highest level. The absolute 
progressivity of public spending is generally greatest in 
the case of children; it diminishes with rising age and
9 The educational categories were: (a) no formal schooling; (b) 1 to 
8 years of schooling; (c) 9 to 15 years of schooling; and (d) 16 or 
more years of schooling.
then turns regressive, with greater benefits at the highest 
socio-economic levels. These differences are due to a 
large extent to the greater labour incomes of persons 
with higher educational levels, a determining factor in 
pension benefits. In Brazil, the point at which spending 
becomes regressive is age 45, whereas in Chile this occurs 
somewhat later, between 50 and 54 years.10 
Despite public-sector involvement, total investment in 
education is rather unequal at the different socio-economic 
levels (see figure 20). In Brazil, investment in a child’s 
education at the highest socio-economic level is more 
than double the amount at the second level and more than 
three times the investment in education at the lowest level. 
Figures for Chile are very similar. This difference stems 
from the yawning gaps in education spending between 
high- and low-income families. Greater private spending 
by high-income households with highly-educated heads 
of households leads to markedly segmented education 
on the supply side determined by the payment capacity 
of the student´s household of origin.
10 This is why it is important for pension systems to have a solidarity 
pillar as ECLAC has argued. Contributory systems are usually 
regressive to the extent that benefits are linked to contributions. 8 Except in the case of Mexico, where income in the form of assets, 
particularly State property assets, represents the main source 
of support.
9 The educational categories were: (a) no formal schooling; (b) 1 to 
8 years of schooling; (c) 9 to 15 years of schooling; and (d) 16 or 
more years of schooling.
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Figure 20 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of processing of data from the Brazilian National Household Survey (PNAD), 2003, and 
the Family Budgets Survey (POF), 2006/2007, in the case of Brazil, and from the National Socio-economic Survey (CASEN), 2007, and the Budgeting and Expenditure 
Survey (EPG) 2006/2007, in the case of Chile.
a Total per capita spending on education includes public and private spending at the pre-primary, primary, secondary and tertiary education levels. 
 Conclusion
National transfer accounts furnish a global, consistent 
measurement of the role played by governments in 
providing economic support to young people and older 
adults. They also allow improved monitoring of the scope 
of government policies and provide a comprehensive 
view of the functions of other economic agents (financial 
markets, the family and civil society). 
Furthermore, national transfer accounts provide a 
basis for governments’ long-term fiscal projections, to 
anticipate the significant economic changes that will 
be brought about by the slow but inexorable advance of 
social forces such as population ageing, epidemiological 
transition and changes in educational levels.11 More subtle
11 The epidemiological transition is a change, largely caused by 
population ageing, where acute illnesses, more common among 
children, give way to chronic and degenerative diseases, more 
common among older persons, as main causes of morbidity and 
mortality. For further details, see ECLAC/CELADE (2010). 
changes in fiscal and public-spending policies can thus 
be detected.
The results of this analysis have highlighted one of 
the most notable characteristics of the economies of Latin 
America: the low levels of consumption among children 
and young people associated with low public investment 
in these population groups. The results clearly indicate 
the need for much stronger public-sector involvement, 
to provide the necessary investment for the development 
of young people. This is not only in order to address the 
reproduction of inequalities throughout the life cycle —it 
is also the best way to prepare for the impending rapid 
ageing of the population.
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Public transfers early in the life cycle: a key challenge 
for fighting inequality over time
 Social deficits associated with life cycle stages and 
 how to address them
To make progress on the equality agenda the State must 
lead the way in several areas. As noted earlier, it falls 
to the State to decouple children’s and young people’s 
educational attainments and learning from their socio-
economic background and to foster greater convergence 
of these attainments throughout society to reduce labour 
market gaps and vulnerability. The State must also 
address asymmetries, both through active employment 
and wage policies and by means of clearly distributive 
public transfers throughout the life cycle.
In this context, the welfare state model shows that 
universal policies achieve the most systemic impact in 
terms of progressive redistribution of opportunities, assets 
and access to well-being. This model can also include 
selective transfers to more vulnerable groups, where the 
guiding principle is not to target them but precisely to make 
conditions in society as a whole mor e egalitarian. 
This chapter therefore sets out options for public transfers 
to vulnerable sectors during childhood and youth and provides 
cost estimates for achieving universal coverage in education. 
These options are based on evidence put forth in preceding 
chapters. In Latin America, States and the transfers they make 
have little influence on the consumption structure of families 
with children and adolescents. On the other hand, in many 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries, consumption by persons aged 0-19 is 
met almost equally by public and family transfers but the 
average State transfer component in Latin America does 
not exceed 20% for this age group. This means that the 
redistributive impact is very small compared with primary 
family income. It should therefore come as no surprise 
that inequality persists despite public transfers targeting 
families with children and young people. This constraint is 
compounded by educational systems (where a large part of 
the public transfers are focused on the youngest population 
segment) that are ineffective in reversing underlying structures 
of inequality. In short, the region faces enormous challenges 
in harnessing the redistributive role of the State in the fight 
against inequality over time.
Alleviating these deficits, then, calls for redistributive 
measures in line with the life-cycle approach, focusing on 
the population of children and young people and involving 
transfers targeting families whose labour income is patently 
insufficient. These mechanisms should include different 
measures at each stage, and they fall into three broad 
categories. In one category are cash transfer schemes 
focusing on households with children to improve the odds 
that the family will have an appropriate environment for 
child socialization (nutrition, housing, clothing). In another, 
funding goes to instruments geared towards reversing the 
deficits in coverage and access to early childhood care 
and stimulation that trap children and adolescents in a 
pattern of exclusion, with the subsequent negative impact 
on young people as they approach emancipation. Last 
is another set of cash transfers for employment and job 
training services targeting young people in the process 
of becoming emancipated adults. 
These measures, encompassing the stage in life that is 
the subject of this edition of Social Panorama (0-29 years 
of age, culminating in emancipation and the transition to 
adulthood) should include the following components:
Early childhood•	 : cash transfers to households with 
children (aged 0-4) and policies to ensure care (0-2) 
and preschool education (3-5). 
Period between childhood and early stages of •	
emancipation (childhood and early adolescence, 
6-14): lengthening the time spent in school, 
investing in primary education and the lower 
cycle of secondary school to increase coverage 
and graduation rates.
Emancipation•	 : cash transfers in the form of 
vouchers, that is, incentives to stay in or return to 
school or the labour market. For this instrument, 
the benchmark age is 15-29, but the analyses set 
out below centre on the group aged 15- 24 as the 
modal group in the vulnerable sectors. 
This chapter therefore proposes a set of transfers and 
shows the cost of achieving universal coverage from early 
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childhood education through upper secondary school 
for the countries of Latin America. These transfers are 
explained in this chapter and listed below:
1. Transfer to all vulnerable families (with income at or 
below 1.8 poverty lines per household member) an 
amount equivalent to one poverty line per child aged 
0-4 and 1.5 poverty lines in the case of single-parent 
families; the cost of this transfer at the national level 
is shown as a percentage of GDP.
2. For this group of families, transfer the equivalent of 
0.5 poverty lines per child aged 5-14, or 0.75 poverty 
lines in the case of single-parent households; the 
cost of this transfer at the national level is shown as 
a percentage of GDP.
3. Transfer, to each young person aged 15-24 who is 
neither studying nor working, an allowance equivalent 
to the monthly public cost per pupil at the upper 
secondary school level; the cost of this transfer at the 
national level is shown as a percentage of GDP. 
4. Invest in education an amount equal to what it would 
cost the educational system to bring in all of the 
children and young people who are currently not 
included in all levels; early childhood, preschool, 
primary, lower secondary and upper secondary, at 
the appropriate age. The monthly cost per pupil for 
each level is calculated and the aggregate total cost 
of allocating such an amount per month is simulated, 
taking into account all school-age children and young 
people who are not attending school.
 Costs and impacts
In addition to knowing what these measures cost, we 
need to know their social yield, too, that is their impact 
on equality and well-being. 
Poverty, inequality and income transfers:  
costsand impacts
The most direct and easiest-to-evaluate mechanisms 
are income transfers to children aged 0-14 and transfers 
or job and training subsidies to young people aged 15-24 
who are neither studying nor working. In both cases, the 
cost and impact of these transfers is estimated and their 
scope is limited to the vulnerable population (belonging to 
households whose per capita income is below 1.8 poverty 
lines). As figure 21 shows, the cost of such a transfer 
system is fairly easily fundable for one group of countries, 
represents a major effort for another group and is beyond 
the range of possibility for a third set of countries.
For Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay and, to a 
lesser extent, Brazil and Panama, the additional costs are 
manageable for a short period of time, representing some 
2% of GDP. For the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Dominican Republic and Mexico, 
the effort is considerable (near to or in excess of 5 
percentage points of GDP). For Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay and the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, the fiscal requirement would be excessive, 
making it important to mobilize additional international 
cooperation resources.
As for the effect on poverty, the three kinds of transfers 
proposed would, combined, have a substantial absolute 
impact. For example, the poverty rate would fall from 
61.8% to 34.6% in Nicaragua and from 45.7% to 29.9% 
in Guatemala. The decrease in more developed countries 
would also be significant.
Figure 21 
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): COST OF ALL CASH 
TRANSFERS TARGETING THE VULNERABLE 
POPULATION, AROUND 2008 a
(Percentages of GDP)
0.71 0.54 0.99 1.03 1.59 1.54



































































































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the relevant countries and projections of gross domestic product (GDP). 
a  Here the vulnerable population is defined as the population whose income is at or below 
1.8 poverty lines. Data for Nicaragua refer to 2005, for Argentina, Chile and Guatemala 
to 2006, and for Honduras and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to 2007.
The nature of the transfers is such that their impact 
is strongest among children and young people. In these 
cases, the relative decline in the poverty rate will be 
proportionally larger than shown in figure 22. And there 
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will be a significant decrease in inequality–more striking 
in the less developed countries and more modest in the 
more advanced ones.
Figure 22 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): IMPACT OF TRANSFERS ON 







































































































































Current poverty rate Poverty after transfers
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the relevant countries and projections of GDP. 
a  Data for Nicaragua refer to 2005, for Argentina, Chile and Guatemala to 2006, and 
for Honduras and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to 2007. 
Poverty, inequality, education cycle and life cycle: 
costs and impacts
Taking aim at inequality and poverty among children 
and young people calls for initiatives on at least three critical 
fronts: extend coverage in early childhood by means of 
early childhood care and education systems (0-4 years of 
age), complete the process of achieving universal coverage 
in the basic education cycle age brackets (0-14) and work 
towards universal coverage among adolescents and young 
people in the upper cycle of secondary education (15-17). 
All of these targets, and the additional per-student cost in 
each country, are within the reach of all of the countries 
of the region. Indeed, as figure 23 shows, in 15 of the 18 
countries reviewed the cost does not exceed one percentage 
point of GDP, considering the minimum required cost for 
completing coverage at constant investment rates because 
only the current expense per pupil is taken into account. 
Creating the infrastructure and improving the conditions 
that would enable such coverage to truly level the playing 
field would require substantially heavier outlays.
For example, while the cost of achieving universal 
primary education is very low in terms of GDP (0.02%-
0.31%, depending on the country), extending coverage to 
a full day for children aged 6-11 would push the cost up 
substantially because in almost all of the countries of the 
region the vast majority of children in this age group did 
not have a full school day around 2008. It is easy to see that 
investing in the buildings and human resources required 
to extend the school day pose challenges for the countries 
that are far more complex than the data on coverage for 
the age brackets in this cycle would suggest.
Figure 23 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): COST OF INCORPORATING 
CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 0-17 INTO THE 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the relevant countries and projections of gross domestic product (GDP). 
a  Data for El Salvador refer to 2004, for Nicaragua to 2005, for Argentina, Chile and 
Guatemala to 2006, and for Honduras and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to 2007. For 
the 0-5 age group in countries without data for the entire bracket, the earliest available 
ages for the level were used: 4-5 in the Dominican Republic and 5 years of age in 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay and the Plurinational State of Bolivia.
Even with these qualifications, an expansion programme 
like the one proposed would have a substantial impact 
on the circuits that reproduce inequality and exclusion 
among children and young people. The two extremes of the 
challenge (preschool and upper cycle of secondary school) 
provide an idea of the leap in coverage that this would 
bring, especially for the poor and vulnerable population 
segment. Chapter II of this edition of Social Panorama 
highlights the yawning gaps by income quintile among 
children and young people (especially when comparing 
the two extreme quintiles) in terms of preschool education 
and completion of the upper cycle of secondary school. 
For this reason, transfers geared towards narrowing gaps 
at these levels would have an enormous impact in reducing 
inequalities in education opportunities.
For the most critical level in most countries (early 
childhood), even gradual incorporation would benefit a 
large group of countries in which the children that would 
be brought into the system account for a substantial portion 
of the population. In countries like El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras and Nicaragua, between three fourths and nearly 
9 out of 10 children in the vulnerable deciles (below 1.8 
poverty lines) would come into the system.
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 Funding over time
Combining cash transfers and educational coverage 
increments at basic costs would make it possible, in 
almost all of the countries, to tackle the reproduction of 
inequality at its roots early in the life cycle, giving the 
State a larger role in the goods and services consumption 
structure of the youngest segment of the population. This 
would obviously involve considerable effort, and this goal 
would have to be made a top fiscal priority. The aggregate 
cost for both sets of measures can be seen in figure 24.
Figure 24 
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): COST OF TOTAL CASH 
TRANSFERS TO THE VULNERABLE POPULATION AND OF 
INCORPORATING CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 
0-17 INTO THE EDUCATION SYSTEM, AROUND 2008 a
(Percentages of GDP)
2.17 2.25 2.77 2.79
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the relevant countries and projections of GDP. 
a  Data for Nicaragua refer to 2005, for Argentina, Chile and Guatemala to 2006, and 
for Honduras and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to 2007. For the 0-5 age group 
in countries without data for the entire bracket, the earliest available ages for the 
level were used: 4-5 in the Dominican Republic and 5 years of age in Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay and the Plurinational State of Bolivia.
Funding for these measures cannot be conjured out of 
nowhere. Depending on the countries, the resources needed 
to implement the proposed transfer scheme will depend 
on the following variables: (a) economic growth trends, 
because if tax pressure remains constant the total tax take 
will rise; (b) tax burden trends combined with economic 
growth (the countries with room to increase the tax burden 
might collect more resources by increasing the extraction 
rate in proportion to the effort of the economy); (c) any 
additional resources from restructuring public spending 
and making it more efficient; and (d) mobilization of 
additional international cooperation resources.
Figure 25 shows the fiscal space that the countries 
have over a 10-year horizon to cover the additional costs 
arising from the set of measures proposed. The economic 
growth rate is assumed to be somewhat greater than 2%; in 
countries whose GDP offers potential for expanding the tax 
burden, the impact of that expansion (in annual increments) 
is shown. As can be seen, most of the countries could 
reach the break-even point before the end of the period, 
with a sizeable surplus after covering the deficit.
Figure 25 
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): TAX DEFICIT OR SURPLUS FOR 
FUNDING THE TRANSFER SYSTEM AND THE ENHANCEMENT 
OF CARE AND EDUCATION SERVICES IN GROWING GDP AND 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
relevant countries, projections of GDP and data from the Latin American and 
Caribbean Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) for effective 
and potential tax burden.
a  Data for Nicaragua refer to 2005, for Argentina, Chile and Guatemala to 2006, and 
for Honduras and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, to 2007.
With a growing GDP combined with an expanding 
tax burden where possible, the countries of Latin America 
fall into three groups. The first group comprises those 
countries that in 2012 will be very near to taking in (or 
will be collecting far more than) the percentage points of 
GDP needed to afford the measures proposed. This group 
includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, 
Panama and Uruguay. A second group of countries would 
be a position to do so around 2014. Such is the case with 
the Dominican Republic, Colombia and Ecuador. The 
remaining countries (Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay and the Plurinational State of Bolivia) would 
not —except for Paraguay in the final year— have enough 
revenues to cover these costs by the end of the period, 
even in the best-case scenario with combined impacts on 
fiscal space. Complementary resources, such as those from 
international cooperation, must therefore be considered. 
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A. Poverty and inequality: crisis and recovery
Chapter I
Poverty, inequality and life cycle
The economic crisis that shook the world and the region did not affect poverty and indigence 
as much as expected. Although output fell almost everywhere, there was virtually no rise in 
poverty rates, and indigence rates went up only slightly. There were a number of contributory 
factors, including steady real wages (thanks to low inflation) and policies geared towards 
preventing losses of income or large-scale redundancies, plus a slight improvement in the 
income distribution structure. 
This outcome helped keep the region on the road to meeting target 1A of Millennium 
Development Goals. It also laid the groundwork for the economic recovery expected in 2010 
to push the poverty rate down further. The positive developments over the past few years 
encompassed such components of well-being as access to basic services and education.
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Per capita GDP in Latin America and the Caribbean fell 
by 3% in 2009 in the midst of a generalized international 
crisis. This contraction impacted most of the countries of 
the region, especially the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico and Paraguay. Only in 
the Dominican Republic and Uruguay did GDP rise by 
more than 2% (see table I.1). 
1.  Economic context
Table I.1  
LATIN AMERICA (20 COUNTRIES): SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 2000-2009
Country/ 
Year















for the period) b
(percentages)
(Average annual variation) (Average annual variation) a
(Simple average 




2000-2007 2.2 14.2 3.1 9.9 2000-2007 -1.2 … … 17.2
2008 5.7 7.9 8.8 7.2 2008 -0.8 … … 17.0
2009 -0.2 8.7 11.7 7.7 2009 1.2 … … 2.1
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Honduras
2000-2007 1.4 8.0 -0.4 4.6 2000-2007 3.1 6.1 … 8.1
2008 4.3 6.7 -7.4 11.8 2008 1.9 4.1 … 10.8
2009 1.6 7.9 … 0.3 2009 -3.8 4.9 … 3.0
Brazil Mexico
2000-2007 2.2 9.7 -1.5 7.0 2000-2007 1.8 4.4 2.3 4.9
2008 4.1 7.9 2.1 5.9 2008 0.5 4.9 2.2 6.5
2009 -1.1 8.1 1.3 4.3 2009 -7.5 6.7 0.6 3.6
Chile Nicaragua
2000-2007 3.2 9.1 1.8 3.4 2000-2007 2.0 8.9 0.5 8.8
2008 2.6 7.8 -0.2 7.1 2008 1.4 8.0 -3.8 12.7
2009 -2.5 9.7 4.8 -1.4 2009 -2.7 10.5 6.5 1.8
Colombia Panama
2000-2007 3.0 15.7 1.6 6.3 2000-2007 3.7 13.6 -1.1 2.2
2008 0.9 11.5 -2.0 7.7 2008 8.9 6.5 -0.6 6.8
2009 -1.1 13.0 1.1 2.0 2009 0.8 7.9 -0.4 1.9
Costa Rica Paraguay
2000-2007 2.9 6.1 0.6 11.0 2000-2007 0.5 10.1 0.3 9.0
2008 1.5 4.8 -2.0 13.9 2008 3.9 7.4 -0.7 7.5
2009 -2.3 7.6 7.7 4.0 2009 -5.5 8.2 4.3 1.9
Cuba Peru
2000-2007 6.1 2.8 5.6 … 2000-2007 3.6 9.1 0.6 2.2
2008 4.1 1.6 0.1 … 2008 8.5 8.4 2.2 6.6
2009 1.4 1.7 4.1 … 2009 -0.3 8.4 0.3 0.2
Dominican Republic Uruguay
2000-2007 3.7 16.3 … 14.6 2000-2007 2.0 13.6 -1.6 9.0
2008 3.8 14.1 … 4.5 2008 8.2 7.9 3.6 9.2
2009 2.1 14.9 … 5.7 2009 2.5 7.7 7.3 5.9
Ecuador Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
2000-2007 3.4 9.3 … 17.5 2000-2007 2.4 13.4 -1.4 19.6
2008 6.1 6.9 … 8.8 2008 3.0 7.3 -4.5 31.9
2009 -0.7 8.5 … 4.3 2009 -4.9 7.8 -6.6 26.9
El Salvador
2000-2007 2.3 6.4 … 3.8
2008 2.0 5.5 … 5.5
2009 -4.0 7.1 … -0.2
Guatemala Latin America
2000-2007 1.3 5.0 -0.7 7.3 2000-2007 2.2 9.8 0.5 7.6
2008 0.8 … -2.6 9.4 2008 3.0 7.3 -0.5 8.4
2009 -1.9 … 0.1 -0.3 2009 -3.0 8.2 3.1 4.7
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a  Based on per capita GDP in dollars, at constant 2000 prices. 
b  In the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chile, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, the figures are for total national unemployment. In Guatemala, figures for the period 
2000-2007 were only available for the three years from 2002 to 2004. The unemployment figures for Peru cover only the city of Lima. The data for Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 
have been adjusted to reflect changes in methodology in 2003, 2002 and 2005, respectively.
c  Generally speaking, coverage of this index is very partial. In most countries, it covers only formal workers in the industrial sector. Rates of change in Latin America as a whole 
were calculated using a global index calculated as a simple average of the indices for those countries of the region with data available.
d  Simple average of variations from December to December each year.
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Unlike prior crises, though, this time public policy was 
paramount in tempering the impact on labour and social 
conditions. The countries drew on solid macroeconomics 
built up during the economic and financial boom, applying 
countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies. 
So, although the employment rate did fall from 55.1% 
to 54.6% as unemployment rose from 7.3% to 8.2%, the 
impact on the labour market was less than initially forecast 
(ECLAC/ILO, 2010).
Price stability helped protect the purchasing power of 
income and thus staved off a significant drop in domestic 
demand. The simple average inflation rate for the region as a 
whole was 4.7% in 2009. Excluding the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela brings the average down to 2.6%. Available 
data on average real wages for most of the countries show 
a slight uptick after the decrease posted in 2008.
In this context, regional GDP growth is projected to 
recover quickly in 2010, to 5.2% (equivalent to a 3.7% 
rise in GDP per capita). Economic expansion is seen 
throughout the region, although the pace is higher in the 
countries of South America and the highest rate of growth 
is in Brazil (ECLAC, 2010e).
2.  Recent evolution of poverty
The poverty rate in the region was 33.1% in 2009, with 
13.3% of the population living in extreme poverty or 
indigence. These figures translate into 183 million poor 
and 74 million living in indigence (see figure I.1). 
Despite the marked drop in GDP in the region in 2009, 
the poverty rate worsened only slightly compared with 
2008, equivalent to an increase of 0.1 percentage points. 
Extreme poverty posted a somewhat higher increase: 
0.4 percentage points. The number of poor and indigent 
rose by 3 million.
These figures point to relatively positive results 
over the past few years. Compared with 2002, when 
poverty and indigence rates were the highest since 1990, 
both indicators are down sharply —by 10.9 percentage 
points for the former and 6.1 percentage points for 
the latter.
However, the two indicators have evolved differently 
over the past two years, with the indigence rate showing 
more appreciable deterioration. Unlike the poverty rate, 
indigence fell at a faster pace to 2007 than it did to 2009.
Figure I.1 
LATIN AMERICA: POVERTY AND INDIGENCE, 1980-2010 a




















































1980 1990 1999 2002 2007 2008 2009 2010
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  Estimate for 18 countries of the region, plus Haiti. The figures above the bars are the percentage and total number of poor persons (indigent plus non-indigent poor).
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indicators deteriorated appreciably in 2009, rising by 
2.5 percentage points and 1.4 percentage points, respectively 
(see figure I.3).
Figure I.2 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): ACCUMULATED VARIATION  
OF FOOD CPI COMPARED WITH NON-FOOD CPI, 2006-2009
(Multiples)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official information from the respective countries.
Figure I.3 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): ANNUAL VARIATION IN POVERTY AND INDIGENCE RATES, 2002-2008 AND 2008-2009 a
(Percentage points)
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  The variations are changes in percentage point rates divided by the number of years in the period. The year of the survey used differs from country to country. The period 2002 
corresponds to the latest survey available between 2000 and 2002, and the period 2008 represents surveys available between 2006 and 2008. The year 2009 refers only to data 
for that year.
b  Urban areas.
c  The 2002-2008 variation relates to urban areas and the 2008-2009 variation to the national total.
2 For Colombia, this edition of the Social Panorama uses the new 
series of official poverty estimates produced by the country for the 
years 2002-2009. Accordingly, the figures may not match those 
published in previous editions.
The differing dynamics of poverty and indigence are 
due in part to the evolution of food prices compared with 
the prices for other goods. Food prices rose nearly two and 
a half times more than non-food products between 2006 and 
2009 (see figure I.2). The increase in food prices transfers 
in its entirety to the value of the indigence line, pushing 
the latter up more quickly than the poverty line.1 
There is information available for assessing the 
evolution of poverty and indigence between 2008 and 
2009 for nine countries. In six of them, poverty dropped 
appreciably between the two years. In the Dominican 
Republic and Uruguay (data for urban areas), the poverty 
rate fell by more than 3 percentage points; Brazil, 
Panama, Paraguay and Peru recorded declines between 
0.9 percentage points and 2.2 percentage points. Slightly 
smaller negative poverty rate variations were posted in 
Colombia and Ecuador (see figure I.3).2 In 2009, the 
indigence rate came down considerably in Colombia, 
the Dominican Republic, Panama, Peru and Uruguay 
and declined slightly in Brazil and Paraguay. Costa Rica 
is the only country in which the poverty and indigence
1 Until 2007 the same price deflator was used to update the indigence 
and poverty lines, so the ratio between them held constant over time. 
But the widely diverging evolution of food and non-food prices 
led to the use of different deflators starting in 2007. The indigence 
line is updated using the food consumer price index (CPI); the 
non-food component of the poverty line is updated on the basis of 
the variation of the CPI for the relevant goods and services.
2 For Colombia, this edition of the Social Panorama uses the new 
series of official poverty estimates produced by the country for the 
years 2002-2009. Accordingly, the figures may not match those 
published in previous editions.
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According to the approach used in this report 
to estimate poverty, a person is classified 
as poor when the per capita income of that 
person’s household is below the poverty 
line, that is, the minimum income needed 
to meet a person’s basic needs. Poverty 
lines expressed in national currency reflect 
a calculation of the cost of a basket of 
basic goods and services, using the cost-
of-basic-needs method.
Where relevant data were available, 
the cost of a basic food basket that covers 
a person’s nutritional needs was estimated 
for each country and geographical area, 
taking into account consumption habits, 
the actual availability of foodstuffs and 
their relative prices, as well as the price 
differences between metropolitan areas, 
other urban areas and rural areas. This is 
the indigence line. 
The poverty line is defined by adding 
to the indigence line an estimate of the 
resources needed by a household to satisfy 
its basic non-nutritional needs. This estimated 
amount is the result of multiplying the 
indigence line by a constant factor of 2 for 
urban areas and 1.75 for rural areas.a
In most cases, data on the structure of 
household consumption of both foodstuffs 
and other goods and services came from 
national household-budget surveys.b Because 
those surveys were conducted before the 
poverty estimates were made, indigence 
lines and poverty lines have been updated 
using cumulative variations in the consumer 
price index (CPI). Until December 2006, the 
same variation was applied to both lines. 
Starting in 2007, however, the indigence line 
has been adjusted to reflect changes in the 
foodstuffs component of the CPI, whereas 
the part of the poverty line that corresponds 
to non-food spending is adjusted to reflect 
changes in that component of the CPI. From 
2007 onwards, therefore, the differential 
between the indigence and poverty lines 
is no longer constant.
Data on family income were taken from 
household surveys conducted in each country 
in the years that correspond to the poverty 
estimates contained in this publication. In 
line with its usual practice, ECLAC made 
corrections to account for a lack of response 
to some income-related questions (in the 
case of wage-earners, self-employed workers 
and retirees) and for probable biases that 
stem from underreporting. This was done by 
comparing the survey entries for income with 
figures from an estimate of the household 
income and spending account taken from 
each country’s system of national accounts, 
prepared for this purpose using official 
information.
Income here means total current 
income; that is, income from wage labour (in 
both money and kind), self-employed work 
(including self-supply and the consumption 
value of home-made products), property 
income, retirement and other pensions and 
other transfers received by households. 
In most countries, household income 
also includes the imputed rental value of 
owner-occupied dwellings. 
Box I.1 
METHOD USED TO MEASURE POVERTY
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a  The sole exceptions to this general rule were Brazil and Peru. For Brazil, the study used new indigence lines estimated for different geographical areas within the country, 
in the framework of a joint project conducted by the Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE), the Brazilian Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) and 
ECLAC in the late 1990s. For Peru, the indigence and poverty lines used were estimates prepared by the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics under the programme 
for the improvement of surveys and the measurement of living conditions in Latin America and the Caribbean implemented in that country.
b  When data from the processing of a recent survey of this type were not available, other information on household consumption was used.
The figures available to 2009 for Argentina, Chile 
and El Salvador show the evolution of poverty over a 
broader period. Between 2006 and 2009, poverty and 
indigence in Argentina (urban areas) dropped at the rate of 
3.2 percentage points and 1.1 percentage points per year, 
respectively. In Chile, poverty declined slightly between 
2006 and 2009, with the indigence rate remaining basically 
unchanged.3 Poverty and indigence rates in El Salvador 
did not change between 2004 and 2009.
A broader look that encompasses changes between 
2002 and the latest available estimate reveals a generalized 
trend towards lower poverty and indigence in the countries 
of the region. According to the poverty gap and the squared 
poverty gap indices, the net exit of persons from poverty 
and indigence during the period was accompanied by 
3 The estimates published herein differ in many cases from official 
poverty figures issued by the countries because of differing 
methodological approaches. For Chile, the figures set out herein 
diverge for the first time from the country’s official estimates 
(MIDEPLAN, 2010). In keeping with the change in methodology 
introduced by ECLAC in 2007, the indigence line was updated 
in keeping with the food CPI. The part of the poverty line that 
corresponds to non-food spending was adjusted to reflect changes 
in the rest of the CPI instead of using the same deflator for both 
lines as in the past.
rising average income among the poor and less distributive 
disparity in their income. These indices, whose formulation 
incorporates not only the percentage of poor but also the 
gap between average income for the poor and the poverty 
line (for the second index) and the way that income is 
distributed among the poor, declined more in percentage 
terms than did the poverty and indigence rates in most of 
the countries (see table I.A-1 in the appendix). 
These latest figures on poverty and indigence can 
also be used to evaluate the progress the countries are 
making towards meeting target 1A of the first Millennium 
Development Goal: to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the 
proportion of people living in extreme poverty. 
Despite the setback in 2008 and 2009, Latin America 
is well on the way to achieving target 1A. Progress stands 
at 82%, which is the accumulated decrease in indigence 
between 1990 and 2009 (9.2 percentage points) divided by 
the total expected decrease (11.3 percentage points). This 
is at the 72% mark of the time set for meeting the goal.
Projections for GDP growth and inflation in the 
countries suggest that the poverty rate will resume its 
downward trend in 2010 and reach 32.1% —one percentage 
point lower than in 2009. The indigence rate is expected 
to fall by some 0.4 percentage points (see figure I.1).
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As in previous editions of Social Panorama, two different 
methodological approaches are used to gauge the influence 
that some of the factors usually associated with poverty 
have had on the trend line. The first approach involves 
determining how much of the change in the poverty rate 
is due to income variation and how much to changes in 
income distribution. The second approach weighs the 
different sources of household income, focusing on labour 
market factors that affect labour income changes.
The variation in poverty and indigence rates may be 
broken down into two components: growth in average 
individual income (the growth effect) and changes in how 
that income is distributed (the distribution effect). This 
breakdown reveals whether the change in income that 
pushed the poverty rate in a given direction is part of a 
general trend for all income groups or had a more specific 
effect on the poor. The results of this analysis, based on data 
from household surveys, are presented in such a way that 
the effect of both components entirely explains the poverty 
rate variation in a given period (see box I.2).
Changes between the most recent estimate available last 
year and 2009 are due to different combinations of the growth 
effect and the distribution effect in each country.4 In one 
group of five countries, the principal factor behind declining
4 The pre-2009 information available for Argentina and Chile dates 
from 2006 and for El Salvador from 2004. The changes examined 
therefore encompass a longer period than the crisis itself.
poverty was average income growth. In three (Chile, Peru 
and Uruguay), the effect of this factor was boosted by an 
improvement in distribution —at least in the distribution area 
near the poverty line. On the other hand, the downward trend 
in poverty in Argentina and the Dominican Republic was, 
in part, slowed —not helped— by changes in distribution. 
In another group of five countries the distribution effect was 
the main determinant of falling poverty rates. In some cases 
(Ecuador and Panama) the distribution effect was heightened 
by rising average income, while in others (Brazil, Colombia 
and Paraguay) it offset declines in income. Costa Rica, the 
only one of the 12 countries reviewed in which poverty rose 
significantly, saw a clear deterioration of distribution that 
more than offset the increase in average income. The opposite 
happened in El Salvador, where the uptick in the poverty 
rate was triggered by a drop in average income combined 
with an improvement in distribution (see table I.2).
A look at the period from 2002 to 2009 shows that 
poverty reduction was due to mutual complementarity between 
the growth effect and the distribution effect. Both effects 
contributed to the outcome in countries where the poverty 
rate came down by 7 percentage points or more, with the 
growth effect accounting for 41% to 80% and the distribution 
effect accounting for 20% to 59% (see table I.3).
3.  Factors behind the changing poverty rate
Box I.2 
METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYSING GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION EFFECTS
According to the traditional scheme for 
measuring poverty based on insufficient 
income, a country’s poverty rate at a given 
point in time is determined entirely by three 
elements: the poverty line, average income 
and the income distribution structure. 
Accordingly, if the poverty line remains 
constant in real terms, any change in the 
poverty indicator can be analysed on the 
basis of variations in average income and 
income distribution.
According to Datt and Ravallion (1992), 
a poverty indicator can be calculated using 
income distribution for the beginning period 
and average income for the ending period. 
The difference between this indicator and 
the poverty rate observed in the beginning 
period can be interpreted as a growth 
effect. It is also possible to calculate the 
poverty rate corresponding to average 
income in the beginning period, but with 
income distribution similar to that of the 
ending period. The difference between this 
indicator and the beginning poverty rate is 
the distribution effect. The two effects can 
also be calculated with the beginning and 
ending periods interchanged.
In formal terms, if H(yt, dt) is the 
poverty indicator for period t, determined 
by average income (yt) and the shape 
of the distribution (dt), a breakdown into 
growth and distribution effects can be 
expressed as:
H(y2, d2) – H(y1, d1) = [H(y2, d1) – H(y1, d1)] + [H(y1, d2) – H(y1, d1)] + R
Growth effect Distribution effect
Such a breakdown has two disadvan-
tages. First, it is not exact: the residual has 
no analytical interpretation. The second 
shortcoming is that the size of each effect 
depends on the baseline year used in the 
comparison (beginning or ending year). 
Both disadvantages can be overcome 
by averaging the calculated effects using 
both baseline years (Kakwani, 1997). This 
is the procedure that was followed for the 
calculations presented in this chapter.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Gaurav Datt and Martin Ravallion, “Growth and redistribution components of 
changes in poverty measures”, Journal of Development Economics, vol. 38, 1992; Nanak Kakwani, “On measuring growth and inequality components of changes in 
poverty with application to Thailand”, Discussion Paper, University of New South Wales, 1997.
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Table I.2 
LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES): CHANGES IN POVERTY RATES AND CONTRIBUTION OF GROWTH  





Beginning Ending Beginning Ending Variation Growth Distribution Growth Distribution
Argentina b 2006 2009 21.0 11.3 -9.7 -9.7 0.0 100 0
Uruguay 2008 2009 13.7 10.4 -3.3 -2.1 -1.2 65 35
Dominican Republic 2008 2009 44.3 41.1 -3.2 -5.7 2.5 >100 <0
Chile 2006 2009 13.7 11.5 -2.2 -1.5 -0.7 70 30
Paraguay 2008 2009 58.2 56.0 -2.2 0.1 -2.3 <0 >100
Peru 2008 2009 36.2 34.8 -1.4 -2.1 0.7 65 35
Panama 2008 2009 27.7 26.4 -1.3 -0.5 -0.8 44 56
Brazil 2008 2009 25.8 24.9 -0.9 0.6 -1.5 <0 >100
Ecuador 2008 2009 42.7 42.2 -0.5 0.6 -1.1 <0 >100
Colombia 2008 2009 46.1 45.7 -0.4 0.8 -1.2 <0 >100
El Salvador 2004 2009 47.5 47.9 0.4 0.7 -0.3 >100 <0
Costa Rica 2008 2009 16.4 18.9 2.5 -1.3 3.8 <0 >100
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  Countries in order of total variation in poverty rate, expressed in percentage points. The period 2008 refers to the latest survey available between 2006 and 2008.
b  Urban area.
Table I.3 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): CHANGES IN POVERTY RATES AND CONTRIBUTION OF GROWTH  





Beginning Ending Beginning Ending Variation Growth Distribution Growth Distribution
Argentina b 2002 2009 45.4 11.3 -34.1 -27.3 -6.8 80 20
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 2002 2008 48.6 27.6 -21.0 -11.7 -9.3 56 44
Peru 2001 2009 54.7 34.8 -19.9 -15.5 -4.4 78 22
Brazil 2001 2009 37.5 24.9 -12.6 -5.8 -6.8 46 54
Panama b 2002 2009 36.9 26.4 -10.5 -4.9 -5.6 47 53
Ecuador b 2002 2009 49.0 40.2 -8.8 -6.1 -2.7 70 30
Chile 2000 2009 20.2 11.5 -8.7 -3.8 -4.9 44 56
Colombia 2002 2009 54.2 45.7 -8.5 -6.4 -2.1 75 25
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) b 2002 2007 62.4 54.0 -8.4 -3.5 -4.9 41 59
Honduras 2002 2007 77.3 68.9 -8.4 -6.0 -2.4 71 29
Nicaragua 2001 2005 69.4 61.9 -7.5 -5.5 -2.0 73 27
Dominican Republic 2002 2009 47.1 41.1 -6.0 -11.4 5.4 >100 <0
Guatemala 2002 2006 60.2 54.8 -5.4 -7.1 1.7 >100 <0
Paraguay a 2001 2009 61.0 56.0 -5.0 -0.9 -4.1 18 82
Uruguay b 2002 2009 15.4 10.7 -4.7 -3.2 -1.5 69 31
Mexico 2002 2008 39.4 34.8 -4.6 -4.2 -0.4 90 10
Costa Rica 2002 2009 20.3 18.9 -1.4 -2.2 0.8 >100 <0
El Salvador 2001 2009 48.9 47.9 -1.0 2.5 -3.5 <0 >100
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  Countries in order of total variation in poverty rate, expressed in percentage points. The period 2009 refers to the latest survey available between 2006 and 2009.
b  Urban area.
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The second approach for analysing poverty rate 
variation involves assessing the impact of variations 
in sources of income. Of particular interest are labour 
income (as the primary source of household resources) 
and public transfers.
In 2009, changes in poor household income were 
triggered mainly by rising or falling labour income. In 
most of the countries reviewed, average labour income 
in poor households increased in real terms. Wage and 
independent work income tended to vary in the same 
direction, except in Colombia, the Dominican Republic 
and Ecuador.
Transfers made a noticeable contribution to the increase 
in total income among the poor in six of the countries 
reviewed. Virtually all of these transfers are in the form 
of government subsidies or assistance. The exception is 
Argentina, where retirement pensions account for the 
largest portion of the increase in this source of income.
Labour income per person can be expressed as the 
product of labour income per employed person and the 
ratio of the number of employed persons to the total 
population, making it possible to identify what each 
component contributes to the annual variation in labour 
income per person.
In most of the countries reviewed, average labour 
income for poor households rose in real terms in 2009. 
In El Salvador, Peru and Uruguay this was the result of 
both an increase in labour income per employed person 
and a rise in the proportion of employed persons. In 
Argentina, the Dominican Republic and Panama the 
reason was a considerable increase in labour income per 
employed person. In Colombia and Paraguay, the drop 
in labour income per employed person was offset by a 
rising proportion of employed persons. 
Labour income decreased in Chile, Costa Rica and 
Ecuador. The factors assessed interacted in different ways 
in each of these countries. In Chile, the employment rate 
fell while income per employed person rose. The opposite 
happened in Ecuador; both factors declined in Costa Rica 
(see figure I.5). 
Figure I.4 
LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES): ANNUAL VARIATION IN  
TOTAL INCOME PER PERSON AND BY SOURCE 

































































































Wages and salaries Self-employment earnings Transfers
Other income Total income Poverty rate
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the respective countries.
a  Countries in order of annual variation in poverty rate. The period 2008 refers to 
the latest survey available between 2006 and 2008. The percentage of population 
analysed is the same for both periods and refers to the poverty rate in 2008.
b  Urban area.
Figure I.5 
LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES): ANNUAL CHANGE OF  
LABOUR INCOME COMPONENTS PER PERSON  




































































YL/E E/N Labour income
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the respective countries.
a  Countries in order of annual variation in poverty rate. The period 2008 refers to 
the latest survey available between 2006 and 2008. The percentage of population 
analysed is the same for both periods and refers to the poverty rate in 2008.
b  Urban area.
4.  Recent evolution of inequality
The distribution of income in the countries of Latin 
America is known as one of the most unequal in the 
world; this has not changed over the past four decades 
(UNDP, 2010). Broadly, the income share of the four 
poorest deciles averages less than 15% of total income, 
with the wealthiest decile accounting for about one third 
of the total. Average income received by the wealthiest 
20% of the population is 19.3 times more than for the 
poorest quintile (see figure I.6).
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Figure I.6 










































































































































































































































































































































C. Gap between wealthiest and poorest quintile
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  The year of the survey used differs from country to country. The period 2002 corresponds to the latest survey available between 2000 and 2002, and the period 2008 represents 
surveys available between 2006 and 2008. The year 2009 refers only to data for that year.
b  Urban area.
Although distributive inequality is a significant problem 
in all of the countries of the region, it varies in magnitude. 
In the countries with less inequality (Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela and Uruguay), the four poorest deciles receive 
some 20% of total income. The wealthiest decile receives 
approximately 25%; average income for the wealthiest 
quintile does not exceed 10 times that for the poorest 
quintile. At the other extreme, in the countries with the 
greatest inequality the four poorest deciles receive less 
than 12% of income. The wealthiest quintile has a share 
of nearly 40%, and income for the wealthiest quintile can 
be more than 30 times that of the poorest quintile. 
Despite this heterogeneity, in most of the countries 
there has recently been an incipient trend towards less 
concentration of income: between 2002 and the most recent 
estimate available, the share of the poorest 40% increased 
in 12 countries (by at least 0.5 percentage points). The 
share of the wealthiest 10% fell in 14 countries, and the 
gap between the extreme distribution quintiles narrowed 
in 14 of the 18 countries studied (see figure I.6).
The trend toward less inequality is corroborated by 
the variation of the Gini and Atkinson indices between 
2002 and the most recent date for which information 
is available. These indices may show different trends 
because they assign different relative weights to each 
income distribution segment, so they should be viewed 
as complementary to each other (see box I.3).
All three indices point to a decrease in distribution 
disparity in 13 countries. Results are mixed for Colombia, 
Costa Rica and Honduras because only some indicators 
show deteriorating distribution. The only countries with 
deteriorating distribution were the Dominican Republic 
and Guatemala (considering data to 2006, the most recent 
date for which information is available) (see figure I.7).
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Box I.3 
INDICATORS FOR MEASURING DISTRIBUTIVE INEQUALITY
A wide range of indicators can be used to 
measure the degree of concentration of a 
given income distribution. This chapter uses 
two of the best known inequality indicators, 
the Gini and Atkinson indices.
Gini index: 
Atkinson index: 
where n = population size, yi = per capita 
income of the ith individual and μ = mean 
income.
The best-known of the indices used 
to analyse income distribution is the Gini. 
Its formulation is expressed graphically, 
as it corresponds to the area between the 
Lorenz curve and the equidistribution line. 
The greater the income concentration, the 
larger this area will be and the higher the 
value of the indicator.
Despite its popularity, the Gini index does 
not satisfy the transfer sensitivity principle, 
a desirable property for inequality indicators 
whereby inequality should decrease in 
response to a progressive transfer of income 
(i.e., from a “wealthy” household to a “poor” 
one). The lower the position of the individuals 
concerned in the distribution, the greater the 
decrease in inequality should be.
The Atkinson index does satisfy the 
transfer sensitivity principle, and the weight 
that it assigns to the lowest portion of 
the distribution can be regulated using a 
parameter called “inequality aversion” (ε). 
The greater the value used, the higher the 
weight given to observations in the lower 
part of the distribution, most frequently 
between 0.5 and 2.0.
Both indicators take values in the range 
of zero to one (where zero corresponds to 
absolute equality and one represents absolute 
inequality), such that the higher the value of 
the indicator, the greater the inequality.
All inequality indicators are ordinal, 
so their values cannot be compared. 
Furthermore, as each of them measures 
partial aspects of inequality, they can 
generate different rankings for the same 
distribution. The ranking of a group of 
distributions can be considered definitive 
only if it does not vary between indices. The 
best procedure, therefore, is to see inequality 
indices as complementary to each other 
and analyse the findings together.
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Frank Cowell, “Measuring Inequality”, LSE Handbooks in Economics, Prentice 
Hall, 2000.
Figure I.7 














































































































































































Gini Atkinson (0.5) Atkinson (1.5)
B. 2008-2009A. 2002 – most recent year
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  The year of the survey used differs from country to country. The period 2002 refers to the latest survey available between 2000 and 2002. The period 2008 corresponds to the 
latest survey available between 2006 and 2008. The year 2009 refers only to data for that year.
b  Urban area.
Isolating the behaviour of inequality in 2009 from 
the rest of the period reveals contrasting trends in 
which improvements in distribution, albeit of lesser 
magnitude, predominate. Brazil, Colombia, Peru and 
Uruguay saw the largest declines in all three indices: 
at least 1.5% per year. While this is not a large value, it 
does represent a noticeable change. Argentina, Ecuador, 
El Salvador and Panama also recorded declines in all 
three inequality indicators. It is striking that Paraguay 
showed a significant drop in inequality according to 
the Gini coefficient and the Atkinson index (with an 
inequality aversion ratio of 0.5) but did not according 
to an index that assigns greater weight to the lower 
portion of the distribution. 
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Inequality indicators in Chile remained virtually 
unchanged between 2006 and 2009. Hence, Costa Rica 
and the Dominican Republic are the only countries with 
a clear deterioration of distribution in 2009, recording 
Gini coefficient increases of more than 4% and even 
larger variations in the other indicators. 
While inequality in Latin America is still among the 
highest in the world, the favourable trend in recent years 
shows that distribution can be improved. Some studies 
indicate that the main factors behind this trend are the 
narrowing labour income gaps between highly skilled and 
less skilled recipients and the increase in income transfers 
to the poorest (López-Calva and Lustig, 2010). In both areas 
there is space for public policy to enhance redistribution 
efforts geared towards more equitable distribution, not 
only in income but also in opportunities.
5.  Multidimensional poverty
Poverty encompasses deprivations across a broad spectrum 
of the dimensions of human well-being. Nonetheless, the 
usual way of quantifying these deprivations is to equate 
poverty to the lack of economic resources because income 
is the means whereby most material needs can be met and 
inadequate income is closely associated with deprivations 
in other areas of well-being. 
For all its virtues, income alone does not provide 
a complete picture of poverty in a country. There are 
various situations of deprivation that a lack of economic 
resources does not fully capture. This is especially clear 
when poverty is conceptualized in a way that looks beyond 
material needs to cover such areas as psychological well-
being or self-acceptance, but it can also hold true when its 
definition is limited to these needs. This usually happens 
when the goods and services required to meet needs are 
not purchased in the market but are self-produced or 
provided by the state. For example, a successful literacy 
programme improves the well-being of the population but 
does not increase income (at least not in the short run). 
Consequently, a measure of poverty based on income 
inadequacy might be insensitive to certain changes in 
the well-being of the population.
In recent years there has been growing interest in 
conceptualizing and measuring poverty multidimensionally. 
One of the conceptual frameworks receiving the most 
attention in this context is the “capabilities and functionings” 
approach proposed by Amartya Sen. According to this 
approach, an individual’s standard of living should be 
assessed on the basis of the freedom that person has 
(capabilities) to be or do something (functionings), not 
on the basis of the objects that person possesses or their 
“utility”. In this context, then, poverty is defined as the 
lack of certain basic capabilities. 
Poverty can also be seen as a violation of a person’s 
economic, social and cultural rights. In this context, 
“poverty may be defined as a human condition characterized 
by sustained or chronic deprivation of the resources, 
capabilities, choices, security and power necessary for 
the enjoyment of an adequate standard of living and 
other civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights” 
(United Nations, 2001).
Taking a multidimensional approach to measuring 
poverty involves identifying the relevant dimensions, 
selecting the appropriate indicators and defining the 
thresholds for what is considered sufficient in each case. 
There are several ways do to this; they can be based on 
normative assumptions, empirical antecedents or public 
consensus, among others (Alkire, 2008). 
With a multidimensional measure, it is common to 
seek synthetic indices that sum up data on poverty in a 
single figure. There have been significant advances in this 
area in recent years, consolidating desirable properties 
for these indices and proposing families of indicators 
(Bourguignon and Chakravarty, 2003; Tsui, 2002; Alkire 
and Foster, 2009).
Latin America has habitually issued figures equatable 
to the notion of multidimensional poverty, applying 
the unsatisfied basic needs method. This method rates 
basic deprivation among the population for such factors 
as housing, access to potable water and sanitation and 
education. While it is commonly used with data from 
population and housing censuses, it can also be applied 
to data from household surveys. 
Growing interest in developing multidimensional 
measures of poverty has led to new applications in the 
region and worldwide. One example is the official measure 
of multidimensional poverty for Mexico developed recently 
by the National Council for the Evaluation of Social 
Development Policy (CONEVAL, 2009). Worldwide, 
the United Nations Development Programme Human 
Development Report 2010 includes a multidimensional 
poverty index based on household surveys conducted 
in countries around the world. It replaced the Human 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)52
Poverty Index presented in 1997 (Alkire and Santos, 
2010). Thanks to the work done by the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), there has also been progress 
towards a multidimensional measure of child poverty in 
the world (Gordon and others, 2003). 
In line with the need to complement the monetary 
measure of poverty with a multidimensional approach, 
this section looks at the evolution of living conditions 
in the region using a method similar to the unsatisfied 
basic needs method, complemented by some more recent 
proposals for building synthetic indices. 
The basic needs considered are those that are usually 
measured by household surveys in the countries of the 
region. They concern housing quality and adequacy in 
aspects such as type of floor, access to potable water and 
sanitation, availability of electricity and crowding (Feres 
and Mancero, 2001). To capture shortfalls in education, 
the approach was similar to the one followed by Alkire 
and Santos (2010), linking attendance rates for school-
age children to educational deficiencies among the adult 
population.5 Box I.4 explains the selected satisfaction 
indicators and thresholds.
5 This makes it possible to evaluate the education dimension for all 
households, not only those with school-age children as is usually 
done with the traditional unsatisfied basic needs method.
Unsatisfied basic needs of households were 
evaluated by referring to the traditional scheme 
for the region, with some modifications. 
The indicators chosen refer to housing 
characteristics, especially floor type, crowding 
(number of people per room), availability of 
potable water and sanitation and access to 
education for children (school attendance) and 
adults (number of years of schooling).
The satisfaction thresholds for each 
indicator are similar to those used for previous 
applications of the method. Where relevant, 
differentiated thresholds were established 
for urban and rural areas. The following are 
considered unsatisfied needs:
–  Dwelling quality: dwellings with dirt 
floors (urban and rural areas);
–  Crowding: three or more people per 
room (urban and rural areas);
–  Water source: any source of water 
except a public system (urban areas); 
river, stream, rain etc. (rural areas);
–  Toilet facility: no sanitation, or toilet not 
connected to a sewer system or septic 
tank (urban areas); no sanitation, or 
untreated toilet system (rural areas);
–  Electricity: no electricity, either public 
or private (urban and rural areas);
–  Education: whether the household 
has children who are not attending an 
educational establishment, or no one 
has completed six years of schooling.
Box I.4 
UNSATISFIED BASIC NEEDS INDICATORS
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
The survey results show, first, how the deprivation 
rates evaluated vary widely among the countries of the 
region. For example, the lack of an appropriate floor in the 
dwelling is fairly widespread in Guatemala, Nicaragua and 
Peru, at 35% or more of the population, and, to a lesser 
extent, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), El Salvador and 
Honduras (20% to 30% of the population). By contrast, in 
six countries of the region less than 5% of the population 
lacks appropriate flooring (see figure I.8). 
The situation is similar for the other situations of 
deprivation evaluated. The percentage of persons without 
an appropriate source of drinking water ranges from 2% 
to 28%. Between 1% and 40% lack an appropriate sewage 
elimination system. Crowding (three or more persons per 
room) affects 1% to 20% of the population. The range is 
3% to 40% for insufficient access to education.
Figure I.8 also shows that all of the deprivations rated 
trended down between 2000 and 2009. In most cases, 
the decreases have been proportionally similar from one 
country to the next, so their ranking has not changed 
much since the early 1990s.
One way to measure poverty multidimensionally is 
to count the situations of deprivation for each household 
and to define as poor those with a certain number of 
deprivations. The traditional aggregation approach under 
the unsatisfied basic needs method used in the region is to 
consider as poor those who have at least one situation of 
deprivation. But deprivation in any given dimension might 
not be representative of poverty. For this reason it is better 
to define the poverty threshold using deprivation in two 
dimensions, in line with other recent multidimensional 
measurements (Alkire and Santos, 2010; CONEVAL, 
2009; Gordon and others, 2003). 
The aggregate indicator confirms the two findings 
discussed above: the magnitude of multidimensional 
poverty varies widely among the countries of the region, 
and the multidimensional poverty rate has been falling 
considerably. 
This wide range of multidimensional poverty 
indicators is, broadly speaking, similar to the outcomes 
from a monetary measure of poverty. The countries with 
the highest multidimensional poverty rates (Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua and the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia) are also those with the highest monetary poverty 
rates. At the other extreme, Chile, Costa Rica and 
Uruguay (urban area) are the countries with the lowest 
multidimensional poverty rates and the lowest monetary 
poverty rates (see table I.4).
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Figure I.8 































































































































































































































































































































































































































B. Access to drinking water
D. Education
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  Countries listed in order of the rating for each basic need, for the latest year on which information is available. The year of the survey used differs from country to country. The 
period 2000 corresponds to the latest survey available in 2000, and the period 2008 represents the latest surveys available between 2006 and 2008. The year 2009 refers only 
to data for that year.
b  Urban area.
Table I.4 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): MULTIDIMENSIONAL AND MONETARY POVERTY RATE, 2009 a
(Percentage of persons)
Multidimensional poverty
> 40 30-39 20-29 5-20 0-5
Monetary 
poverty
























Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  Refers to the latest survey available between 2006 and 2009.
b Urban area.
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Over the past decade, practically all of the countries 
of the region recorded a reduction in multidimensional 
poverty rates, with drops of more than 10 percentage 
points in six cases (see figure I.9). The only cases where 
multidimensional poverty did not decline was in some 
countries where rates were below 10% (which is to be 
expected because some of the indicators used are probably 
at the minimum threshold level). 
The evidence confirms the trend towards improving 
living conditions. However, this assessment of 
multidimensional poverty is limited to the material 
deprivations that household surveys conducted in the region 
can quantify. To make better use of the multidimensional 
approach, material deprivations should be assessed along 
with deprivation in other components of well-being. To 
do so requires improving the sources of information 
currently available. 
Figure I.9 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): MULTIDIMENSIONAL  














































































































2000 Most recent year
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the respective countries.
a  The year of the survey used differs from country to country. The period 2000 
corresponds to the latest survey available in 2000, and the period 2009 represents 
the latest surveys available between 2006 and 2009.
b  Urban area.
c  The surveys available around 2000 do not allow a comparable estimate of 
multidimensional poverty.
B.  Fertility, early emancipation and poverty
1. Poverty trends among children and adolescents and  
 some of the demographic determinants
In monetary terms, child poverty in Latin America 
declined significantly between 2000 and 2009; child and 
adolescent poverty fell in 13 of 15 countries of the region 
(see figure I.10). Nevertheless, poverty still affects children 
and adolescents proportionally more than the rest of the 
population. Between 2002 and 2009, the overrepresentation 
Early initiation of emancipation is a milestone in life for poor young persons. In most of the 
countries of the region, early fertility among poor mothers is falling at a slower pace than for 
all mothers. This means that a significant number of women are forming a family prematurely, 
with scant resources and a heavy child-rearing burden. Institutional disaffiliation (neither 
working nor going to school) is therefore more frequent among women than among men 
and for young people from lower-income strata than for their peers who are better off. This 
situation calls for comprehensive policies that, together, tackle issues involving reproductive 
outcomes, school dropout rates, emancipation paths and vulnerability to exclusion.
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of children and adolescents living in poverty rose from 
1.6 to 1.7 (see figure I.11), highlighting the need to better 
understand the factors and dynamics that are behind child 
poverty in order to design and implement policies for 
making substantial headway in bringing the child and 
adolescent poverty rate down.
Figure I.10 
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): CHILDREN AND 
ADOLESCENTS IN POOR HOUSEHOLDS, 1990-2009 a











































































































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the respective countries.
a  Annualized. Obtained by dividing the percentage change in the poverty rate during 
the period by the number of years in the period.
b  Metropolitan area. In Argentina, refers to Greater Buenos Aires. In Paraguay, refers 
to the Asunción metropolitan area.
c  Urban areas.
Figure I.11 
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): RATIO OF CHILD AND 
ADOLESCENT POVERTY TO THE POVERTY RATE IN  































































































































































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the respective countries.
a  Metropolitan area. In Argentina, refers to Greater Buenos Aires. In Paraguay, refers 
to the Asunción metropolitan area.
b  Urban areas.
c  Simple averages.
One of the keys to understanding the dynamics behind 
the reproduction of child poverty is to be found in behaviour 
during the early stages of the life cycle. Particular attention 
should be paid to reproductive behaviour leading to early 
fertility. It has been observed that children are highly likely 
to repeat the reproductive patterns of their parents, and in 
the poorest families these patterns involve early fertility 
and more children than the average for all households. It 
has been suggested that there is a vicious circle whereby 
poverty is linked to higher and earlier fertility and a heavy 
child-rearing burden for households that leads back to 
greater poverty (Carrasco, Martínez and Vial 1997; Paz 
and others, 2004; Rodríguez, 2006).
A heavy child-rearing burden forces poor families 
to distribute scarce resources (material and time, among 
others) among a large number of children and makes it 
harder for mothers to participate in the labour market. All 
of this works against overcoming the poverty threshold 
(Rodríguez, 2006). Poor children develop at a disadvantage 
in terms of nutrition, health and access to the education 
system. This erodes their accumulation of human capital 
and funnels them into precarious jobs that are more 
poorly paid and generate less household income, thus 
contributing to the reproduction of poverty in the long 
run (Paz and others, 2004).
In any event, as child poverty has come down in most 
of the countries of the region the overall fertility rate has 
also been declining in recent years. This is in keeping 
with the behaviour of factors linked to the demographic 
transition (ECLAC, 2004). In some countries the age at 
which the first child is born is increasing, especially among 
younger cohorts with higher school attendance rates (INE, 
2006). Fertility rates also differ between socio-economic 
strata; new reproductive patterns such as an increase in 
adolescent fertility are appearing (Di Cesare, 2007). The 
drop in the child and adolescent poverty rate might be due 
in part to the declining fertility rate among poor mothers. 
However, this impact might have been offset somewhat by 
the slower decrease in the fertility rate for poor mothers 
than for all mothers.
Table I.5 shows the percentage of change, between 
1990 and 2009, in poverty rates for children aged 0-5 and 
for children and adolescents aged 0-15, as well as the 
fertility rate changes during the same period for four 
groups: (a) poor adolescent and young mothers; (b) all 
poor mothers; (c) all adolescent and young mothers; and 
(d) all mothers. This classification is used to analyse 
the relationship, over time, between the child poverty 
rate and early fertility among poor mothers. It is also a 
criterion for comparing the fertility rate for all mothers, 
controlling for age.
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Table I.5 
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): CHANGES IN CHILD AND ADOLESCENT MONETARY POVERTY RATE  
















Argentina -54 -26 -33 -48 -7 -27
Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of) -14 -23 -30 -9 -17 -29
Brazil -25 -27 -53 -28 -19 -47
Chile -74 -63 -57 -74 -57 -51
Colombia -7 -19 -24 -6 -13 -19
Costa Rica -15 -46 -54 -15 -33 -43
Ecuador -21 -37 -51 -21 -25 -43
El Salvador -11 -39 -39 -7 -23 -26
Guatemala -7 -10 -16 -6 -4 -11
Honduras -8 -46 -49 -8 -29 -34
Mexico -9 -37 -49 -16 -34 -43
Nicaragua -10 -43 -48 -8 -25 -34
Panama -28 13 -19 -37 -7 -24
Paraguay 17 -23 -27 11 -22 -23
Uruguay -45 -33 -31 -45 -41 -39
Venezuela 
(Bolivarian Republic of) -11 -38 -53 -16 -29 -42
Latin America c -20 -31 -40 -21 -24 -33
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  Changes in fertility rates for poor and non-poor mothers were calculated considering a constant overall poverty rate at the value for 1990.
b  The term “mothers” refers to all women identified as female heads of household or spouses of the head of household.
c  Simple averages.
In terms of simple averages for the region, table I.5 
shows: (a) poverty among children aged 0-5 and among 
children and adolescents aged 0-15 has come down 
at very similar rates (by 20% and 21% respectively); 
(b) the fertility rate for poor mothers has decreased less 
than for total mothers —both for early fertility (mothers 
aged 15-24) and for all poor mothers; and (c) the fertility 
rate decline among the youngest mothers (aged 15-24) is 
greater than for all mothers. The latter comparison should 
be interpreted with care because the age group 15-24 has 
a broader potential fertility horizon than the rest of the 
mothers simply because they are younger.
As for the link between poverty rates among children 
aged 0-5 and fertility rates for mothers aged 15-24, in 
Chile and Uruguay (two of the four countries that brought 
child poverty down the most) the fertility rate among poor 
mothers fell more than for all mothers aged 15-24. On 
the other hand, Argentina (the second most successful 
country in reducing child poverty) saw the fertility rate 
for the youngest poor mothers decline less than for all 
mothers. In Panama, which ranked fourth in reducing child 
poverty, the fertility rate among poor mothers rose; this 
was the only case among 16 countries. In Paraguay, the 
only country where child poverty increased, the fertility 
rate among poor mothers declined less than for all mothers 
but the difference was slight (a decrease of 23% versus 
a decrease of 27%).
From the data in table I.5 it can be deduced that, in four 
of the five countries where the poverty rate for children aged 
0-5 fell the most (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay), the 
simple average decline in the fertility rate for poor mothers 
aged 15-24 was 37%. For the countries that were least 
successful at decreasing the child poverty rate (Colombia, 
Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico and Paraguay), the simple 
average decrease was 27%. These calculations did not 
include Panama among the countries with the largest drops 
in the child poverty rate because the fertility rate among 
poor mothers aged 15-24 in Panama increased.
Bringing the co-variation of child and adolescent 
poverty rates and fertility rates among all poor mothers 
into the picture does not change it substantially. In Chile 
and Uruguay, fertility dropped more among poor mothers 
than for mothers overall. Argentina and Panama saw the 
fertility rate for poor mothers decline far less than for all 
mothers. In Paraguay —the only country where child and 
adolescent poverty rose between 1990 and 2009— the 
decline in the fertility rate for poor mothers and for all 
mothers was nearly equal.
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So, despite positive trends in decreasing child poverty 
in the countries of the region (linked in some cases to 
declining early fertility rates among poor mothers), 
monetary poverty among children and young people is 
still high. Add to this the fact that early fertility rates 
among poor mothers aged 15-24 have fallen at a slower 
pace than for all mothers in the same age group and it 
emerges that there is still a significant number of mothers 
who are forming a family prematurely in a context of scant 
resources and a heavy child-rearing burden. 
In short, reproductive outcomes can have a long —and 
lasting— impact in terms of poverty for mothers and their 
children. This calls for policies targeting current and future 
mothers. Among such policy instruments are those that foster 
(a) postponing the age at which motherhood is initiated; 
(b) improving access to information on reproduction 
control; (c) retaining women in the education system; 
(d) improving the quality of their education to ensure 
that learning outcomes meaningfully broaden labour 
opportunities; and (e) making institutions available to 
provide care for young children, thus making it easier for 
mothers to attend (or return to) the education system and 
facilitating their stable participation in the labour market. 
In other words, poor young women should be offered an 
attractive, believable and accessible future that does not 
confine them to motherhood and the domestic world as 
their only alternatives for gaining a place in society. 
The countries should redouble their efforts to guarantee 
the fundamental rights of the child population, both to bring 
the poverty rate down and to prevent the reproduction of 
poverty throughout the life cycle. The States of the region 
have signed international instruments pledging to ensure 
the core rights of all children, but this has not happened. 
According to a rights-based approach to measuring child 
poverty, 17.9% of the children of Latin America (somewhat 
more than 32 million) were living in extreme poverty 
in 2007, that is, they suffered from one or more of the 
following serious deprivations: precarious housing; overall 
undernutrition and/or serious chronic undernutrition; lack 
of drinking water and sanitation in the household; lack 
of communications and information media; and lack of 
access to the education system. Forty-five per cent of the 
child population (nearly 81 million) suffered at least one 
moderate or serious deprivation (see box I.5). 
Box I.5 
A MULTIDIMENSIONAL, RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO MEASURING CHILD POVERTY
Over the past few years child poverty has 
come to be seen as a multidimensional 
issue. From this new vantage point, the 
lack of monetary income for meeting basic 
needs is not the only consideration. The 
lack of access to basic services as well as 
other factors (such as discrimination and 
exclusion) that keep children from developing 
to their full potential and hinder their social 
integration are also important. One path 
towards a multidimensional measure of 
child poverty is the rights-based approach, 
which requires a broader range of indicators 
than those habitually used to measure child 
poverty in Latin America. Along these lines, 
in 2008 and 2009 ECLAC, in conjunction 
with the UNICEF Regional Office for the 
Americas and the Caribbean, conducted 
the first comparative study of child poverty 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. This 
research painted a multidimensional picture 
of child poverty and established a regional 
baseline as a benchmark for follow-up 
rights-based studies on child poverty. 
Under the study’s multidimensional 
approach, the poor have unmet needs that 
are assessed using indicators of levels of 
deprivation during childhood as first proposed 
by the University of Bristol and the London 
School of Economics.a This approach is 
similar to the unsatisfied basic needs method 
that had already been used in Latin America. 
This criterion for identifying the poor was 
compared with the indirect method (more 
traditional in the region), which defines 
poverty on the basis of per capita household 
income. The basis for this was an analysis 
of available surveys of living conditions in 
households in the region, providing data for 
implementing both methodologies. 
The deprivation thresholds for the 
UNICEF global study refer only to the most 
serious violations of children’s rights. To 
enhance the diagnostic study, the assessment 
of Latin America and the Caribbean also 
used thresholds of moderate deprivation, 
which reflect unmet needs that undermine 
children’s well-being and development. This 
made it possible to measure the magnitude 
and depth of extreme child poverty (severe 
deprivations) and overall child poverty (the 
sum of severe and moderate deprivations) 
in the countries of the region. 
Under the child rights approach, each 
deprivation was considered to be an indicator 
of poverty, since it represents a violation of or 
failure to comply with at least one right. This 
methodology considers children poor when 
any one of their fundamental rights is not met, 
regardless of geographical location, ethnic 
origin or other social or cultural characteristics. 
The thresholds, dimensions and indicators 
used for the study are set out below.
Thresholds, dimensions 
and indicators Moderate Severe/serious
Article of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child that is violated 
Nutrition
Weight to age ratio




severely undersize for age 
(chronic undernutrition): less 
than -2 standard deviations 
from benchmark
Severely underweight or severely 




Access to safe drinking water by:
- origin
- supply
- access time (if available)
(a) Origin: well or pump
(b) Water supplied from outside 
or away from the dwelling 
(for example, public cisterns, 
water trucks etc.)
(a) Unsafe water source: natural 
sources  (rivers, springs)
(b) If indicator of access time to 
the water source is available, 
15 minutes or more
24 (2) (e)
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Thresholds, dimensions 
and indicators Moderate Severe/serious
Article of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child that is violated 
Sanitation
Connection to sewage 
system (excreta disposal)
No sewage connection (for 
example, cesspools) or 
access outside of house 
or beyond land parcel
No sewage service (for example, 
channelled directly into a river)
24 (2) (c)
Housing





Crowding: three or more persons 
per bedroom/room (excluding 
bathroom and kitchen); dirt floor, 
unsafe building materials (walls or 
roof of mud or similar materials)
Overcrowding: five or more persons 
per bedroom/room, temporary 
housing (tents, etc.), walls or 
roofs built with waste materials
27 (3)
Education
School attendance and number 
of years of school completed 
Children and adolescents who have 
attended school but dropped out 
before completing secondary school
Children and adolescents who 
have never attended school
28 (1) (a) (b)
Information
Access to electricity, possession 
of a radio, television or telephone
No household access to at least two 
of: electricity, telephone (landline 
or mobile), radio or television 
No household access to any of: 
electricity, telephone (landline or 
mobile), radio and television 
13/17
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of E. Espíndola and N. Rico, “La pobreza infantil: un desafío prioritario”, Boletín 
Desafíos, No. 10, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean ECLAC/United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 2010.
a In 2003, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and researchers from the University of Bristol and the London School of Economics conducted the first rights-based 
global measurement of child poverty. The study adopted seven dimensions of children’s rights as its principle: adequate nutrition, safe drinking water, decent sanitation, 
health, housing, education and access to information. An indicator was designed for each dimension (Gordon and others, 2003).
Box I.5 (concluded)
2. Emancipation paths, poverty and inequality
The principal assets that people must mobilize if they are 
to have access to well-being as adults are accumulated 
earlier in the life cycle. Some of these assets, such as a 
certain degree of emotional maturity, development of 
cognitive abilities and social skills, are already put to use 
in the early years of life. But it is during adolescence and 
youth that people reach crucial junctures. On the basis 
of assets already accumulated they must choose between 
behaviours that lead to different paths to adulthood. 
Each one of these “emancipation paths” is paved with a 
series of decisions as to whether to continue school and 
when to enter the labour market, start a family, set up an 
autonomous household and have children.6 For society 
as a whole, the earlier in the life cycle that the different 
emancipation paths branch out, the more likely the social 
divides are to widen. 
Decisions as to how and how much to participate 
in any one of the spheres (education, work, family and 
parenthood) leave less room for choice as to how and how 
much to participate in the others. Hence, dropping out of 
school early restricts choices in the labour market, while 
the requirements for most jobs limit the possibilities for 
attending an educational establishment on a regular basis. 
And taking on domestic responsibilities at an early age 
is usually incompatible with staying in school. In short, 
6 Because the scope of the choices an individual can make throughout 
the life cycle hinges directly on socio-economic status, the options 
open to adolescents and young people from poor households are 
usually very limited.
decisions at this decisive stage of life hinge on complex 
patterns of causation and, once made, contribute to mapping 
a path of ever-diminishing choices. 
Educational attainments are so important in 
contemporary society that most public policy efforts 
targeting young people seek to keep them from dropping 
out of school and to prevent the early assumption of adult 
roles from leading them to exit the educational system 
or bar them from returning. Some examples are direct 
subsidies for attending educational institutions, flexible 
work hours for young people, day care centres, expanded 
school schedules, creation of opportunities for training 
outside the formal educational system and, indirectly, 
conditional cash transfers. It is harder to act on other 
factors with a major impact on school desertion, such as 
signals from the market concerning the value that society 
attaches to educational attainments and the inertia of 
traditional symbolic representations that define a place in 
society for women from lower socio-economic strata by 
assigning them roles as housekeepers and mothers. 
Most public policies in this sphere are grounded in the 
recognition that poor educational credentials and heavy 
family responsibilities produce a socially explosive mixture 
that is fertile ground for high vulnerability to poverty and 
social exclusion and for the intergenerational reproduction 
of just such situations. Add to this the negative impact of 
this mix of precariousness and responsibility and one of 
the results is the low level of life satisfaction among the 
15-to-29-year-olds in Latin America who have children, 
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lack a stable partner and must become providers at a very 
early age without appropriate support for shouldering 
such responsibilities.
So, emancipation paths vary substantially for young 
people from different socio-economic strata. In stark contrast 
with the paths open to middle- and upper-class young people, 
early emancipation is common among those from low 
socio-economic strata. In the higher strata, socialization and 
the availability of material resources facilitate the adoption 
of patterns of deferred gratification that favour putting off 
entering the labour market, starting a family or becoming a 
parent. Even if such postponements might not always be an 
objective per se, they do reflect a certain ability to adjust to 
rising educational thresholds for adequate performance in 
society’s principal economic, social and cultural circuits.7
(a)  Emancipation paths by gender and  
household income 
Early initiation of emancipation is a milestone in 
life for poor young persons. This is seen more clearly 
in figures I.12 and I.13, which provide a snapshot of the 
major differences in the emancipation paths followed by 
men and women in different social strata according to the 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the 
country in question.
 broader and can even be mobilized by the parents themselves, prodding 
young people to leave the family household. In any event, because such 
postponement usually involves accumulating human capital, many of 
the young people who join adult life “late” have a much broader range 
of alternatives for social inclusion than those who do so early. 
Figure I.12 




















































14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
Age
A. Men, quintile I B. Men, quintile V





No conjugal union, quintile I
No conjugal union, quintile V
Single, quintile I
Single, quintile V
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  The data for Uruguay correspond to circa 2008.
7 Nevertheless, the possibility that certain forms of social exclusion can 
impact those who postpone taking on adult roles beyond the average 
age of their cohort cannot be ignored. Indeed, once past the upper 
threshold of the culturally accepted age for initiating emancipation, 
the social forces pushing for the performance of adult roles become 
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Figure I.13 
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No conjugal union, quintile I














A. Men, quintile I
C. Women, quintile I
B. Men, quintile V
D. Women, quintile V
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  The data for El Salvador correspond to 2004, for Guatemala to 2006, for Honduras to 2007 and for Nicaragua to 2005.
Figures I.12 and I.13 highlight the differences between 
countries by focusing on two groups of societies at the 
extremes of Latin American heterogeneity in terms of 
stage of demographic transition and level of educational 
coverage. The two groups comprise: (a) Argentina, Chile and 
Uruguay, where the regional context is one of a relatively 
good education supply, with urbanization, fertility and 
age structure indicators that place them late in the first 
stage of demographic transition; and (b) El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, with indices that 
differ strikingly in both dimensions (Filgueira, Filgueira 
and Fuentes, 2001). 
Figures I.12 and I.13 also show the different 
emancipation paths for adolescents and young people 
at opposite poles of the social stratification. To this 
end, behaviour indicators for persons from households 
in the highest 20% and the lowest 20% of the income 
distribution were taken. Figures I.12 and I.13 therefore do 
not show predominant youth behaviours in the region nor 
the characteristic patterns for each country. Rather, they 
underscore the breadth of the challenges that the region 
faces in keeping emancipation paths from diverging on 
the basis of gender, class and nationality and thus from 
contributing to the current trends towards social inequality 
within and between countries. 
A reading of these figures leads to a number of 
conclusions.
First, there are substantial differences between the 
country groups in terms of school attendance rates among 
15-year-olds, reflecting varying intensities of educational 
dropout at early stages. At that age, 100% of the adolescents 
in the highest strata in the first group are still in the 
educational system. The same is true for some 90% of 
the adolescents in the low strata. In the second group, on 
the other hand, the values are approximately 95% in the 
highest quintile and 75% in the lowest quintile. 
In both groups of countries, the emancipation paths 
are the most different for women in the lower-income 
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strata, both compared with men and compared with their 
peers in the higher strata. One of the main features of the 
paths of the poorest adolescent and young women is that 
labour participation for poor women does not reach 50% 
for any of the ages in the 15-29 age bracket. Conversely, 
in the countries in the second group some 80% of the 29-
year-old women in the wealthiest strata participate in the 
labour market, as do 90% of their peers in the countries in 
the first group. In other words, the tendency for men and 
women to participate in the labour market converges in 
the higher strata while the opposite happens in the lower 
strata. This difference surely reflects a permanent division 
of labour within poor families, influenced by the traditional 
polarity between a private female world and a public male 
world. This polarity is even more pronounced in countries 
that have a high ratio of children per adult because they are 
in the earlier stages of the demographic transition.
The fact that paths for men and women converge in 
the high-income strata is also indicative of an overlap 
between labour participation and school attendance. Young 
people in this stratum have opportunities for engaging in 
paid activities without giving up their studies; this holds 
more for men than for women and more for countries 
in the first group than for the second group. The paths 
clearly diverge for men and women in the lower strata. 
Men exchange their status as a student for status as a 
worker with no overlap between the two, while most 
women exchange their status as a student for one as a 
mother, housewife or assistant housewife without passing 
through the labour market. 
The age at which a family is formed (which as a 
gross approximation is equated here with ceasing to be 
single) also varies significantly between sexes, classes 
and national contexts. In the low strata in the second 
group of countries, half of the 20-year-old women are 
no longer single. In the first group, this change in civil 
status for women in the same stratum takes place at age 
24. In the highest quintile, women form families at age 
25 and age 27 in the second and first groups, respectively. 
So, while the higher strata in all of the countries clearly 
postpone the age for forming the first spousal couple (as 
is characteristic of the second demographic transition), 
this is still an incipient process among poor women in 
the countries of the region that are just entering the first 
demographic transition. 
Lastly, a comparison of the curves shows that in many 
cases forming a family does not coincide with setting up 
a household of one’s own. Only among young people in 
countries at an advanced stage of demographic transition is 
ceasing to be single part of the process of gaining autonomy 
from the family of origin. In all other cases, the autonomy 
curve traced by variations in the percentage of young people 
who are heads of household or spouses of heads of household 
is always above the curve showing the declining percentage 
of single people. This indicates the existence of new core 
families without the resources to become independent from 
the household of origin of one of the spouses.
(b)  Young people who neither study nor work
The data on the proportion of young people who are 
neither studying nor working raise a red flag for the risk 
of poverty and social exclusion in any society. Strictly 
speaking, the emancipation path scenario emerging from 
an assessment of the differences by country, class and sex 
clearly indicates that young people of the region can be 
classified into at least three general groups: 
(i) Those whose main activity is studying and who, by 
staying connected to educational institutions for most of 
this period, maximize the opportunities for accumulating 
the human capital required for full integration into adult 
life. This status can coexist (or not) with sporadic or 
stable participation in the world of work.
(ii) Those whose main activity is work and who have left 
the educational system early. In certain conditions, 
labour experiences can mitigate the risk of lack of well-
being in the future caused by leaving school early and 
can facilitate the insertion of dropouts in society. This 
is particularly the case with the kinds of productive 
insertion that provide ongoing training, job stability, 
labour union membership, benefits and social security. 
However, recognizing that the likelihood of access 
to such opportunities varies inversely with the levels 
of qualification attained highlights the importance of 
efforts to prevent early dropouts.
(iii) Those who drop out of the educational system early 
and fail to achieve labour market insertion. As for the 
likelihood of full integration into adult life, there is 
no doubt that the longer the period of disaffiliation 
from the principal institutions that shape the passage 
to adulthood (education and work), the greater the 
danger of social exclusion. As discussed in the 
foregoing analysis of the figures on emancipation 
paths, men and women face different situations and 
risks merely because many poor young women have 
no attractive, believable and accessible options for 
joining society other than motherhood and confinement 
to the domestic world.8 
8 The number of categories of institutional affiliation/disaffiliation can 
expand to differentiate between risky and precarious affiliation. In 
the case of education, for example, this would make it possible to 
identify the relative weight of young people with significant lags. And 
for the labour market, it would be possible to differentiate between 
formal and informal workers and between those who are looking for 
work and those who are not. Fluid changes in employment status 
are one of the most salient characteristics of youth. 
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Table I.6 
LATIN AMERICA (SEVEN COUNTRIES): POPULATION AGED 15-29 NEITHER STUDYING NOR WORKING BY AGE GROUP,  
INCOME QUINTILE AND COUNTRY GROUPING, AROUND 2006
(Percentages)
First country grouping (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay)
Male Female
15-19 years 20-24 years 25-29 years 15-29 years 15-19 years 20-24 years 25-29 years 15-29 years
First quintile 23.5 34.7 22.5 26.2 30.8 59.5 64.2 47.6
Fifth quintile 6.3 5.6 3.7 5.0 5.8 8.5 10.0 8.3
Second country grouping (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua)
First quintile 10.0 13.4 12.5 11.6 56.1 77.3 73.6 67.2
Fifth quintile 6.5 8.2 7.0 7.3 15.0 24.7 25.3 21.7
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
The data on the relative weight of the group of young 
people who neither study nor work are a danger sign for the 
risk of marginalization and social exclusion in any society. 
Table I.6 provides a simplified view of the relative weight 
of this population category among adolescents and young 
people from households at opposite extremes of the income 
distribution. As with the figures analysed above, only two 
groups of countries are considered, classified on the basis 
of where they are in the demographic transition and the 
extent of educational coverage of the population. 
Reading the data in the table leads to some broad 
conclusions. 
First, disaffiliation from the principal public institutions 
is more frequent among women than among men and for 
lower-income young people than for their peers at the 
other extreme of the distribution. 
Moreover, the percentage of institutional disaffiliation 
among poor men in the group of countries at a later stage 
in the demographic transition (first group) is twice to three 
times the percentage for young men in the lower strata 
in the second country group. These data might be the 
combined result of at least three trends. First, the relative 
development of countries is associated with less willingness 
on the part of young people to accept low-paying, unstable 
jobs with little or no protection. A second trend that could 
be contributing to the social disaffiliation of young men 
in the second country group is the rapid overall raising of 
the qualification thresholds for accessing good jobs. And 
a third trend, already reflected in figures I.12 and I.13, is 
that even with low participation rates for women in the 
first quintile, these rates are higher in the more developed 
countries than in the less developed countries of the region. 
A larger number of women in the market means they are 
competing with men for access to low-skill jobs; this could 
be undercutting job opportunities for men.
Lastly, in the less developed countries of the region, 
young women in the higher strata who neither study nor 
work but surely perform traditional domestic tasks still 
outnumber their peers in more developed countries by 
more than three to one. 
C.  Subjective well-being, living conditions and life cycle: 
 Latin America and other regions of the world
National life satisfaction averages in the countries of Latin America are far higher than what would 
be expected on the basis of per capita GDP, and the gaps in subjective well-being associated with 
monetary income are narrower than would be expected in view of the distributive inequality in the 
region. In Latin America, life dissatisfaction is more likely among persons aged 60 and older in 
the worst socio-economic situation, among 17-to-29-year-olds with children and among persons 
without a stable partner. Policies should thus take into consideration the difficulties associated 
with ageing without the necessary economic resources, as well as the problems arising from 
taking on the roles of provider and child caregiver early in conditions of greater vulnerability. 
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Previous sections of this chapter have shown that Latin 
America is increasingly in need of moving towards a broader 
view of poverty and well-being that both incorporates and 
goes beyond the monetary dimension. The reasoning behind 
incorporating the subjective dimension in an assessment of 
well-being is a matter of general discussion. The answer lies 
in conceptual and normative reflection and in examining 
the empirical behaviour of the subjective indicators. 
This brings relevance to empirical studies analysing how 
expressions of subjective well-being are linked to objective 
living conditions in Latin America.9
In Latin America, unlike in developed countries, there 
have been few studies of the relationship between living 
condition indicators and subjective measurements of well-
being.10 From the empirical antecedents available, Diener 
(2000) and Inglehart and others (2008) found that, compared 
with other regions, average life satisfaction in the countries 
of Latin America was higher than to be expected on the 
basis of degree of wealth. But these conclusions were drawn 
9 See the most recent editions of Social Panorama of Latin America 
(ECLAC, 2007, 2008a and 2009) and ECLAC (2010d).
10 This interest in the relationship between objective and subjective 
well-being is a long-standing one in the developed world. The first 
systematic studies of life satisfaction began in the 1950s (Keyes, 
Ryff and Shmotkin, 2002).
from a limited number of countries and observations over 
time.11 Nor have there been systematic studies on the region 
linking subjective well-being to indicators of an individual’s 
life-cycle position and associated tasks, or comparing this 
relationship with observations elsewhere in the world.
This section therefore looks at the relationship between 
life satisfaction and income indicators (GDP per capita 
and household income, in this case), comparing Latin 
America and other regions cross-sectionally and over 
time. This analysis seeks to confirm, on the basis of the 
largest possible number of countries and observations, 
whether subjective well-being in Latin America is higher 
than would be expected on the basis of GDP per capita. It 
also examines the relationship between subjective well-
being and indicators for the position and responsibilities 
of men and women in different stages of the life cycle 
(age, civil status and number of children), controlling for 
household monetary income and comparing the findings 
with other regions of the world. 
11 Diener (2000) is based on data for Argentina, Brazil and Chile; 
Inglehart and others (2008) analyse evidence from 12 countries of 
Latin America and 2 countries in the Caribbean (4 of them with a 
single observation).
1.  Empirical antecedents
Researchers who first analysed subjective well-being 
focused on identifying external conditions (like income 
per capita) that could lead to more satisfactory lives. 
One of the most influential studies was conducted by 
Easterlin (1973, 1974), who observed that countries 
with the largest increments in GDP had stable levels of 
subjective well-being over time. These findings were 
corroborated by other research. For example, Frey and 
Stutzer (2002) noted that gains in subjective well-being 
level off once GDP per capita tops US$ 10,000, and Diener 
and Biswas-Diener (2002) found that the correlation 
between income and subjective well-being is far smaller 
in more developed countries. Diener and Suh (1999) 
observed a correlation of 0.62 between mean purchasing 
power12 and life satisfaction in the countries under review. 
But they did note outliers like Japan (high income and 
low subjective well-being) and poor countries whose 
population did not report extremely low satisfaction levels.
12 Refers to the ability to purchase a standard basket of goods that 
an average person in each country can afford on his or her annual 
income, expressed as a percentage of the mean purchasing power 
of individuals in the United States. Indicator constructed on the 
basis of information provided by the World Bank.
The past few years have yielded evidence of a stronger 
relationship between income and subjective well-being at 
the country level. Boarini, Johansson and Mira d’Ercole 
(2007) note that the tendency for satisfaction to level 
off at high levels of GDP is less clear when considering 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
countries only, and that how these factors are linked 
depends on the countries evaluated and the measure of 
income used. Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) and Inglehart 
and others (2008) propose that there was an increase in 
subjective well-being in many countries associated with 
an increment in income. But Diener and others (2010) 
suggest that research outcomes vary and conclusions are 
based on uncertain statistics; Easterlin (2005) stresses that 
many countries saw increases in income without rising 
subjective well-being and that these disparate trends indicate 
that factors other than income influence life satisfaction. 
According to Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), the more 
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time series and countries become available the stronger the 
evidence is that happiness increases along with GDP. 
The pattern is similar for the relationship between 
income and life satisfaction at the individual level: income 
has a positive but varying impact, and there are striking 
differences in how individuals turn income into well-being. 
In the slums of Calcutta, the ratio between income and life 
satisfaction was 0.45 (Diener, Oishi and Lucas, 2003). On 
the other hand, most studies in Europe show a positive but 
weak relationship between income and satisfaction (Dolan, 
Peasgood and White, 2008). In the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Shields and Price 
(2005) observed that 1% of the variance in subjective well-
being was explained by income. Moreover, longitudinal 
studies show that changes in income are not followed by 
equivalent changes in subjective well-being and that different 
individuals do not transform income into well-being in the 
same way (Clark and others, 2005).13
13 This study was based on three rounds of the European Community 
Household Panel (1994 to 1996) on the basis of a sample of 
109,425 cases (36,475 subjects for each round in 12 countries).
The research identified variables other than income 
that are associated with subjective well-being. Notable 
among these are employment status, education and physical 
health, as well as factors showing the subjects’ position 
in the life cycle. Among these are age, civil status and 
responsibilities in caring for other household members 
(Dolan, Peasgood and White, 2008). Concerning age, 
studies in developed countries have found a U curve where 
the highest levels of subjective well-being are among the 
youngest and oldest age groups and the lowest levels are in 
the intermediate age groups (Dolan, Peasgood and White, 
2008; Shields and Price, 2005). As for civil status, being 
married is associated with the highest level of subjective 
well-being and being separated with the lowest level 
(Helliwell, 2003; Shields and Price, 2005). The time spent 
on activities related to the economy of care is associated 
with lower levels of happiness and more symptoms of 
depression (Dolan, Peasgood and White, 2008).
2. Life satisfaction and income indicators
Figure I.14 sets out the results of a study linking national 
average life satisfaction and GDP per capita in countries 
of Latin America and the Caribbean and in other regions 
for the period 1981-2008. For most of the countries and 
years, both for Latin America and the Caribbean and for 
the rest of the countries, life satisfaction data are from the 
World Values Survey (WVS). To have more cases, the series 
for Latin America was completed with data from the 2007 
round of the Latinobarómetro survey for 10 countries of the 
region. The logarithm of GDP was used instead of GDP in 
United States dollars because changes in subjective well-
being will be associated more with relative variations in 
living conditions (Kahneman and Deaton, 2010).14
The results set out in figure I.14 indicate that, 
worldwide, life satisfaction is correlated to GDP per capita. 
National life satisfaction averages rise significantly as 
14 Logarithmic transformation can represent a regular quantitative 
perception of physical stimuli. It has an experimental basis known as 
Weber’s law. The rule is that the effective stimulus for perceiving and 
evaluating changes in the environment is proportional (not absolute) 
change. A US$ 100 wage hike would therefore not have the same 
significance for a company manager as for someone earning the 
minimum wage, but doubling the wages of both individuals should 
have a similar perceived impact for both subjects (Kahneman and 
Deaton, 2010). The problem is that individuals can evaluate the 
same stimulus on the basis of differential thresholds in different 
sociocultural contexts. 
GDP per capita increases (measured in logarithms).15 
The national life satisfaction averages for the countries 
of Latin America seem to be far higher than their GDP 
per capita, not only because they exceed the scores in 
countries of Eastern Europe and Asia but also because they 
are comparable with national averages in the countries of 
Western Europe, North America and Oceania. 
One way to determine with greater certainty whether 
Latin Americans are more satisfied with life than their GDP 
per capita would suggest is to analyse the residuals of an 
ordinary least squares regression model with the subjective 
well-being indicator as the dependent variable and GDP 
per capita as the independent variable, where the residuals 
are equivalent to the distance between the value predicted 
by the equation and the observed value. The results of 
this analysis are set out in figure I.15, which shows that 
Latin America and the Caribbean have the highest average 
positive residuals (average of 0.92). This means that the 
countries of the region have satisfaction levels that are 
higher than would be expected on the basis of GDP per 
capita.16 The exact opposite is found in Eastern Europe 
(average of -0.96). The differences between Latin America 
and the Caribbean and the other regions, particularly 
Eastern Europe, are statistically significant.
15 P = 0.000*** (statistically significant difference at the 99.99% level).
16 The average residuals for Latin America and the Caribbean without 
the Latinobarómetro data are slightly lower, suggesting that part of 
the deviation for Latin America could be due to the small number 
of observations.
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Figure I.14 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (20 COUNTRIES)  
AND OTHER REGIONS: LIFE SATISFACTION BY 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of data from the World Values Survey 
database, 1981-2008; the Latinobarómetro survey for 2007; World Bank, 
World Development Indicators [online] http://data.worldbank.org/indicator; 
information on per capita GDP of the relevant countries, 1981-2008.
a  Average values on a life satisfaction scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is very unsatisfied 
and 10 is very satisfied. 
 Western Europe, Noth America and Oceania: Andorra, Australia, Canada, Cyprus, 
Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. Eastern Europe: Albania, Belarus, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
and Ukraine. Asia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, China, Georgia, Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region of China, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), 
Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic 
of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey and Viet Nam. Africa: Algeria, 
Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, 
Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Latin America and 
the Caribbean: Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Puerto 
Rico, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay. 
 The Latinobarómetro data were used to estimate life satisfaction in 2007 in the following 
countries: Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Plurinational State of 
Bolivia. The question used by Latinobarómetro is not 100% comparable with the WVS 
question because the Latinobarómetro survey used a scale from 1 to 10 and the WVS 
has been using a scale from 1 to 10 since 1981. Accordingly, the Latinobarómetro 
scores were corrected by increasing the national average by one point.
 Log (10) values: 2.5 = US$ 314 per capita; 3 = US$ 1,023 per capita; 3.5 = US$ 3,157 per 
capita; 4 = US$ 9,913 per capita; 4.5 = US$ 32,040 per capita.
The analysis in figures I.14 and I.15 associates life 
satisfaction and GDP per capita in a cross-sectional fashion 
and cannot be used to examine the relationship between 
changes in GDP and variations in satisfaction levels or to 
compare trends across regions. This latter analysis is set 
out in figure I.16, which shows that changes in GDP per 
capita are significantly associated with changes in national 
satisfaction averages.17 In this case, the percentage of 
variance explained is smaller than in the cross-sectional 
analysis. However, a smaller number of observations was 
available for the change analysis.
17 Adjusted R-squared=0.20; standardized beta coefficient=0.457; 
p=0.000*** (significant at the 99.9% level).
Figure I.15 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (20 COUNTRIES)  
AND OTHER REGIONS: ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES 
REGRESSION RESIDUALS FOR LIFE SATISFACTION 



















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of data from the World Values Survey 
database, 1981-2008; the Latinobarómetro survey for 2007; World Bank, 
World Development Indicators [online] http://data.worldbank.org/indicator; 
information on per capita GDP of the relevant countries, 1981-2008.
a  Average difference between expected and observed values. Significance of differences 
between Latin America and the Caribbean and the other regions: p Eastern Europe = 
0.000***; p Asia = 0.000***; p Western Europe, North America and Oceania = 0.001**. 
From post-hoc Scheffe comparisons.
Figure I.16 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (NINE COUNTRIES) AND 
OTHER REGIONS: CHANGES IN LIFE SATISFACTION  
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of special tabulations of data from the World Values Survey 
database, 1981-2008; the Latinobarómetro survey for 2007; World Bank, 
World Development Indicators [online] http://data.worldbank.org/indicator; 
information on per capita GDP of the relevant countries, 1981-2008.
a Latin America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Puerto Rico and Uruguay. Western Europe, North 
America and Oceania: Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. Eastern Europe: 
Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Czech Republic, Hungary, Montenegro, 
Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Ukraine. Asia: Bangladesh, China, 
India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Japan, Jordan, Philippines, Republic of 
Korea, Turkey and Viet Nam.
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The greatest coincidence of the direction of change 
for GDP per capita and for life satisfaction is in Eastern 
Europe. The smallest coincidence is in Western Europe, 
North America and Oceania, where the greater number 
of observations show a rising GDP and a small decline in 
satisfaction. In Latin America and the Caribbean, several 
points on figure I.16 show a convergence between the 
direction of changes in GDP and in life satisfaction. But 
there are counter-intuitive situations, such as satisfaction 
rising when per capita GDP is falling, or increases in GDP 
while life satisfaction is declining.
Measuring relative household monetary income 
also reveals these regional differences in behaviour 
of the subjective well-being indicator over time. This 
has the additional advantage of showing the evolution 
of differences in satisfaction among monetary income 
groups, taking into consideration recent historical 
events in the countries and regions (such as economic 
or political crises). 
Figure I.17 shows that over the past two decades life 
satisfaction levels in Latin America have been higher and 
more stable than in Asia and Eastern Europe and that the 
satisfaction gaps between lower and higher monetary 
income groups are less marked than in the other regions. 
The fact that income differences have such a slight 
influence on life satisfaction brings into question the 
impact of objective inequality on subjective well-being 
in the countries of Latin America.18 
18 After all, Latin America and the Caribbean is among the regions of 
the world with the highest distributive inequality, and perceptions of 
distributive injustice are widespread in the region (ECLAC, 2010d).
Figure I.17 
LATIN AMERICA (FIVE COUNTRIES), EASTERN EUROPE AND ASIA: LIFE SATISFACTION IN  
HIGH- AND LOW-INCOME GROUPS, 1990-2008 a
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from the World Values Survey database,1981-2008.
a  The measure of income is based on self-reported income classified in 10 steps or groups, arranged from lowest to highest relative income. The classification, from the World 
Values Survey, defines income brackets as appropriate for the realities of each country. For reasons of sample size, this exercise used a recoding of the income groups originally 
defined in the World Values Survey. Steps 1 and 2 in each country refer to the low-income group, while steps 5-10 refer to the high-income groups of the population.
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One possible interpretation is that in Latin America 
inequality is so firmly rooted in the population that it has 
lost relevance for subjective well-being, while in Eastern 
Europe the depth of change (not only in the economy but in 
life in general) since the fall of the Berlin wall might have 
triggered so many new stimuli that the population would 
have needed to draw on significant psychological and other 
resources to deal with the changes.19 In other words, the 
happiness system would be more a reflection of changing 
circumstances than of their desirability (see box I.6).
Another possible interpretation is that drastic changes 
in the environment can significantly alter expectations. 
19 In sociological terms, this equates to a more general interpretation 
of psychological malaise informed by Durkeim’s anomie and not by 
Marx’s theory of alienation. For an explanation of the differences 
between these two approaches, see ECLAC (2008a).
In Eastern Europe, then, expectations for greater well-being 
after the fall of the Berlin wall could have been generally 
low. But the collapse of the old order and the opening of 
a window on developed-country levels of consumption 
might have brightened expectations that subsequently went 
unfulfilled because of the crisis that hit Eastern Europe 
in the mid-1990s. A comparable case in Latin America 
would be Chile, where high life satisfaction among low- 
and high-income groups in 1990 could have been linked 
to the advent of democracy. But it would seem that the 
expectations of lower-income groups were not fully met, 
as figure I.17 shows.20 
20 This could be an affective forecasting issue because Chile 
systematically improved its objective living conditions indicators 
between 1990 and 2006.
The field of hedonic psychology seeks valid 
and reliable approaches to the concept 
of utility that indicate how individuals rate 
life experiences as pleasant. The most 
frequently used measures of subjective 
well-being are obtained from population 
surveys, where the interviewees answer 
general retrospective questions on well-
being (life satisfaction or happiness). These 
reports tend to tie in with other measures 
of subjective well-being, which suggests 
a certain degree of validity (Diener and 
Tov, 2005). But such measures have been 
challenged, based mainly on issues of 
interpersonal comparability.
1. Adaptation 
Adaptation is the adjustment of the 
intensity of response to stimuli repeated 
over time. This objection is among those 
most frequently mentioned in the non-
psychological literature (see, for example, 
Sen, 1985). The problem is that if people 
adapt to their circumstances and adjust 
their expectations, individuals living in 
very different conditions will score equally 
high for subjective well-being. Brickman 
and Campbell (1971) proposed that 
human beings are trapped on a “hedonic 
treadmill”, meaning that they can do little 
to change their levels of satisfaction over 
time because adaptation is inevitable and 
no single circumstance could lead to lasting 
changes in satisfaction. Individuals would 
therefore revert to a neutral position after 
any significant emotional event (Diener 
and Tov, 2005).
The hedonic treadmill theory is based 
on a model in which psychological systems 
react automatically to deviations from their 
adaptation level. In these processes, a 
repeated stimulus loses relevance and this 
frees up resources for reacting to new stimuli. 
So, the “happiness system” would be more 
a reflection of changes in circumstances 
than of their desirability. Brickman, Coates 
and Janoff-Bulman (1978) provided early 
empirical support for the hedonic treadmill 
model when they concluded that lottery 
winners were no happier than losers and 
that paraplegics were not substantially 
unhappier than people who can walk. 
However, the following observations have 
been made over the past few years: (a) 
there is no neutral set-point (people are 
happy most of the time); (b) set-points 
vary between individuals and dimensions 
of well-being; (c) happiness changes over 
time; and (d) adaptation is not universal 
—there are types of pleasure and pain to 
which individuals do not adapt (Diener, 
Lucas and Scollon, 2006; Kahneman and 
Sugden, 2005).
2.  The failures of affective forecasting
An individual’s predictions of experienced 
utility are subject to systematic error because 
people do not consider how hedonic 
adaptation to new circumstances will 
influence future levels of well-being. Moreover, 
individuals tend to exaggerate the importance 
of their current focus of attention. Hence, 
although human beings are trapped on a 
hedonic treadmill they believe that they are 
improving their well-being. The systematic 
failure of affective forecasting lies in the fact 
that people incorrectly predict future happiness 
(Kahneman and Sugden, 2005).
3.  Memory bias 
Memor ies are in f luenced by 
expectations and mood; in some cases 
individuals block out some experiences 
and exaggerate others. Such bias is 
especially present in reports based on 
general retrospective evaluations (example: 
how satisfied are you with your life as a 
whole) in which the subjects average the 
well-being they obtain from certain activities 
or domains. By contrast, when subjects 
report on their mood immediately (online), 
few memory biases are operating because 
the individual is reporting emotions and 
cognitions right then. Indicators based on 
general retrospective questions are modestly 
reliable for estimating an individual’s current 
well-being (Diener and Tov, 2005; Kahneman 
and Sugden, 2005).
4.  Social comparison 
Self-ratings of well-being are based 
more on the relative status of individuals 
than on any absolute level of consumption 
or well-being. Wood (1996) holds that 
social comparison is a thought process 
based on the observation of similarities 
and differences with other individuals 
and that the focus of comparison is not 
determined on the sole basis of proximity or 
accessibility of other relevant factors. It was 
initially proposed that an individual should 
be happy if relevant others are worse off, 
and unhappy if relevant others are better 
off (Diener and Fujita, 1997). According 
to Brown and Dutton (1995), individuals 
compare themselves with others when they 
think that the comparison will make them 
Box I.6 
MEASURING SATISFACTION AND HAPPINESS
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feel good and avoid comparisons when 
they believe comparisons will make them 
feel bad. Lyubomirsky and Ross (1997) 
observe that happy individuals tend to 
compare themselves down and unhappy 
individuals tend to compare themselves 
both up and down.
5.  Personality factors 
There is evidence that personality is a 
powerful predictor of subjective well-being 
(Diener and others, 1999). Costa and McCrae 
(1980) found links between extraversion and 
positive affect and between neuroticism 
and negative affect. This was confirmed 
by subsequent studies and explained by 
the joint operation of genetic, biological, 
psychological and social mechanisms 
(Diener and others, 1999). The problem 
is that because of their correlation with 
personality traits, measures of well-being 
could reflect individual differences beyond 
the reach of policies. Moreover, the observed 
differences in subjective well-being might 
not be due to living conditions but rather 
to individual predisposition. In any event, 
while personality explains part of subjective 
well-being, living conditions are also an 
influence (Schmutte and Ryff, 1997; Dolan, 
Peasgood and White, 2008).
6.  Cultural differences 
Culture shapes the world vision and 
affects how individuals evaluate their 
circumstances and life experiences. These 
differences may be expressed in differing 
concepts of happiness or satisfaction, in the 
use of different kinds of information and even 
in different forms of self-conceptualization 
associated with specific cultural norms. 
For example, while internal emotional 
experience (the balance between positive 
and negative affect) predicts life satisfaction in 
individualistic cultures (Sweden or the United 
States of America), in more collectivistic 
societies like China or India life satisfaction 
is associated more with social norms (Suh, 
Diener and Updegraff, 2008).
7.  Issues with operationalization and 
measurement 
Questions about life satisfaction are 
ordinal and have upper and lower limits. 
A life satisfaction score of 6 on a scale of 
1 to 10 does not mean that the individual 
is twice as satisfied as another individual 
with a score of 3. For this reason it has 
been recommended that ordinal regressions 
be used instead of ordinary least squares 
procedures, even though recent research 
showed that this had little effect on findings 
(Clark and others, 2005). Other problems 
have to do with the order of questions 
(some items can stress some aspects of 
life over others) and the differential use of 
scales (some individuals may tend to use 
the extreme numbers while others may 
prefer the intermediate numbers) (Diener 
and Tov, 2005). 
Source: Economic Comission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Box I.6 (concluded)
In any event, the reasons why Latin America is a 
subjective well-being outlier should be researched more 
thoroughly. Some hypotheses concern the effect of cultural 
factors such as religion (Inglehart and others, 2008) and 
the high levels of social support and social closure that 
characterize Latin American societies (Diener and Tov, 
2005). It has also been suggested that the consolidation 
of democracy in the countries of the region increased 
perceived freedom and led to a rise in subjective well-being 
in Latin America (Inglehart and others, 2008).21
21 The consolidation of democracy is framed by a theory of cultural 
change tied to modernization.
There are methodological issues as well, such the 
effect of cultural differences on self-evaluations of well-
being and how people respond to surveys. One possibility 
is that in Latin America life satisfaction, as one of the 
cognitive components of subjective well-being, is more 
strongly correlated to the emotional aspects of well-being 
(like happiness) than in other regions and is less correlated 
to income.22 However, the available data point in exactly 
the opposite direction (see table I.7).
22 For further details on the dimensions of subjective well-being and their 
relationship to measures of monetary income, see Diener, Kahneman 
and Heliwell (2010) and Kahneman and Deaton (2010).
Table I.7 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (11 COUNTRIES) AND OTHER REGIONS: CORRELATION  
BETWEEN LIFE SATISFACTION AND HAPPINESS, 1981-2008
Latin America and 
the Caribbean a Eastern Europe
 b Continental 
Europe c
Anglo-Saxon 
countries d Nordic countries
 e
Correlation ratio 0.359 0.488 0.554 0.520 0.519
Sample size 39 980 31 341 9 841 12 831 8 115
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from the World Values Survey 1981-2008.
a  Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. 
b  Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation and Ukraine.
c  France, Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland. 
d  Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States.
e  Finland, Norway and Sweden.
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This section looks at the relationship between subjective 
well-being and indicators for the position of men and 
women in the life cycle (age, civil status, number of 
children), comparing Latin America with other regions 
according to the welfare regimes they have in place. 
For the developed countries, the typology proposed by 
Esping-Andersen (1990) is used, distinguishing between 
liberal, conservative and social democratic regimes.23 Latin 
America and Eastern Europe were analysed as separate 
groups, with two elements in common: neither region is, 
strictly speaking, a “mature” welfare regime, and both 
are developing regions.24
The first phase of the analysis identified how life-cycle 
factors affect life satisfaction and compared the findings 
by region and welfare regime. A more exhaustive analysis 
followed, including the life-cycle factors most associated 
with life satisfaction in the first stage. This second analysis 
sought to identify interactions between life-cycle factors and 
living conditions because, for example, the effects of age on 
life satisfaction might not be the same at different levels of 
monetary income. To ensure sufficient sample sizes, all of 
the World Values Survey rounds available for the selected 
countries between 1981 and 2008 were used, although most 
of the cases are in the 1990-2008 segment.25
From the first phase of the analysis, perhaps the 
most interesting finding from a life-cycle viewpoint is the 
association between age and subjective well-being. The 
U-shaped pattern described in the literature (showing higher 
levels of satisfaction at younger ages and in older adults) is 
seen in the Nordic countries and does not strictly hold for 
continental Europe or the Anglo-Saxon countries, because 
the youngest are less likely to be satisfied than older persons 
are. The U pattern does not hold in Eastern Europe either, 
because young people there are significantly more likely 
to be satisfied than are older persons. No age effect is seen 
in Latin America (see table I.A-1 in the appendix).
23 These correspond to the Anglo-Saxon countries, the countries 
of continental Europe and the Nordic countries, respectively. 
The classification is based on criteria such as the degrees of 
commodification (dependence or not on market income to 
maintain an acceptable standard of living) and defamiliarization 
(emancipation of women from work related to the economy of care 
in the household) in the countries.
24 Regardless of any specific welfare configurations in the countries 
of Latin America and Eastern Europe. 
25 Respectively, 93.1% in Latin America; 90.5% in the liberal Anglo-
Saxon countries; 86% in the countries of continental Europe; 87.7% 
in the Nordic countries; 92.7% in Eastern Europe.
Although the U-shaped pattern does not strictly 
apply for most of the regions, in almost all of the groups 
of countries analysed (except for Latin America) the 
likelihood of satisfaction declines in the intermediate 
age groups (30-44 and 45-59). This is regardless of the 
welfare regime in place and could be a reflection of the 
tensions and burdens that characterize this stage in life, 
when intermediate-age adults must be providers as well 
as care for dependants in the household. 
As for the association between gender and life 
satisfaction, the regression analysis shows no significant 
relationship in Latin America or Eastern Europe, while 
there is one in the more developed countries regardless 
of the specific welfare regime in place. In the Nordic 
countries and the Anglo-Saxon countries and in continental 
Europe, the likelihood of life satisfaction is significantly 
lower among men than among women (see table I.A-1 in 
the appendix). This could be an expression of malaise in 
societies that have undergone major changes in gender role 
models, with growing levels of autonomy for women.
Being married, being in a shared living arrangement 
or having a partner significantly increase the likelihood 
of being satisfied with life compared with being single, 
separated, divorced or widowed, both in Latin America 
and the rest of the regions. Not having children reduces 
the likelihood of life satisfaction in the Nordic countries 
and in continental Europe, but —unexpectedly— this 
does not have the same effect in Latin America. 
What has been presented up to now is the outcome 
for the principal effects. From here on the focus will be 
on the relationship between subjective well-being and 
life-cycle indicators —this time to research interactions. 
First comes an examination of the relationship between 
age and subjective well-being, controlling for household 
monetary income. Then the focus will shift to the association 
between life satisfaction and such factors as civil status, 
number of children and age. For the latter, the universe is 
limited to the working-age population (age 17-59).
Figure I.18 shows that the age effect differs among 
monetary income brackets in all of the country groups. 
Strictly speaking, in the more developed countries the 
U-shaped pattern is found only among individuals living 
in the lowest-income households, while in Latin America 
the life-satisfaction gap linked to income bracket is 
wider among individuals aged 60 or older. In Eastern 
Europe, life-satisfaction levels fall off consistently after 
age 30-44.
3. Satisfaction and life cycle
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Figure I.18 
LATIN AMERICA (11 COUNTRIES) AND OTHER REGIONS: LIFE SATISFACTION BY AGE AND MONETARY INCOME, 1981-2008 a
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from the World Values Survey database,1981-2008.
a  Interaction income/age; Latin America p=0.027*; Eastern Europe, p=0.003**; Nordic countries, p=0.000***; continental Europe, p=0.000***; Anglo-Saxon countries, p=0.000***.
b  Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay.
c  Finland, Norway and Sweden.
d  Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation and Ukraine.
e  Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States. 
f  France, Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland. 
The data for Eastern Europe and Latin America 
bring into question the idea of hedonic adaptation of 
expectations among the population aged 60 and older. It is 
not the same thing to age without financial worries (either 
because of self-funded pensions or thanks to a more or 
less generous welfare state) than to do so in a precarious 
economic situation without social protections. Projections 
for the developing countries based on the trends observed 
in developed countries suggest a medium-term scenario 
for Latin America in which the relationship between life 
satisfaction, age and income could approach the pattern 
seen in the more affluent societies. 
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As seen in figure I.19, in Latin America being married 
or in a shared living arrangement or having a partner is 
associated with higher levels of life satisfaction regardless 
of number of children or age. Such is not the case in the 
other regions, where the correlation between having (or 
planning to have) a family and life satisfaction always 
occurs in interaction with such other factors as number 
of children and age. At the same time, in Latin America 
there is an interaction effect between age and number of 
children: childless 17-to-29-year-olds report the highest 
levels of life satisfaction. The lowest life satisfaction levels 
are seen in the same age group with one or more children. 
A similar situation is observed in Eastern Europe and in 
the Anglo-Saxon countries.
Figure I.19 
LATIN AMERICA (11 COUNTRIES) AND OTHER REGIONS: LIFE SATISFACTION BY MARITAL STATUS AND NUMBER  
OF CHILDREN IN POPULATION AGED 17-59, 1981-2008





















































Married, shared living arrangement, partner Separated, widowed, single, never married
Married, shared living arrangement, partner Separated, widowed, single, never married Married, shared living arrangement, partner Separated, widowed, single, never married
Married, shared living arrangement, partner Separated, widowed, single, never married
Married, shared living arrangement, partner Separated, widowed, single, never married
































0 children 1 or more 0 children 1 or more
0 children 1 or more
0 children 1 or more 0 children 1 or more
0 children 1 or more 0 children 1 or more 0 children 1 or more
0 children 1 or more 0 children 1 or more
Latin America a
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from the World Values Survey database,1981-2008.
a  Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay; interaction age*children (p=0.000***), 
principal effect of marriage (p=0.000***).
b  France, Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland; interaction marriage*children (p=0.000***), principal effect of age (p=0.006**). 
c  Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation and Ukraine; interaction marriage*children 
(p=0.000***) and age*children (p=0.000***). 
d  Finland, Norway and Sweden; interaction marriage*children (p=0.001**), principal effect of age (p=0.000*).
e  Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States; interaction age*marriage (p=0.004**), marriage*children (p=0.002**) and age*children (p=0.004**).
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Life-cycle variables, then, influence subjective well-
being in Latin America and other regions. How these factors 
are associated seems to have more to do with the degree 
of development at the county level than with the welfare 
regime in place. Strictly speaking, the greater responsibilities 
and tasks linked to intermediate ages in the life cycle do 
not always lead to lower life satisfaction; the likelihood of 
this happening increases when material living conditions 
are more precarious. The fact that in Latin America the 
life satisfaction gap linked to income bracket widens in 
the population aged 60 and older shows that individuals do 
not always adapt their expectations. As said earlier, better 
material living conditions make it easier to adapt.
Lastly, the family is still at the core of individual life 
projects in Latin America, as shown by the principal effect 
that being married, being in a shared living arrangement 
or having a partner has on subjective well-being. This 
effect is not seen in any of the other regions or countries 
included in this analysis. Also to be borne in mind is 
how well-being can be negatively impacted by the need 
to take on the role of provider and caregiver at a very 
early age without adequate support for shouldering these 
responsibilities. This is seen in the low levels of life 
satisfaction among 17-to-29-year-olds in Latin America 
with children and without a partner. 
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Appendix
Table I.A-1 



















Argentina c 1990 d 16.2 21.2 7.2 3.4 3.5 5.2 1.6 0.8
1999 16.3 23.7 8.6 4.3 4.3 6.6 2.1 1.1
2002 34.9 45.4 21.1 12.8 13.9 20.9 8.4 4.6
2006 14.7 21.0 8.3 4.6 4.9 7.2 2.8 1.5




1989 e 48.9 52.6 24.5 15.0 21.9 23.0 9.7 6.1
1999 54.7 60.6 33.9 24.1 32.5 36.4 20.3 14.7
2002 55.5 62.4 34.4 23.8 31.7 37.1 19.5 13.5
 2007 47.2 54.0 27.8 18.2 27.2 31.2 14.5 9.7
Brazil 1990 41.4 48.0 23.5 14.7 18.3 23.4 9.7 5.5
1999 29.9 37.5 17.0 10.2 9.6 12.9 5.3 3.3
2001 29.9 37.5 17.3 10.7 10.0 13.2 5.8 3.8
2008 19.9 25.8 10.7 6.3 5.8 7.3 3.3 2.2
2009 19.3 24.9 10.5 6.2 5.7 7.0 3.2 2.2
Chile 1990 33.3 38.6 14.9 8.0 10.6 13.0 4.4 2.3
 1998 17.8 21.7 7.5 3.8 4.6 5.6 2.0 1.1
 2003 15.3 18.7 6.3 3.2 3.9 4.7 1.7 1.0
 2006 11.3 13.7 4.4 2.2 2.7 3.2 1.1 0.7
 2009 9.8 11.5 4.0 2.2 3.3 3.6 1.5 1.0
Colombia 1994 47.3 52.5 26.6 17.5 25.0 28.5 13.8 9.1
1999 48.7 54.9 25.6 15.7 23.2 26.8 11.2 6.9
2002 f 48.2 54.2 26.3 16.5 17.6 19.9 8.8 5.6
2008 f 39.5 46.1 21.7 13.7 15.5 17.9 8.4 5.6
2009 f 39.3 45.7 20.8 12.7 14.3 16.5 7.2 4.6
Costa Rica 1990 23.6 26.3 10.7 6.5 10.0 10.1 4.8 3.4
 1999 18.2 20.3 8.1 4.8 7.5 7.8 3.5 2.3
 2002 18.6 20.3 8.4 5.2 7.7 8.2 3.9 2.7
 2008 14.8 16.4 5.8 3.1 5.2 5.5 2.2 1.4
 2009 16.8 18.9 6.9 3.9 6.4 6.9 3.0 2.0
Dominican 
Republic
2002 42.2 47.1 20.9 12.6 18.2 20.7 8.8 5.3
2008 40.1 44.3 20.2 12.1 20.4 22.6 8.8 5.0
 2009 37.8 41.1 18.5 11.0 19.8 21.0 8.0 4.5
Ecuador c 1990 55.8 62.1 27.6 15.8 22.6 26.2 9.2 4.9
1999 58.0 63.5 30.1 18.2 27.2 31.3 11.5 6.3
2002 42.6 49.0 20.8 11.8 16.3 19.4 6.9 3.7
2008 36.5 42.7 16.6 9.0 14.8 18.0 6.1 3.2
2009 35.9 42.2 16.8 9.1 14.9 18.1 6.2 3.3
El Salvador 1995 47.6 54.2 24.0 14.3 18.2 21.7 9.1 5.6
 1999 43.5 49.8 22.9 14.0 18.3 21.9 9.4 5.8
 2001 42.9 48.9 22.7 14.0 18.3 22.1 9.5 5.7
2004 40.4 47.5 21.1 12.6 15.6 19.0 8.1 5.0
 2009 41.8 47.9 19.4 10.5 14.1 17.3 5.7 2.7
Guatemala 1989 63.0 69.4 35.9 23.1 36.7 42.0 18.5 11.2
1998 53.5 61.1 27.3 15.4 26.1 31.6 10.7 5.1
2002 52.8 60.2 27.0 15.4 26.9 30.9 10.7 5.5
2006 46.7 54.8 25.5 15.2 22.7 29.1 11.3 5.8
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Country Year
Poverty b Indigence















Honduras 1990 75.2 80.8 50.2 35.9 53.9 60.9 31.5 20.2
 1999 74.3 79.7 47.4 32.9 50.6 56.8 27.9 17.5
 2002 70.9 77.3 45.3 31.2 47.1 54.4 26.6 16.2
 2007 63.1 68.9 39.5 27.6 39.9 45.6 23.9 15.7
Mexico 1989 39.0 47.7 18.7 9.9 14.0 18.7 5.9 2.7
1998 38.0 46.9 18.4 9.4 13.2 18.5 5.3 2.2
2002 31.8 39.4 13.9 6.7 9.1 12.6 3.5 1.4
2008 27.9 34.8 12.0 5.7 8.2 11.2 3.2 1.3
Nicaragua 1993 68.1 73.6 41.9 29.3 43.2 48.4 24.3 16.2
 1998 65.1 69.9 39.4 27.3 40.1 44.6 22.6 15.1
 2001 63.0 69.4 37.1 24.5 36.5 42.5 19.2 12.0
 2005 54.4 61.9 29.1 17.3 26.8 31.9 12.3 6.5
Panama 1991 c 27.4 32.7 13.7 8.1 10.1 11.5 5.2 3.4
1999 c 17.0 20.8 7.6 4.1 4.9 5.9 2.3 1.4
2002 30.0 36.9 16.8 10.2 14.4 18.6 7.6 4.3
2008 21.5 27.7 11.5 6.5 9.5 13.5 5.1 2.7
2009 20.6 26.4 10.0 5.2 8.2 11.1 3.8 1.9
Paraguay 1990 g 36.8 43.2 16.1 8.0 10.4 13.1 3.6 1.5
 1999 51.7 60.6 30.2 19.0 26.0 33.8 14.5 8.5
 2001 52.0 61.0 30.3 19.5 26.5 33.2 15.4 9.6
 2008 50.2 58.2 26.9 15.9 25.1 30.8 12.1 6.5
 2009 50.1 56.0 26.0 15.8 26.7 30.4 12.7 7.4
Peru 1997 40.5 47.6 20.8 12.0 20.4 25.1 10.1 5.7
1999 42.3 48.6 20.6 11.7 18.7 22.4 9.2 5.1
2001 h 48.7 54.7 24.7 14.5 20.4 24.4 9.6 5.2
2008 h 31.0 36.2 13.6 7.0 10.5 12.6 4.0 1.8
2009 h 30.3 34.8 12.9 6.5 9.9 11.5 3.5 1.6
Uruguay c 1990 11.8 17.9 5.3 2.4 2.0 3.4 0.9 0.4
1999 5.6 9.4 2.7 1.2 0.9 1.8 0.4 0.2
2002 9.3 15.4 4.5 1.9 1.3 2.5 0.6 0.2
2008 8.5 13.7 4.2 1.9 1.8 3.4 0.9 0.3




1990 34.2 39.8 15.7 8.5 11.8 14.4 5.0 2.4
1999 44.0 49.4 22.6 13.7 19.4 21.7 9.0 5.5
2002 43.3 48.6 22.1 13.4 19.7 22.2 9.2 5.7
 2008 23.6 27.6 9.9 5.2 8.5 9.9 3.5 2.0
Latin America i 1990 41.0 48.3 … … 17.7 22.5 … …
1999 35.4 43.9 … … 14.1 18.7 … …
2002 36.1 44.0 … … 14.6 19.4 … …
2008 26.2 33.0 … … 10.0 12.9 … …
2009 26.3 33.1 … … 10.3 13.3 … …
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a H = headcount ratio; PG = poverty gap; FGT2 = Foster, Greer and Thorbecke index.
b  Includes households (individuals) living in indigence or extreme poverty.
c Urban area.
d  Greater Buenos Aires.
e  Eight departmental capitals plus the city of El Alto.
f Figures from the Mission to Reduce Poverty and Inequality (MERPD), the National Planning Department (DNP) and the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) 
of Colombia. These values are not comparable with those for previous years.
g Asunción metropolitan area.
h Figures from the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) of Peru. These values are not comparable with those for previous years because of the change in sampling 
framework for the household survey. The figures for 2001 refer to the fourth quarter; the figures for 2005-2008 refer to entire years.
i  Estimate for 18 countries of the region plus Haiti.
Table I.A-1 (concluded)
Social Panorama of Latin America • 2010 75
Table I.A-2 




Percent of total income Per capita income ratio c






D10 / D(1 to 4) Q5 / Q1
Argentina d 1990 e 10.6 15.0 23.7 26.7 34.6 13.5 13.5
1999 11.3 15.8 22.1 25.3 36.8 16.2 16.6
2002 7.3 14.4 20.5 24.6 40.5 19.0 20.7
2006 10.8 16.9 22.9 25.2 35.0 14.4 15.5
2009 16.1 15.5 24.6 27.8 32.1 15.0 16.6
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
1989 f 7.7 12.1 21.9 27.9 38.1 17.1 21.4
1999 5.6 9.3 24.1 29.6 37.0 26.7 48.1
 2002 6.1 9.5 21.4 28.3 40.8 30.3 44.2
 2007 6.1 11.2 25.2 28.2 35.4 22.2 31.5
Brazil 1990 9.4 9.6 18.5 28.0 43.9 31.2 35.0
1999 11.3 10.0 17.4 25.4 47.2 32.0 35.6
2001 11.0 10.3 17.4 25.6 46.7 32.2 36.9
2008 12.1 12.7 19.2 24.7 43.4 23.8 26.2
2009 11.8 13.2 20.3 25.5 41.0 21.1 23.9
Chile 1990 9.5 13.2 20.8 25.3 40.7 18.2 18.4
 1998 13.7 13.0 20.4 26.6 40.0 19.1 19.7
 2003 13.6 13.8 20.8 25.6 39.8 18.8 18.4
 2006 14.4 14.6 21.6 26.7 37.1 15.9 15.7
 2009 14.5 14.4 21.2 26.0 38.4 16.3 15.9
Colombia 1994 7.7 9.9 21.3 27.0 41.8 26.8 35.2
1999 6.7 12.4 21.6 26.0 40.0 22.3 25.6
2002 6.9 10.9 21.2 27.2 40.7 27.1 32.9
2008 7.3 11.3 22.2 26.9 39.6 25.4 32.8
2009 7.1 11.8 22.5 26.3 39.4 23.1 28.0
Costa Rica 1990 9.5 16.7 27.4 30.2 25.7 10.1 13.1
 1999 11.4 15.3 25.7 29.7 29.3 12.6 15.3
 2002 11.7 14.4 25.6 29.7 30.3 13.7 16.9
 2008 11.1 15.4 25.2 28.4 31.0 12.5 13.5
 2009 11.5 14.3 24.3 28.5 32.9 14.8 16.4
Dominican Republic
2002 6.9 12.7 22.7 26.9 37.7 17.8 20.7
2008 7.3 11.5 23.3 30.4 34.8 21.2 25.3
 2009 8.4 10.7 21.5 27.5 40.3 24.3 28.0
Ecuador d 1990 5.5 17.1 25.4 26.9 30.6 11.4 12.3
1999 5.6 14.1 22.7 26.5 36.7 17.2 18.4
2002 6.7 15.5 24.3 26.1 34.1 15.7 16.8
2008 7.1 15.5 24.4 27.0 33.1 14.1 15.5
2009 7.0 15.8 24.6 26.9 32.7 14.5 15.3
El Salvador 1995 6.2 15.5 24.8 27.0 32.7 14.1 16.9
 1999 6.6 13.8 25.0 29.1 32.1 15.2 19.6
 2001 6.7 13.5 24.7 28.7 33.1 16.2 20.3
2004 6.2 15.9 26.0 28.8 29.3 13.3 16.3
 2009 5.8 16.6 25.2 26.8 31.4 12.0 13.0
Guatemala 1989 6.0 11.8 20.9 26.9 40.4 23.6 27.4
1998 7.1 14.3 21.6 25.0 39.1 20.4 19.8
2002 6.8 14.1 22.4 27.3 36.2 18.6 19.3
2006 7.6 12.8 21.8 25.7 39.7 22.0 23.9




Percent of total income Per capita income ratio c






D10 / D(1 to 4) Q5 / Q1
Honduras 1990 4.3 10.2 19.7 27.1 43.0 27.4 30.7
 1999 3.9 11.8 22.9 29.0 36.3 22.3 26.5
 2002 4.3 11.4 21.7 27.6 39.3 23.6 26.3
 2007 4.7 10.1 23.5 29.5 36.9 23.6 32.5
México 1989 8.6 15.8 22.5 25.1 36.6 17.2 16.9
1998 7.7 15.0 22.7 25.6 36.7 18.4 18.5
2002 8.2 15.7 23.8 27.2 33.3 15.1 15.5
2008 8.6 16.0 24.0 25.6 34.4 16.1 16.0
Nicaragua 1993 5.2 10.4 22.8 28.4 38.4 26.1 37.7
 1998 5.6 10.4 22.1 27.0 40.5 25.3 35.1
 2001 5.8 12.0 21.7 25.6 40.7 23.6 27.5
 2005 6.5 14.3 24.0 26.2 35.5 17.2 18.6
Panama 1991 d 10.8 14.1 23.9 29.3 32.7 16.8 20.1
1999 d 12.6 15.6 25.2 27.8 31.4 14.0 15.9
2002 9.8 12.2 23.6 28.0 36.2 20.1 25.7
2008 10.3 14.5 25.7 27.8 32.0 15.2 18.8
2009 10.4 14.7 25.5 28.3 31.5 15.3 18.2
Paraguay 1990 g 7.7 18.7 25.7 26.8 28.8 10.2 10.6
 1999 6.2 13.2 23.0 27.8 36.0 19.3 22.6
 2001 6.2 12.9 23.5 26.3 37.3 20.9 25.6
 2008 5.7 14.7 24.7 26.4 34.2 16.7 18.4
 2009 5.6 13.7 25.3 28.3 32.7 14.7 18.3
Peru 1997 7.5 13.3 24.6 28.7 33.4 17.9 20.9
1999 7.5 13.3 23.1 27.1 36.5 19.5 21.7
2001 6.4 13.4 24.6 28.5 33.5 17.4 19.3
2008 7.8 15.7 26.5 28.4 29.4 12.8 14.4
2009 8.0 15.9 26.5 28.4 29.2 12.4 13.7
Uruguay d 1990 9.9 18.9 23.3 22.5 35.3 11.0 10.5
1999 11.9 21.6 25.5 25.8 27.1 8.8 9.5
2002 9.4 21.7 25.4 25.6 27.3 9.5 10.2
2008 9.2 21.1 25.5 26.4 27.0 9.0 9.6




1990 8.9 16.7 25.7 28.9 28.7 12.1 13.4
1999 7.2 14.5 25.0 29.0 31.5 15.0 18.0
2002 7.1 14.3 25.0 29.5 31.2 14.5 18.1
 2008 8.6 19.2 27.9 28.1 24.8 8.4 9.7
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  Households in the country as a whole, in order of per capita income.
b  Average monthly household income, in multiples of the per capita poverty line.
c  D(1 to 4) refers to the 40% lowest-income households; D10 refers to the 10% highest-income households. The same notation is used for quintiles (Q), which refer to 20% segments 
of all households.
d  Total urban areas.
e  Greater Buenos Aires.
f  Eight major cities plus El Alto.
g  Asunción metropolitan area.
Table I.A-2 (concluded)
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Table I.A-3 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): INCOME CONCENTRATION INDICATORS, 1990-2009 a
Country Year
Percentage of 
people with per 
capita income 





(ε = 0.5) (ε = 1.0) (ε = 1.5)
Argentina c 1990 d 0.205 0.501 0.555 0.216 0.360 0.473
1999 0.222 0.539 0.667 0.250 0.410 0.530
2002 0.243 0.578 0.724 0.282 0.464 0.593
2006 0.217 0.519 0.626 0.234 0.393 0.522




1989 e 0.206 0.537 0.574 0.243 0.430 0.600
1999 0.295 0.586 0.658 0.293 0.537 0.738
 2002 0.286 0.614 0.776 0.322 0.556 0.738
 2007 0.272 0.565 0.611 0.269 0.493 0.709
Brazil 1990 0.266 0.627 0.816 0.324 0.528 0.664
1999 0.259 0.640 0.914 0.341 0.537 0.663
2001 0.261 0.639 0.914 0.340 0.536 0.665
2008 0.243 0.594 0.808 0.298 0.477 0.604
2009 0.239 0.576 0.716 0.277 0.455 0.586
Chile 1990 0.204 0.554 0.644 0.255 0.422 0.546
 1998 0.210 0.560 0.654 0.261 0.430 0.553
 2003 0.195 0.552 0.674 0.257 0.418 0.535
 2006 0.185 0.522 0.568 0.228 0.381 0.497
 2009 0.174 0.524 0.585 0.231 0.384 0.501
Colombia 1994 0.260 0.601 0.794 0.308 0.517 0.684
1999 0.218 0.572 0.734 0.275 0.450 0.603
2002 0.248 0.594 0.753 0.293 0.487 0.640
2008 0.249 0.589 0.737 0.289 0.486 0.787
2009 0.243 0.578 0.706 0.279 0.469 0.702
Costa Rica 1990 0.194 0.438 0.328 0.152 0.286 0.412
 1999 0.207 0.473 0.395 0.179 0.328 0.457
 2002 0.212 0.488 0.440 0.193 0.349 0.491
 2008 0.185 0.473 0.427 0.183 0.323 0.439
 2009 0.203 0.501 0.474 0.204 0.358 0.485
Dominican 
Republic
2002 0.221 0.537 0.569 0.236 0.404 0.536
2008 0.250 0.550 0.593 0.249 0.429 0.569
 2009 0.243 0.574 0.677 0.273 0.455 0.589
Ecuador c 1990 0.174 0.461 0.403 0.173 0.306 0.422
1999 0.188 0.526 0.567 0.228 0.381 0.498
2002 0.196 0.513 0.563 0.222 0.371 0.487
2008 0.206 0.504 0.507 0.210 0.363 0.486
2009 0.197 0.500 0.502 0.207 0.356 0.475
El Salvador 1995 0.220 0.507 0.502 0.213 0.377 0.525
 1999 0.242 0.518 0.496 0.224 0.416 0.601
 2001 0.244 0.525 0.528 0.232 0.423 0.602
2004 0.213 0.493 0.449 0.203 0.379 0.552
 2009 0.203 0.478 0.440 0.189 0.333 0.449
Guatemala 1989 0.227 0.582 0.736 0.282 0.460 0.590
1998 0.200 0.560 0.760 0.273 0.428 0.534
2002 0.179 0.542 0.583 0.239 0.401 0.515
2006 0.247 0.585 0.773 0.291 0.467 0.590
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Country Year
Percentage of 
people with per 
capita income 





(ε = 0.5) (ε = 1.0) (ε = 1.5)
Honduras 1990 0.261 0.615 0.817 0.317 0.515 0.649
 1999 0.257 0.564 0.636 0.263 0.451 0.603
 2002 0.265 0.588 0.719 0.288 0.476 0.608
 2007 0.305 0.580 0.650 0.282 0.496 0.661
Mexico 1989 0.197 0.536 0.680 0.248 0.400 0.509
1998 0.229 0.539 0.634 0.245 0.403 0.515
2002 0.212 0.514 0.521 0.218 0.372 0.485
2008 0.199 0.515 0.599 0.227 0.375 0.485
Nicaragua 1993 0.274 0.582 0.671 0.270 0.458 0.619
 1998 0.268 0.583 0.731 0.285 0.481 0.654
 2001 0.238 0.579 0.783 0.288 0.470 0.620
 2005 0.226 0.532 0.614 0.241 0.402 0.526
Panama 1991 c 0.220 0.530 0.543 0.228 0.398 0.534
1999 c 0.217 0.499 0.459 0.202 0.361 0.490
2002 0.266 0.567 0.616 0.266 0.466 0.618
2008 0.254 0.524 0.522 0.229 0.410 0.557
2009 0.248 0.523 0.522 0.226 0.398 0.533
Paraguay 1990 f 0.164 0.447 0.365 0.161 0.287 0.386
 1999 0.257 0.565 0.668 0.268 0.455 0.599
 2001 0.264 0.570 0.702 0.277 0.471 0.631
 2008 0.227 0.527 0.597 0.235 0.397 0.525
 2009 0.245 0.512 0.527 0.220 0.388 0.529
Peru 1997 0.256 0.533 0.567 0.238 0.415 0.554
1999 0.236 0.545 0.599 0.249 0.424 0.560
2001 0.239 0.525 0.556 0.231 0.397 0.527
2008 0.223 0.476 0.428 0.187 0.335 0.457
2009 0.218 0.469 0.414 0.181 0.325 0.442
Uruguay c 1990 0.174 0.492 0.699 0.227 0.349 0.441
1999 0.190 0.440 0.354 0.158 0.286 0.393
2002 0.196 0.455 0.385 0.169 0.301 0.412
2008 0.187 0.445 0.372 0.163 0.291 0.397




1990 0.201 0.471 0.416 0.183 0.327 0.446
1999 0.216 0.498 0.464 0.202 0.363 0.507
2002 0.224 0.500 0.456 0.201 0.361 0.507
 2008 0.178 0.412 0.295 0.136 0.255 0.363
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  Calculated on the basis of the distribution of per capita income for individuals in the country as a whole.
b  Includes people with income equal to zero.
c  Total urban areas.
d  Greater Buenos Aires.
e  Eight major cities plus El Alto.
f  Asunción metropolitan area.
Table I.A-3 (concluded)
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Chapter II
Education and the intergenerational 
reproduction of inequality and exclusion: 
realities and challenges in Latin America
A. The education agenda in the region
Education is at the core of all the developmental stages of the life cycle discussed in this 
edition of Social Panorama. The data indicate that it is one of the best tools at the disposal 
of States and public policy for reversing the intergenerational reproduction of inequality and 
dissociating an individual’s social background from the well-being he or she attains. But the 
region has not harnessed the education system as a driver of equal opportunity. In the Ibero-
American Year of Education, the regional agenda is, to a large extent, a double one because 
the unresolved issues of the twentieth century (coverage, access, timely progression and 
completion of education cycles) are compounded by the great challenge of the twenty-first 
century: how to narrow the digital divide and improve the quality of education to address the 
new formative requirements of the knowledge society. 
In the Ibero-American Year of Education, education must 
take centre stage in each of the phases of lifelong personal 
development examined in this edition of Social Panorama. 
The dynamics of the information society have revived the 
centrality of education in dealing with the challenges of 
international competitiveness, democratic sustainability 
and social equity. This idea is grounded in an abundance 
of evidence linking the number of students completing 
the middle level of education and the quality of the skills 
acquired to greater competitiveness at the country level 
and to the heightened citizen awareness of rights and 
responsibilities that is essential for enhancing democracy. 
The data also bear out the idea that government action 
on the education front can contribute substantially to 
dissociating an individual’s social background from the 
well-being he or she attains. 
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But the region has not harnessed the education 
system as a driver of equal opportunity, in part because 
household environment and disposable income are major 
determinants of educational attainments and returns. 
Most of the time, this inequality is also reflected in 
highly segmented and stratified quality and efficiency 
on the supply side of education. 
Education moved up on the social policy agenda 
in Latin America when the education agenda was 
globalized by the 1990 World Conference on Education 
for All in Jomtien, Thailand. After the Jomtien World 
Declaration on Education for All, global education 
agenda milestones with repercussions for the region 
were the World Education Forum held in Dakar in 
2000 and the United Nations Millennium Declaration 
signed that same year. The Forum led to the Dakar 
Framework for Action on Education for All, which 
reaffirmed the commitments made under the Jomtien 
World Declaration on Education for All (UNESCO, 
2000). One of the highlights of the Forum was the 
pledge to achieve basic education for all. This began 
to lay the conceptual groundwork for the Education for 
All movement led by the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and 
gave rise to the idea of inclusive education as a way 
to address the exclusion of some citizens from (and 
within) the formal education system. 
The Millennium Declaration in turn led to the 
Millennium Development Goals project that set goals, 
targets and deadlines for action on several social fronts. 
Millennium Development Goal 2 seeks achievement 
of universal primary education; target 2A calls for 
ensuring that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and 
girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of 
primary schooling. 
These international instruments have put such issues 
front and centre on regional and national agendas, for 
contextualized discussion. For example, the Education 
for All in the Americas: Regional Framework of 
Action was drafted at the 2000 conference in Santo 
Domingo. The framework highlights progress made 
on the priority area of access to primary education, 
the relative decrease in illiteracy rates, the increase 
in the number of years of compulsory education and 
the increase in early childhood care and education 
(UNESCO, 2000). It also recognizes that challenges 
remain for the region, including the formulation of 
inclusive policies to ensure access and create conditions 
that promote timely progression and completion and 
quality learning, especially in the basic cycle but also 
at the secondary level. In addition, the framework calls 
for a pledge to advance towards non-discrimination on 
the basis of gender, culture, language or socio-economic 
status, viewing education as a universal right. Accordingly, 
there is a need for meaningful curricula, intercultural and 
bilingual education and initiatives for involving the families 
of excluded children and young people (UNESCO, 2000) 
in view of the enormous weight of the family environment 
in determining the relationship between family members 
and education.
Virtually universal access to basic education has 
been achieved in Latin America and the Caribbean, so 
education policy efforts have shifted to early childhood 
education. The social and economic returns from investing 
in early childhood education are vital (UNESCO, 2010a). 
The focus on early childhood education in recent years 
led to the World Conference on Early Childhood Care 
and Education held in Moscow in 2010, providing a 
comprehensive approach to the developmental needs of 
children in this stage of life. Among these, education is 
critical. The region took up this challenge when the members 
of the Organization of American States (OAS) signed the 
Hemispheric Commitment to Early Childhood Education 
and pledged to turn recognition of early childhood care 
and education into specific actions within the institutional 
framework of each country.
The regional agenda is, to a large extent, a double one 
(ECLAC/OEI/SEGIB, 2010). There are the unresolved 
challenges of the twentieth century: coverage, access 
and timely progression and completion of education 
cycles. Then comes the great challenge of the twenty-first 
century: the quality of education provided by schools. This 
second dimension includes improving teaching through 
training and integrating new educational resources such 
as information and communications technologies and 
putting traditional educational resources to better use. 
Concern as to the quality of education in the region was 
reaffirmed at the Santo Domingo conference by including 
this dimension in the 12 commitments of the regional 
framework of action (UNESCO, 2000) and the global 
monitoring report on the Education for All project in the 
region (UNESCO, 2007). 
A noteworthy region-wide project is “Goals 2021: The 
Education We Want for the Bicentennial Generation”, which 
divides the region’s dual agenda into targets referring to 
unresolved issues in education and targets concerning future 
challenges in this arena. One of the first targets addresses the 
extra-school factors that affect general well-being and the 
school performance of children and young people in each 
education cycle. The goal is to achieve education equality by 
eliminating the discrimination that works against insertion 
and participation in the school system. 
For the post-secondary cycle there are targets related 
to the nexus of education, knowledge and employment 
linking the challenges of the twentieth century to those 
of the twenty-first. In this new century, the focus is on 
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quality of education, stressing that the skills acquired 
by students must be practical and relevant to social 
integration. In this process, the emphasis is not only 
on academic subjects but also on reading, education in 
democratic values, art education, sports and the use of 
new technologies in education. To complete this picture, 
the resources provided for education and the number 
of full-time primary schools must be increased. And 
the quality of education cannot be improved without 
enhancing the teaching profession. Initial training, 
accreditation and continuing education are therefore 
among the project targets.
International cooperation under the Organization of 
Ibero-American American States for Education, Science 
and Culture (OEI) and the Ibero-American General 
Secretariat (SEGIB) is an important part of the project 
and involves the countries of the Iberian peninsula on 
the basis of shared but differentiated responsibility. A 
promising avenue for financial partnership is South-
South cooperation, an initiative for financial aid between 
countries of the region. This requires gathering up-to-date 
information on the status of education in the region, the 
cost of achieving education targets and potential sources 
of funding. The Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has been actively involved in 
this task. The general targets have already been approved 
by the countries, and it is hoped that a pledge to move 
forward in meeting the specific goals that will guide action 
for developing education in the region will emerge from 
the Twentieth Ibero-American Summit of Heads of State 
and Government, to be held in Mar del Plata, Argentina, 
in December 2010.
B. Gaps in attainment and in learning
In recent decades, advances in coverage, access and progression through education cycles have 
caused stratification in learning and attainment within educational systems. Access to preschool 
learning is uneven across the region; some countries have nearly universal enrolment while in 
others it is in the area of 30%. Access to primary education is virtually universal, with room 
for improvement in timely progression and completion and in inclusion of the most neglected 
social groups. Access and timely progression in secondary education are substantially lower 
and differ more among countries. The gaps in secondary school completion rates exacerbate 
socio-economic inequalities by geographic area and ethnic background. Access to the final 
cycle of post-secondary education is generally reserved for a relatively small portion of 
the region’s young people. Among the factors of inequality, household socio-economic 
conditions and level of formal education of the head of household are among the root causes 
for disparate results in learning and progression through the education system, as is widely 
varying access to quality education. As for the dynamics of skill acquisition, the promise of 
digital convergence (or rather, the threat of a widening digital divide) has been looming on 
the horizon for some time now.
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In successive editions of Social Panorama and in 
contributions to the Millennium Development Goals, 
ECLAC, aware of the pace of educational devaluation 
in the region, has focused on monitoring changing 
levels of educational attainment that effectively reduce 
vulnerability to poverty and social exclusion. One of the 
greatest difficulties that the education system faces is the 
snowballing levels of knowledge needed to meet individual 
and collective goals. Studies show that what each period 
of history regards as minimum qualifications depends to 
a large extent on the skills and knowledge required in that 
period for individuals to participate in the dynamics of 
progress and well-being. 
Educational devaluation is happening in Latin 
America, where modernization has, among other 
things, been effacing the social prestige attached to 
certain qualifications and specialties. This prestige is 
shifting to other skills sets that are more in line with 
ever-changing requirements for competitiveness and full 
participation in society. Over the course of the twentieth 
century, skill thresholds shifted from the dividing line 
between literacy and illiteracy to the divide between 
those who completed primary school and those who 
did not, and subsequently to completion of the basic 
cycle of secondary education. The threshold is now at 
completion of secondary education, although in some 
countries of the region there are already signs that even 
those who complete this cycle are vulnerable to poverty 
and social exclusion. The permanent pressure on skill 
thresholds for attaining decent living conditions is thus 
nothing new. What is new is the pace, which is creating 
complex problems for keeping the workings of the 
education system in sync with outcomes.
While there have been advances in education in 
recent decades, expanding access has also led to greater 
segmentation in attainment and in quality on the supply 
side. This means that the intergenerational reproduction 
of inequality does not occur because some have access 
to formal education and others do not, but rather that 
everyone has access but the outcome is differentiated in 
terms of what students learn and how far they progress in 
the system. The clearest manifestations of this segmentation 
in the education systems of Latin America are examined 
in the following pages.
1. Access to early childhood and preschool education
Preschool education has recently become a top public 
policy issue in the region.1 The situation varies widely, 
with access rates (starting with preschool enrolment of 
children between 3 and 6 years of age) that are nearly 
universal in Cuba and Mexico but in the area of 30% in 
the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Honduras (see 
figure II.1.A). Enrolment in early childhood education 
(from birth to age 3) is, as a rule, lower, owing to less 
coverage on the supply side and to cultural factors.
Across the region, differences between socio-
economic strata in terms of enrolment in the last year 
before entering primary education are smaller, with rates 
ranging from 80% for the lowest income quintile to 92%
1 In 2007 the ministers of education of the member States of the 
Organization of American States agreed to develop legal frameworks 
and financing mechanisms to ensure the sustainable implementation 
of early childhood policies and improve coverage and quality of 
education. The agreement calls for comprehensive policies and a 
targeted approach focusing on attending to the poor, vulnerable 
and excluded segments of society in keeping with their particular 
needs, characteristics and contexts. At a meeting held in 2009 in 
the framework of the Organization of Ibero-American States for
for the wealthiest quintile. The differences in enrolment 
between boys and girls are not substantial (ECLAC/OEI/
SEGIB, 2010). But the regional average masks marked 
inequalities in smaller countries in the region with lower 
coverage —there are gaps of 30 percentage points or more 
in El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay (see 
figure II.1.B).2 While it seems that there are no significant 
socio-economic inequalities in attendance towards the end 
of the preschool cycle, evidence from household surveys 
does suggest that inequalities are more striking at younger 
ages. Moreover, there are marked differences in access 
between urban and rural areas and for indigenous groups 
(ECLAC, 2008a).
 Education, Science and Culture (OEI), the ministers of education 
approved a comprehensive early childhood project that is at the 
heart of the project “Goals 2021: The Education We Want for the 
Bicentennial Generation” (ECLAC/OEI/SEGIB, 2010). 
2 Some countries of the region have extended the beginning of 
compulsory education into the preschool cycle. Such is the 
case in countries with more generalized attendance, such as 
Uruguay (4 years) and Mexico (3), but also in El Salvador (4) and 
Paraguay (5).
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Figure II.1 
LATIN AMERICA (19 COUNTRIES): NET ENROLMENT RATIO FOR PRE-PRIMARY LEVEL (3 TO 6 YEARS); ESTIMATED ENROLMENT RATIO 
FOR EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION (0 TO 3 YEARS); AND DIFFERENCES IN ATTENDANCE RATES BETWEEN THE FIRST AND FIFTH 





































































































































































































































































































































A. Net enrolment ratios B. Preschool attendance rates for children who are one year younger 
than the official age for starting primary school, first and fifth quintiles
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), estimates and household surveys 
conducted in the respective countries (attendance rates).
a  Early childhood enrolment ratio estimate based on exponential models on the basis of household surveys in countries with information available (see ECLAC/OEI, 2010). The 
age groups vary, depending on the official cycles in the countries.
2. Access to primary education and unequal completion rates
Historically, primary education has been regarded as crucial 
for a child’s future, since it is possible to have a positive 
and effective influence on children during this stage of 
development. It is no coincidence that all international 
agreements on education call for universal access to primary 
education (ECLAC, 2010b). It is hoped that this will 
translate into more students remaining in and completing the 
entire cycle of primary education and become a successful 
springboard to secondary education. Completion of the 
latter is becoming more and more a necessity.
Access to primary education is generally assessed 
by looking at the enrolment ratio. The net ratio shows the 
proportion of pupils of primary school enrolment age who 
are actually enrolled. Access to primary education is, with 
few exceptions, widespread across Latin America and the 
Caribbean and is nearly universal in some countries (see 
figure II.2). Differences in access between girls and boys 
and between socio-economic strata are not significant 
at this level.
Nonetheless, access to the education system does 
not necessarily ensure appropriate progression or, more 
important, completion of primary education. At this level 
there are problems of school lag and retention (dropping 
out). Educational lag is costly for the education systems 
of the region. It is estimated that the region spends more
Figure II.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (36 COUNTRIES 
AND TERRITORIES): NET PRIMARY EDUCATION 
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Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), online database, www.uis.unesco.org.
a  Adjusted net enrolment ratio. The calculation of enrolment ratios can be somewhat 
erratic since it relies on population estimates and projections that do not always 
reflect migratory movements. For this reason, some of the figures should be read 
with caution, particularly for smaller countries and territories. Data for Argentina 
and the Turks and Caicos Islands correspond to 2005; and data for Anguilla and 
Paraguay correspond to 2006.
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than US$ 9 billion on children who are in primary school 
but should be in secondary school according to their age 
(ECLAC/OEI, 2010). Even bearing in mind that several 
countries have automatic promotion systems for the first few 
grades, by 9-11 years of age there is already a significant 
percentage of children who are two or more years behind 
the grade they should be in (see figure II.3.A.). According to 
UNESCO, in the period 2007-2008 the overall percentage of 
repeaters for all primary education grades was 3.8% and the 
drop-out rates for grades one through six were 3.7%, 1.7%, 
2.0%, 1.5% and 2.8% respectively (UNESCO, 2010b). In 
2006-2007, nearly 3 million children were not in school.
Gender differences according to socio-economic level 
and geographic area, among other factors, also become 
apparent upon examination of school completion rates: 
girls do slightly better than boys. And while only 2 out of 
100 children in the higher-income strata (fifth quintile) 
3. Unequal access to, progression in and completion of 
 secondary education 
The ratios for access to and timely progression through the 
secondary cycle are significantly lower than for primary 
education and vary more widely from country to country. The 
net attendance rate for the secondary level is 88%, versus 97% 
for the primary level (see tables II.A-1 and II.A-2). Educational 
lags accumulate at this stage, and socio-economic inequalities 
according to geographic location or ethnic background grow 
more marked. Household educational climate emerges as 
a determining factor in educational lags for children age 
12-14: a child living in a household with a low educational 
climate is 10 times more likely to fall behind in school than 
one in a household with a positive climate. There are also 
notable differences by area of residence. This is naturally 
linked to household and student well-being. Hence, in terms 
of completion (timely or otherwise) of the lower cycle of 
secondary schooling, there is a marked difference between 
young people who are from poor households (52%) and those 
who are not (82%) (ECLAC/OEI/SEGIB, 2010). 
do not finish primary school, in the poorer strata some 
12 out of 100 do not (see figure II.3.B). Primary education 
completion rates are 96% in urban areas but only 85% in 
rural areas. The problem is worse among indigenous and 
Afro-descendent children: just 80% complete this cycle 
(ECLAC, 2008a).
Judging by primary education access rates from the 
early 1990s (about 90%) and the relatively poor progress 
in this regard, there are obviously some obstacles in the 
path to universal access. This is because when access to 
primary education is widespread, the investment needed 
to promote enrolment among disadvantaged groups (the 
extremely poor, inhabitants of rural areas, indigenous and 
Afro-descendent groups) is substantial and should focus 
not only on increasing the supply of education but also 
on ensuring the conditions for effective access to these 
services. This often involves action in multiple sectors.
Figure II.3 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): EDUCATIONAL LAG AMONG CHILDREN AGE 9-11 AND PRIMARY EDUCATION COMPLETION  






















































0 Total Quintile I Quintile VQuintile IVQuintile IIIQuintile II
Males Females
A. Educational lag B. Completion rate
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the Information System on Educational Trends in Latin America (SITEAL), Statistical 
Summary I, National Totals, October 2008, and special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  Educational lag is calculated on the basis of children who are two or more years behind the grade they should be in for their age.
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Poor or not, females complete this level of education 
more frequently than males, owing in part to the higher 
likelihood of males entering the labour market early. In 
contrast, there is evidence showing that among young 
people from indigenous groups the ratio is reversed, with 
a smaller proportion of females completing secondary 
education (ECLAC, 2008a). Such differences in educational 
access, progression and completion are gradually amplified 
throughout the educational cycle. The chain of inequality 
is thus reproduced through the education system itself.
Young people approaching the upper secondary cycle 
already have opportunities to enter the labour market. This 
acts as a disincentive to staying in school, especially if students 
face adverse economic or academic conditions or problems 
with integration or identity formation. In addition, this level of 
education is still not compulsory in many countries of the region, 
so States cannot force young people to stay in school.
Access and timely progression at this stage vary widely 
across the region, ranging from a net enrolment ratio of 
more than 80% (Bahamas, Chile, Cuba, Grenada and 
Montserrat) to very low ratios, where two thirds or more 
of the young people are behind in school or simply drop 
out (El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua). The regional 
average barely exceeds 50% (see figure II.4).
Figure II.4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (36 COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES): NET ENROLMENT RATIO IN THE FIRST AND 






















































































































































































































































































































Lower secondary Upper secondary
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), estimates on the basis of data from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS).
a  Data for the Netherlands Antilles correspond to 2003; data for Anguilla, the Turks and Caicos Islands, Paraguay and Suriname correspond to 2005; and data for Argentina, 
Guatemala and Panama correspond to 2006.
In addition to heterogeneity among countries, there are 
ever more pronounced differences within countries: between 
rural and urban areas, poor and non-poor students, different 
socio-economic groups and indigenous and non-indigenous 
groups, as well as other discriminating factors.
Four out of five students from the highest-income 
households (fifth quintile) complete their secondary education, 
whereas only one out of five at the lowest socio-economic 
level do. The difference in attainment between males and 
females begins to widen in the intermediate socio-economic 
levels (see figure II.5). In rural areas where indigenous 
communities occupy more or less defined territorial spaces 
and have a culture and identity that is often clearly different 
from the prevailing “westernized” urban culture, early drop-
out rates for girls are much higher than for boys and their 
upper secondary education completion rates are lower. Girls 
tend to focus on activities related to agricultural production 
in their communities or families. This pattern is not seen 
among indigenous young people living in urban areas.
Figure II.5 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): POPULATION AGE 20-24 WITH 
COMPLETE SECONDARY EDUCATION BY PER CAPITA  

































Income quintile Rural areas
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the respective countries.
a  The data for indigenous and non-indigenous young people refer to eight countries 
and correspond to 2007.
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4.  Discrimination and lag in primary and secondary education 
 among indigenous and Afro-descendent groups
Historically, ethnic minorities and indigenous groups 
have been affected by unequal conditions in the region. 
The barriers to equitable access to the education system 
are related to higher incidence of poverty, distance 
from school, quality of educational establishments 
to which there is access, curriculum relevance and 
discrimination. All of these factors diminish educational 
opportunities.
On top of a low standard of living and the social 
discrimination that makes them targets of rejection and 
refusal, many of these groups live in rural areas far from 
the main centres of education. Local supply is scarce, 
infrastructure is poorly maintained and the quality of 
teachers and teaching materials is wanting (ECLAC, 
2008a). Another barrier that keeps these groups from 
entering and staying in the school system is the lack of 
appropriate, relevant and meaningful curricula. This is 
another instance of poor linkage between culture and 
environment, on one hand, and school subject content, 
on the other (ECLAC/OEI, 2010).
Table II.1 
LATIN AMERICA (NINE COUNTRIES): NET PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE RATIOS, PRIMARY CYCLE COMPLETION 
FOR YOUNG PEOPLE AGE 15-19 AND SECONDARY CYCLE COMPLETION FOR YOUNG PEOPLE AGE 20-24 BY AREA OF RESIDENCE 
AND ETHNIC BACKGROUND, AROUND 2008
(Percentages)
Country





National total National total Rural areas National total
Indigenous or 
Afro-descendent












Not indigenous or 
Afro-descendent
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) (2007) … … 90 95 86 90 90 94
Brazil (2008) 98 99 93 95 83 89 91 93
Chile (2006) 98 99 98 99 97 98 94 95
Ecuador (2008) 97 98 89 95 89 93 76 86
El Salvador (2004) 92 92 74 78 63 65 83 79
Guatemala (2006) 86 91 49 71 40 58 61 75
Nicaragua (2005) 85 81 58 71 46 54 86 84
Panama (2008) 98 99 73 97 73 93 74 89
Paraguay (2008) 96 98 83 94 82 87 71 92
Total 93 97 82 93 70 84 85 92
Country
Lower cycle of secondary education completed Upper cycle of secondary education completed
National total Rural areas National total Rural areas
Indigenous or 
Afro-descendent












Not indigenous or 
Afro-descendent
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) (2007) 76 88 62 68 55 71 38 44
Brazil (2008) 74 78 49 53 47 56 24 27
Chile (2006) 94 96 84 89 65 81 50 63
Ecuador (2008) 47 73 38 48 31 59 23 33
El Salvador (2004) 60 57 41 35 37 36 17 17
Guatemala (2006) 19 44 12 20 13 33 7 12
Nicaragua (2005) 34 44 11 21 21 32 5 13
Panama (2008) 36 79 36 58 12 60 12 40
Paraguay (2008) 45 80 40 54 25 62 21 36
Total 62 77 38 49 40 56 20 28
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
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Figure II.6 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION ATTENDANCE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE AGE 20-29 AND COMPLETION 






























































Total Quintile I Quintile II Quintile III Quintile IV Quintile V
Income quintile
Males Females
A. Post-secondary education attendance B. Completion of five years of post-secondary education
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
5. Access to and completion of post-secondary education: 
 the bottleneck
Generally speaking, access to post-secondary education is 
reserved for a relatively small proportion of young people 
in the region (see figure II.6.A). Very few students complete 
technical/vocational studies or a university education, 
because they have not acquired the competencies needed 
to succeed at higher levels. At the root of this problem is 
the uneven quality of primary and secondary education, 
plus other factors such as the need to earn money in order 
to attain a minimum level of well-being. Only 8.3% of 
young people age 25-29 have completed at least five 
years of post-secondary education (typical length of time 
for a university degree programme). There is marked 
stratification by per capita income quintile: for every 27 
young persons from high-income strata (fifth quintile) 
who complete five years of post-secondary studies only 
one lower-income one does (see figure II.6.B). 
The promising side of the coin is the large contingent 
of first-generation college students for whom the future 
holds unprecedented potential for socio-occupational 
mobility compared with their parents. In several countries 
of the region, more than one half of the university students 
are “first-timers” in their direct family. But here, too, the 
percentage of young persons from lower-income or less-
educated families who do attend college is still very low. 
As a rule, when development strategies leave post-
secondary education entirely up to the workings of supply 
and demand, access to the highest levels is confined to a 
small elite of students. And the limited level of development 
in some economies of the region has led the better qualified 
to emigrate to more developed countries in search of 
better job opportunities and greater specialization. The 
lack of a critical mass of young people in technical and 
vocational fields who are familiar with cutting-edge tools 
for innovation is hindering modernization and efforts to 
increase competitiveness in most countries of the region 
(ECLAC/OIJ, 2008).
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6. Intergenerational transmission of education inequalities
(a) In families
It is hard to grasp the complex challenges faced by 
education in decreasing inequalities without noting that 
social patterns are not reproduced by any single institution 
but rather by the institutional structure as a whole, where 
the education system combines, above all, with family 
and neighbourhood life to form a child’s most immediate 
community environments. Also, much of the success of 
institutionalized education depends on how well the efforts 
and influences of these three spheres of socialization are 
meshed. When families and neighbourhoods fail to provide 
adequate support, it is harder for the education system 
to fulfil its key role in integrating new generations or to 
capitalize on its particular ability to dissociate educational 
achievement from student background. 
Against this backdrop, household socio-economic 
conditions and education level of the head of household 
continue to be the root cause of differences in learning 
outcomes. Some of the most influential conditions are 
discussed below. First come physical capital (such as dwelling 
infrastructure, income and household equipment), human 
capital (educational climate) and cultural capital (habits 
and values in common with the educational ideology). 
Substandard housing, overcrowding, a large number of children, 
scarce human capital, fragile ties to the labour market and 
income instability are some of the factors that undermine a 
family’s ability to meet basic needs and can raise sometimes 
insurmountable barriers to achieving the conditions required 
for regular school attendance and adequate learning.
In addition, how motivated families are to invest 
resources in their children’s education is directly related 
to the credibility they attach to the education system as a 
vehicle for social mobility —that is, the perception that the 
quality of the educational opportunities that the family’s 
available resources put within the children’s reach will 
really open alternatives for them to access society’s main 
social and economic circuits. Likewise, the “subjective 
educational climate” in the household depends to a large 
extent on the quality of education supply, on how the 
school involves and motivates the community of parents 
and on how families generally view meritocracy and the 
broadening of opportunities in society. 
The intergenerational reproduction of inequality in 
education obstructs mobility. Children of low-income, 
poorly educated parents tend to learn and achieve less than 
their peers from families with more educational capital. 
This will in turn confine the former to lower-paid jobs 
throughout their life, and so on. Figure II.7 shows the high 
correlation between household educational climate (years 
of education or educational attainment of the parents) and 
the children’s educational attainments, especially when 
comparing parents with different levels of education. 
While only 3.4% of the children whose parents did not 
complete primary school go on to finish post-secondary 
studies, the rate climbs to 71.6% when the parents have 
completed tertiary education.
Figure II.7 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): YOUNG PEOPLE AGE 
25-29 WHO COMPLETED VARYING LEVELS OF EDUCATION BY 



































Complete primary Complete secondary Complete tertiary
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the respective countries. 
a  Average years of education their parents completed, except for young people who 
are already emancipated and are themselves heads of households. In this case, 
refers to their own level of educational attainment.
Conversely, when parents did not complete primary 
school, one out of three of their children finish secondary 
school and 85.5% complete primary school. This indicates 
a high (and thus rigid) correlation between parent and 
child educational stratification, but also a clear tendency 
for children to surpass their parents in education. So there 
is systemic mobility owing to the joint expansion of 
attainment thresholds, but there is also rigid stratification 
to the detriment of the lowest socio-economic levels, rural 
areas and indigenous and Afro-descendent groups.
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(b) At school
The social and cultural disadvantages that burden 
lower-resource students as they enter the educational 
system are compounded by access to lower-quality 
education services than are available to students with more 
resources. This reinforces the inequality of their learning 
paths. Over the past few decades, expanding access to the 
educational system for traditionally excluded sectors has 
come with greater segmentation of supply and a sharp 
increase in out-of-pocket expenses and the number of 
private schools. The quality of education tends to be 
segmented on the basis of the students’ socio-economic 
background. Private schools are increasingly a magnet for 
the upper-middle and upper classes seeking to preserve 
their upwards differentiation in the intergenerational 
transmission of human capital and to avoid the quality 
concerns surrounding mass public education.
The social make-up of student bodies is, then, 
increasingly uniform; this determines the profile of the 
peer group with which the child will be in contact every 
day. The key factors that determine how homogeneous 
the social make-up of an educational establishment will 
be can be spatial, economic or a combination of the two. 
Spatial factors refer to the fact that schools usually recruit 
students in the immediate geographical area and thus tend 
to reproduce, inside the school, the social make-up of the 
environs. Economic factors refer to household purchasing 
power, which is mirrored in different opportunities to access 
private or for-pay schools. Urban segregation and segmentation 
among schools are thus mutually reinforcing.
Educational segmentation leads to differentiations 
that exacerbate divides in school life. First, it weakens the 
oversight that better-qualified, more “authoritative” parents 
could exercise over education in public establishments. 
Second, school segmentation by household purchasing 
power generates significant differences in how well 
equipped the schools are and how well trained the 
teaching staff is. Both affect learning outcomes. Third, 
living in an environment with a high density of other 
children from higher-strata households helps students 
accrue social and cultural capital that will subsequently 
facilitate their entry into the labour market and the 
networks of adult life. Fourth, segmentation undermines 
the integrative capacity of schools, part of which is based 
on their ability to gather under one roof students from 
different social backgrounds. This inhibits interaction 
between children and young people from diverse socio-
economic and cultural realities. Fifth, for schools in 
highly vulnerable or poor areas, the magnitude and 
seriousness of problems outside the school make it 
harder to manage life and pedagogical processes inside 
the school. The most dramatic extreme is intra-school 
violence at many establishments in marginal urban areas 
of Latin American cities. It is a major factor behind 
learning disorders, the dropout rate and the unravelling 
fabric of coexistence.
Conversely, studies on learning impacts show that if 
children from poor households can attend schools with 
a heterogeneous social make-up, their expectations for 
their own educational attainment change for the better. 
They have more cognitive and practical resources for 
problem-solving and broader social capital/exchange 
networks, as well as regular opportunities to build shared 
codes for the timely learning of civic responsibilities and 
mutual respect for the rights of other groups.
7. Learning outcome gaps within and between countries
Monitoring and measuring the region’s progress in 
this sphere is not without its difficulties. Research and 
decision-making in the field of public education policy 
have generally focused on measuring the quality of 
students’ academic outcomes, using standardized national 
or international tests. These measurements are generally 
confined to assessing basic learning subjects such as 
language development, math skills and, in some cases, 
scientific knowledge. Although such measurements limit 
the analysis of the range of skills that children should 
acquire during their school years, recent international 
evaluations have shown a disturbing basic skills-learning 
deficit among students in the region.
The most recent data available on academic outcomes 
in countries of the region are from the OECD Programme 
for International Student Assessment (PISA), dating from 
2006, and from the Second Regional Comparative and 
Explanatory Study (SERCE) conducted in 2006 by the 
UNESCO Latin American Laboratory for Assessment of 
the Quality of Education. The former surveys a sample 
of 15-year-old students to assess the basic skills they 
have acquired in science, mathematics and reading 
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comprehension. In 2006, six countries of the region took 
part in the survey: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico and Uruguay. SERCE, in which 16 countries 
of the Latin American region took part, measured basic 
skills in the same curricular areas, but for third- and 
sixth-grade pupils.
Although they assessed students in different age 
brackets, both measurements are consistent in revealing 
a high percentage of the student population with very 
poor performance in basic educational competencies. 
Moreover, the difference in PISA performance between 
the countries of Latin America and the average for 
developed OECD countries is very significant (around 
75 points). Between 40% and 60% of students in Latin 
America who took part in PISA fall below the levels of 
performance regarded as essential for participating as 
citizens in academic, social and labour life. Because their 
relative SERCE ranking is similar, it can be concluded 
that improving the performance level of all students is a 
region-wide challenge (OEI, 2008).
SERCE shows that except for Cuba (which has very 
high achievement levels), at least 40% of the third-graders 
of most of the countries of Latin America have the lowest 
possible math achievement score. This means that a 
significant percentage of the student population will have 
serious difficulties in progressing in a timely fashion and 
successfully completing their education, with a domino 
effect on future job opportunities and social integration 
(ECLAC/OEI/SEGIB, 2010).
The situation varies among the countries of the region 
and is significantly associated with each country’s level 
of development and wealth. There are therefore clear 
differences between countries by per capita income. In 
general, the wealthier countries provide their students 
with better education in basic competencies. Figures 
II.8 and II.9 show the association between GDP and 
academic performance in the language area in primary 
school (on the basis of SERCE 2006) and in the science 
area in secondary school (on the basis of PISA 2006). 
The trend they show is that the higher the per capita 
GDP, the better average academic outcomes are. But 
some countries in each figure with similar per capita 
GDP rank higher or lower, leading to the conclusion 
that while this variable is important, it is not the only 
determining factor. Other national context factors must 
also be taken into consideration.
Figure II.8 
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): AVERAGE SECOND REGIONAL 
COMPARATIVE AND EXPLANATORY STUDY (SERCE) 
READING TEST SCORES FOR SIXTH-GRADERS 






























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of figures from the Second Regional Comparative and Explanatory 
Study (SERCE), 2006; and World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
a Cuba is not included because it does not have a World Bank per capita GDP 
indicator.
Figure II.9 
LATIN AMERICA (SIX COUNTRIES) AND OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN 
THE PROGRAMME FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDENT ASSESSMENT 
(PISA) (20 COUNTRIES): AVERAGE PISA SCIENCE TEST SCORES 










































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of figures from the Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA), 2006; and World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
Inequality and social exclusion, which are such 
problematic extra-school factors in the region, are being 
reproduced by the educational system and are reflected in 
outcomes and associated opportunities. PISA, SERCE and 
educational research in general show a clear link between 
students’ socio-economic and cultural environment and 
academic performance. In most countries of the region, 
family socio-economic and cultural environment is at 
the root of the most significant differences in learning. 
Figure II.10 shows the distribution by socio-economic and 
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cultural status of academic performance for 15-year-old 
students in science.3 Most students in the first and second 
socio-economic and cultural quartiles in countries of Latin 
America perform below level 2, meaning that they have 
not developed the basic competencies for performance 
in this area.
Level 2 is the level at which students possess adequate 
scientific knowledge to provide possible explanations in 
familiar contexts or draw conclusions based on simple 
investigations. At level 3, students can identify clearly 
described scientific issues in a range of contexts, select 
facts and knowledge to explain phenomena and apply 
simple models or inquiry strategies. At level 4, students 
can work effectively with situations and issues that may 
involve explicit phenomena requiring them to make 
inferences about the role of science; they can integrate 
explanations from different disciplines of science, 
reflect on their actions and communicate decisions using 
scientific evidence.
3 PISA prepares this index using three factors assumed to be 
related to socio-economic status (OECD, 2008): household 
purchasing power and the occupational status and educational 
level of the parents of students participating in PISA tests. 
Purchasing power is measured by the presence of certain 
items in the household (e.g., DVD player, dishwasher, desk, 
personal computer, number of television sets). Occupational
The students presenting the best performance in 
science are classified in levels 5 and 6. Unlike the case 
among students of the third and fourth quartiles in OECD 
countries, few students in Latin America reach these 
two levels. Students at level 5 can identify the scientific 
components of many complex life situations and apply 
scientific concepts; they can use well-developed inquiry 
abilities, link knowledge appropriately and bring critical 
insights to situations. The top-performing students (those 
at level 6) can consistently identify, explain and apply 
scientific knowledge in a variety of complex life situations; 
they clearly demonstrate advanced scientific thinking and 
use it to develop arguments in support of recommendations. 
Only 1.3% of all students in the OECD countries attain this 
level of competency. Although OECD countries also show 
some variations in educational attainment among students 
in different quartiles, in all those countries —unlike in Latin 
America— the vast majority of students attain the expected 
basic level of competency (level 2 and higher).
 status is determined by asking students what each of their parents 
does for a living; the occupation having the higher status is 
classified and then converted into a score based on the International 
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). Educational 
level of the parents is classified according to the International 
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) ranking, using 
the higher of the rankings between the two parents.
Figure II.10 
LATIN AMERICA (SIX COUNTRIES) AND OECD (30 COUNTRIES): DISTRIBUTION OF LEVELS OF PERFORMANCE ON THE PISA SCIENCE 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Argentina Brazil Colombia Mexico Uruguay Chile Latin America OECD
Below level 1 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of microdata from the PISA 2006 survey.
a  The distribution of performance levels in Latin America and in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) refers to the simple average of the 
weighted mean national achievement levels of the countries participating in PISA 2006.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)94
As for gender, girls, on average, perform better 
in language assessments and boys perform better in 
mathematics and science evaluations. These differences 
could suggest that socially imposed differentiated gender 
roles permeate pedagogical and socialization practices in 
schools (UNESCO/LLECE, 2008). However, gender gaps 
in academic outcomes differ among countries (see figure 
II.11). Costa Rica, Peru and Colombia have the largest 
gender gaps in favour of boys in math performance in the 
sixth grade of primary school. In Brazil, boys perform 
significantly better in mathematics and girls in reading. 
Along with Brazil, girls in Uruguay, Panama and Cuba show 
higher levels of reading competency than do boys.
Lastly, segmentation between rural and urban areas is 
dramatic. In almost all of the countries of the region, pupils 
in urban schools perform significantly better than those in 
rural schools. The average difference in reading competency 
scores in the countries participating in SERCE is 44.7 points 
in favour of urban students. The difference for the math 
assessment is 36.3 points. Because indigenous groups are 
more concentrated in rural areas, it could be assumed that 
many of these groups are caught up in this performance gap. 
This is corroborated by the cognitive achievement study 
conducted by the UNESCO Latin American Laboratory 
for Assessment of the Quality of Education (UNESCO/
LLECE) on the basis of the SERCE 2006 study. All of the 
countries that included indigenous groups in the assessment 
showed a negative association between this characteristic 
and learning outcome. This association is most relevant in 
learning to read. Controlling for other factors associated with 
learning (socio-economic context and the characteristics 
of the school), indigenous sixth-graders will tend to score 
an average of 17 points lower in reading in Colombia, 24 
points less in Costa Rica, 21 points less in Ecuador, 18 in 
Guatemala and 15 in Peru.
Figure II.11 
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): AVERAGE MATH AND 
READING PERFORMANCE BY SEX (GIRLS-BOYS), SECOND 
REGIONAL COMPARATIVE AND EXPLANATORY 
STUDY (SERCE) SCORE, SIXTH GRADE, 2006 a



















Significant difference in mathematics Significant difference in reading
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of figures from the Second Regional Comparative and Explanatory 
Study (SERCE), 2006.
a The lighter-coloured bars show differences that are not statistically significant.
8. Acquisition of digital competencies: new kinds of exclusion
Another new development is that educational credentials 
alone are declining in importance among the qualifications 
for full participation in the economy, society and political 
life. The penetration of information and communications 
technologies (ICT) in all corners of society is making 
attainment of digital competency thresholds a prerequisite 
for social inclusion, and the pace of change is even more 
vertiginous than in education. 
Both trends (in education and in technology) are indeed 
very closely related. First, the telematics revolution has 
confirmed the supremacy of human capital in defining 
an individual’s assets and in making countries more 
competitive, thus bringing educational systems back to the 
forefront in promoting production and well-being. Second, 
educational systems cannot sidestep the challenges of the 
digital revolution in teaching. Third, they cannot ignore 
how the new technologies are changing the qualifications 
required by the labour markets. Last, while there is still 
no conclusive evidence, it is widely suspected that the 
confluence of formal education attainments and digital 
competencies multiplies and enhances knowledge.4 
Using ICT in schools is not merely a question of 
ensuring digital literacy among the population, but also 
of introducing ICT throughout the teaching and learning 
process in order to facilitate the acquisition of modern 
4 Recognition of this potential positive synergy is reflected, inter alia, 
in how hard it now is to find publications on the status of education 
at a national or international level that do not refer extensively to the 
incorporation of digital equipment into teaching practices, and to 
the levels of digital competency that pupils bring to the classroom. 
But unlike for educational attainment, there are still no standardized 
measurements of levels of digital competency that could track 
changes in the demand for these skills on the market. It could be 
that the speed of change, combined with the difficulty of measuring 
these factors, has so far made it impossible to devise a standard 
measurement for levels of digital competency that would guide 
national institutes of statistics in gathering the requisite data. 
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competencies and improve overall student achievement 
(United Nations, 2010). The skills involved in mastering 
ICT are an increasingly important part of the set of 
core assets that people need in order to take advantage 
of new opportunities in the economy, the State and the 
community, and for full participation in today’s society 
(Kaztman, 2010). 
However, just as ICT create an opportunity for equity 
and social integration, the current distribution of resources 
and competencies in the societies of Latin America is such 
that the very dynamics of ICT penetration can lead to 
vicious circles, widening existing gaps or superimposing 
new ones and contributing to societal polarization. The 
digital divide in Latin America is, in part, rooted in 
unequal access stemming from enormous differences in 
the availability of equipment. But it also has to do with 
how pupils use and can benefit from such equipment. At 
this other level, inequality is evidenced in different levels 
of ability to use ICT productively and take advantage 
of their potential for developing the competencies and 
skills that are increasingly necessary for integration in 
the globalized world (Sunkel and Trucco, 2010).
The burgeoning, market-driven penetration of ICT 
in the region is creating substantial gaps in access to 
equipment by social class. While approximately 55% of 
the households in the highest income quintile (average 
for 13 countries of Latin America) have a computer 
connected to the Internet, only 26% of the households 
in the first income quintile do.5 In general, studies show 
that despite this segmented access to technology, children 
and young people are entering the world of technology in 
greater numbers. In households with 13-to-19-year-olds, 
connectivity is rising at a faster rate than in households 
where all members are over 20. 
Identifying different connectivity access rates by 
generation leads to an examination of how much this weakens 
or reinforces class-based gaps (Kaztman, 2010). A look at 
the figures shows that in the countries of the region where 
technology is more market-driven (such as Brazil, Chile and 
Uruguay) the class gaps for younger-generation users are not 
narrowing. They are widening (see figure II.12). In Uruguay, 
for example, the connectivity gap between households with 
younger members in the highest and lowest quintiles is more 
than 80 percentage points. In households without young 
people the gap is less than 40 percentage points.
5 Unweighted average on the basis of special processing of household 
surveys reconciled by the Observatory for the Information Society 
in Latin America and the Caribbean (OSILAC): Brazil (2008), 
Chile (2006), Colombia (2008), Costa Rica (2008), Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela (2008), El Salvador (2007). Guatemala 
(2006), Honduras (2008), Mexico (2008), Paraguay (2008), Peru 
(2008), Plurinational State of Bolivia (2007) and Uruguay (2008). 
See Kaztman (2010).
Figure II.12 
LATIN AMERICA (11 COUNTRIES): DIFFERENCE IN THE PROPORTION 
OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH AN INTERNET CONNECTION IN THE 
HIGHEST AND LOWEST INCOME QUINTILES BY PRESENCE  































































































Households with members over 20
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special processing of household surveys reconciled by the 
Observatory for the Information Society in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(OSILAC); and R. Kaztman, “Impacto social de la incorporación de las TIC 
en el sistema educativo”, Políticas sociales series, No. 166 (LC/L.3254-P), 
Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 2010.
a Countries shown in order of the percentage of households with Internet connection 
in each country.
The fact that access is available elsewhere than at home 
brightens this pessimistic picture of unequal opportunities 
to acquire digital competencies. Figure II.13 shows the 
differences between the highest and lowest quintiles in 
terms of percentage of Internet users, regardless of the 
place where they access equipment and the Internet. The 
relative intensity of the digital gaps changes for both 
groups. In 4 of the 11 countries studied (Chile, Costa 
Rica, Mexico and Uruguay), the digital gap between 
the poorest and wealthiest quintiles of the population of 
13-to-19-year-olds is narrower than for the population 
age 20 or older. In the other seven countries, the digital 
gap between socio-economic levels is wider for the 
younger group.
The school system has been called to lead the way in 
policies for achieving mass access to, training in and use 
of the new digital technologies, precisely because of its 
ability to counteract underlying inequalities. But the school 
system has not been the only door to technology for the 
lower-income segments of the population. Neighbourhood 
cybercafés have also played a significant role, especially in 
countries with greater purchasing power. Despite efforts to 
offset the underlying social inequalities stemming from the 
market-driven penetration of such equipment, the school 
system has not had much influence. The only clear signs 
of an impact are in Chile (see figure II.14). 
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Figure II.13 
LATIN AMERICA (11 COUNTRIES): DIFFERENCE IN THE 
PROPORTION OF INTERNET USERS IN THE HIGHEST AND 




























































































Users age 13-19 Users 20 and olderSource: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special processing of household surveys reconciled by the 
Observatory for the Information Society in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(OSILAC); and R. Kaztman, “Impacto social de la incorporación de las TIC 
en el sistema educativo”, Políticas sociales series, No. 166 (LC/L.3254-P), 
Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 2010.
a Countries shown in order of the percentage of households with an Internet connection 
in each country.
Figure II.14 
LATIN AMERICA (11 COUNTRIES): DIFFERENCE IN THE 
PROPORTION OF 13-TO-19-YEAR-OLD INTERNET USERS  
IN THE HIGHEST AND LOWEST INCOME QUINTILES  


























































































Home School Commercial establishmentSource:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special processing of household surveys reconciled by the Observatory 
for the Information Society in Latin America and the Caribbean (OSILAC); 
and R. Kaztman, “Impacto social de la incorporación de las TIC en el sistema 
educativo”, Políticas sociales series, No. 166 (LC/L.3254-P), Santiago, Chile, 
ECLAC, 2010.
a Countries in order of percentage of households with an Internet connection.
The problem with access opportunities at commercial 
establishments (and even in educational establishments 
in some cases) is the low intensity at which individuals 
can make use of the technology. Because of the cost, or 
because of access conditions at educational establishments, 
those who use these locations normally do so for shorter 
periods of time and so have fewer possibilities for 
developing digital competencies for social and productive 
integration than do young people who can access the 
Internet at home.
This leads us to another dimension of the digital divide, 
one that is not related to access but rather to modes and 
intensity of use. A recent study (Sunkel, Trucco and Möller, 
2010) profiled young ICT users in three countries on which 
PISA 2006 information was available (Chile, Colombia and 
Uruguay) on the basis of what they reported using computers 
and the Internet for, and how intensely. The typology 
shows that there are four types of user, differentiated on 
the basis of how intensely they use the technology and the 
degree of specialization they have acquired. One group is 
“distant” users, that is, young people who use the computer 
infrequently for a variety of tasks. Another group is the 
“Web surfers” who use the computer mainly to browse the 
Internet and to collaborate with groups, download software 
or music and communicate (e-mail and other media). A 
third group is the “specialized” users. These young people 
more frequently use software to write documents or create 
spreadsheets, graphic presentations, programs or educational 
software. The last group comprises “multifunctional” users, 
who frequently engage in both technical and recreational 
activities. It is this type of user that is making the most 
complete use of the potential opportunities provided by 
digital technologies (Sunkel and Trucco, 2010). 
Figure II.15 
CHILE, COLOMBIA AND URUGUAY: PROPORTION OF 15-YEAR-






















Source: G. Sunkel, D. Trucco and S. Moller, “Aprender y enseñar con tecnologías de 
la información y las comunicaciones (TIC) en América Latina. Potenciales 
beneficios”, Políticas sociales series, No. 169 (LC/L.3291-P), Santiago, Chile, 
ECLAC, 2010.
a The construction of the ICT use indicators meets methodological and statistical 
requirements set out in chapter 16 of the PISA 2006 Technical Report (OECD, 2009).
The analysis indicates that there are structuring 
variables, such as socio-economic and cultural differences 
and student gender, that define user types. Males are 
more likely to be multifunctional users; females are 
more likely to be distant users. Young people from more 
privileged social groups have more options for developing 
multifunctional digital competencies. 
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C. The transition from education to employment 
 and the intergenerational reproduction of unequal 
 productive opportunities and access to well-being 
This edition of Social Panorama focuses on the life-
cycle period from birth to 29 years of age, encompassing 
childhood, adolescence and young adulthood. It is during 
this part of the life cycle that people transition from the 
intensive acquisition of knowledge and development of skills 
to productive integration into society; from dependence 
to economic autonomy; from living in the household of 
origin to forming one’s own household. This transition 
determines, to a large extent, the success (or rather, the 
skills and potential) that the new generations will have in 
being full members of society throughout their adult lives, 
free to pursue their life plans, participate as citizens and 
contribute to development. This formative period determines 
whether social inequalities will be perpetuated or whether 
they will lessen from one generation to the next.
The disparity in skills development relates not just to 
educational attainment but also to self-regulating labour 
markets in their role as “factories of segmentation” by level 
of productivity, access to well-being and full enjoyment 
of social entitlements. Structural inequality (as replicated 
from the productive structure, markets and institutions) 
thus compounds intergenerational inequalities, with gaps 
becoming further entrenched throughout the life cycle and 
propagated from one generation to the next.
Accordingly, the approach adopted must be a 
comprehensive one, addressing structures and institutions 
as well as the life cycle. Education is a key consideration 
here, as it prepares individuals to be full participants in all 
spheres of society throughout their adult life. One of those 
spheres, among various others, is the workplace. ECLAC 
has conclusively documented that, in the current situation 
of most countries of the region, individuals who do not 
complete secondary education are exposed to a high level 
of social vulnerability since their labour-derived earnings 
will tend to be low as a reflection of low educational 
attainment; and they will be at high risk of falling into 
poverty and becoming excluded or marginalized if they 
have to work in self-regulating labour markets without 
any minimum assurances or labour rights.
Against this backdrop there is a wide-ranging debate 
and considerable concern about the link between education 
and employment. The bridge between the two generally leads 
from dependence to autonomy, from acquisition of knowledge 
and skills to their use in adult life, and from conditions in 
the household of origin to those in the individual’s own 
household. It is known that the level of education attained 
has a strong bearing on the kind and quality of employment 
that can be accessed, but young people seeking to enter the 
In a context of unequal access to educational opportunities, the link between education and 
employment reproduces social inequalities and can worsen them. Stratified education coupled 
with self-regulating labour markets segmented by level of productivity cement the gaps passed 
on from generation to generation throughout the life cycle. Education is segmented by socio-
economic conditions and educational levels in the household of origin, and the return on that 
education also reproduces the gaps in access to decent jobs and well-being. The rates of return 
on education rise along with years of schooling, but the biggest leaps are upon completing 
secondary school, upon beginning tertiary education and, above all, upon completing tertiary 
education. Education levels being equal, the rates of return (measured by labour income) are 
lower for females than for males, and they are lower for informal workers than for formal 
workers; that is tangible evidence of the patterns of exclusion existing in the workplace.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)98
world of work face particular obstacles. How gaps entrenched 
in the educational system are reproduced when people enter 
the world of work is discussed below.
As ECLAC and UNESCO noted as long ago as 1992, 
education and employment are linked as basic pillars 
of changing production patterns with equity (ECLAC/
UNESCO, 1992). To put it another way, it is impossible 
to fight social inequality without achieving equity in 
educational attainment and then turning it into jobs with 
smaller gaps in income and in access to social protection. 
Unfortunately, when there is unequal access to educational 
opportunities and productive structures are exclusionary, 
that link between education and employment reproduces 
social differences and inequities and can even amplify 
them. As seen above, this holds true for the countries of 
the region.
In Latin America, employment is still the mainstay 
of social inclusion. It provides differing degrees of access 
to well-being via the autonomous (or heteronomous, in 
the case of wage workers) generation of income. Labour 
income is still the principal source of household resources, 
accounting for some 80% of total household income 
(ECLAC, 2008a).
Employment is still the basic connection with social 
protection systems —specifically, access to social security 
and health systems. This is despite the strengthening, in 
some countries of the region, of non-contributory inclusion 
and protection mechanisms. Noteworthy among these 
mechanisms is the solidarity component of financing 
(and hence accessing) basic social security and preventive 
health-care benefits, as well as policies and programmes 
geared towards fighting poverty through social policies 
targeting lower-income sectors that are not integrated in 
the labour market (ECLAC, 2009; ECLAC, 2010a). 
Work also enhances the feeling of belonging. For 
many, being outside the world of work is the most dramatic 
way to “not belong”, to be excluded both socially and 
symbolically. This feeling is particularly marked among 
young people because employment is the main road to 
integration in society. It facilitates interpersonal development, 
self-esteem and mutual recognition in groups with shared 
characteristics (ECLAC/OIJ, 2008).
1. Minimum thresholds for well-being, credentials and 
 educational devaluation
A few decades ago, a relatively low percentage of the 
population managed to access educational systems and reach 
significant milestones (completion of secondary education, 
tertiary education). This high concentration of (scarce) 
educational capital worked in favour of a high return on 
education because having completed primary education was 
enough to access good jobs with wages and benefits, mainly 
in the primary and secondary sectors. Mass access to and 
completion of primary education in the 1980s and 1990s, 
plus the generalization of secondary education (chiefly the 
lower cycle), have led to creeping devaluation. These levels 
of educational attainment are no longer enough to reach 
social positions with incomes that offer an easy escape from 
poverty, let alone above-average labour income.
ECLAC has repeatedly noted that completion of 
secondary education is the minimum educational threshold 
in the region for ensuring a future free of poverty (ECLAC, 
2000; ECLAC/OIJ, 2008 and 2004). Attaining this level of 
education is crucial for acquiring the basic skills needed for 
development and lifelong learning in a globalized, democratic 
world. It is also a determining factor in the attainment of a 
baseline well-being that will shatter the mechanisms that 
reproduce inequality. Otherwise, these mechanisms will 
impact that individual’s children (see figure II.16).
Figure II.16 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): YEARS OF SCHOOLING 
REQUIRED TO BE LESS LIKELY TO LIVE IN POVERTY OR 
TO EARN ABOVE-AVERAGE LABOUR INCOME AMONG 
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Years of schooling needed to have
above-average labour income
Years of schooling needed to have less-than-
average likelihood of falling into poverty
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the respective countries.
a Employed persons working 20 or more hours per week.
b Urban areas.
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Although trends in labour market incorporation and 
the quality of employment depend on many different 
factors and on just how the labour market is segmented 
in each country (inter alia, gender differences, the weight 
of the informal sector and the degree of development of 
social protection systems), the relevance of educational 
attainment in the structure of labour supply and demand 
is clear. So, and especially for females, higher rates of 
participation in the labour force are found precisely 
among those who have completed secondary education 
and have some kind of post-secondary education. Because 
a certain percentage of young people is still in school, 
participation is slightly higher for those who left school 
early and for those who have already acquired some kind 
of credential (see figure II.17 (A and B) and the breakdown 
by country in table II.A-7). The trend is much clearer 
among the adult female population: the higher the level 
of education, the greater the proportion of participation 
in the labour force. 
For men, figure II.17.B shows a higher proportion 
of labour market participation, with a significant group 
starting to work quickly after leaving school early (with 
or without completing primary school). As the primary 
source of family income, men are often forced by economic 
necessity to leave school early (see sections above), precisely 
to enter the labour market. But this higher participation 
rate does not mean access to good-quality employment, 
as discussed in the following section.
Figure II.17 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): PARTICIPATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATES, AGES 15-29, 30-64  













































































































































Age 15-29 Age 30-64 15 and older
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a The length of education cycles was defined in accordance with the 1997 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).
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Those who have the most common level of education 
—incomplete or complete secondary education— have 
the hardest time finding work (see figure II.17 (C and D)). 
Sixty-four per cent of young people have an incomplete 
secondary education (upper or lower cycle) or have 
completed secondary education but have no further 
schooling. For the adult population, the figure is 44%, 
with 36% of the adult population having completed 
primary education or less. There is obviously a tipping 
point for labour market participation that could be 
related (especially for the younger generations) to 
changing expectations as to the kind of employment 
they can aspire to: jobs that require higher degrees of 
specialization but do not seem to be in ample supply. 
Unemployment impacts young people the most, with 
an average unemployment rate of 11.8% versus 4.1% 
for adults. It is even larger for young females. Although 
the distribution of unemployment rates shows similar 
trends for males and females, they are higher for 
young females at all levels of educational attainment. 
Evidence from several periods shows that completion 
of the primary cycle and, later, secondary education has 
become relatively devalued on the labour market. This 
is seen in terms of both quantity —demand relative to 
the supply of labour at these levels of education— and 
price, with wages declining relatively over time (see 
tables II.A.7-14). This can be seen especially among the 
young population (ECLAC/OIJ, 2004 and 2008).
2. Education and quality of employment
The quality of labour market participation is highly subject 
to the level of education attained. This becomes more 
apparent with conclusion of higher cycles of education. 
This link between education and quality of employment is 
seen in levels of participation in the formal economy (or in 
medium- and high-productivity sectors), in access to social 
protection systems and in income, as discussed below.
First, the higher the level of education attainment, the 
higher the proportion of wage-earners. Contrary to some 
hypotheses that identify independent work as prevalent in 
more dynamic, modern and globalized labour markets with 
a labour force that values autonomy and hence chooses 
such occupations, evidence seems to show that in Latin 
America independent work is associated more with the 
informal labour market, low productivity, low levels of 
qualification and lower income (for further information, 
refer to ECLAC, 2009). Wage labour employment is higher 
among the young labour force (75% of those employed) 
than among adults (just above 60% of the employed age 
30-64). This latter trend would, in part, be due to the higher 
likelihood of independent work —the level of education 
attainment being the same— later in the life cycle. But it 
is also true that in all of the countries self-employment is 
the only option open to a significant portion of the less-
qualified adult population for generating labour income 
(see table II.A-11).
Second, an increase in educational attainments is 
inversely related to employment in the informal or low-
productivity sector (see figure II.18.A), which is to a certain 
degree also related to the potential for employment as a 
wage-earner. Therefore, if 47% of the employed population 
age 15 and older works in the informal sector, the percentage 
rises to 74% for those who did not complete primary 
education and falls to 64% for those who did, 32% for 
those who completed secondary education and just 14% for 
those who completed education at a university level. The 
adult labour force is more likely than young people to be 
inserted in low-productivity sectors (48.4% of employed 
adults versus 39.7% of employed young people).
This, too, is closely linked to access to social 
protection systems associated with employment: the 
higher the education level of the workforce, the greater 
the proportion of those who belong and pay into social 
security. While some 43% of the total workforce participates 
in social security, only 21% of workers who completed 
a few grades of primary education are protected by such 
systems, compared with 69% of those who have some 
kind of post-secondary education. There is also marked 
dissimilarity in social security system coverage (in terms 
of the percentage of the workforce enrolled), ranging from 
less than one fifth (Paraguay) to more than two thirds 
(Costa Rica). And the lower the general enrolment in 
social security, the greater the differences in enrolment 
based on level of education (see table II.A-13).
Lastly (and expectedly), there is a strong link between 
the level of educational attainment and labour income. 
While the average income for the employed labour 
force in the region is a little more than US$ 660 (at 2000 
purchasing power parity prices), those who completed 
primary education or less earn just US$ 350, on average. 
Those who attained post-secondary education average 
more than US$ 1,400 per month (see figure II.18.B).
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Figure II.18 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): INFORMALITY AND MONTHLY LABOUR INCOME FOR THE EMPLOYED  









































Age 15-29 Age 30-64 15 and older
B. Average monthly labour income
































Age 15-29 Age 30-64 15 and older
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a The length of education cycles was defined in accordance with the 1997 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).
A classic way to show the relationship between educational 
attainments and income is to calculate the internal rates 
of (private) return on education, showing the percentage 
increase in labour income according to additional years 
of education, educational cycles completed or other 
ways of specifying an individual’s accrued educational 
capital. Doing so provides a snapshot of the “yield” on 
education in terms of greater labour income (usually, 
wages), taking into account several factors involved in 
this relationship.6
6 It is not being said here that the purpose of education, either 
exclusively or primarily, is to achieve the rates of return that years 
of schooling produce in competitive labour markets. It is worthwhile 
showing, however, to what extent democratization of educational 
opportunities is crucial to ensuring people’s right to exercise their 
positive liberty, i.e. to pursue life projects on the basis of, inter alia, 
timely development of their skills. That development of skills is 
necessary but not sufficient in and of itself, inasmuch as labour 
markets should be subject to regulatory policies and guidance
Noteworthy among the factors to bear in mind when 
assessing the private return on education are those related 
to labour market segmentation. Taken into consideration 
here were three major factors that distinguish between 
dual labour markets and those that operate in a parallel 
(albeit not separate) fashion and have a significant impact 
on educational returns. These factors are employment 
in low-productivity sectors, sex and area of residence 
(see box II.1 and the results of the regression analyses 
in table II.A-15).
 to ensure full enjoyment of labour rights and social protection. 
In this regard, the State should play a core role in preventing 
educational differentiation from condemning to exclusion those 
not achieving the educational attainments indicated. Hence, 
productivity increases should not be understood solely in terms 
of return on learning but also in terms of the possibility of a 
society —through the State and the tax system— redistributing 
resources and extending social protection to the most disadvantaged 
sectors.
3. Internal rates of return on education
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Box II.1 
PROCEDURE FOR ESTIMATING INDIVIDUAL RETURNS ON EDUCATION
The origins of the empirical analysis showing 
the influence of schooling on income formation 
date from the late 1950s and the 1960s. The 
work of Jacob Mincer (1958 and 1962) and 
Gary Becker (1964) generated evidence on 
the income differential by sex and educational 
background. The classic study positing a 
positive relationship between schooling and 
income was conducted by Mincer in 1974; in 
it, he links the natural log of income with the 
number of years of study and experience, 
through the following equation:
 (1)
where parameter β0 is the natural 
log of the income of an individual without 
any schooling, while β1 is the percentage 
increase in income for each additional 
year of education completed, i.e., the rate 
of return. Various studies on this subject 
have been conducted during the last few 
decades; in the case of Latin America the 
available results show the positive effect 
of schooling in determining labour income 
(Psacharopoulus and Chu, 1992; ECLAC, 
2002). There is also abundant literature 
on the problems deriving from selection 
bias in estimating these models, as well 
as on the problems arising in interpreting 
the results when instrumental variables 
designed to correct them are incorporated 
(Kling, 2000).
The results presented in the 2001-
2002 edition of Social Panorama were 
generated by adjusting a function for 
estimating the increase in income, that 
is, the return on a larger number of years 
of schooling. The average rate of return 
was calculated on the basis of equation 
(2), which was applied in order to estimate 
the differences generated between each 
of the education cycles (basic, secondary 
and higher):
 (2)
The variable Sch represents the number 
of years of schooling of each individual; b is 
the total number of years corresponding to the 
basic cycle; s is the number corresponding to 
the secondary cycle; db is a binary variable 
that has a value of 1 when an individual has 
a number of years of schooling equal to or 
greater than b; ds is equal to 1 when an 
individual has s or more years of schooling, 
while the potential experience is obtained by 
subtracting from the reported age the age of 
entry into the formal educational system and 
the accumulated years of schooling. Equation 
(2) corresponds to an additive effects model, 
so that the rate of return for a given level of 
education is calculated by adding together 
the values of the parameters estimated in 
previous cycles. Thus, β1 corresponds to the 
baseline parameter and is equivalent to the 
rate of return for primary schooling, while 
(β1+ β2) corresponds to the secondary cycle 
of education and (β1+ β2+ β3) corresponds 
to individuals who have completed higher 
studies. Variables dgender, darea and 
dsector are binaries with a value of 1 if the 
individual is male or lives in an urban area 
or works in the formal sector.
The results of the regressive analyses 
presented herein are for equation (2), 
but separate results were generated for 
males and females, for urban and rural 
areas and for formal and informal sector 
workers. The estimation method used 
was minimum weighted squares, and the 
expansion factor associated with each 
observation was included in the calculation 
algorithm. The sampling refers to persons 
age 20 and older who reported being 
wage-earners who usually work more 
than 19 hours per week and who earned 
some income from work during the survey 
period. Monthly income (per hour worked, 
assuming a standard 48-hour work week) 
was expressed in local currency at average 
prices for 2002.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin America 2001-2002 (LC/G.2183-P), Santiago, Chile, 2001. United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.02.II.G.65. 
Generally speaking, primary education has a return 
(or income increment) of 4.7% per year of education 
(simple average of 18 countries), which rises to 7.0% 
per additional year in the secondary cycle and 14.9% 
per each year of post-secondary education. Although 
this trend is general across countries, the return on 
each education cycle differs widely from one country 
to another in terms of effective increment. As table II.2 
shows, the return ranges from 1% to 8.7% per additional 
year of primary education (Costa Rica and Honduras), 
from 2.9% to 12.4% per additional year of secondary 
education (Plurinational State of Bolivia and Guatemala) 
and from 8.4% to 25.5% per additional year of post-
secondary education (Argentina and Brazil). Perhaps 
the most striking examples are the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia and Peru, where the return on secondary 
education is lower than for primary education and could 
become a disincentive for completing the 12 years of 
education that, as seen above, is the minimum threshold 
for attaining well-being.7
The differences in income between labour market 
segments should also be weighed. It is not that rates of 
return differ significantly across labour segments, but rather 
that income levels and, therefore, income trajectories do. 
The results shown below reflect the application of separate 
models for the formal sector, the informal sector, males, 
females and urban and rural areas, without controlling 
for other segmentations involved.8
7 This is not the case in the Plurinational State of Bolivia if the rates 
of return are calculated for the informal sector only, nor in Peru if 
only women are considered. These models based on labour market 
segments give rise to the curves in figure II.19, but the results are 
not shown here for space reasons.
8 The segmentation variables are considered jointly in the general 
model summarized in tables II.2 and II.A-15.
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Table II.2 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): INTERNAL RATES OF RETURN ON EDUCATION  
AND RELEVANCE OF OTHER FACTORS IN WAGE INCREMENT a
(Percentages of increment of base wage)
Country Year













Argentina (urban areas) 2006 3.0 7.6 8.3 … 15.8 47.8
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2007 5.1 2.9 * 16.5 59.2 18.3 30.5
Brazil 2008 6.7 9.2 25.5 18.7 24.5 26.9
Chile 2006 3.0 7.5 19.4 7.4 20.7 24.3
Colombia 2008 5.1 5.6 * 14.0 7.7 11.8 40.8
Costa Rica 2008 1.0 5.6 16.0 7.1 * 23.0 29.5
Dominican Republic 2008 4.4 4.5 * 18.2 9.1 21.7 30.3
Ecuador 2008 4.3 6.0 10.8 12.7 17.6 28.4
El Salvador 2004 3.7 7.1 17.3 13.9 10.8 23.1
Guatemala 2006 7.5 12.4 14.8 8.0 15.7 9.7
Honduras 2007 8.7 10.9 14.4 44.4 0.2 * 67.1
Mexico 2008 4.5 9.0 14.8 21.4 17.6 33.2
Nicaragua 2005 5.2 7.9 14.0 10.2 15.6 21.5
Panama 2008 5.3 6.1 * 12.3 11.1 18.7 55.4
Paraguay 2008 5.5 7.7 * 16.6 4.1 * 10.9 30.5
Peru 2008 6.3 3.7 11.0 25.2 32.7 43.1
Uruguay 2008 2.9 8.7 14.9 -3.1 21.5 35.8
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 2008 2.9 3.6 9.8 … 14.5 36.0
Simple average 4.7 7.6 14.9 17.6 18.3 34.1
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a An asterisk is used to denote instances in which the regression is not statistically significant at 5%.
First, there is an obvious segmentation by worker 
gender (see figure II.19.A). Although the rates of 
return are higher for females, mainly in secondary 
education but also at the tertiary level, their levels of 
income are consistently lower than for men: labour 
income rises an average of slightly more than 17% 
just for being male.
Second, the differences between urban and rural labour 
markets lead to different rates of return on education. They 
are higher in rural areas, especially for post-secondary 
education. These significant differences in returns mean 
that although the baselines (wage levels without education 
or with just a few years) favour urban areas, the increment 
is larger in rural areas, especially at higher levels of 
education attainment. The shortage of qualified workers 
in rural areas is one of the reasons for their income being, 
on average, higher than in cities (see figure II.19.B). In any 
event, and considering that in rural areas the less educated 
account for a higher proportion of the working population, 
the employed earn, on average, 13.9% more income just 
for participating in urban labour markets.9
Last, the greatest differences in the rates of return appear 
when the labour markets are segmented along formal and 
informal lines. Figure II.19.C shows that labour income 
trajectories by years of schooling are clearly unequal: 
while at lower levels of education the wage differences 
do not exceed 10% to 12%, at higher levels the wage in 
the formal sector can be 80% higher than in the informal 
sector with the same level of qualification. On average, 
employment in the formal economy yields an income that 
is 34% higher than in the informal economy.
9 There are striking differences between countries. In the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia and in Honduras, the income increment is 40% more in 
urban areas. The differences are minimal in Costa Rica and Uruguay, 
and in the latter even seem to favour rural labour markets.
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Figure II.19 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): INCOME TRAJECTORY BY YEARS OF SCHOOLING, WAGE-EARNERS AGE 20 AND OLDER 
WORKING 20 OR MORE HOURS PER WEEK, BY SEX, GEOGRAPHIC AREA AND LABOUR MARKET FORMALITY a
(Wages with zero years of schooling in the comparison category with the highest income=100)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective 
countries.
a  Simple average trajectory for each segment of the labour market, by country. The trajectory within each segment was calculated using a separate model that does not control for 
the other segmentations.
Despite the persistent labour segmentation owing to 
ascriptive factors such as gender, geography and levels of 
productivity, educational expansion has also increased the 
proportion of intermediately qualified workers who are 
paid sufficiently (although unemployment is also higher 
among them). Concentrations of labour income are therefore 
lower. Examination of the labour Gini coefficient by age 
group reveals some positive data. What table II.3 shows 
is that among all employed age groups, the lowest Gini 
coefficient (both for labour income in general and for wage 
income in particular) is among young people. This could 
indeed be because education attainment for this age group 
as a whole is higher. Educational expansion increases the 
proportion of the economically active population with 
average levels of qualification and pay, increasing the 
total income and wages distributed in the labour market.
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Table II.3 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): CONCENTRATION OF LABOUR AND WAGE INCOME AMONG WORKERS IN DIFFERENT AGE GROUPS
(Gini coefficient)
Country Year
Workers age 15-29  Workers age 30-39  Workers age 40-49 Workers age 50-64
All workers Wage-earners All workers Wage-earners All workers Wage-earners All workers Wage-earners
Argentina (urban areas) 2006 0.39 0.35 0.41 0.37 0.48 0.40 0.49 0.41
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2007 0.61 0.39 0.55 0.41 0.58 0.41 0.67 0.48
Brazil 2008 0.47 0.38 0.51 0.45 0.56 0.50 0.63 0.54
Chile 2006 0.45 0.41 0.52 0.47 0.54 0.48 0.57 0.49
Colombia 2008 0.45 0.37 0.49 0.44 0.53 0.48 0.58 0.51
Costa Rica 2008 0.34 0.31 0.43 0.37 0.50 0.42 0.48 0.43
Dominican Republic 2008 0.53 0.38 0.50 0.41 0.53 0.48 0.54 0.50
Ecuador 2008 0.47 0.33 0.49 0.37 0.54 0.41 0.56 0.45
El Salvador 2004 0.48 0.37 0.50 0.43 0.54 0.45 0.60 0.50
Guatemala 2006 0.57 0.37 0.57 0.43 0.64 0.48 0.65 0.51
Honduras 2007 0.57 0.45 0.56 0.46 0.60 0.51 0.64 0.56
Mexico 2008 0.52 0.43 0.54 0.44 0.58 0.47 0.66 0.51
Nicaragua 2005 0.55 0.38 0.52 0.45 0.56 0.48 0.57 0.45
Panama 2008 0.44 0.33 0.44 0.35 0.49 0.41 0.55 0.45
Paraguay 2008 0.51 0.34 0.49 0.34 0.55 0.40 0.63 0.50
Peru 2008 0.59 0.40 0.56 0.44 0.57 0.48 0.61 0.50
Uruguay 2008 0.41 0.36 0.45 0.40 0.49 0.43 0.52 0.45
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 2008 0.32 0.28 0.33 0.30 0.35 0.31 0.38 0.32
Simple average 0.48 0.37 0.49 0.41 0.53 0.44 0.57 0.48
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective 
countries.
D. Key factors for fighting inequality from within the 
 educational system: progress and challenges 
Education policy must dovetail with other social promotion and protection measures if inequality 
in the intergenerational transmission of educational opportunities is to be successfully reversed. 
There are key intervention factors in the field of education. One of them is extending early 
childhood education coverage. Another is lengthening the school day at the primary level. 
This is particularly important for students who do not have an appropriate educational climate 
or place for studying at home. Incorporating digital technologies into education is seen as a 
critical opportunity in the battle for equity. Conditional cash transfer programmes for families 
can bolster timely education progression and help prevent dropouts, extending achievements 
to the most disadvantaged sectors of society. The supply of training for work is also essential, 
and the formal education system should coordinate with informal training programmes and 
the productive world. One of the main challenges in higher education is how to reconcile 
education quality with expanding access to traditionally excluded sectors.
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Addressing inequality in the region is not an easy task. Nor 
can education be expected to solve problems involving 
multiple factors. That is why education policy must be 
linked with other social promotion and protection measures 
in an integrated approach that will help reverse inequality 
in the intergenerational transmission of educational 
opportunities. 
It is important for education policy to provide for 
investing in schools. What is needed is educational 
infrastructure and resources, improved teacher training 
and a better teaching environment, enhanced school 
management and better curriculum content at all levels of 
education (ECLAC, 2010b). Public education for young 
people should extend beyond the end of the compulsory 
education cycle to ease the transition into the labour 
market and help reduce inequalities in the return on 
education throughout life. Set out below are key factors 
in education that can make a significant contribution to 
reducing inequality in the age bracket that is the focus 
of this edition of Social Panorama.
1. Early entry: early childhood and preschool education
ECLAC has proposed that broadening early childhood 
education coverage should be a pro-equality policy priority 
in the region (ECLAC, 2010a). Preschool education recently 
became a top public policy issue in the region because of 
its key role in providing basic care for children, especially 
for families in a vulnerable socio-economic environment. 
Publicly funded institutional care for children under 6 has 
well-documented benefits (UNESCO, 2010).
Such care facilitates the integration of females into 
the labour market, fosters their autonomy and increases 
household resources. For the young cohort, it provides 
an opportunity for young mothers, giving them more 
free time to continue studying and avoid breaking their 
own education cycle. In-school meals and health care, 
as well as early stimulation, offset deficiencies at home. 
Such care also has a positive effect on future cognitive, 
psychomotor and attention-span development and activity 
levels and has a substantial impact on the child’s prospects 
in subsequent education cycles. It is during the early years 
of life that personality, intelligence and social behaviour 
develop most quickly. 
Quality of care and educational strategy must also be 
taken into consideration (ECLAC/OEI, 2010). Expanding 
the supply of education at the preschool (3-5 years of 
age) and early childhood (birth to 3 years) levels, along 
with appropriate policies that target and facilitate access 
for the most vulnerable sectors, will help build a strong 
educational base for the fight against problems such as 
repeating grades and dropping out. 
There is clear evidence of the positive effect that preschool 
education has on academic outcomes for pupils in primary 
education and subsequent levels (UNESCO, 2010a). This 
effect is more apparent in the outcomes of learning to read, 
which is one of the skills that most influences household 
educational capital. Enhancing these skills in the first years 
of life is crucial. Aided by early stimulation from early 
childhood education, it makes a difference in future cognitive 
development. This association is not seen in all of the countries 
participating in SERCE, and it varies in intensity in those 
where it does have an impact (see figure II.20).
Figure II.20 
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): IMPACT OF YEARS OF 
PRESCHOOL ATTENDANCE ON READING PERFORMANCE 
IN THIRD AND SIXTH GRADE a
(Multilevel model coefficients) 













Sixth grade Third grade
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of Latin American Laboratory for Assessment of the Quality of Education, 
Factores asociados al logro cognitivo de los estudiantes de América Latina y 
el Caribe, Santiago, Chile, UNESCO Regional Office for Education in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 2010.
a The coefficients for Guatemala and Nicaragua are not statistically significant. The 
coefficients for the regional model were worked out with equivalent weights for 
each country. 
Education is compulsory in all countries of the region, 
at least in primary education (six years). But in recent 
years many countries have lowered the entry age to include 
compulsory preschool education. Mexico is the country 
that has added the most years (three, from age 3 to age 6) 
of compulsory preschool education. Next come Chile, El 
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Salvador, Guatemala, Panama and Uruguay, with two 
years of compulsory preschool (age 4 to age 6).
Beyond compulsory education in the early years, 
the countries of the region are promoting policies and 
programmes geared towards protecting and fostering early 
childhood development. These programmes generally 
provide supplemental care for children in the most 
vulnerable social sectors; some of the components they 
have in common are discussed below. 
First is the role of public day-care centres and 
kindergartens in providing meals and preventing childhood 
undernutrition. Studies of early childhood and preschool 
education policies in 13 countries of Latin America 
(Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia) show that all 
have preschool meal policies. For many families, these 
supplemental nutrition programmes take pressure off 
family budgets and do a great deal to further the healthy 
development of the recipient children.
The region has also advanced in early childhood 
education quality and methods, involving families in the 
education process. Several countries are implementing 
programmes to train and/or support parents in better 
caring for their children. Gaps in coverage are most 
significant for the youngest, from birth to age 3 —when 
family involvement in care is essential. There is a need 
for education on the demand side of out-of-home care and 
programmes that support in-home care because turning to 
such public services is not part of the culture in most of 
the countries. There are many kinds of support available 
to meet a variety of needs.
Several countries of the region also stress multicultural 
education. To address the historical marginalization of 
indigenous groups, several countries of Latin America 
have added policies geared towards increasing preschool 
education coverage for them. One of the benefits 
documented by international studies of preschool education 
is its ability to decrease inequality among children from 
different ethnic groups as they enter primary school. 
2. Extended school day 
Advances in current pedagogical models and the education 
needs of the modern world are making longer school days 
increasingly important. There is much left to do on this 
front in Latin America. In most of the countries of the 
region, the primary school day is 4-5 hours long, with 5-6 
hours of class in the lower cycle of secondary education 
(Johansen, 2005). 
Lengthening the school day would not only mean more 
absolute time in school but would also help reorganize 
the entire system in line with changing curricula and 
modern teaching models. An extended school day would 
be expected to change the ratio between time spent on 
working and time for rest, increasing pedagogical work 
for pupils at school and decreasing the time spent on 
homework. This is especially important for students 
who lack an educational climate at home and whose 
environment does not provide appropriate stimulus or 
support for learning. Previous sections of this chapter 
have already shown that the household educational climate 
is one of the major determining factors behind unequal 
educational attainment.
Extended days should also take some pressure off 
school management tasks and reduce the time that teachers 
and managers spend on individual and group planning. For 
teachers, expanding to a full workday can help improve 
job and wage stability and reduce their usually excessive 
workload. It would involve changing their contract 
status and eliminating moonlighting at other educational 
establishments. And increasing teacher well-being could 
improve their pedagogical capacity.
A full school day also has positive externalities for 
families, such as easing concerns about out-of-school care, 
including meals. Children who are in school longer can 
be less exposed to the external risks involved in spending 
several hours a day on the street. This can help improve 
family life by increasing safety and peace of mind as to 
what the children are doing. A longer day also facilitates 
the incorporation of mothers into the labour market. As 
seen in several ECLAC publications, this is a significant 
source of income for lower-resource households. 
In most of the countries of the region, most of the 
supply of extended days and better quality is in private 
schools. Coverage depends on families’ ability to pay, 
with the resulting segmentation (ECLAC, 2010a). Most 
efforts to extend the school day in public education have 
been at the secondary level. The countries that have made 
the greatest efforts to extend the day at the primary level 
are Cuba, Chile and Colombia (see figure II.21).
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Figure II.21 
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): SIXTH-GRADERS ATTENDING 
EDUCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS WITH PARTIAL OR EXTENDED 
DAYS (SEVEN OR MORE CHRONOLOGICAL HOURS) BY TYPE 
































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of microdata from the Second Regional 
Comparative and Explanatory Study (SERCE) of 2006.
a Latin America represents the simple average for countries participating in SERCE. 
Brazil is not included in the analysis because of lack of consistency in measuring 
the school day.
The most recent study on Chile (Pires and Urzúa, 
2010) showed that extended days at the secondary level 
decreased teenage pregnancy by 4%, raised the likelihood 
of not dropping out of school by 32% and reduced the 
likelihood of being arrested. Cognitive measurement 
scores doubled. The study shows that the positive impact 
is greater for the most vulnerable children because it 
offsets the lack of household educational resources and 
equipment and reduces the likelihood of risky behaviour. 
The extended school day also increases the likelihood of 
going on to post-secondary studies, thus improving future 
job opportunities. 
SERCE (2006) learning assessments show that in 
countries that have establishments with an extended primary 
school day there is a positive association between length of 
the school day and math outcomes at those establishments. 
But in all of the countries analysed (except Chile), the 
academic outcomes for the most vulnerable pupils fell 
short of those of pupils with a shorter school day. So, 
at educational establishments serving the socially most 
disadvantaged population, just extending the school day 
might not have an impact on academic performance.10 It 
is probably not enough to do more of the same, but rather 
to make more substantial changes in how the system is 
organized in addition to adding more hours. 
Changing the school day usually requires expanding 
school space, improving the equipment available at 
schools and considering the infrastructure and costs 
associated with more meals for pupils. Extending the day 
also requires that resources be allocated in keeping with 
each establishment’s needs, such as providing enough 
drinking water, sanitation facilities and educational 
resources like libraries and computer labs to ensure an 
enhanced educational environment. The condition of the 
educational establishment can have a negative or positive 
effect on students. Another significant cost in effectively 
implementing an extended day is teacher pay. Lengthening 
the teacher workday entails costs associated with changing 
the type of contract and the work hours; these costs need 
to be considered when planning the change.
10 These results should be interpreted with caution because few 
socio-economically and culturally disadvantaged children attend 
educational establishments with an extended school day.
3. Incorporating digital technology into education: 
 cutting-edge competencies
The ongoing technological revolution is redefining the role 
of education in the effort to achieve equal opportunities. 
However, as happened with educational attainment 
differentials, there is a risk that relative market-based 
advantages for families will continue to be the prime 
determinant of digital divides. This being the case, 
incorporating new technologies into education might just 
reinforce existing inequalities. 
Incorporating digital programmes through education 
has revealed a collective imaginary with high expectations 
for educational opportunities for the new generation, 
as seen in Uruguay’s Basic Computer Connectivity for 
Online Learning Plan (CEIBAL). An ECLAC study of the 
social impacts of incorporating ICT into the educational 
system (Kaztman, 2010) reviews some of the ways these 
technologies could be harnessed for individual growth. 
First, participating in peer-to-peer networks with a 
high degree of digital socialization stimulates and facilitates 
exploration and use of the virtual world. This increases the 
opportunities for each participant to accrue knowledge 
and skills in handling digital tools. Second, gradual 
expansion of the frontiers of the virtual world also broadens 
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exchanges with other stakeholders in society and multiplies 
affiliations and belongings, i.e., communities of interests 
and potential actions. This makes it possible to expand 
technical competencies and spaces for citizen participation, 
and to build a collective identity. Young people’s interest in 
participating in virtual communities and networks seems to 
be related to a search for recognition and for belonging to 
spaces that transcend the domestic and institutional borders 
in which they usually move (Winocur, 2006).
This requires more than universal access. Children and 
young people must shift from being distant users to being 
multifunctional ones. Greater intensity and productivity 
in use requires more time in front of the monitors and 
good programmes for developing the requisite skills set. 
Here, the difference between those who access these 
technologies at home and those who do not currently 
determines the depth of the digital divide and reinforces 
underlying socio-economic and capital gaps.
For the same reasons, school should play a basic 
role in counteracting these inequalities by preparing to 
offer more and better access to technology to those who 
have none at home, deepening penetration in order to 
increase usage time per pupil and offering pedagogical 
guidance that motivates students to use the technology 
independently for research and homework. Evidence from 
research associated with PISA 2006 seems to indicate that 
the degree of confidence with which young people use the 
Internet, and the proportion of computers connected to the 
Internet at the educational establishment, are positively 
associated with learning in the science area. Moreover, 
the type of pedagogical approach taken is not neutral and 
is related to how the students use the technology. 
As ECLAC research on the social impact of 
incorporating ICT through educational systems (Kaztman, 
2010) shows, most educational systems in the region are 
faced with a scenario that forces them to work doubly 
hard to achieve equity, to the extent that the problems 
they inherited and could not resolve compound those 
posed by incorporating ICT into learning processes. The 
magnitude of the challenges is such that it would not be 
reasonable to expect the educational system to make this 
contribution without sustained support from other primary 
institutions of society. 
Defining the criteria for choosing the models for 
incorporating ICT into teaching practices should be 
subordinated to State goals for education in each country. 
One of the priorities for the States of Latin America (and 
for those in charge of their educational systems) is to make 
universal access to computer skills a key tool in the effort 
to dissociate social background from learning attainments. 
This is seen as an essential step in reducing poverty and 
inequality and in enhancing social integration. Some of 
the approaches to this challenge in the region have been 
more successful than others. For example, over a 20-
year period Chile has consistently implemented policies 
for achieving mass access to ICT through educational 
establishments. This approach is having an impact on 
distributive equity in access (as noted in the preceding 
section). Uruguay, with a much more recent policy, 
opted for proactive school-to-home outreach under its 
student-targeted policy to achieve universal access. Such 
strategies seek to involve and mobilize households and 
the community to complement the work being done by 
the educational system.
4. Support for families in order to reinforce educational 
 progression in vulnerable sectors: conditional cash 
 transfer programmes
Public policy cannot obviate the role that family environment 
plays in the intergenerational reproduction of inequalities. 
As discussed above, completion of secondary education is 
a key challenge for achieving equity and social inclusion 
through the schools. It is therefore important to test 
instruments and strategies that help keep students in the 
system during this cycle, that is, that foster sustained, 
timely school progression. 
When thinking about policies for narrowing gaps in 
school progression rates, the first approaches that come 
to mind are usually reforms of the educational system. 
However, as noted here, factors that influence learning 
and attainment are also found outside the system and are 
closely tied to the students’ family environment. Conditional 
cash transfer programmes are one of the pillars that the 
countries have built over the past two decades in order 
to encourage lower-income families to buy into keeping 
children in the educational system. Such programmes 
have the virtue of improving, however marginally, the 
monetary resources available to poor households, preventing 
dropouts for opportunity cost reasons (staying in school is 
part of the transfer programme contract). There is much 
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room for deepening here. First, by gradually increasing 
the transfers and extending them to keep young people in 
secondary school. Second, by linking these programmes 
to broad social protection networks that operate in concert 
to ensure basic thresholds of stability, income and well-
being in vulnerable households. Third, by using them to 
reinforce deep family commitment to school attainment 
and learning for children and young people. Fourth, by 
coordinating improvements on the educational demand 
side under these programmes with improvements on the 
educational service supply side so as to create areas of 
synergy and prevent early discouragement. Fifth, by using 
these programmes to bring parents in closer contact with 
the school system and thus build an education community 
involving all stakeholders. 
Most conditional transfer programmes in the region 
have at least one condition linked to education. This is 
usually in the form of a cash transfer to families that hinges 
on the school-age children enrolling, attending or staying 
in the educational system (see table II.A-4). While these 
programmes promote demand for educational services 
among poor and vulnerable families, they usually do 
not create incentives on the supply side.11 Hence these 
programmes are implemented in areas with an adequate 
educational infrastructure, making it difficult for them to 
gain traction in remote rural areas. 
Programmes that stress the enhancement of educational 
attainment and skills set explicit, firm sanctions for 
failure to comply with education conditions. Transfers 
are calculated in order to offset the opportunity costs 
of using social services. Programmes based on this 
logic are Oportunidades in Mexico and Let’s Advance 
Together in Costa Rica. The latter targets families that for 
economic reasons are having difficulties in keeping their 
children in school. For the programmes geared towards 
ensuring a basic level of consumption for poor families, 
eligibility does not hinge on compliance, so verification 
mechanisms are weak and the associated sanctions are 
moderate or non-existent. Such is the case with the Human 
Development Grant (BDH) in Ecuador.12 Last, there are 
programmes that seek to combine ensured access for poor 
11 The Family Allowance Programme (PRAF) II in Honduras and 
the Social Protection Network (RPS) and Crisis Care System 
(SAC) in Nicaragua, all terminated in 2006, were an exception in 
that they included innovative benefits in the form of transfers to 
educational establishments (Moore, 2008 and 2009; Cecchini and 
others, 2009).
12 The Human Development Grant programme had no specific 
conditions for transfers. However, for a brief period, television spots 
highlighted how important it was for BHD beneficiary families to 
send their children to school. An assessment of the programme 
showed an increase in school enrolment and a decrease in child 
labour (see table II.A-5). This could be associated with how the 
beneficiaries perceived this condition, although they were not 
monitored administratively (Schady and Araujo, 2006).
and vulnerable families to a broad set of benefits, as is 
the case with Chile Solidario and the Together Network 
in Colombia. In these programmes, education is but one 
of several components, and the conditions are part of a 
broad intervention agreement between programme field 
representatives and families.
Such diversity also entails different educational targets. 
Some programmes only seek to enhance attendance. Others 
also hope to impact performance and grade promotion, 
foster greater education incorporation among target gender 
and age groups, and even reduce child labour. For this 
reason, the way in which education transfers are calculated 
varies in accordance with programme goals. In the Family 
Allowance Programme (PRAF) in Honduras and the 
Oportunidades Programme in Mexico, the transfer covers 
the direct costs of sending children to school (registration, 
supplies and transportation) and the opportunity cost for 
poor and vulnerable families who send their children to 
school instead of putting them to work. Oportunidades, 
Colombia’s Families in Action and the Programme of 
Advancement through Health and Education (PATH) in 
Jamaica step up transfers during secondary education, 
reflecting the greater opportunity cost of sending children 
to school. Oportunidades and PATH pay different amounts 
according to student gender in order to address gender 
inequality in the secondary education participation rate, 
albeit in opposing directions: Oportunidades makes larger 
transfers to girls, PATH to boys. 
The impact of conditional transfer programmes on 
education has been assessed from several viewpoints 
in most of the countries that have or have had such 
programmes (see table II.A-5).13Although the impacts 
were not consistent in all countries and the outcomes vary 
depending on the focus of each programme, the assessments 
generally reveal improvements in the intermediate goals 
for educational attainment and skills building (Bastagli, 
2008). In other words, they show that conditional transfer 
programmes improve access to school and also improve 
indirect indicators such as school enrolment and attendance. 
Indicators for access and coverage tend to rise more in 
countries where the baselines were lower, in transitional 
grades with high drop-out rates (such as the move from 
primary to secondary school) and in the poorest households 
and locations. But the assessments provide no information 
on areas such as child learning, the improvement of which 
has not been among the explicit goals of conditional 
transfer programmes (Reimers, DeShano da Silva and 
Trevino, 2007; Villatoro, 2007). 
13 Most of these assessments were based on random sampling designs 
that were quasi-experimental or, less frequently, experimental 
(Barrera-Osorio and others, 2008; Levy and Ohls, 2007) or non-
experimental (Perova and Vakis, 2009), with control groups in each 
case to compare impacts on treatment groups. 
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Evaluations of the Education, Health and Nutrition 
Programme (PROGRESA) rolled out in Mexico in 1997 and 
recast as Oportunidades in 2001 show more improvement 
in secondary education than at the primary level and better 
outcomes for girls than for boys and for rural areas than 
in urban ones (De Brauw and Hoddinott, 2008). They 
also reveal a positive impact in terms of higher enrolment 
and grade promotion rates for indigenous children (World 
Bank, 2009; Escobar and de la Rocha, 2002, 2008). 
Families in Action in Colombia also had more significant 
impacts in increasing school attendance among secondary 
school students than at the primary school level, because 
school attendance was already high in the latter before the 
programme was launched (Attanasio and others, 2008). 
According to Colombia’s National Planning Department 
(DNP, 2008), secondary school attendance rose about five 
percentage points in urban areas and seven percentage 
points in rural areas. The Solidarity programme in the 
Dominican Republic increased by 14 percentage points 
the likelihood of adolescents age 14-16 attending school 
(Government of the Dominican Republic, 2008). 
The enrolment rate in Paraguay rose 2.5% among 
children in families enrolled in the Tekoporã programme, 
and the school attendance rate increased between five 
and eight percentage points. The best outcomes were 
for adolescents age 11-15, for whom this indicator rose 
between 9 and 15 percentage points. The assessment of 
the Tekoporã programme also shows that it decreased 
the likelihood of dropping out of school and checked the 
increase of child labour in Paraguay, presumably because 
of the increase in school attendance —especially among 
older boys, i.e., those who leave school earliest in order 
to work (Veras Soares, Perez and Issamu, 2008).
Gertler, Patrinos and Rubio-Codina (2007) evaluated 
the role of other educational policies in Mexico in schools 
where a large percentage of the pupils are enrolled in the 
Oportunidades programme. These authors report that 
schemes seeking to empower associations of parents 
and legal guardians (the School Management Support 
Programme, or AGE, part of the broader Compensación 
Educacional programme) successfully decrease grade 
repetition and school drop-out rates. These impacts 
seem to indicate that greater feedback and coordination 
between conditional transfer programmes and other 
types of educational and social interventions can bring 
improvements in educational processes and outcomes. 
The neighbourhood peer effects of these programmes 
should also be highlighted. For PROGRESA, Bobonis and 
Finan (2008) show that children who are not eligible for 
transfers are still influenced by peers who are enrolled 
in the programme, with more of the former remaining 
in the educational system at the secondary level. The 
results show that in locations where the programme 
was implemented, school enrolment among children 
not participating in the programme rose five percentage 
points anyway, compared with data for control locations. 
This impact is especially beneficial for children in the 
poorest segments. 
5. Better training for work
The path leading young people to the world of work is, as 
we have seen, highly segmented by educational attainment 
levels. On average for Latin America, only half of the 
population age 20-24 completes the upper cycle of secondary 
school. Only 33% of young people age 20-29 are enrolled 
in some sort of post-secondary education programme, and 
less than 10% have completed five years of education at 
this level. There is also a large group of young people who 
neither study nor work and are at high risk for institutional 
disaffiliation and social disintegration. This situation calls 
for timely, effective alternatives for training for work.
The formation of competencies in the 15-20 age 
group is essential for successful entry into the labour 
market with meaningful opportunities for the future. 
Public efforts are therefore required to target this area of 
education and link this supply of education services to 
the production sector.
According to UNESCO and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), the supply of technical and vocational 
education is “a comprehensive term referring to those 
aspects of the educational process involving, in addition 
to general education, the study of technologies and related 
sciences, and the acquisition of practical skills, attitudes, 
understanding and knowledge relating to occupations in 
various sectors of economic and social life”. Such education 
can be provided by the educational establishment or by 
another entity supervised by the public authority. It includes 
formal and informal education programmes (UNESCO/
UNEVOC, 2006) and is an important “means of preparing 
for occupational fields and for effective participation in 
the world of work” as well as “a method of facilitating 
poverty alleviation” (UNESCO, 2005).
This broad field of education for work encompasses 
an array of hard-to-classify learning activities. Coverage 
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and supply at this level of education vary widely. In 
developed countries, especially in Europe, their coverage 
and impact are far higher. In Europe, approximately half 
of the students enrolled in the upper cycle of secondary 
school are in technical and vocational education 
programmes (UNESCO/UNEVOC, 2006). In countries 
like Austria, Germany and Switzerland there is a 
historically consolidated vocational track in the upper 
level of secondary school. English-speaking countries 
tend to postpone technical and vocational programmes 
until the post-secondary cycle. 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the situation in 
the upper level of secondary education also varies widely. 
Coverage at this level of education is very low in Brazil 
despite strong technical and vocational programmes in 
the post-secondary cycle. In Argentina and Guatemala, 
a high percentage (more than 80%) of those enrolled 
in the upper cycle of secondary education are in such 
programmes (see figure II.22).
Figure II.22 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (28 COUNTRIES): 
STUDENTS ENROLLED IN TECHNICAL/VOCATIONAL 
PROGRAMMES COMPARED WITH TOTAL ENROLMENT 

























































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of UNESCO International Centre for Technical and Vocational Education 
and Training, Participation in Formal Technical and Vocational Education and 
Training Programmes Worldwide. An initial statistical study. Montreal, 2006.
Changing industrialization and development 
processes in Latin America in the closing decades of 
the twentieth century brought into question the region’s 
traditional institutional approach to education for work as 
a specialized branch of secondary education for specific 
occupations and as vocational training provided by large 
institutions with ties to government, labour unions and 
business. Globalization and new requirements for more 
flexible competencies that can be shaped over time are 
shifting such training away from State-run institutions 
and leading to the use of public funds to outsource it to 
the private sector, seeking to meet the training needs of 
the production sector (Gallart, 2002).
Programmes, reforms and initiatives have taken different 
paths in the region over the past few decades. Generally 
speaking, specialized training has been postponed to as 
late as possible in the secondary education cycle. Technical 
educational establishments at the secondary level have 
strongly resisted having to provide a general education; 
rather, they have sought to redesign the kind of vocational 
education they provide (Gallart, 2002). 
As for post-secondary education, Jacinto (2010) 
describes two prevailing models for the supply of vocational 
training in the region in the late 1990s. All of the models 
involve coordinating the public and private sectors. In 
the first model, such education is provided at traditional 
vocational training establishments developed in the 
1950s and run by the State or by three-way partnerships 
(the State, labour unions and business). The other model 
involves ad hoc, decentralized programmes that report to 
the ministry of labour or to vocational training institutions 
and delegate training to other institutions (private or run 
by civil society organizations). In this model there are 
two kinds of supply: one based on the open market, with 
specific training courses for formal employment; and one 
with subsidies for organizations benefiting disadvantaged 
sectors, seeking their social inclusion through employment 
(informal or self-employment). 
According to the review conducted by Jacinto (2010), 
new administrations in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century and criticism of the social costs of privatization 
policies led to a certain retooling of this kind of education. 
Efforts to reach vulnerable populations affected by 
varying forms of exclusion were beefed up. There have 
also been measures to improve the quality of education 
provided by these programmes and to devolve resources 
and capacities to the local stakeholders who manage 
them. Most of the countries have taken the approach to 
learning based on development of competencies. Despite 
recent action to link existing institutions, the sector is still 
not well coordinated. Substantially different approaches 
separate the formal education system and the vocational 
training system and set both apart from the production 
sector. Policies and programmes often lack continuity. 
They overlap and are sometimes irrelevant for the labour 
integration of young people.
The developed countries understand how important 
such education is to having the highly qualified labour 
force that on-the-job training cannot be expected to deliver. 
Changes in the production and manufacturing sector have 
done away with the long-term labour relationships that 
made investing in specialized training for employees 
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worthwhile for most businesses. According to OECD 
(2010), development of such programmes should focus 
on long-term career paths and deliver competencies that 
enable young people to enter the labour market directly 
while allowing them to continue their education in 
the future. 
6. Support for continuing higher education 
Education at the university level must meet the demands 
of the world of work and further the consolidation of the 
knowledge society, thereby helping enhance the university as 
a centre for producing and transferring knowledge (Malagón, 
2004). The higher education system in Latin America and 
the Caribbean has expanded and grown substantially over 
the past few decades. However, as noted in preceding 
sections of this chapter, coverage is still limited and it is 
concentrated in the medium- and high-income levels.
Ensuring greater equality of opportunities at the university 
level calls for policies that offset the lack of monetary resources 
and of time among young people graduating from secondary 
school who need to work to survive or to help their families. 
Some such policies could include cross subsidies for higher 
education to ensure that it is free for those who cannot pay, 
and to make it bankable; scholarships and soft loans for 
students from lower-income households; and flexible class 
schedules with morning and evening modules. 
Despite all efforts there is still no broad scholarship 
mechanism for disadvantaged students, just a mix of 
loans and scholarships that are mostly available to 
medium- and medium-low income groups. For young 
people in lower income brackets to have access to such 
funding and truly be able to attain education at this level 
requires enhancement of the entire educational chain. 
Once young people are inside the system, mechanisms 
must be developed to enable them —who are often the 
first generation to access this level of education— to 
stay in the system and complete the cycle. The internal 
rates of efficiency for higher education systems in 
the region are quite low overall compared with the 
developed countries. This means that many more 
young people are entering the system but few complete 
their education (especially those from lower-income 
households, who are usually the first generation to go 
on to higher education).
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Table II.A-3 
LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES): 13-TO-19-YEAR-OLD INTERNET USERS BY UPPER AND LOWER HOUSEHOLD  
PER CAPITA INCOME QUINTILES AND PLACE OF CONNECTION, AROUND 2008 a
(Percentages)
Country/year Place Quintile I Quintile V Quintile V-Quintile I Total
Uruguay, 2009 Home 08.0 91.5 83.5 33.0
School 20.6 40.6 20.0 23.3
Commercial establishment 27.4 12.8 -14.6 28.3
Brazil, 2008 Home 04.4 72.2 67.8 26.6
School 08.9 32.2 23.3 16.8
Commercial establishment 27.5 26.2 -01.3 34.1
Chile, 2006 Home 03.7 60.9 57.2 21.5
School 42.2 41.3 -00.9 41.5
Commercial establishment 25.8 21.9 -03.9 30.4
Costa Rica, 2008 Home 01.7 48.1 46.4 13.9
School 07.1 27.3 20.2 14.4
Commercial establishment 28.3 30.9 02.6 37.8
Mexico, 2007 Home 01.1 45.3 44.2 10.6
School 03.4 10.7 07.3 06.3
Commercial establishment 28.0 25.8 -02.2 30.9
Panama, 2007 Home 00.6 47.4 46.8 09.3
School 07.0 26.4 19.3 15.0
Commercial establishment 06.1 26.4 20.3 19.6
Peru, 2009 Home 00.6 39.5 38.9 09.2
School 01.9 09.4 7.5 05.2
Commercial establishment 18.9 46.5 27.6 43.7
Ecuador, 2009 Home 01.3 34.0 32.7 09.9
School 12.6 37.9 25.3 24.1
Commercial establishment ... ... ... ...
Paraguay, 2008 Home 00.8 33.7 32.9 07.3
School 01.3 17.8 16.5 06.1
Commercial establishment 07.2 24.9 17.7 13.0
El Salvador, 2008 Home 0.00 22.0 22.0 04.0
School 00.6 06.3 05.7 02.4
Commercial establishment 05.4 26.6 21.2 14.3
Honduras, 2007 Home 00.1 10.3 10.2 01.9
School 00.3 11.0 10.7 02.9
Commercial establishment 02.5 40.2 37.7 15.2
Nicaragua, 2006 Home 00.0 04.3 04.3 00.7
School 02.5 16.4 13.9 06.8
Commercial establishment 04.8 40.0 35.2 15.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special processing of household surveys reconciled by the Observatory for the 
Information Society in Latin America and the Caribbean (OSILAC); and R. Kaztman, “Impacto social de la incorporación de las TIC en el sistema educativo”, Políticas 
sociales series, No. 166 (LC/L.3254-P), Santiago, Chile, ECLAC, 2010.
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Table II.A-4 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): EDUCATION-RELATED COMPONENTS OF CONDITIONAL TRANSFER PROGRAMMES
Country  
(Programme/Transfer) Targets Condition Sanctions
Argentina  
(Universal allowance per 
child for social protection)
5-to-18-year-olds Proof of regular attendance Withholding of 20% of the transfer until 
proof of meeting the condition is provided
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)  
(Juancito Pinto Grant)
Children under 18 up 
to eighth grade
School attendance record 
of at least 80%
Benefit suspended if records delivered 




6-to-15-year-olds School attendance record 
of at least 85% 
Upon third absence, benefit suspended for 60 
days. Upon fifth absence, family unenrolled 
(Bolsa Família/Variable benefit 
linked to adolescents)
16-to-17-year-olds School attendance record 
of at least 75%
Upon second absence, benefit suspended for 60 
days. Definitive suspension upon third absence
Chile 
(Chile Solidario)
5-to-15-year-olds Attendance at educational 
establishment
As provided in the family contract
Colombia  
(Families in Action)
7-to-17-year-olds in second 
to eleventh grade
School attendance record 
of at least 80%
Suspension of the benefit if more than eight 
unexplained absences per two-month period
Costa Rica  
(Let’s Advance Together)
12-to-25-year-olds in secondary 
school (seventh to twelfth grade)
Enrolment in the school 
year; punctual, consistent 
school attendance 
Suspension of the benefit if the student drops out
Dominican Republic 
(Programa Solidaridad/Incentivo 
a la asistencia escolar)
6-to-16-year-olds enrolled 
in basic public education 
grades one to eight
85% school attendance Definitive suspension if noncompliance 
with co-responsibility in three 
consecutive periods (six months)
Ecuador  
(Human Development Grant)
5-to-17-year-olds School attendance record of 75% 
El Salvador  
(Comunidades 
Solidarias Rurales)
6-to-15-year-olds Enrolment and regular school 
attendance from nursery school (if 
space is available) to sixth grade
Suspension of the benefit if more than 
four unexplained absences per month
Guatemala  
(My Family Progresses)
6-to-15-year-olds 80% school attendance Benefit cancelled if co-responsibilities 
not fulfilled on three occasions
Honduras  
(PRAF/School grant for 
first to sixth grade)
6-to-14 year-olds up to sixth 
grade in public schools
No more than nine unexplained 
absences per trimester, and 
85% actual class attendance 
13- and 14-year-olds who have not completed 
sixth grade and have not fulfilled the conditions 
are not entitled to the bimonthly grant
(PRAF/urban and 
rural youth grant)
13-to-24-year-olds Daily attendance and minimum 




6-to-17-year-olds Monthly attendance of at least 85% Transfers suspended for noncompliance, 
until responsibility met






Children and young people 
attending school at the 
basic, secondary and 
upper secondary levels 
School attendance of at least 85% Definitive suspension in the case of beneficiary 
duplication and if secondary-school students 
receive benefits for more than four years. For 
four or more unexplained absences per month, 
suspension applies for the current month
(Oportunidades/Jóvenes 
con oportunidades)
Students between third year 
of junior high school and 
fourth year of high school
Upper secondary education 
completed by age 22, and being 
a beneficiary of Oportunidades 
Transfer suspended if re-enrolment 
in high school detected
Panama  
(Opportunity Network)
4-to-17-year-olds Enrolment, and absences not 
to exceed 10% of actual class 





6-to-18-year-olds Enrolled; with 85% attendance 
record. Participation of adults 
in literacy programmes 
Peru  
(Together)
6-to-14-year-olds 85% school attendance Noncompliance with co-responsibility 
triggers suspension for three months 
Uruguay  
(Family Allowances)
4-to-14-year-olds in primary 
school and 15-to-18-year-
olds in high school
Enrolment and attendance Benefit suspended if records forged or 
compliance with conditions not proven
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the database of social programmes.
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Table II.A-5 
LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES): ASSESSMENT OF THE EDUCATIONAL IMPACT OF CONDITIONAL TRANSFER PROGRAMMES 
Country 
(Programme) Type of assessment Indicator
Age group and/or 







Likelihood of school absence 
in the most recent month
Likelihood of dropping 
out of school 
7-to-14-year-olds in 
families living in poverty 
… - 3.6 c




Review of secondary 
information 
Effectiveness in eliminating 
child labour e






Quasi-experimental f Enrolment 8-to-13-year-olds … +1 to +3 Attanasio and 
others (2006)
14-to-17-year-olds … +5 to +7 
Domestic child labour 8-to-13-year-olds in rural areas - 10 g -13 g
Experimental, 
on the basis of a 
panel survey h
Attendance Primary education 
(8-to-11-year-olds)







… +5 (urban 
areas) and +7 
(rural areas)
















Experimental j Enrolment Sixth-graders … +17.8 Schady and 
Araujo (2006)






on the basis of 
panel surveys k
Enrolment 5-to-12-year-olds … +17 IFPRI (2003)
Jamaica
(PATH)
Experimental, on the 
basis of a survey l
Number of days of 
school attendance in a 
typical 20-day period 






with data from 
panel survey 





Secondary education 67% (girls) 
73% (boys)
+7.2 to +9.3 
(girls)  
+3.5 to +5.8 
(boys)
Random experimental Enrolment Children under 10 -1% n +1.2% Attanasio and 
others (2005)
10-to-13-year-olds -0.3% n +2.4%
14-to-17-year-olds +5.1% n +7.5%
6-to-17-year-olds +1.6% n +3.3% 
Random experimental School attendance Between sixth grade 
and the first level of 
secondary education





Random experimental Enrolment Transition from primary to 
secondary education
63.2% 75.7% De Janvry 
and Sadoulet 
(2006)
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Country 
(Programme) Type of assessment Indicator
Age group and/or 








Enrolment Children enrolled in 
the programme
… +18 Maluccio and 
others(2005)
Attendance Children enrolled in 
the programme
… +23
Promotion to sixth grade Primary education … +7




Analysis of the 
Standard of Living 
Survey (SLV) o
Enrolment 4-to-14-year-olds in non-
indigenous rural areas











Quasi-experimental p Attendance Total children enrolled 
in the programme
93% 95.5% Veras Soares 
and others 
(2008)
Children enrolled … +6 to +11
11-to-15-year-olds … +9 to +15 
Peru
(Together)
Non-experimental q Enrolment 6-to-14-year-olds 81% 85% Perova and 
Vakis (2009)
7-year-olds 83% 93%
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, (ECLAC).
a Refers to changes in the control group or in total beneficiaries as an effect of the programme. How this impact is expressed varies according to the indicator used in each study: 
increase (+) or decrease (-), percentage points or percentages (%).
b Study conducted in 2005.
c Results from the treatment group (beneficiary families) compared with the control group.
d Data from families exiting the Bridge programme in 2007.
e Percentage of families whose children were working at initiation of the programme and who resolved the situation.
f Data gathered in 2001 and 2003.
g Decrease in the domestic child labour rate among children enrolled in the programme in the same time period.
h Data from household surveys conducted in 2002, 2003 and 2006.
i Data gathered between 2003 and 2005.
j Data for 2000-2001.
k Data gathered between 2003 and 2005.
l Data gathered between 1997 and 1998.
m Changes in the control group in the same time period.
n Study conducted between 2001 and 2003.
ñ Data from the 2008 SLV. Lacking a baseline for the programme, considers historical administrative records for households and the results of the household survey conducted in 2007.
o Results drawn from the 2007 household survey.
p Data for the control group drawn from a survey conducted between 2006 and 2007.
q Control group defined as eligible children who were unable to participate in the programme. Results drawn from data gathered in 2002 and 2007.
Table II.A-5 (conclusion)
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Table II.A-6 
























2006 Age 15-29 2.9 1.3 34.4 6.7 30.6 17.0 7.1 100.0
Age 30-64 8.7 0.6 33.4 8.0 21.8 8.3 19.2 100.0
15 and older 8.8 0.8 35.3 7.0 24.0 10.6 13.5 100.0
Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of)
2007 Age 15-29 12.0 3.3 11.1 29.3 22.1 17.3 4.9 100.0
Age 30-64 42.2 4.2 8.0 8.6 14.6 11.4 11.0 100.0
15 and older 32.5 3.8 8.9 17.0 16.9 13.3 7.7 100.0
Brazil 2008 Age 15-29 7.9 4.3 29.8 16.4 29.1 10.7 1.8 100.0
Age 30-64 23.4 13.0 23.5 4.3 21.4 10.7 3.7 100.0
15 and older 21.3 10.5 24.4 8.3 22.6 10.0 2.9 100.0
Chile 2006 Age 15-29 2.7 1.4 11.9 29.2 32.0 18.7 4.2 100.0
Age 30-64 14.0 7.4 14.7 15.9 27.0 13.2 7.7 100.0
15 and older 14.3 6.7 13.0 19.6 26.6 13.8 6.0 100.0
Colombia 2008 Age 15-29 8.6 9.2 33.3 25.4 0.1 16.4 7.0 100.0
Age 30-64 25.6 18.1 17.4 19.5 0.1 7.0 12.3 100.0
15 and older 22.7 15.1 22.4 20.3 0.1 9.9 9.5 100.0
Costa Rica 2008 Age 15-29 8.7 21.3 27.6 8.9 13.6 17.1 2.8 100.0
Age 30-64 17.2 31.1 14.7 2.3 12.1 13.9 8.7 100.0
15 and older 17.6 26.7 18.8 4.6 12.0 14.3 6.0 100.0
Dominican Republic 2008 Age 15-29 14.5 4.1 16.0 28.4 18.9 17.0 1.2 100.0
Age 30-64 35.8 5.6 17.1 12.3 11.8 14.4 3.0 100.0
15 and older 31.4 4.7 16.1 17.8 13.6 14.3 2.2 100.0
Ecuador 2008 Age 15-29 6.8 14.3 23.8 16.3 20.2 14.7 4.0 100.0
Age 30-64 20.9 28.6 11.1 4.4 16.1 9.6 9.4 100.0
15 and older 19.8 23.0 15.0 8.5 16.5 10.6 6.7 100.0
El Salvador 2004 Age 15-29 26.1 9.0 30.1 8.8 16.1 8.4 1.6 100.0
Age 30-64 47.8 12.3 14.2 2.6 12.0 5.5 5.6 100.0
15 and older 42.1 10.6 19.9 5.0 12.8 6.3 3.4 100.0
Guatemala 2006 Age 15-29 41.5 18.5 19.5 2.9 5.7 10.6 1.2 100.0
Age 30-64 62.2 13.6 6.3 0.6 3.9 9.0 4.4 100.0
15 and older 54.7 15.3 11.8 1.6 4.5 9.2 2.8 100.0
Honduras 2007 Age 15-29 24.6 29.7 20.8 5.2 4.5 13.6 1.6 100.0
Age 30-64 50.0 25.1 6.7 0.8 2.3 10.6 4.5 100.0
15 and older 41.3 25.7 12.6 2.8 3.2 11.4 2.9 100.0
Mexico 2008 Age 15-29 7.2 11.3 36.3 13.8 15.4 12.5 3.5 100.0
Age 30-64 25.4 19.5 23.4 5.0 11.2 8.1 7.4 100.0
15 and older 22.6 16.1 26.7 8.0 12.0 9.1 5.5 100.0
Nicaragua 2005 Age 15-29 31.6 14.9 25.0 5.5 12.8 6.9 3.3 100.0
Age 30-64 53.3 14.0 13.1 2.0 7.1 4.6 5.9 100.0
15 and older 45.6 14.0 17.8 3.5 9.3 5.3 4.3 100.0
Panama 2008 Age 15-29 6.2 11.9 25.5 16.3 21.5 13.5 5.0 100.0
Age 30-64 13.2 21.0 18.0 5.4 20.2 9.5 12.7 100.0
15 and older 14.1 18.3 19.9 8.9 19.4 10.2 9.1 100.0
Paraguay 2008 Age 15-29 12.5 14.1 25.4 16.2 19.6 12.3 0.0 100.0
Age 30-64 32.1 25.3 12.5 4.3 13.1 12.7 0.1 100.0
15 and older 27.1 19.8 17.2 9.0 15.0 11.9 0.0 100.0
Peru 2008 Age 15-29 7.6 7.7 19.0 9.0 31.3 18.8 6.7 100.0
Age 30-64 33.8 4.7 10.5 1.9 22.3 13.2 13.6 100.0
15 and older 28.8 5.5 13.0 4.4 24.0 14.2 10.1 100.0
Uruguay 2008 Age 15-29 3.6 14.7 32.3 22.8 9.3 15.4 1.9 100.0
Age 30-64 10.1 23.6 21.8 14.3 8.9 15.7 5.5 100.0




2008 Age 15-29 7.1 10.2 23.1 8.9 22.9 20.8 6.9 100.0
Age 30-64 15.5 22.1 17.8 2.6 20.3 10.6 11.1 100.0
15 and older 14.7 18.1 19.0 4.9 20.3 14.0 9.0 100.0
Latin America Age 15-29 9.2 8.0 28.9 15.5 21.5 13.5 3.5 100.0
Age 30-64 24.8 14.7 20.7 6.2 16.4 9.9 7.3 100.0
15 and older 22.5 12.4 22.7 9.2 17.2 10.5 5.5 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective 
countries.
a  The length of education cycles was defined in accordance with the 1997 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).
b Total population in each age group. The category “15 and older” includes the population age 65 and older.
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Table II.A-7 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PARTICIPATION RATES FOR THE POPULATION AGE 15-29, 30-64 AND 15 AND OVER, 
























2006 Age 15-29 44.8 45.5 46.0 52.6 62.7 55.4 87.5 56.1
Age 30-64 65.4 76.7 71.9 74.6 77.2 82.7 89.2 77.0
15 and older 43.9 55.4 53.2 62.9 65.6 65.5 83.8 61.5
Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of)
2007 Age 15-29 75.3 81.0 62.3 48.3 63.6 48.3 83.5 59.3
Age 30-64 84.7 91.2 80.8 81.6 80.3 83.5 89.0 84.1
15 and older 79.1 84.4 69.1 56.7 69.6 62.3 85.9 71.3
Brazil 2008 Age 15-29 60.9 68.6 59.9 59.0 82.8 82.0 88.2 69.7
Age 30-64 68.0 71.0 76.0 77.3 81.1 85.5 90.5 76.2
15 and older 55.3 61.9 66.7 63.4 80.0 81.7 86.7 68.6
Chile 2006 Age 15-29 40.3 46.2 30.2 24.6 67.9 51.5 85.5 47.4
Age 30-64 55.4 58.2 67.9 70.4 75.5 83.3 91.5 71.7
15 and older 38.5 44.1 53.1 45.0 69.9 67.8 86.6 57.3
Colombia 2008 Age 15-29 59.2 67.9 38.0 74.7 51.3 57.2 79.5 58.0
Age 30-64 66.7 71.7 75.1 79.1 74.5 84.8 90.5 75.7
15 and older 55.3 64.2 52.7 75.4 58.3 67.0 85.2 64.1
Costa Rica 2008 Age 15-29 58.1 65.0 43.4 38.8 65.0 67.9 92.2 57.4
Age 30-64 59.6 67.4 73.4 71.3 72.0 79.0 90.5 71.2
15 and older 45.9 62.6 55.0 47.0 66.9 72.2 87.3 60.9
Dominican Republic 2008 Age 15-29 64.3 54.7 52.5 43.7 70.2 70.5 92.1 58.7
Age 30-64 66.5 73.0 74.5 77.5 79.5 88.1 90.4 75.0
15 and older 55.9 64.3 62.3 55.4 73.7 78.8 86.5 63.6
Ecuador 2008 Age 15-29 61.4 75.3 51.0 34.3 69.8 55.9 82.5 58.2
Age 30-64 69.3 74.6 78.4 79.1 78.9 85.6 91.8 77.5
15 and older 59.6 70.4 60.8 46.0 72.7 69.2 88.0 66.2
El Salvador 2004 Age 15-29 56.5 56.9 46.2 36.0 72.9 51.3 86.1 54.3
Age 30-64 61.9 74.1 76.8 79.0 80.1 85.2 89.1 71.0
15 and older 54.0 63.6 56.3 46.5 75.0 64.6 86.4 59.6
Guatemala 2006 Age 15-29 60.2 67.6 54.9 37.5 61.4 79.9 82.3 62.3
Age 30-64 68.6 75.9 86.6 85.7 78.4 83.8 91.5 73.6
15 and older 63.0 70.0 62.6 45.7 67.0 80.1 86.6 66.2
Honduras 2007 Age 15-29 58.6 61.3 38.8 29.2 38.8 60.5 80.0 53.5
Age 30-64 64.6 71.2 74.4 71.7 75.0 78.4 90.9 69.9
15 and older 58.7 65.0 47.3 35.0 50.6 67.0 86.2 59.7
Mexico 2008 Age 15-29 59.4 63.8 56.2 39.7 64.0 53.4 85.4 56.9
Age 30-64 62.5 66.3 73.8 75.7 76.1 83.5 88.1 71.6
15 and older 53.3 61.9 63.6 51.2 69.1 67.0 85.4 62.2
Nicaragua 2005 Age 15-29 61.0 61.1 51.7 43.8 63.0 56.4 85.7 58.5
Age 30-64 66.1 73.5 79.0 81.7 80.2 82.6 90.3 72.3
15 and older 60.1 65.4 60.5 53.6 68.7 66.6 88.3 63.0
Panama 2008 Age 15-29 57.6 67.1 48.7 38.0 72.2 63.6 88.6 58.8
Age 30-64 63.5 68.9 74.1 74.4 78.6 84.7 88.3 75.3
15 and older 51.8 61.4 59.1 49.1 72.6 72.8 84.2 63.9
Paraguay 2008 Age 15-29 67.8 72.0 52.5 52.3 77.7 78.0 100.0 65.2
Age 30-64 72.0 77.7 79.2 85.1 80.9 92.5 77.7 78.7
15 and older 63.8 73.5 61.8 59.6 77.9 83.9 82.7 69.5
Peru 2008 Age 15-29 72.4 76.6 58.9 48.8 70.1 68.5 81.1 67.2
Age 30-64 83.2 85.9 85.0 88.4 83.1 84.4 89.4 84.6
15 and older 73.6 79.8 69.1 57.4 75.0 75.3 84.8 74.4
Uruguay 2008 Age 15-29 50.4 67.3 57.7 58.3 67.9 72.1 84.4 62.7
Age 30-64 67.6 76.1 82.4 83.9 84.9 88.8 94.6 81.5




2008 Age 15-29 66.3 70.9 48.3 31.6 59.1 53.4 72.1 55.6
Age 30-64 68.7 74.0 78.3 78.3 80.6 83.5 87.2 77.9
15 and older 57.9 67.1 62.7 44.7 69.6 65.2 80.3 65.2
Latin America Age 15-29 61.0 66.8 54.0 51.8 74.0 64.8 83.2 62.1
Age 30-64 67.7 70.6 75.4 77.2 79.7 84.7 89.5 75.5
15 and older 56.7 63.6 62.8 60.1 75.1 73.6 85.1 65.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a The length of education cycles was defined in accordance with the 1997 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).
b Total population in each age group. The category “15 and older” includes the population age 65 and older.
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Table II.A-8 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): EMPLOYMENT RATES FOR THE POPULATION AGE 15-29, 30-64 AND 15 AND OVER, 
























2006 Age 15-29 37.9 33.4 37.4 45.1 50.7 46.3 80.6 46.5
Age 30-64 60.4 71.6 66.6 69.8 71.8 77.7 87.2 72.4




2007 Age 15-29 73.4 77.1 59.7 44.8 53.4 40.2 63.7 53.0
Age 30-64 83.1 89.8 80.2 79.5 78.4 79.4 84.9 81.9
15 and older 77.7 82.2 67.6 53.6 63.2 56.1 77.5 67.5
Brazil 2008 Age 15-29 55.2 62.9 52.0 48.3 72.3 73.9 81.3 60.9
Age 30-64 65.5 68.7 72.3 73.2 77.0 82.9 88.2 73.0
15 and older 53.0 59.4 61.4 54.8 73.1 77.1 83.5 63.7
Chile 2006 Age 15-29 33.3 40.9 25.9 20.3 58.6 44.8 78.2 40.8
Age 30-64 52.1 55.8 64.1 66.2 71.7 79.4 89.2 68.1
15 and older 36.0 42.1 49.4 40.9 64.1 62.7 83.3 53.1
Colombia 2008 Age 15-29 50.9 59.2 30.9 58.5 39.7 45.1 65.7 47.0
Age 30-64 62.3 66.6 68.7 72.0 62.4 76.8 84.8 69.9
15 and older 51.3 58.8 46.2 64.3 47.2 56.5 77.5 56.9
Costa Rica 2008 Age 15-29 52.2 57.5 38.9 34.6 60.5 63.6 90.5 52.2
Age 30-64 56.8 65.4 71.0 68.8 70.7 77.1 90.0 69.2
15 and older 43.3 59.1 51.5 43.2 64.3 69.3 86.6 57.9
Dominican Republic 2008 Age 15-29 53.1 45.4 40.6 33.2 49.0 57.2 82.5 45.4
Age 30-64 60.8 64.9 66.4 67.9 69.7 80.0 86.4 67.4
15 and older 50.5 56.3 53.2 45.4 57.8 68.4 81.6 54.5
Ecuador 2008 Age 15-29 58.3 70.6 45.9 30.2 57.7 48.4 71.6 51.5
Age 30-64 67.5 72.6 75.9 76.9 75.1 81.6 88.7 74.9
15 and older 58.1 68.0 56.8 42.5 65.2 63.5 83.3 62.3
El Salvador 2004 Age 15-29 51.4 50.9 41.8 33.2 65.2 47.2 72.1 49.1
Age 30-64 58.8 71.0 72.5 74.6 76.8 81.4 85.9 67.6
15 and older 50.5 59.6 52.0 43.4 69.4 60.7 81.2 55.5
Guatemala 2006 Age 15-29 59.3 66.3 52.1 35.3 57.3 76.1 78.6 60.4
Age 30-64 68.0 75.4 85.1 85.7 76.7 81.6 90.5 72.7
15 and older 62.4 69.0 60.2 43.8 63.9 77.1 85.2 64.9
Honduras 2007 Age 15-29 56.4 58.9 36.9 28.1 36.2 55.6 75.0 50.9
Age 30-64 63.6 69.9 72.7 69.5 73.5 77.1 89.5 68.7
15 and older 57.5 63.2 45.5 33.8 48.4 63.8 83.8 58.0
México 2008 Age 15-29 55.7 59.7 50.9 36.4 58.9 50.2 75.5 52.3
Age 30-64 60.8 64.6 71.8 74.2 74.0 82.0 85.8 69.8
15 and older 51.5 59.6 60.0 48.6 65.6 64.7 81.4 59.4
Nicaragua 2005 Age 15-29 59.2 58.1 48.0 38.8 57.1 50.4 71.9 54.7
Age 30-64 65.0 72.1 76.2 78.7 77.1 78.1 87.5 70.5
15 and older 58.8 63.2 57.2 49.2 63.8 61.2 81.6 60.4
Panama 2008 Age 15-29 54.9 63.2 42.6 33.2 61.5 56.2 79.9 52.0
Age 30-64 62.7 67.2 71.3 72.1 76.3 80.7 86.3 73.2
15 and older 50.9 59.4 55.0 45.2 67.1 67.3 81.0 60.3
Paraguay 2008 Age 15-29 62.6 69.3 46.6 45.8 69.2 69.9 100.0 59.0
Age 30-64 70.0 75.0 75.3 81.5 78.7 90.7 77.7 76.2
15 and older 61.5 70.9 56.7 53.9 72.3 79.5 82.7 65.6
Peru 2008 Age 15-29 71.4 74.6 53.7 43.7 65.1 61.3 73.1 62.1
Age 30-64 82.5 85.3 83.5 85.5 80.4 81.7 85.9 82.7
15 and older 73.0 78.4 65.7 52.8 71.3 70.5 80.2 71.4
Uruguay 2008 Age 15-29 42.4 56.3 46.6 49.3 57.8 63.8 75.9 52.7
Age 30-64 63.7 72.3 77.6 80.1 81.9 85.9 92.8 77.8




2008 Age 15-29 59.8 63.4 42.9 27.8 52.0 46.9 62.6 49.1
Age 30-64 65.7 70.5 74.8 75.0 77.2 78.8 83.9 74.4
15 and older 54.7 62.9 58.4 41.1 64.7 59.5 75.3 60.7
Latin America Age 15-29 56.4 61.8 47.4 43.3 64.8 57.5 73.6 54.8
Age 30-64 65.3 68.1 71.8 72.6 76.0 81.5 86.6 72.4
15 and older 54.5 60.7 58.0 53.2 69.0 68.6 80.7 61.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a The length of education cycles was defined in accordance with the 1997 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).
b Total population in each age group. The category “15 and older” includes the population age 65 and older.
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Table II.A-9 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR THE ACTIVE POPULATION AGE 15-29, 30-64  
























2006 Age 15-29 15.3 26.5 18.6 14.2 19.1 16.5 7.9 17.0
Age 30-64 7.6 6.7 7.4 6.3 6.9 6.1 2.3 6.0
15 and older 8.9 15.7 10.5 8.4 12.1 11.0 3.4 9.5
Bolivia  
(Plurinational State of)
2007 Age 15-29 2.5 4.8 4.1 7.4 16.0 16.7 23.7 10.6
Age 30-64 1.9 1.5 0.7 2.7 2.4 4.9 4.7 2.6
15 and older 1.7 2.6 2.3 5.5 9.2 9.9 9.8 5.3
Brazil 2008 Age 15-29 9.3 8.2 13.3 18.1 12.7 9.9 7.8 12.7
Age 30-64 3.7 3.3 4.8 5.4 5.0 3.1 2.6 4.2
15 and older 4.2 3.9 8.0 13.6 8.6 5.6 3.7 7.1
Chile 2006 Age 15-29 17.4 11.5 14.4 17.5 13.6 13.0 8.5 13.8
Age 30-64 6.0 4.2 5.5 6.0 5.1 4.7 2.5 5.0
15 and older 6.4 4.5 6.9 8.9 8.3 7.5 3.8 7.3
Colombia 2008 Age 15-29 14.0 12.8 18.6 21.8 22.6 21.2 17.3 18.9
Age 30-64 6.5 7.1 8.5 9.0 16.3 9.4 6.3 7.7
15 and older 7.4 8.4 12.4 14.8 19.0 15.6 9.0 11.3
Costa Rica 2008 Age 15-29 10.2 11.5 10.3 10.9 6.9 6.3 1.8 8.9
Age 30-64 4.7 3.0 3.2 3.5 1.9 2.4 0.6 2.8
15 and older 5.8 5.6 6.3 8.0 4.0 4.0 0.8 4.9
Dominican Republic 2008 Age 15-29 17.4 17.1 22.7 23.9 30.2 18.9 10.4 22.6
Age 30-64 8.7 11.1 10.9 12.5 12.4 9.2 4.4 10.1
15 and older 9.7 12.5 14.6 18.1 21.6 13.2 5.6 14.3
Ecuador 2008 Age 15-29 5.0 6.2 10.1 12.1 17.4 13.4 13.2 11.6
Age 30-64 2.6 2.7 3.2 2.8 4.9 4.7 3.4 3.4
15 and older 2.7 3.5 6.7 7.7 10.3 8.3 5.4 6.0
El Salvador 2004 Age 15-29 9.0 10.6 9.5 7.6 10.6 8.0 16.3 9.6
Age 30-64 5.1 4.2 5.7 5.6 4.0 4.5 3.6 4.8
15 and older 6.5 6.3 7.6 6.8 7.4 6.0 6.0 6.8
Guatemala 2006 Age 15-29 1.6 2.0 4.9 5.9 6.7 4.8 4.5 3.1
Age 30-64 0.8 0.6 1.8 0.0 2.2 2.6 1.1 1.1
15 and older 1.0 1.4 3.8 4.0 4.5 3.7 1.7 1.9
Honduras 2007 Age 15-29 3.7 4.0 5.0 3.7 6.6 8.1 6.2 4.8
Age 30-64 1.5 1.7 2.3 3.1 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.7
15 and older 1.9 2.9 4.0 3.5 4.3 4.8 2.7 2.9
Mexico 2008 Age 15-29 6.2 6.4 9.3 8.2 8.0 6.0 11.6 8.1
Age 30-64 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.0 2.7 1.7 2.6 2.5
15 and older 3.3 3.6 5.7 5.1 5.1 3.5 4.7 4.5
Nicaragua 2005 Age 15-29 2.9 5.0 7.0 11.4 9.4 10.6 16.0 6.5
Age 30-64 1.7 2.0 3.6 3.6 3.9 5.5 3.2 2.5
15 and older 2.0 3.3 5.5 8.3 7.1 8.1 7.6 4.2
Panama 2008 Age 15-29 4.7 5.8 12.5 12.6 14.8 11.6 9.9 11.4
Age 30-64 1.3 2.5 3.7 3.2 2.9 4.8 2.2 2.9
15 and older 1.6 3.3 6.9 7.9 7.5 7.6 3.8 5.6
Paraguay 2008 Age 15-29 7.6 3.7 11.4 12.5 10.9 10.4 0.0 9.6
Age 30-64 2.8 3.4 5.0 4.3 2.7 2.0 0.0 3.2
15 and older 3.6 3.5 8.3 9.6 7.1 5.3 0.0 5.6
Peru 2008 Age 15-29 1.4 2.6 8.7 10.5 7.1 10.5 9.9 7.6
Age 30-64 0.8 0.7 1.8 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.8 2.2
15 and older 0.9 1.7 5.0 7.9 4.9 6.4 5.4 4.0
Uruguay 2008 Age 15-29 16.0 16.4 19.2 15.4 14.9 11.5 10.1 15.8
Age 30-64 5.7 5.0 5.8 4.6 3.5 3.2 1.9 4.5




2008 Age 15-29 9.8 10.6 11.2 12.0 12.0 12.2 13.2 11.6
Age 30-64 4.5 4.8 4.6 4.3 4.2 5.6 3.7 4.5
15 and older 5.5 6.2 7.0 8.1 7.1 8.8 6.3 6.9
Latin America Age 15-29 7.5 7.5 12.2 16.4 12.4 11.2 11.5 11.8
Age 30-64 3.5 3.5 4.7 5.9 4.6 3.8 3.3 4.1
15 and older 3.9 4.4 7.7 11.4 8.1 6.8 5.2 6.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a The length of education cycles was defined in accordance with the 1997 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).
b Active population in each age group. The category “15 and older” includes the population age 65 and older.
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Table II.A-10 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYED POPULATION AGE 15-29, 30-64  
























2006 Age 15-29 2.4 0.9 27.6 6.5 33.3 16.9 12.3 100.0
Age 30-64 7.2 0.6 30.7 7.7 21.7 8.9 23.2 100.0
15 and older 6.3 0.7 30.2 7.3 24.9 11.1 19.6 100.0
Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of)
2007 Age 15-29 16.6 4.9 12.5 24.8 22.3 13.1 5.9 100.0
Age 30-64 42.8 4.6 7.8 8.4 14.0 11.0 11.4 100.0
15 and older 37.4 4.6 8.9 13.5 15.8 11.0 8.8 100.0
Brazil 2008 Age 15-29 7.1 4.5 25.5 13.0 34.6 12.9 2.4 100.0
Age 30-64 21.0 12.2 23.3 4.4 22.5 12.1 4.5 100.0
15 and older 17.7 9.8 23.5 7.1 25.9 12.1 3.8 100.0
Chile 2006 Age 15-29 2.2 1.4 7.5 14.5 45.9 20.5 8.0 100.0
Age 30-64 10.7 6.1 13.8 15.5 28.5 15.3 10.1 100.0
15 and older 9.7 5.3 12.1 15.1 32.1 16.2 9.4 100.0
Colombia 2008 Age 15-29 9.3 11.6 21.9 31.6 0.1 15.7 9.8 100.0
Age 30-64 22.9 17.3 17.1 20.1 0.1 7.7 14.9 100.0
15 and older 20.5 15.6 18.2 22.9 0.1 9.8 12.9 100.0
Costa Rica 2008 Age 15-29 8.7 23.5 20.6 5.9 15.8 20.8 4.8 100.0
Age 30-64 14.1 29.3 15.1 2.3 12.4 15.5 11.3 100.0
15 and older 13.1 27.3 16.7 3.5 13.3 17.1 9.0 100.0
Dominican Republic 2008 Age 15-29 16.9 4.0 14.3 20.8 20.3 21.5 2.1 100.0
Age 30-64 32.2 5.3 16.9 12.4 12.2 17.0 3.9 100.0
15 and older 29.1 4.9 15.7 14.8 14.5 17.9 3.2 100.0
Ecuador 2008 Age 15-29 7.7 19.6 21.2 9.6 22.6 13.8 5.5 100.0
Age 30-64 18.9 27.8 11.2 4.5 16.1 10.4 11.2 100.0
15 and older 18.5 25.1 13.7 5.8 17.2 10.8 9.0 100.0
El Salvador 2004 Age 15-29 27.3 9.3 25.7 6.0 21.4 8.0 2.3 100.0
Age 30-64 41.6 13.0 15.3 2.8 13.7 6.6 7.1 100.0
15 and older 38.4 11.4 18.6 3.9 16.0 6.8 5.0 100.0
Guatemala 2006 Age 15-29 40.7 20.4 16.8 1.7 5.4 13.4 1.6 100.0
Age 30-64 58.2 14.1 7.3 0.7 4.1 10.1 5.5 100.0
15 and older 52.5 16.2 11.0 1.1 4.5 11.0 3.7 100.0
Honduras 2007 Age 15-29 27.3 34.3 15.0 2.9 3.2 14.9 2.4 100.0
Age 30-64 46.3 25.5 7.1 0.9 2.5 11.9 5.9 100.0
15 and older 41.0 28.0 9.9 1.6 2.7 12.6 4.2 100.0
Mexico 2008 Age 15-29 7.7 12.9 35.4 9.6 17.4 12.0 5.1 100.0
Age 30-64 22.1 18.0 24.0 5.4 11.8 9.5 9.2 100.0
15 and older 19.6 16.2 27.0 6.6 13.2 10.0 7.5 100.0
Nicaragua 2005 Age 15-29 34.2 15.9 21.9 3.9 13.4 6.4 4.3 100.0
Age 30-64 49.2 14.3 14.1 2.3 7.7 5.1 7.4 100.0
15 and older 44.5 14.7 16.9 2.9 9.9 5.4 5.8 100.0
Panama 2008 Age 15-29 6.6 14.5 20.9 10.4 25.4 14.6 7.7 100.0
Age 30-64 11.3 19.3 17.6 5.3 21.0 10.5 15.0 100.0
15 and older 11.9 18.1 18.1 6.7 21.6 11.3 12.2 100.0
Paraguay 2008 Age 15-29 13.2 16.6 20.0 12.6 23.0 14.6 0.0 100.0
Age 30-64 29.5 24.9 12.4 4.6 13.5 15.1 0.1 100.0
15 and older 25.4 21.4 14.8 7.4 16.5 14.4 0.1 100.0
Peru 2008 Age 15-29 8.8 9.3 16.4 6.3 32.8 18.6 7.9 100.0
Age 30-64 33.7 4.9 10.6 2.0 21.7 13.0 14.1 100.0
15 and older 29.5 6.0 12.0 3.2 24.0 14.0 11.3 100.0
Uruguay 2008 Age 15-29 2.9 15.7 28.5 21.3 10.2 18.7 2.8 100.0
Age 30-64 8.3 21.9 21.7 14.7 9.4 17.3 6.5 100.0




2008 Age 15-29 8.6 13.2 20.2 5.0 24.3 19.9 8.8 100.0
Age 30-64 13.7 20.9 17.9 2.6 21.1 11.3 12.5 100.0
15 and older 13.2 18.7 18.3 3.3 21.6 13.7 11.1 100.0
Latin America Age 15-29 9.5 9.0 25.0 12.3 25.4 14.1 4.7 100.0
Age 30-64 22.4 13.9 20.5 6.2 17.2 11.2 8.7 100.0
15 and older 20.0 12.3 21.4 8.0 19.3 11.8 7.2 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a The length of education cycles was defined in accordance with the 1997 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).
b Employed population in each age group. The category “15 and older” includes the population age 65 and older.
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Table II.A-11 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): SALARIED PROPORTION OF EMPLOYED POPULATION AGE 15-29, 30-64  
























2006 Age 15-29 80.0 71.7 86.8 82.1 87.6 86.4 88.1 86.5
Age 30-64 71.3 68.4 72.8 71.2 73.0 72.3 74.9 73.0
15 and older 68.8 69.4 75.5 72.8 77.9 78.2 76.6 75.9
Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of)
2007 Age 15-29 29.8 26.3 39.3 44.4 55.5 69.1 85.7 48.6
Age 30-64 19.7 23.9 35.3 43.8 45.8 76.0 66.1 38.3
15 and older 18.6 23.8 37.0 43.4 50.0 72.7 70.2 39.3
Brazil 2008 Age 15-29 62.6 60.3 72.0 78.6 86.0 87.7 81.3 78.7
Age 30-64 48.5 55.0 62.2 64.6 71.1 76.1 69.4 62.6
15 and older 46.4 53.6 65.1 72.8 77.4 79.8 70.9 66.4
Chile 2006 Age 15-29 78.7 82.6 79.2 84.5 90.2 87.1 88.3 87.4
Age 30-64 66.2 64.4 70.5 71.2 75.8 77.9 80.3 73.4
15 and older 63.4 62.1 70.9 73.5 80.5 80.3 81.3 75.7
Colombia 2008 Age 15-29 48.3 50.0 53.5 64.3 55.4 73.1 70.9 60.8
Age 30-64 36.1 39.0 40.7 49.8 52.2 61.3 65.6 46.5
15 and older 35.3 40.4 44.9 55.6 53.4 66.8 66.1 49.6
Costa Rica 2008 Age 15-29 80.7 83.7 83.0 86.3 90.5 91.4 89.2 86.4
Age 30-64 64.0 61.4 64.4 61.0 69.2 75.1 80.2 67.4
15 and older 64.8 67.1 71.8 75.7 77.6 81.5 80.7 72.9
Dominican Republic 2008 Age 15-29 29.6 54.1 50.2 56.7 67.1 82.3 79.5 59.2
Age 30-64 36.2 40.9 46.5 50.6 57.1 73.5 73.3 50.3
15 and older 33.3 44.0 47.4 53.0 61.6 77.0 73.0 52.1
Ecuador 2008 Age 15-29 68.1 65.0 64.2 58.2 75.1 78.7 84.5 69.7
Age 30-64 42.5 46.2 49.3 51.4 58.0 66.9 69.7 52.8
15 and older 40.4 49.0 55.8 54.6 64.4 71.3 71.6 55.7
El Salvador 2004 Age 15-29 64.4 69.0 69.8 69.9 83.9 82.3 81.8 72.5
Age 30-64 42.9 52.2 57.6 51.3 68.2 80.3 78.4 55.0
15 and older 47.3 56.4 63.4 61.9 75.7 81.1 78.6 60.3
Guatemala 2006 Age 15-29 54.5 59.2 60.2 67.3 72.4 81.1 85.6 61.7
Age 30-64 36.3 53.7 55.7 51.6 66.2 70.1 75.1 47.0
15 and older 40.6 56.0 58.5 62.0 68.5 75.7 74.3 51.6
Honduras 2007 Age 15-29 57.1 62.3 60.8 65.0 62.9 82.4 85.7 64.3
Age 30-64 30.0 37.8 45.1 50.9 54.6 66.3 73.6 40.7
15 and older 35.3 49.5 54.5 60.8 58.4 73.4 75.7 48.7
Mexico 2008 Age 15-29 74.1 78.0 83.3 83.3 86.9 88.2 88.9 83.4
Age 30-64 54.7 63.0 72.8 76.9 75.3 81.2 80.0 69.0
15 and older 53.0 65.9 77.2 79.7 80.1 83.7 81.6 72.1
Nicaragua 2005 Age 15-29 49.8 53.8 64.3 59.3 76.4 67.6 86.6 60.3
Age 30-64 33.5 46.4 51.8 50.1 66.0 70.7 74.7 45.7
15 and older 37.1 48.7 58.4 55.0 71.3 68.6 78.0 50.4
Panama 2008 Age 15-29 48.1 51.9 69.4 71.5 84.4 87.4 93.5 74.0
Age 30-64 38.3 53.7 61.8 63.1 73.1 77.9 86.6 65.4
15 and older 35.6 51.6 63.7 66.8 76.6 81.3 87.5 66.1
Paraguay 2008 Age 15-29 51.1 43.4 61.7 60.7 77.9 79.4 100.0 63.5
Age 30-64 30.1 39.0 49.9 58.2 59.1 74.5 100.0 46.7
15 and older 31.3 39.4 55.4 59.2 68.2 75.5 100.0 51.2
Peru 2008 Age 15-29 36.5 38.0 43.8 45.7 63.3 69.1 79.6 56.6
Age 30-64 19.2 27.4 33.5 39.6 45.6 58.3 72.9 39.9
15 and older 18.4 32.4 37.7 43.2 52.9 62.7 73.3 43.0
Uruguay 2008 Age 15-29 65.8 78.3 82.8 84.7 86.5 88.7 73.2 83.2
Age 30-64 59.4 65.0 68.5 69.4 70.1 77.4 58.3 68.1




2008 Age 15-29 55.2 58.6 63.5 64.1 71.9 77.8 84.2 68.9
Age 30-64 39.9 45.2 50.1 49.9 58.3 69.5 78.9 55.2
15 and older 40.3 47.0 54.4 56.6 62.8 73.2 79.7 58.4
Latin America Age 15-29 58.3 63.2 72.3 73.0 82.8 83.4 82.9 75.0
Age 30-64 43.8 53.1 62.0 61.7 68.5 74.1 73.6 60.1
15 and older 42.5 54.0 65.4 67.0 74.3 77.4 74.9 63.4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a  The length of education cycles was defined in accordance with the 1997 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).
b  Employed population in each age group. The category “15 and older” includes the population age 65 and older.
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Table II.A-12 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PROPORTION OF EMPLOYED POPULATION AGE 15-29, 30-64 AND 15 AND OVER, WORKING  
























2006 Age 15-29 56.9 70.4 52.3 46.3 39.2 26.3 13.0 38.6
Age 30-64 61.2 65.7 54.2 50.4 37.3 27.4 13.6 39.0
15 and older 63.1 67.8 54.4 50.0 38.6 27.2 13.7 39.8
Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of)
2007 Age 15-29 89.7 88.3 84.8 81.4 66.7 38.9 7.6 70.4
Age 30-64 89.6 87.6 82.3 74.0 63.2 26.3 16.4 68.6
15 and older 91.0 88.3 83.6 78.9 64.9 31.7 14.4 71.2
Brazil 2008 Age 15-29 45.1 48.1 36.7 28.2 16.6 8.3 8.0 25.4
Age 30-64 61.4 55.7 46.6 39.8 25.7 13.4 10.6 40.1
15 and older 62.2 55.9 43.4 32.9 21.8 11.8 10.2 36.5
Chile 2006 Age 15-29 37.4 39.5 36.9 29.7 19.5 12.8 4.2 20.4
Age 30-64 52.0 52.3 47.8 42.2 30.7 18.5 5.3 34.0
15 and older 53.4 53.2 46.2 39.6 27.0 17.0 5.2 31.5
Colombia 2008 Age 15-29 85.3 82.3 75.8 55.7 62.0 34.6 15.5 58.7
Age 30-64 87.4 80.6 74.7 59.4 59.0 39.4 17.0 64.3
15 and older 88.1 81.5 75.4 58.1 59.4 37.3 16.9 63.7
Costa Rica 2008 Age 15-29 50.6 44.7 42.6 39.3 25.0 10.6 4.2 32.3
Age 30-64 62.1 56.9 49.9 49.0 37.9 19.8 7.5 42.7
15 and older 62.0 54.0 47.2 43.4 32.7 16.1 7.4 40.1
Dominican Republic 2008 Age 15-29 80.3 66.5 67.6 58.6 43.1 22.7 0.6 51.8
Age 30-64 77.8 70.2 65.0 59.2 47.3 16.4 13.2 56.2
15 and older 78.8 69.4 65.8 58.9 45.6 18.8 12.5 55.7
Ecuador 2008 Age 15-29 68.8 70.5 72.1 72.3 52.2 31.1 15.8 58.3
Age 30-64 82.0 77.7 71.6 66.5 55.2 33.7 19.6 62.6
15 and older 82.6 76.6 72.1 69.7 54.2 32.9 19.2 63.0
El Salvador 2004 Age 15-29 76.1 67.4 60.1 53.3 30.6 22.3 9.1 54.2
Age 30-64 81.5 65.6 58.6 54.8 38.6 20.2 15.2 60.5
15 and older 80.7 66.8 59.7 53.9 34.7 21.1 14.3 59.4
Guatemala 2006 Age 15-29 61.9 53.5 43.9 36.9 28.3 15.6 9.6 47.9
Age 30-64 75.1 52.3 42.1 30.1 24.4 22.4 6.1 58.0
15 and older 71.5 53.1 43.3 34.6 27.3 18.9 6.5 54.9
Honduras 2007 Age 15-29 76.8 61.1 58.7 49.0 40.0 17.9 6.1 56.3
Age 30-64 74.4 56.9 47.8 37.8 30.1 21.8 12.1 56.8
15 and older 76.0 59.1 54.5 45.8 35.1 20.3 10.8 57.8
Mexico 2008 Age 15-29 64.5 59.7 51.3 46.9 35.5 22.8 10.1 44.7
Age 30-64 74.9 66.0 52.5 37.2 37.9 23.2 15.3 51.2
15 and older 75.9 64.8 52.1 42.1 36.9 23.3 14.1 50.4
Nicaragua 2005 Age 15-29 77.2 67.6 59.4 61.5 44.3 41.1 14.9 61.8
Age 30-64 83.0 69.8 62.2 53.1 46.0 32.5 17.6 67.3
15 and older 82.0 69.2 60.8 57.9 45.3 37.3 17.3 66.1
Panama 2008 Age 15-29 79.0 73.5 55.7 49.3 29.9 19.6 5.3 43.5
Age 30-64 81.6 67.6 53.1 51.0 35.6 24.1 9.1 45.7
15 and older 84.1 70.3 54.7 50.4 33.8 22.6 8.7 47.0
Paraguay 2008 Age 15-29 85.1 84.2 74.5 68.4 47.1 24.4 40.4 63.1
Age 30-64 88.7 79.8 63.8 56.3 45.8 18.2 0.0 65.4
15 and older 88.9 81.5 69.6 64.3 46.9 21.2 11.0 65.9
Peru 2008 Age 15-29 85.6 83.3 81.0 79.3 62.8 44.0 21.3 64.0
Age 30-64 89.3 84.1 78.8 74.9 66.6 47.5 20.6 67.6
15 and older 90.4 83.9 80.1 77.9 65.2 46.0 21.3 68.3
Uruguay 2008 Age 15-29 62.8 55.4 46.2 36.0 27.7 14.0 5.0 36.9
Age 30-64 66.8 57.9 48.7 38.1 29.8 16.5 8.2 40.7




2008 Age 15-29 68.6 62.5 57.6 53.5 40.7 28.9 12.9 45.2
Age 30-64 73.9 63.9 57.4 55.3 44.6 29.2 10.4 49.2
15 and older 74.5 64.5 57.7 54.6 43.5 29.2 11.2 48.9
Latin America Age 15-29 63.9 62.1 49.3 43.3 27.7 20.2 11.7 39.7
Age 30-64 72.5 64.1 52.9 48.3 34.2 21.5 13.9 48.4
15 and older 73.5 64.4 51.8 46.1 31.7 21.2 13.6 47.0
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a The length of education cycles was defined in accordance with the 1997 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).
b Employed population in each age group. The category “15 and older” includes the population age 65 and older.
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Table II.A-13 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM ENROLMENT RATES FOR EMPLOYED POPULATION  
























2006 Age 15-29 9.6 9.9 24.3 31.7 46.7 49.8 67.3 41.4
Age 30-64 25.3 19.9 35.6 42.1 54.0 59.0 68.5 49.0
15 and older 21.7 15.8 31.7 38.4 50.3 54.4 67.2 45.6
Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of)
2007 Age 15-29 10.3 16.8 9.9 12.7 15.7 38.0 46.0 18.1
Age 30-64 11.7 11.8 15.7 22.4 22.8 63.8 64.0 26.2
15 and older 15.3 15.3 13.3 17.2 20.1 53.5 60.2 24.3
Brazil 2008 Age 15-29 21.2 24.7 34.3 42.2 68.6 73.3 76.5 51.9
Age 30-64 27.8 43.1 51.2 57.0 71.1 81.7 83.0 55.2
15 and older 24.5 38.6 44.6 47.8 69.7 78.3 80.7 52.6
Chile 2006 Age 15-29 46.5 41.4 48.7 52.1 72.9 69.1 73.8 66.3
Age 30-64 49.4 52.3 56.3 60.7 70.5 78.2 86.0 66.4
15 and older 46.2 49.1 54.3 57.8 71.0 75.0 82.6 65.1
Colombia 2008 Age 15-29 5.4 9.1 12.4 35.3 20.3 54.0 72.7 31.1
Age 30-64 9.9 19.3 25.7 41.4 37.3 61.0 75.6 34.3
15 and older 8.7 16.8 20.8 38.8 30.0 57.6 74.8 32.4
Costa Rica 2008 Age 15-29 46.3 56.4 62.2 63.1 78.5 83.9 92.9 68.1
Age 30-64 57.7 67.3 66.8 69.7 74.1 84.6 89.0 71.9
15 and older 53.1 63.4 64.7 65.8 75.5 83.8 88.5 69.7
Dominican Republic 2008 Age 15-29 9.6 22.9 18.1 25.1 42.8 64.9 75.6 34.6
Age 30-64 18.1 25.4 29.4 31.3 43.7 69.5 69.5 35.9
15 and older 16.0 24.6 25.7 28.2 43.1 67.7 69.2 34.7
Ecuador 2008 Age 15-29 9.1 14.5 15.6 18.8 30.0 43.5 61.5 24.8
Age 30-64 17.9 22.9 27.2 27.0 43.4 61.0 70.8 35.3
15 and older 16.8 21.5 21.9 23.1 38.3 54.4 69.6 31.5
El Salvador 2004 Age 15-29 7.1 15.3 22.9 26.6 55.0 63.1 67.2 29.2
Age 30-64 7.7 24.8 32.3 36.3 55.5 77.0 77.0 30.5
15 and older 7.1 21.5 27.5 30.8 55.2 70.9 74.9 28.9
Guatemala 2006 Age 15-29 8.4 15.8 21.9 25.0 46.6 49.7 53.4 20.8
Age 30-64 8.0 23.8 31.6 29.4 44.5 53.4 57.1 20.9
15 and older 7.7 19.2 25.2 26.5 45.0 51.4 54.5 19.9
Honduras 2007 Age 15-29 5.3 15.1 20.9 26.6 30.5 53.7 66.1 21.1
Age 30-64 5.7 16.5 25.7 32.8 36.8 51.4 68.4 20.0
15 and older 5.2 15.6 22.7 28.3 33.6 52.1 67.5 19.5
Mexico 2008 Age 15-29 7.0 14.4 25.3 29.8 42.3 47.9 57.2 30.2
Age 30-64 9.9 18.8 34.1 52.0 48.7 61.2 63.7 34.0
15 and older 8.3 17.1 30.1 41.1 45.8 55.7 61.6 31.5
Nicaragua 2005 Age 15-29 2.6 10.1 17.2 22.9 35.7 40.1 59.6 17.1
Age 30-64 5.6 17.5 22.8 29.3 38.1 50.6 59.3 19.0
15 and older 4.2 13.7 19.6 25.4 36.3 45.0 59.1 17.4
Panama 2008 Age 15-29 11.8 18.8 29.7 35.0 60.4 72.7 87.1 46.0
Age 30-64 17.1 34.0 45.0 47.2 63.9 74.7 86.8 53.2
15 and older 13.1 28.6 38.7 40.7 62.0 73.4 86.1 48.7
Paraguay 2008 Age 15-29 0.8 1.4 3.5 7.5 17.5 38.7 59.6 11.7
Age 30-64 4.5 6.8 15.5 30.5 35.2 58.6 100.0 20.0
15 and older 3.5 5.2 9.2 15.7 25.7 50.5 89.0 16.0
Peru 2008 Age 15-29 1.8 2.5 3.8 3.5 15.4 28.9 42.8 15.0
Age 30-64 7.5 6.6 19.3 22.9 34.4 54.2 76.2 30.6
15 and older 8.8 5.1 13.1 10.6 26.3 43.8 69.0 25.1
Uruguay 2008 Age 15-29 29.2 43.4 53.4 65.4 74.2 82.1 88.5 62.1
Age 30-64 46.4 61.3 66.7 73.9 81.0 87.9 94.9 71.8




2008 Age 15-29 28.6 37.8 42.4 43.4 60.8 69.9 82.7 55.9
Age 30-64 40.4 58.2 63.9 67.6 77.3 84.4 91.0 71.4
15 and older 36.7 52.2 54.9 53.8 70.4 77.3 88.7 65.3
Latin America Age 15-29 12.6 18.2 27.9 35.4 56.8 59.9 66.9 40.3
Age 30-64 18.7 32.5 43.0 48.9 62.6 72.3 75.0 46.1
15 and older 16.5 28.3 36.8 41.9 59.8 67.2 72.7 42.9
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a The length of education cycles was defined in accordance with the 1997 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).
b  Employed population in each age group. The category “15 and older” includes the population age 65 and older.
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Table II.A-14 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): LABOUR INCOME OF EMPLOYED POPULATION AGE 15-29, 30-64 AND  
15 AND OVER, BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION a























2006 Age 15-29 567 685 718 863 949 1 022 1 349 929
Age 30-64 825 831 1 091 1 411 1 596 1 873 2 485 1 597




2007 Age 15-29 151 136 143 170 285 345 738 244
Age 30-64 191 252 297 431 415 568 1 115 401
15 and older 168 214 233 267 353 480 1 031 329
Brazil 2008 Age 15-29 202 221 281 301 458 750 1 539 427
Age 30-64 282 409 512 583 801 1 502 2 886 747
15 and older 260 380 432 412 650 1 240 2 609 631
Chile 2006 Age 15-29 380 369 433 448 563 784 1 771 671
Age 30-64 554 602 627 748 931 1 542 3 116 1 114
15 and older 540 593 598 688 803 1 301 2 860 998
Colombia 2008 Age 15-29 315 346 338 473 357 606 1 212 507
Age 30-64 376 472 512 672 812 1 027 2 073 779
15 and older 361 441 449 591 606 823 1 880 684
Costa Rica 2008 Age 15-29 525 544 557 554 725 976 1 483 709
Age 30-64 546 651 713 793 948 1 458 2 470 1 016
15 and older 531 615 646 654 859 1 254 2 314 905
Dominican Republic 2008 Age 15-29 579 568 593 663 601 675 1 925 651
Age 30-64 667 865 957 948 1 041 1 589 2 806 1 048
15 and older 640 779 851 830 838 1 231 2 649 907
Ecuador 2008 Age 15-29 169 185 172 168 281 354 584 247
Age 30-64 200 290 344 394 491 624 957 425
15 and older 189 265 262 279 409 517 926 362
El Salvador 2004 Age 15-29 217 286 299 311 414 568 782 334
Age 30-64 305 414 458 533 632 864 1 235 497
15 and older 271 373 377 405 522 733 1 152 423
Guatemala 2006 Age 15-29 202 251 268 268 484 525 1 013 296
Age 30-64 359 560 919 888 910 1 075 2 248 630
15 and older 319 400 496 478 698 797 2 225 493
Honduras 2007 Age 15-29 145 208 259 278 364 512 1 221 275
Age 30-64 197 339 452 462 700 795 1 730 427
15 and older 175 274 334 333 536 659 1 614 353
Mexico 2008 Age 15-29 254 291 354 356 465 643 1 036 427
Age 30-64 360 518 640 907 901 1 505 2 272 832
15 and older 337 458 516 640 713 1 169 2 022 684
Nicaragua 2005 Age 15-29 216 255 338 377 422 528 1 028 338
Age 30-64 430 587 621 866 702 919 2 266 670
15 and older 354 439 468 580 627 728 1 865 527
Panama 2008 Age 15-29 205 231 368 356 504 597 871 443
Age 30-64 271 406 577 589 732 964 1 575 733
15 and older 254 364 503 474 661 822 1 453 633
Paraguay 2008 Age 15-29 235 247 279 339 499 642 463 379
Age 30-64 377 472 683 646 844 1 203 711 639
15 and older 329 407 477 449 662 1 012 644 530
Peru 2008 Age 15-29 123 145 176 153 272 416 576 274
Age 30-64 203 238 361 376 465 645 1 011 454
15 and older 180 192 277 237 377 544 906 375
Uruguay 2008 Age 15-29 271 341 376 424 494 615 970 451
Age 30-64 413 507 605 779 981 1 207 2 215 838




2008 Age 15-29 485 541 566 532 619 689 980 628
Age 30-64 555 671 718 688 819 964 1 328 810
15 and older 529 638 664 613 748 838 1 243 746
Latin America Age 15-29 242 286 335 362 480 676 1 165 449
Age 30-64 332 470 598 730 837 1 343 2 165 789
15 and older 307 424 500 548 686 1 086 1 964 666
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a The length of education cycles was defined in accordance with the 1997 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).
b Employed population in each age group. The category “15 and older” includes the population age 65 and older.
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Table II.A-15 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): RESULTS OF THE GENERAL REGRESSION MODEL (WITH CONTROL VARIABLES) FOR ASSESSING 
THE IMPACT OF ADDITIONAL YEARS OF SCHOOLING PER EDUCATIONAL CYCLE ON WAGES OF WAGE-EARNERS AGE 20 
AND OLDER WHO WORK 20 OR MORE HOURS PER WEEK, AROUND 2008
Country Year
Parameters a Adjusted 
R2 aβ0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 β7 β8
Argentina  
(urban areas) 2006 5.079 0.0304 0.0453 0.0076 0.0258 -0.0003 0.4781 0.1579 … 0.285




2007 3.110 0.0512 -0.0219 * 0.1355 0.0422 -0.0006 0.3050 0.1829 0.5922 0.452
(3.56) (-1.13) (10.91) (12.92) (-9.28) (10.12) (6.91) (15.34)
Brazil 2008 3.651 0.0670 0.0249 0.1628 0.0364 -0.0004 0.2687 0.2450 0.1872 0.484
(31.16) (9.49) (92.67) (73.84) (-41.54) (42.38) (62.87) (29.86)
Chile 2006 4.440 0.0296 0.0453 0.1188 0.0210 -0.0002 0.2429 0.2066 0.0741 0.375
(12.09) (14.6) (53.4) (36.69) (-21.29) (41.98) (43.91) (15.34)
Colombia 2008 3.746 0.0508 0.0047 * 0.0849 0.0297 -0.0004 0.4080 0.1180 0.0771 0.488
(23.99) (1.75) (54.71) (65.37) (-38.94) (101.22) (35.55) (11.08)
Costa Rica 2008 4.859 0.0100 0.0457 0.1043 0.0183 -0.0003 0.2954 0.2300 0.0071 * 0.452
(2.79) (9.29) (21.98) (15.11) (-11.43) (27.33) (24.82) (0.79)
Dominican 
Republic
2008 3.765 0.0443 0.0003 * 0.1373 0.0292 -0.0004 0.3031 0.2171 0.0909 0.436
(7.23) (0.03) (15.59) (14.2) (-10.88) (14.8) (13.51) (5.21)
Ecuador 2008 3.543 0.0430 0.0167 0.0483 0.0260 -0.0003 0.2841 0.1755 0.1273 0.397
(12.08) (3.63) (12.11) (22.81) (-14.92) (28.62) (18.02) (12.51)
El Salvador 2004 4.138 0.0368 0.0346 0.1019 0.0255 -0.0004 0.2313 0.1079 0.1387 0.390
(10.59) (6.33) (16.42) (17.27) (-13.99) (18.95) (9.56) (11.73)
Guatemala 2006 3.669 0.0751 0.0490 0.0239 0.0320 -0.0004 0.0972 0.1568 0.0804 0.419
(22.67) (8.09) (3.05) (19.5) (-15) (6.51) (11.52) (6.38)
Honduras 2007 2.945 0.0866 0.0224 0.0354 0.0314 -0.0004 0.6710 -0.0022 * 0.4443 0.570
(23.03) (3.85) (5.31) (19.63) (-14.36) (45.53) (-0.18) (32.48)
Mexico 2008 4.127 0.0449 0.0455 0.0580 0.0395 -0.0005 0.3324 0.1762 0.2136 0.343
(11.99) (8.91) (13.02) (34.66) (-24.36) (34.07) (19.56) (21.06)
Nicaragua 2005 3.421 0.0518 0.0277 0.0609 0.0289 -0.0004 0.2150 0.1560 0.1019 0.374
(11.1) (3.26) (6.28) (12.3) (-9.04) (12.18) (8.97) (5.53)
Panama 2008 4.200 0.0526 0.0088 * 0.0613 0.0220 -0.0003 0.5541 0.1867 0.1107 0.506
(10.22) (1.42) (15.43) (17.83) (-10.36) (45.5) (18.34) (10.59)
Paraguay 2008 3.633 0.0555 0.0215 * 0.0891 0.0378 -0.0005 0.3053 0.1088 0.0413 * 0.403
(5.92) (1.75) (7.54) (13.61) (-9.98) (12.55) (4.9) (1.69)
Peru 2008 3.322 0.0626 -0.0257 0.0729 0.0262 -0.0003 0.4312 0.3266 0.2518 0.367
(8.88) (-2.54) (11.68) (16.5) (-10.12) (28.57) (24.71) (15.44)
Uruguay 2008 4.567 0.0292 0.0578 0.0615 0.0371 -0.0004 0.3575 0.2155 -0.0306 0.357




2008 5.415 0.0294 0.0067 0.0615 0.0193 -0.0003 0.3599 0.1454 … 0.333
(12.47) (2.13) (26.69) (28.76) (-19.3) (54.18) (28.91) …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a β0: Constant term (wage value —natural log— with other variables equal to 0); β1: Regression coefficient for the number of years of schooling. Gives the rate of private return for 
each additional year of primary schooling; β2: Regression coefficient for the number of additional years of schooling after completing the primary cycle. The expression β1 + β2 
gives the rate of private return for each additional year of secondary schooling; β3: Regression coefficient for the number of additional years of schooling after completing the 
secondary cycle. The expression β1 + β2 + β3 gives the rate of private return for each additional year in the higher education cycle; β4: Regression coefficient for the individual’s 
potential experience; β5: Regression coefficient for potential experience squared; β6: Regression coefficient for the dummy variable for informal or formal market integration (informal 
integration =0); β7: Regression coefficient for the dummy variable for sex (female=0); β8: Regression coefficient for the dummy variable for geographic area (rural areas=0).
 T-statistic values for the significance test for each regression are shown in parentheses. An asterisk (*) shows when the regression is not statistically significant at 5%.
 Adjusted r2: Squared correlation coefficient, adjusted for sample size and number of independent variables.
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Chapter III
Public social spending in Latin America: 
general trends and investment in 
developing the skills of the  
new generations
A. Introduction
In the past two decades, the countries of the region have made a substantial effort to 
increase the resources available for social policy implementation. Practically all public 
social spending items have increased not just in absolute terms but in relative terms, too, 
except for a few cases and periods.
Much of this effort has been concomitant with economic 
growth, which has helped to expand resources. Overall 
budget growth, particularly social spending budgets, has 
outpaced GDP growth (especially in the 1990s). But minor 
GDP contractions have also led to larger-than-necessary 
budget cuts. While procyclical budget execution is 
generally driven by fiscal responsibility and international 
recommendations, budget cuts in some spending areas, 
such as education, health and social security, can come 
at substantial economic and social cost.
To counter this trend, most of the region’s countries 
took what have so far been temporary measures to 
increase public spending in order to deal with the fallout 
from the global financial crisis. Many of these spending 
measures were taken to diminish the effects of the 
crisis on the real economy and contain the increase in 
unemployment and ultimately poverty. The following 
pages will review both long-term trends and the latest 
shifts in public social spending growth in countries for 
which adequate information is available, from the time 
the potential impact of the international economic crisis 
was first identified.
This chapter will also examine trends in social 
spending geared towards the development and protection 
of the new generations, in accordance with the approach 
chosen for the 2010 edition of Social Panorama of Latin 
America. Specifically, it will review the countries’ efforts 
to invest more in education and the factors that have been 
most important in the expansion of resources to develop 
the skills of the region’s children and young people. 
Lastly, it will analyse the distributive impact of social 
spending, showing that the beneficiaries of stepped-up 
investment to extend educational coverage are, precisely, 
children and young people in the lowest income strata. 
This furthers social integration and mobility and lays a 
broader foundation for future economic development.
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B. Public social spending in Latin America and effects   
 of its procyclicality on economic growth
Public social spending has risen substantially in the region over recent decades, both absolutely 
(from US$ 445 per person in 1990-1991 to US$ 880 in 2007-2008) and in terms of the 
macroeconomic priority given to it (up from 12.3% of GDP to 18.4% of GDP). Investment in 
social areas has also increased as a share of public social spending. Nonetheless, both public 
spending generally and social spending in particular remain very procyclical, especially in 
education and health. However, the great majority of countries developed active social and 
fiscal policies to confront the international financial crisis, not merely maintaining but actually 
increasing spending to implement a variety of pro-employment and subsidy and transfer 
programmes. This reflects a recognition that periods of economic contraction are precisely 
when social policy efforts need to be stepped up and resources increased.
As different editions of Social Panorama of Latin America 
have noted, the region has made a fairly systematic effort to 
increase public spending, and social spending in particular. 
This began after a period of crisis, structural adjustment 
and subsequent fiscal measures that resulted in sharp 
cutbacks in all expenditure items, market deregulation 
and privatization of social services, among other actions 
recommended by the international financial organizations 
and embodied in the Washington Consensus.
While most of the region’s countries implemented 
these reforms, at different speeds, between the mid-1980s 
and late 1990s, social spending recovered gradually in 
the latter decade, largely thanks to economic growth that 
was relatively sustained if also highly volatile.
In line with the recommendations for greater fiscal 
discipline, public expenditure trends in the region closely 
tracked the ups and downs of its economies. Put another 
way, volatile growth was reflected in the highly procyclical 
behaviour of fiscal expenditure, with recurrent cutbacks in 
public spending precisely at times of economic retrenchment 
and rising unemployment and poverty.
In the mid-1990s, new social policy tools began to be 
tested with a view to addressing the persistent problems 
of poverty, equity and inequality. The economic crises of 
the late 1990s (the Asian crisis, natural disasters in Central 
America, falling international prices for staple grains, the 
slowdown in the world economy in 2000 and, shortly 
afterwards, the crisis affecting Argentina and Uruguay) 
prompted a reformulation of social policy generally and 
anti-poverty policies in particular.
New approaches emerged, emphasizing protection 
against falling incomes, income poverty and social 
exclusion that expose individuals to vulnerability and 
risk (Serrano, 2005). This shift was cast primarily in 
terms of new networks and social protection system 
reforms. Among other things, they spurred a drive for 
coordinated social programmes combining traditional 
social security, social services and assistance programmes. 
Although these were originally seen as provisional 
responses to particular crises, there has been an increasing 
determination to strengthen these networks in pursuit of 
greater income stability and minimum levels of well-
being, given the evidence that the problem of economic 
volatility has not been eradicated once and for all (Acosta 
and Ramírez, 2004).
The guiding principle behind this new social policy 
trend was so-called social risk management. One of 
the risks considered when programmes of this type 
are designed is the absence or loss of employment, 
particularly for certain population groups (young people, 
women, ethnic minorities, the low-skilled) and the drop 
in household income when the head of household loses 
his or her job. Also considered are the risks associated 
with certain stages of the life cycle (such as old age or 
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motherhood), the negative effects on human skills that 
arise from dropping out of school, inadequate nutrition 
and lack of health care, and the impact of natural disasters 
(floods, earthquakes, droughts). The programmes that 
have arisen under this new social policy approach can 
largely be divided into three major groups: job creation 
programmes (public works, subsidies for new jobs and 
subsidized credit lines), training programmes (young 
people and the unemployed) and conditional transfer 
or co-responsibility programmes.
The growth of social spending since the 1990s, 
the rise of these more integrated new forms of social 
policy and the expanded coverage of public-sector 
social transfers in the present decade have borne down 
on poverty and, in some cases, on inequality. This 
was particularly true of the years running up to the 
2008 global financial crisis. The actual and threatened 
impact of the crisis in terms of social costs gave even 
greater impetus to the debate in the region about the 
role of the State as regulator, arbiter, main redistributor 
of resources and guarantor of more universal systems 
of social protection against vulnerability and poverty. 
The countercyclical measures adopted by most national 
States in Latin America and the Caribbean when faced 
with the impact of the crisis on employment, economic 
activity and social vulnerability reflect this change of 
course. The countercyclical logic of social spending has 
played a decisive part in forestalling the social costs of 
the crisis, unlike what happened during the debt crisis 
of the 1980s. Although the social role of the State in 
response to the crisis has varied from country to country, 
depending on the volume of resources it can mobilize, 
its institutional strength and the degree of coordination 
between anti-crisis measures and between these and 
more permanent sectoral programmes, there can be no 
doubt that the idea of a more active role for the State 
and the idea that social spending is less subject to the 
vagaries of economic growth have gained purchase in 
the region.
This chapter will analyse long-term trends 
in public social spending and use the information 
available to examine the reaction of the Latin 
American States to the recent financial crisis, including 
anti-poverty programmes.
1. The long-term trend of public social spending
As the countries of the region came to recognise the 
importance of public social spending as an instrument 
for channelling resources to the poorest in society and 
the role of social development as a driver of economic 
development, they began to ratchet up this spending. Public 
spending, and social spending in particular, has burgeoned 
across the region over the past two decades: while public 
spending has held steady at around 26% of GDP, social 
spending rose from 12.3% of GDP in 1990-1991 to 18.4% 
in 2007-2008. Social spending as a percentage of total 
public spending has thus risen considerably, from just 
under 45% to 65% (see figure III.1).
The countries are enormously diverse, not only in the 
extent to which they have increased social spending but also 
in their past and current levels of public spending. There 
are obvious differences in the macroeconomic priority they 
give to social spending, which ranges from less than 8% of 
GDP in Ecuador, Guatemala and Peru (central government) 
to more than a fifth of GDP in Argentina, Brazil, Cuba and 
Uruguay (see box III.1 for institutional coverage of public 
social spending), even though virtually all the countries have 
striven to increase such coverage since the 1990s.
Figure III.1 
LATIN AMERICA (21 COUNTRIES): TOTAL PUBLIC SPENDING AND 
PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING (WEIGHTED AVERAGES), 1990-2008
























































































Total public spending as percentage of GDP
Public social spending as percentage of GDP
Ratio of social spending to all spending
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social 
expenditure database.
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Box III.1 
UPDATING SOCIAL EXPENDITURE FIGURES
To update social expenditure figures for the 
present edition of Social Panorama of Latin 
America, up-to-date public social spending 
data running up to 2009 were obtained in 
accordance with the total and sectoral series 
published in previous editions. Information 
up to 2009 was obtained for 6 of the 
21 countries considered, and these figures 
have been published because it is important to 
have recent data, even if they are provisional, 
estimated or incomplete. The figures were 
updated during the third quarter of 2009; the 
cut-off point was mid-September.
In most cases it was possible to 
collect data on central government budget 
execution, and in a number of countries 
figures were obtained for actual spending 
by agencies with budgetary autonomy, 
local governments and non-financial 
public enterprises. Although differences in 
institutional coverage make comparisons 
between countries difficult, the most 
extensive data available for each country are 
being published except when they involve 
significant constraints for constructing 
a series for 1990-2009. This is because 
ECLAC’s primary interest is to establish 
the amount of public social spending in 
each country as accurately as possible, 
in order to convey the effort being made 
by States in this area.
The following is a classification of the 
countries by institutional coverage of the 
social expenditure series used:
Total public sector (NFPS + FPS): •	
Costa Rica
Non- f i nanc ia l  publ i c  sec to r •	
(GG + NFPE): Argentina, Brazil and 
Plurinational State of Bolivia
General government (CG + LG): Peru •	
and El Salvador
Central government (BCG + AA): •	
Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Trinidad 
and Tobago and Uruguay
Budgetary central government: •	
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, and Paraguay
where:
AA: agencies with budgetary autonomy; 
BCG: budgetary central government; CG: 
central government; LG: local government; 
NFPE: non-financial public enterprises; 
PFE: public financial enterprises.
Considering that a number of countries 
only very recently adopted the classification 
system of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) Government Finance Statistics Manual 
2001, which is harmonized with the 1993 
System of National Accounts (SNA), the 
1990-2009 series is not always compatible 
at the subfunctions or subgroups level, or 
both. Most of the countries publish the 
functional classification in aggregated form 
and use classifications of their own.
Data continuity problems brought about 
by the switch include a lack of information 
for the full series or for certain years or 
functions (or both) in particular cases. 
This is the case with social protection in 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia between 
1990 and 1994, social protection in El 
Salvador between 1990 and 1992 and in 
Trinidad and Tobago between 1990 and 
1999, and figures relating to social security 
in Nicaragua. In other countries such as 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, it was 
not possible to construct the full series 
from 1997 to 1999 as data on intermediate 
periods were lacking. The 2009 and 2010 
figures for Colombia are provisional: a 
methodological change and a switch in the 
basis for calculating GDP mean that the 
series is not comparable between 1990-
1999 and 2000-2009, and the guidelines 
of the Government Finance Statistics 
Manual 2001 are being incorporated into the 
classification of functions. In Peru, whereas 
the 1990-1999 series covers budgetary 
central government, the series for 2000 
onward is for general government. Lastly, 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has 
series for agreed public social spending 
(budget act and amendments as of 
31 December each year) and for disbursed 
public spending, the latter beginning in 
1999. The institutional coverage of the 
country’s figures is budgetary central 
government. Because it is a federal country, 
the published figures may underestimate 
total social spending by more than those 
of other countries reporting this coverage. 
The same is true of Mexico, although 
what is known about highly decentralized 
spending execution in that country indicates 
that the figures should be read more 
carefully than in other cases because social 
spending execution may be substantially 
underestimated. ECLAC (2006) gives 
examples of centralized and decentralized 
execution of social spending.
Like previous editions, Social Panorama 
of Latin America 2010 uses biennial 
averages to present social spending data. 
The indicators published are for total 
public social spending and its component 
functions and sectors (education, health, 
social security and assistance, and housing, 
sanitation and other functions not included 
in the above categories) as a percentage 
of GDP, in dollars per capita, and as a 
percentage of total public spending. In 
the case of this last indicator, official 
information from the countries is used, but 
these figures may differ from those based 
on other systems (such as economic or 
administrative classification of spending) 
because some include interest payments 
on the public debt and others do not, and 
because different methodologies are used 
to classify disbursements.
The figures used to calculate percentages 
are in current prices for each year and each 
country. These proportions are then applied 
to the GDP series in dollars at 2000 prices to 
obtain per capita social spending, expressed 
in dollars. This may result in certain variations 
in relation to the data in constant currency 
reported by the countries, which depend on 
the degree of exchange-rate appreciation or 
depreciation implicit in the official parity of 
each country’s currency in relation to 2000, 
and also on the population data on which the 
per capita calculations are based.
Figures at current prices on overall 
and social public spending (and the sectoral 
breakdown of the latter) are official data 
provided by the corresponding government 
bodies. Depending on the country, these may 
be directorates, departments, sections or 
units for planning, budgeting or social policy 
within the ministries of the treasury, finance 
or the economy. In addition, information on 
budgetary execution was obtained from 
the countries’ general accounting offices 
or treasury departments, and occasionally 
from central banks, national statistical 
institutes, and national social and economic 
information systems.
The figures for constant 2000 dollar GDP 
are official ECLAC statistics; the population 
figures come from projections by the Latin 
American and Caribbean Demographic Centre 
(CELADE)-Population Division of ECLAC.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin America 2006 (LC/G.2326-P), Santiago, Chile, 2007. United 
Nations publication, Sales No. E.06.II.G.133; for GDP: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures; for population: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre 
(CELADE) - Population Division of ECLAC; and United Nations, System of National Accounts 1993 (ST/ESA/STAT/SER.F/2/Rev.4), New York, 1993. United Nations 
publication, Sales No. E.94.XVII.4.
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Figure III.2 
LATIN AMERICA (21 COUNTRIES): EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL SPENDING RELATIVE TO GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT  































































































































NFPS PS BCG GCP GC
Simple average (21 countries)
2007-2008                                    14.2
2004-2005                                    12.8
2000-2001                                    12.4
1997-1998                                     11.3
1994-1995                                     11.0
1990-1991                                      9.5
Weighted average (21 countries)
2007-2008                                          18.0
2004-2005                                          15.9
2000-2001                                          15.5
1997-1998                                           14.7
1994-1995                                           14.4







































































































































2007-2008                885
2004-2005                691
2000-2001                642
1997-1998                 601
1994-1995                557
1990-1991                440   
Simple average 
2007-2008                666     
2004-2005                506
2000-2001                466
1997-1998                 421 
1994-1995                380
1990-1991                315
440
880
B. Social spending per capita
(dollars at constant 2000 prices)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social expenditure database.
Note: NFPS = non-financial public sector; PS = public sector; GG = general government; BCG = budgetary central government; CG = central government.
Only in Ecuador did social spending become less 
of a macroeconomic priority between 1990-1991 and 
2007-2008. In Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, El Salvador, 
Paraguay and the Plurinational State of Bolivia such 
spending increased by more than 6 percentage points in 
this period. Other than in Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras and 
Nicaragua, the largest increases in social spending as 
percentages of GDP were during the 1990s (see figure 
III.2.A and table III.A-1).
However, the differences between countries lie not 
only in the share of GDP devoted to social spending 
but also in the wealth level of each country. Different 
development levels and tax burdens and thence the 
size of general public budgets and, specifically, social 
budgets are behind the large disparities in the amount 
of resources per capita that States can spend on social 
areas such as education, health and social security 
and assistance. The lowest spending per capita is in 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua; the first 
two give social spending a low priority as a share of 
GDP. The countries spending the largest amounts per 
capita are Argentina (more than US$ 2,000 per capita), 
Brazil, Cuba, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay, all 
of which have social spending of over US$ 1,000 a 
year per inhabitant. On average, the highest-spending 
countries devote 13 times more per capita funding to 
this area than those that spend the least. The Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Paraguay, Peru and Trinidad 
and Tobago are the countries which increased funding 
the most in absolute terms between 1990-1991 and 
2007-2008 (at least tripling their per capita expenditure in 
the period), although only Trinidad and Tobago currently 
has a high level of expenditure (see figure III.2.B and 
table III.A-2).
2.  The procyclicality of social spending relative to economic    
 growth: an ongoing debate
Although the region’s countries have steadily increased 
th1eir public budgets, particularly where social spending is 
concerned, in most cases these have fluctuated for reasons 
generally determined by local economic developments. 
This section takes a look at the procyclical nature 
of spending.
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The debate centres on the following considerations. 
Although budgeting tied to the economic cycle generally 
reflects responsible fiscal management, it can sometimes 
impair economic and social development processes that 
depend on a stable flow of resources. This is because 
many of the processes involved in the production of public 
services entail a large proportion of recurrent expenditure 
deriving from legal or contractual commitments, such 
as wages and retirement and other pensions. Budgetary 
fluctuations can sometimes affect pay levels and continuity 
for the personnel required to maintain public services. In 
other cases the non-discretionary nature of some public 
spending results in drastic cuts to investment (for example, 
in building, maintaining, renovating and equipping public 
facilities such as schools and hospitals).
Accordingly, while responsible fiscal management is vital 
to long-term economic development, the over-adjustments 
often made to public spending and social spending when 
growth slows can adversely affect the very processes that 
prudent fiscal management is meant to safeguard. As a rule, 
when cuts to public social spending occur in the region, they 
are sharper than the slowdown in growth: between 1991 and 
2008, there were 45 episodes in which countries cut public 
social spending in absolute terms. On 93% of these occasions 
(42) the cut was larger than the decline in GDP (including 
periods in which GDP continued to rise).
Notwithstanding this, social spending is less sensitive 
to the economic cycle than the overall budget, as figure 
III.3 shows. For all its procyclicality, then, social spending 
has been better protected against economic fluctuations 
than non-social public budget items.
Figure III.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): 
ANNUAL CHANGE IN PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING, TOTAL PUBLIC 

















































Annual change in GDP
Annual change in total public spending
Annual change in public social spending
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social 
expenditure database.
a Weighted averages. The 2009 expenditure figures are estimates based on information 
from seven countries.
Once again, there are outliers in the region. While 
GDP and social spending are highly correlated in countries 
such as Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, 
Mexico, Panama and Uruguay, in others such as Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Paraguay, the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia and Trinidad and Tobago 
social spending is fairly independent of growth. However, 
this does not just mean that the social services budget 
is protected during economic downturns, but also that 
any budget growth can far outpace (or be outpaced by) 
upswings in the economy. The differences between the 
countries that are most and least procyclical in their social 
spending can be seen in figure III.4.
Figure III.4 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): CHANGES IN SOCIAL 














































Annual change in public social spending Annual change in GDP
A. Countries with highly procyclical spending: Argentina, 














































B. Countries where spending is not procyclical: Costa Rica, 
Paraguay, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Trinidad and Tobago a
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social 
expenditure database.
a Simple average of growth rates in the countries.
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Lastly, evaluation criteria based on how closely or 
otherwise the budget tracks economic growth cycles 
provide only a general guide: the fact of public spending 
not being highly procyclical does not mean that the 
social area is neglected. In most cases, spending has 
effectively expanded. Inertial social spending may be 
insensitive to economic downturns, but it will not be 
sensitive to economic expansion either, and wholly 
countercyclical social spending is not desirable because 
it would fall just when the economy was growing. Of 
course, it is to be expected that some specific spending 
items will indeed be countercyclical, like those which 
finance emergency programmes at times of crisis and 
rising poverty and tail off in periods of economic growth. 
Others may prove more stable because they involve 
regular payment commitments, as is the case with social 
security. Still others can be expected to expand along 
with the economy to a reasonable degree that does not 
trigger macroeconomic imbalances or a tendency towards 
deficit spending.
3.  The evolution of social spending by sector
As social spending has risen, all sectors or major spending 
items have risen with it, but this growth has been uneven. 
Social security and assistance have recorded the strongest 
increase: almost three percentage points of GDP, or just 
over half of the total rise in public social spending. This is 
due in some degree to the new emphasis on anti-poverty 
policies and conditional cash transfer programmes in 
particular, as will be seen further on. At the same time, 
population ageing and associated commitments for 
funding retirement and other pensions, together with 
improvements to social security systems in a number of 
the region’s countries (including the strengthening of their 
non-contributory components), have caused this sector to 
grow faster than the rest (see figure III.5).
Figure III.5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): 
EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING  















































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social 
expenditure database.
a Percentage point increases in spending between 1990-1991 and 2007-2008.
Education spending is the item that has seen the 
next-largest increase, in accordance with the international 
commitments entered into by the region’s countries, rising 
by just over 50% as a proportion of GDP. This substantial 
rise in resources has not been free of volatility, however, 
as the following section will discuss. Together with social 
security and assistance, education spending accounts for 
almost 80% of the rise in total social spending between 
1990-1991 and 2007-2008.
Lastly, of the sectors that can be examined separately 
across all the countries analysed, spending on public 
health systems saw the lowest growth over almost two 
decades, lagging behind even housing expenditure 
and related items (such as water and sanitation). This 
is partly due to the tendency in a number of countries 
for health service expansion to be carried out by the 
private sector, in line with the reforms that followed 
the structural adjustment of the 1980s. Another reason, 
though, is that this is a highly procyclical item with a 
significant investment spending component that is cut 
back severely at times of economic contraction or slow 
growth (ECLAC, 2008a).
Uneven growth across spending items led to 
something of a shift in the weight of different sectors 
within total social spending. Social security increased its 
share to almost 43% of the region’s social expenditure. 
The share of education also rose slightly, to 27%, 
all to the detriment of spending on housing (9.7%) 
and, above all, health, whose share of total social 
spending dropped from 24.1% in 1990-1991 (just under 
US$ 110 per capita) to 20.5% in 2007-2008 (just over 
US$ 180 per capita).
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4. Expenditure trends during the financial crisis
The region’s countries adopted a broad range of measures 
in the face of the financial crisis. Unlike action taken on 
similar occasions (such as the crises of the 1980s and 
1990s), these measures set out not to shrink spending 
but to expand it, at least temporarily (see figure III.3). 
Measures of this kind (including those announced and 
those actually implemented) encompassed monetary and 
financial policy, fiscal policy, exchange-rate and foreign 
trade policy, sectoral policies, employment and social 
policies and multilateral financing (ECLAC, 2010c). 
Broadly speaking, they were aimed, first, at restoring 
confidence and making financial markets operational 
again and, second, at strengthening demand.
The range of measures was quite wide, not just 
because the impact of the crisis varied from one country 
to another, requiring different instruments to counter 
it, but also because of differences in each country’s 
capacity to implement initiatives, as determined by the 
availability of resources.
In the early stages, central banks mobilized to 
inject liquidity into financial systems in order to restore 
normal functioning to local credit markets or provide 
financing resources where these were in shortest supply. 
But the nature of the crisis, particularly the nose-dive 
in confidence, called for additional measures. Although 
it was necessary to shore up liquidity and hold interest 
rates as low as possible, the former would not guarantee 
an increased supply of credit and the latter would not 
ensure higher demand for goods. This made fiscal policy 
important as well.
In the area of fiscal policy, measures to increase 
spending had greater potential than those based on reducing 
taxes. While tax cuts do increase the disposable income 
of the private sector, in a crisis a large proportion could 
go to savings. Conversely, spending measures directly 
increase demand. If higher spending takes the form of 
direct transfers, however, it will have the greatest impact 
when targeted on sectors more inclined to consume. 
Transfers of this type are harder to implement in the short 
run and more demanding institutionally than untargeted 
transfers, however. Programmes to boost infrastructure 
investment were also implemented, although not all such 
projects were equally effective in bolstering employment 
and demand for locally produced inputs.
At the time the present edition of Social Panorama of 
Latin America went to press, information on 2009 public 
spending and social spending levels was available for seven 
countries. These data show that while GDP contracted in 
absolute terms in most of these countries, they all continued 
to increase their social spending. A number had already 
done so in 2008, and five of the seven countries (Brazil, 
Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama) made a still 
greater effort in 2009. Although the others also stepped up 
social spending, they did so more slowly than in 2008.
All the countries other than Cuba also increased total 
public spending, albeit almost always to a lesser degree 
than its social component. As figure III.6 shows, however, 
Cuba, Guatemala and Honduras had to make absolute 
cuts in public spending on non-social functions to be 
able to increase their social spending. Of the countries 
analysed, only Brazil and Panama increased non-social 
spending by more than social spending (Panama by 
almost twice as much).
Figure III.6 
LATIN AMERICA (SEVEN COUNTRIES): CHANGES IN PUBLIC 
SPENDING, SOCIAL SPENDING, NON-SOCIAL SPENDING AND 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social 
expenditure database.
The most commonly used fiscal measures in the 
countries have included cutting taxes, increasing tax 
benefits and subsidies and raising or bringing forward 
expenditure. In the social and production sectors, 
considerable extra resources have been put into housing, 
water and sanitation, support for small and medium-sized 
enterprises and the agricultural sector (easier credit 
and repayment terms), enhanced employment policies 
(unemployment insurance, recruitment subsidies, job 
creation programmes) and social programmes, especially 
conditional cash transfer programmes.
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5. Conditional cash transfer programmes: protecting the poor   
 throughout the life cycle
Conditional cash transfer programmes (CCTPs) are now 
the leading mechanism for combating the intergenerational 
reproduction of poverty in the region’s countries. The 
beneficiary population for these programmes consists 
of poor and vulnerable families with children. These 
families receive monetary transfers on condition they 
meet certain requirements intended to develop skills 
and improve educational attainments (see chapter II 
for more information on CCTPs and education). These 
programmes provide protection in the early stages of the 
life cycle: transfers with health- and nutrition-related 
conditions attached are aimed at the neonatal stage and 
early childhood, while those with educational conditions 
target children and adolescents.1 However, some countries’ 
programmes also include transfers for older persons 
(Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Paraguay and Peru), persons with disabilities 
(Argentina, Ecuador, Jamaica and Paraguay) and poor 
working-age adults (Jamaica), usually without conditions 
(Cecchini and Madariaga, 2010). 
(a) The growth of CCTPs
In the decade and a half that has passed since 
the first CCTPs were implemented in Brazil, with its 
Bolsa Escola, and Mexico, with its education, health 
and nutrition programme (PROGRESA), these social 
assistance programmes have grown at a steady pace in 
the Latin American and Caribbean countries in terms of 
both population coverage and spending. Around 2000, 
CCTPs or their direct precursors —major poverty reduction 
programmes based on direct income transfers such as 
Ecuador’s solidarity grant and the Family Allowance 
Programme (PRAF) in Honduras— were already operating 
in six countries, covering about 6% of the region’s population 
and spending the equivalent of 0.19% of GDP.2 These 
programmes expanded very rapidly in the following five 
years, so that by 2005 they had spread to 17 countries in 
the region and covered 14% of the region’s population, 
spending the equivalent of 0.24% of GDP.
1 In Latin America and the Caribbean, the maximum age for receiving 
transfers with educational conditions attached is generally about 
18. The exceptions are the Programa Ciudadanía Porteña of the city 
of Buenos Aires and Avancemos in Costa Rica, which cover young 
people up to the age of 25 (Cecchini and Madariaga, 2010).
2 Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua.
Spending on CCTPs increased to 0.34% of GDP 
in 2008 and 0.40% of GDP in 2009; this latter increase 
was due to the combined effects of rising budgets for 
these programmes and falling GDP as a result of the 
global economic crisis (see figure III.7). In 2010, six 
of the 10 countries for which information is available 
increased their CCTP budgets in nominal terms, while 
four cut them.
Figure III.7 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (19 COUNTRIES): 
COVERAGE OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMES 
AND PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON THEM a
A. Coverage, 2000-2010  
























2000 2005 2008 2009
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
a Weighted averages.
Thanks to this expansion, as of 2010 one in five 
inhabitants of Latin America and the Caribbean (113 million 
people) are receiving State cash transfers through CCTPs. 
About 52 million of these are children aged 0 to 14.
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Eighteen countries now have CCTPs, following the 
launch of the Conditional Cash Transfer Programme 
(CCTP) in Trinidad and Tobago in 2006 and Mi Familia 
Progresa in Guatemala in 2008, and the halting of such 
programmes by Nicaragua in 2006. In addition, new 
programmes have been launched or existing ones modified 
in recent years. In 2009, Argentina launched its Universal 
Child Allowance for Social Protection, which took over the 
beneficiaries of the Families for Social Inclusion programme, 
and the Plurinational State of Bolivia created the Juana 
Azurduy de Padilla mother-and-child voucher. In 2010, 
Honduras added a transfer of 10,000 lempiras a year to the 
benefits of the Family Allowance Programme (the Bono 
10000, worth about US$ 500) with a view to improving 
education, health and nutrition in indigent households 
with children and adolescents (see table III.1).
(b) Dissimilar experiences
Although rising spending and population coverage are 
common to the region’s CCTPs, the coverage levels actually 
achieved by each programme vary substantially.
As of about 2010, Ecuador, with its Human Development 
Voucher, is the country where the largest percentage of the 
population (44%) is covered by a CCTP. The programmes 
with the largest number of beneficiaries in absolute terms 
are Bolsa Família family grants in Brazil (52 million people, 
or about half of all CCTP beneficiaries in the region), 
Oportunidades in Mexico (27 million) and Families in Action 
in Colombia (12 million) (see figure III.8 and table III.1). 
In six countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico 
and Uruguay), the number of beneficiaries is as great as or 
greater than the number of indigent people,3 although it could 
be argued that there is still scope to expand programmes 
of this type and cover a larger number of families that are 
unable to meet their basic needs, since in 2009 some 190 
million people were living in poverty.
Bolsa Família and Oportunidades are also the 
programmes with the largest budgets in the region 
(US$ 6.2 billion and US$ 3.5 billion, respectively), although 
as percentages of GDP (0.47% and 0.51%, respectively) 
they are surpassed by Ecuador’s Human Development 
Voucher (1.17%) (see figure III.9 and table III.1).
3 Not considering programme inclusion and exclusion errors.
Figure III.8 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (19 COUNTRIES): 
COVERAGE OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER  
PROGRAMMES, AROUND 2000, 2005 AND 2010





































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Figure III.9 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (19 COUNTRIES): PUBLIC 
SPENDING ON CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER  





































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
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Table III.1 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): INDICATORS OF COVERAGE AND PUBLIC SPENDING ON CONDITIONAL  



























Argentina Universal Social Protection 
Benefit for Each Child




Juancito Pinto Grant … 1 729 17.5 32.4 50.7 0.33 Government of the 
Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, World Bank(2009)
Brazil Bolsa Família 12 583 51 590 d 26.4 84.6 > 100.0 0.47
 e Government of Brazil, 
World Bank
(2010) (2010)  
Chile Chile Solidario 333 f 1 147  f 6.8 51.7 > 100.0 0.11 Government of Chile
(2008) (2008)
Colombia Families in Action 2 589 g 11 651 d g 25.2 56.5 > 100.0 0.39 
e Government of Colombia, 
IDB, World Bank
(2010) (2010)
Costa Rica Avancemos … 151 3.3 17.4 52.2 0.39 Government of Costa 
Rica, World Bank
(2009)
Dominican Republic Solidaridad 758 2 098 21.2 46.3 89.0 0.51
 e Government of the 
Dominican Republic
(2010) (2010)  
Ecuador Human Development 
Voucher
1 179 h 6 100 d h 44.3 > 100.0 > 100.0 1.17 Government of Ecuador, 
IDB, World Bank
(2010) (2010)
El Salvador Solidarity in Rural 
Communities
106 508 d 8.2 17.1 38.7 0.02 World Bank, IDB, 
other bilateral and 
multilateral sources(2009) (2009)
Guatemala Mi Familia Progresa 592 3 254 d 22.6 39.7 70.5 0.32 Government of Guatemala
(2010) (2010)
Honduras Family Allowance 
Programme (PRAF)
132 i 661 d i 8.7 12.3 17.2 0.24 
j Government of Honduras, 
IDB, other bilateral and 
multilateral sources(2010) (2010)
Jamaica Programme of Advancement 
Through Health and 
Education (PATH)
… 307 11.3 > 100.0 k >100.0 k 0.40 Government of Jamaica, 
World Bank
(2009)
Mexico Oportunidades 5 561 27 247 d 24.6 62.8 > 100.0 0.51 Government of Mexico, 
IDB, World Bank
(2010) (2010)
Panama l Red de Oportunidades 77 377 d i 10.9 39.5 81.0 0.22 em World Bank, IDB
(2009) (2009)
Paraguay Tekoporã 99 n 554 n 8.6 13.9 25.2 0.36 
n IDB
(2010) (2010)
Peru Juntos 410 2 253 d 7.6 21.2 60.6 0.14 Government of Peru
(2009) (2009)
Trinidad and Tobago Targeted Conditional 
Cash Transfer 
Programme (TCCTP)
… 33 2.4 14.6
  k >100.0 k 0.19 Government of Trinidad 
and Tobago
(2009)
Uruguay Family Allowances 91 d 390 11.6 84.6 >100.0 0.45 Government of Uruguay
(2009) (2009)
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 25 263 o 113 449 o 19.3 p 47.5 q > 100.0 q 0.40 p
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures; and ECLAC, Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
2008-2009 (LC/G.2410-P), Santiago, Chile, 2009. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.09.II.62.
a Programme inclusion and exclusion errors are not taken into account.
b Unless otherwise indicated, data correspond to the budget for each programme.
c GDP figures are projections.
d Coverage estimated on the basis of the number of beneficiary families and average size of urban households in the poorest Quintilee in the most recent year for which information 
is available from the CEPALSTAT social indicators and statistics database (BADEINSO) of ECLAC.
e Budget as executed.
f Puente programme beneficiaries.
g Includes indigenous and displaced beneficiary families.
h Includes beneficiaries who are older persons or persons with disabilities.
i Planned coverage.
j Includes Family Allowance Programme (PRAF)/IDB phase III pilot stage.
k Figure calculated on the basis of national poverty estimates which are incompatible with ECLAC estimates on the countries of Latin America.
l Includes Family Vouchers for Food Purchases programme.
m 2008 data.
n Includes Ñopytyvo and ProCountry II programmes.
o Total relates to all countries for which information is available.
p Weighted average.
q Simple average.
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C. Social investment at early ages: spending  
 per student
The social sectors which saw the greatest increases in public-sector resources were social 
security and assistance, followed by education. Some social assistance spending goes into the 
effort to combat the intergenerational reproduction of poverty, and to that extent is directed at 
the new generations. Undoubtedly, however, it is education spending that is chiefly directed 
at children and the young, and copious resources are dedicated to this. Spending per student 
has increased significantly, although this is largely due to the substantial economic growth of 
the past two decades. The States have also made a significant effort to increase the weight of 
this spending within their budgets. But population ageing and the decline in the school-age 
population ratio can be a factor in lowering per-student spending, and the expansion of education 
coverage itself has constrained further increases in this area. Still, this expansion has also helped 
to make education spending more progressive, since more of it goes to lower-income students, 
at least at the preschool, primary and lower secondary levels.
Much of the social spending growth discussed earlier 
herein has been maintained at times of economic 
upheaval precisely because spending items associated 
with social protection have been increased, especially 
social security and assistance. The strengthening of 
social protection systems, combining contributory and 
non-contributory mechanisms, has unquestionably been 
a major advance for social policy and its impact on the 
well-being of the poorest.
A great deal certainly remains to be done both in 
expanding coverage and in improving benefits. Conditional 
cash transfer programmes enshrine a determination to 
combat the intergenerational reproduction of poverty 
(see chapter II); most of these programmes take a life 
cycle approach in which income transfers to cover 
basic needs in the poorest families are combined with 
investment in developing the skills of the new generations 
in these families so that they have greater opportunities 
in their adult lives. It is important to highlight these in 
the present edition of Social Panorama, whose focus 
is precisely on the life cycle and the reproduction (or 
reversal) of intergenerational inequalities.
These programmes, and the solidarity components 
of social security and health systems, complement broad 
social policy goals and are thus but a part of overall public 
spending in this area. By way of example, while public social 
spending in the region is around 18% of GDP, spending on 
anti-poverty programmes is only 0.4% of GDP.
The very design of social protection systems in 
the region, specifically the weight of their contributory 
component and thus their dependence on the operation of 
labour markets, means that the future role of the younger 
generations in funding and sustaining these systems 
in the long run is critical. As ECLAC has stressed on 
numerous occasions, the region currently has the potential 
to benefit from a demographic dividend (a growing ratio 
of working-age people to dependents), but this is clearly 
time-limited and the opportunity needs to be seized now 
(ECLAC/OIJ, 2008; ECLAC, 2009).
Taking advantage of this demographic dividend means 
first and foremost investing in the new generations. Their 
lesser relative weight in the total population has opened a 
window of opportunity, but these new generations will have 
to be highly productive in their adult lives, when society will 
have to sustain a larger demographic burden as the elderly 
population swells. Investing in skills development for the 
young thus becomes doubly important  —to keep pace with 
the demographic transition and to halt the intergenerational 
reproduction of poverty, inequality and low productivity. It 
is also important to have a more productive economically 
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active population as a driver of economic growth bringing 
knowledge and innovation into the productive system. 
Combined with policies fostering social and labour rights, 
this will also boost social protection systems.
The prime areas for investment in the new generations 
are health (especially mother and child health) and 
education. Budgets for both sectors have increased 
substantially over the past two decades, although they have 
been very much subject to economic fluctuations. It is 
public spending in these areas that has suffered most from 
the economic instability (whether internally or externally 
generated) of many of the region’s countries.
There can be no doubt, in any case, that the countries 
have made enormous efforts to increase their social 
investment in education and health, partly with the support 
of international initiatives and commitments, particularly 
where education is concerned (see the first section of 
chapter II). Not enough information is available to conduct 
a specific region-wide analysis of health spending on 
infants, children and adolescents, so the following pages 
will examine trends in public-sector education spending 
(particularly at the primary and secondary levels) and 
the factors that have most influenced the growth of this 
spending. They will also review the distributive impact 
of public education spending at the preschool, primary, 
secondary and tertiary levels and assess how progressive 
this is, especially in the case of educational levels where 
universal access has been achieved.
1. Public-sector education spending
Education spending is highly procyclical, growing strongly 
in periods of vigorous economic growth but also contracting 
sharply during economic slowdowns or downturns, 
sometimes by even more than would be expected on the 
basis of GDP performance (see figure III.10).
Figure III.10 
LATIN AMERICA (19 COUNTRIES): RATES OF ANNUAL VARIATION 
IN GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND PUBLIC-SECTOR 

















































Gross domestic product Public education spending
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures and information from the Commission’s social 
expenditure database.
a The 2009 education spending figures are estimates based on official information for 
six countries.
Despite this procyclicality, the countries’ efforts have 
resulted in their education budgets increasing relative to 
GDP. To a large degree, economic growth has facilitated the 
extension of education services in this decade. Thus, education 
spending in the countries for which adequate information is 
available increased on average from 3.1% of GDP in 1990 to 
3.6% in 2000 and 4.2% in 2008.4 The region’s GDP almost 
doubled between 1990 and 2008 (growing by 3.4% a year 
and 84% over the whole period), and public-sector education 
spending in the region expanded 5% a year in absolute 
terms, or 140% over the whole period. In per capita terms, 
the average increase was from US$ 86 per person in 1990 
to US$ 119 in 2000 and US$ 171 in 2008.
The above figures mask vastly dissimilar levels of per 
capita spending and rates of increase. Countries such as the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia spent less than US$ 100 per inhabitant on 
education in 2008, while Argentina, Costa Rica, Mexico 
and Uruguay spent over US$ 250. Ecuador, Nicaragua and 
Panama are the countries that increased their per capita 
spending by the least (in Ecuador it actually fell slightly), 
while Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia at least trebled it (see table III.2).
4 These figures might not match those presented in the first section 
of the chapter because the information used in the present section 
comes from the administrative classification of spending (by origin) 
rather than the functional classification (by destination).
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Table III.2 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): INDICATORS OF PUBLIC-SECTOR EDUCATION SPENDING, 1990 AND 2008 a
(Percentages and dollars)
Education spending 




 Primary or secondary 
school-age population
Spending on primary 
and secondary 
schooling per  
school-age person b
1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008
Argentina 3.4 4.9 190 489 23.7 20.6 616 1 773
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2.7 6.7 23 76 29.2 27.8 70 166
Brazil 4.6 5.3 154 232 24.6 19.3 349 911
Chile 2.7 3.6 83 224 22.3 19.8 258 837
Colombia 2.8 5.1 59 147 25.3 21.4 139 531
Costa Rica 4.5 5.2 140 268 23.8 20.2 331 974
Dominican Republic 2.0 2.5 37 91 28.7 25.1 80 279
Ecuador 2.6 2.1 34 36 c 29.3 24.7 72 120
El Salvador 2.0 3.6 33 82 31.4 25.2 70 196
Guatemala 1.4 3.2 20 61 28.8 27.8 43 160
Honduras 3.7 7.0 39 101 c 30.7 29.0 84 288
Mexico 4.0 5.8 197 378 27.8 21.6 398 1185
Nicaragua 4.4 3.2 30 29 c 30.8 26.3 37 49
Panama 5.4 4.1 159 229 26.9 22.8 356 463
Paraguay 1.1 4.1 15 62 29.0 26.8 35 173
Peru 1.5 2.7 25 81 26.5 22.2 48 269
Uruguay 3.1 3.1 169 272 c 20.8 18.9 551 998
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 3.1 3.8 150 227 25.7 21.7 144 515
Simple average 3.1 4.2 86.5 171.4 27.0 23.4 205 549
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS) and ECLAC/Organization of 
Ibero-American States for Education, Science and Culture (OIS), “Metas Educativas 2021: estudio de costos”, Project documents, No. 327 (LC/W.327), Santiago, Chile 
[online] http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/0/40520/metas-educativas-2021.pdf, 2010.
a The figures follow the administrative classification of public spending and might not match those based on the functional classification.
b Primary and secondary school-age population as per the 1997 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).
c Estimates based on data from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS). 
Despite the efforts made in the region, public-sector 
resources remain inadequate. Although the average 
commitment of public resources by the developed countries 
has been taken as the benchmark and it has been suggested 
that the region’s countries need to set out to achieve the 
same percentage expenditure (public education spending in 
27 countries of the European Union averaged 5.04% of GDP 
in 2006),5 a number of countries in Latin America and the
5 See [online] http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=ta
ble&init=1&language=en&pcode=tsdsc510&plugin=1.
 Caribbean actually spend a higher proportion, as figure III.11 
shows, but the absolute amounts still fall short of needs.
Notwithstanding the above, many countries still have 
some room to expand public-sector education spending. In 
a context of relatively sustained future growth, this could 
involve substantial resources that could be used to achieve 
universal primary and secondary education and to enhance 
other areas such as school retention and learning quality.
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Figure III.11 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS) and ECLAC/Organization of 
Ibero-American States for Education, Science and Culture (OIS), “Metas Educativas 2021: estudio de costos”, Documentos de proyecto, No. 327 (LC/W.327), Santiago, 
Chile [online] http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/0/40520/metas-educativas-2021.pdf, 2010.
a The figures follow the administrative classification of public spending and might not match those based on the functional classification.
2. Primary and secondary education spending
A better way of analysing the evolution of spending is 
to focus on the target population. Education is a lifelong 
process; the public resources used to provide it should 
therefore benefit all members of society to a greater or lesser 
degree. However, the formal education system (preschool, 
primary, secondary and tertiary) is generally aimed at more 
specific populations: children and young people. Neither 
preschool nor tertiary education is compulsory in most 
of the countries, and there are no age limits for tertiary 
education, so our focus at this stage is on spending on 
primary and secondary education.6
The effect of population ageing is germane to any 
analysis of education spending on the target population 
of young people that is the focus of this edition of Social 
Panorama. In Latin America, this effect is mainly in 
the form of the demographic dividend. As can be seen 
in figure III.12, the decline between 1990 and 2010 in 
the demographic weight of the age groups typically in 
school (5 to 19), combined with a steady increase in the 
working-age group, has been an important development. 
The growth of the older adult population is a trend that 
will accelerate in the coming years.
6 The full secondary cycle is not compulsory in all the region’s 
countries; the basic education cycle, encompassing primary school 
and the lower cycle of secondary school, is compulsory, however, 
and typically represents nine years of schooling (see table III.3).
Figure III.12 




























































Population aged 5 to 19 Population aged 15 to 59
Population aged 60 and over
Source: Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) - Population 
Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections.
Table III.3 provides a more precise account of the 
primary and secondary school age population, following 
the educational cycle duration criteria of the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) 1997 International Standard Classification 
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of Education (ISCED).7 On average, this population 
declined from 27% of the total in 1990 to 23.4% in 2008. 
The countries are naturally at different stages of the 
demographic transition, and this affects the rate of decrease. 
In Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico and Nicaragua 
the decline in the primary and secondary school-age 
population ratio has been in excess of 4.5 percentage points 
(which does not mean an absolute decline in the number 
of people). In Guatemala, Honduras, the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia and Uruguay the relative decline has 
been very small. While the first three of these countries 
are at a moderate stage of the demographic transition, 
the last is at the very advanced stage (Chackiel, 2004).
Because the school-age population represents only 
about a quarter of the total and has been declining, average 
public spending on primary and secondary education has 
increased significantly in relation to the potential target 
population, from US$ 215 per school-age person in 1990 
to US$ 352 in 2000 and US$ 549 in 2008. Thus, the 
demographic transition has helped boost education spending, 
since for every US$ 1 per potential student budgeted in 
1990, US$ 2.7 were budgeted in 2008. These demographic 
conditions have enabled the region to accelerate the skills 
development in the younger generations.
However, to determine effective spending per student 
(i.e., in relation to the proportion of the primary or secondary 
school age population benefiting from public investment in 
these levels of education), two other key factors must come 
into the picture: the actual percentage of students enrolled and 
the percentage attending publicly-funded establishments.
Regarding the percentage of students enrolled, 
much of the progress with education in the region has 
consisted precisely in increasing the coverage of and 
access to education systems. On average, the level 
of access among the region’s primary and secondary 
school-age population is almost 90%, with substantial 
growth seen mainly between 1990 and 2000 (from 71% 
to 85%). Much educational investment has been designed 
to increase educational coverage at the secondary level 
(primary education was already virtually universal by 
the beginning of the 1990s). Spending growth has made 
it possible to integrate a larger proportion of children 
and young people, particularly those from low-income 
families. In half the 18 countries analysed, over 90% 
7 Children and young people aged approximately 6 to 17. This varies 
from country to country according to the official starting age of the 
primary cycle and the duration of this and the secondary level.
of children and young people of compulsory school 
attendance age actually do attend. Only in the Dominican 
Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay 
are actual access levels below 85%. In 1990, access levels 
were below this in virtually all the countries, while in 
13 countries over 20% of the school-age population 
was outside the education system (see table III.4). 
Nonetheless, this very increase in coverage also kept 
spending per student from rising more.
Regarding the percentage of students attending publicly-
funded establishments, some of the large expansion of 
education system access is due in part to gradually increasing 
private investment in education services, including services 
provided through church- and community-associated 
foundations and organizations. This has shifted a large 
proportion of students to privately-funded establishments, 
freeing up capacity in the public sector (and helping to 
raise public spending per student), but it also set into 
motion the processes of school segregation and gradual 
differentiation in the quality of education services.
Almost 84% of students were attending publicly 
financed institutions in 1990, a percentage that had 
dropped to just under 81% by 2008. Although this is a 
fairly widespread trend in the region’s countries, there 
are large differences in the extent to which education 
services have been privatized. In Brazil, Colombia, El 
Salvador, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay, 
the percentage of students in public education systems 
increased, although the number of students attending 
private institutions (either for-profit or non-profit) also 
rose in all but Uruguay, by 2.5 million. In Chile, Ecuador, 
Honduras and Peru, meanwhile, the percentage of private 
students rose substantially (by seven percentage points 
or more), although the absolute number of public-sector 
students did not fall in any of these countries. Only in 
Chile do more than 50% of students attend private-sector 
educational establishments (including publicly-subsidized 
private establishments); the percentage in the other 
countries is 30% or less.
The number of primary and secondary school students 
attending public establishments in the region increased by almost 
29 million between 1990 and 2008 to a total of 91.2 million 
(with 18.5 million attending private schools).8
8 The students analysed here are those of primary or secondary 
education age who are actually in those levels of education. The 
figures do not include secondary school students who are behind 
their year (generally aged 18 or over).
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Table III.3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (41 COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES): COMPULSORY EDUCATION AND  
OFFICIAL DURATION OF THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CYCLES, 2007-2008 a
(By age groups and number of years)
Country or territory
Compulsory education  b Primary education Secondary education Compulsory 
years and total 
















Anguila 5-17 13 13 5-11 7 12-16 5 12/12
Antigua and Barbuda 5-16 12 12 5-11 7 12-16 5 12/12
Netherlands Antilles 6-15 10 10 6-11 6 12-17 6 10/12
Argentina 5-15 11 10 6-11 6 12-17 6 10/12
Aruba 6-16 11 11 6-11 6 12-16 5 11/11
Bahamas 5-16 12 12 5-10 6 11-16 6 12/12
Barbados 5-16 12 12 5-10 6 11-15 5 11/11
Belize 5-14 10 10 5-10 6 11-16 6 10/12
Bermuda 5-16 12 12 5-10 6 11-17 7 12/13
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 6-13 8 8 6-11 6 12-17 6 8/12
Brazil 7-14 8 8 7-10 4 11-17 7 8/11
Chile 6-17 12 12 6-11 6 12-17 6 12/12
Colombia 5-15 11 10 6-10 5 11-16 6 10/11
Costa Rica 6-15 10 10 6-11 6 12-16 5 10/11
Cuba 6-14 9 9 6-11 6 12-17 6 9/12
Dominica 5-16 12 12 5-11 7 12-16 5 12/12
Dominican Republic 5-14 10 9 6-11 6 12-17 6 9/12
Ecuador 5-14 10 9 6-11 6 12-17 6 9/12
El Salvador 7-15 9 9 7-12 6 13-18 6 9/12
Grenada 5-16 12 12 5-11 7 12-16 5 12/12
Guatemala 6-15 10 9 7-12 6 13-17 5 9/11
Guyana 6-15 10 10 6-11 6 12-16 5 10/11
Haiti 6-11 6 6 6-11 6 12-18 7 6/13
Honduras 6-13 8 8 6-11 6 12-16 5 8/11
Cayman Islands 5-16 12 12 5-10 6 11-16 6 12/12
Turks and Caicos Islands 4-16 13 11 6-11 6 12-16 5 11/11
British Virgin Islands 5-16 12 12 5-11 7 12-16 5 12/12
Jamaica 6-12 7 7 6-11 6 12-16 5 7/11
Mexico 6-15 10 10 6-11 6 12-17 6 10/12
Montserrat 5-16 12 12 5-11 7 12-16 5 12/12
Nicaragua 6-11 6 6 6-11 6 12-16 5 6/11
Panama 6-14 9 9 6-11 6 12-17 6 9/12
Paraguay 6-14 9 9 6-11 6 12-17 6 9/12
Peru 6-18 13 13 6-11 6 12-16 5 11/11
Saint Kitts and Nevis 5-16 12 12 5-11 7 12-16 5 12/12
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 5-15 11 11 5-11 7 12-16 5 11/12
Saint Lucia 5-15 11 11 5-11 7 12-16 5 11/12
Suriname 7-12 6 7 6-11 6 12-18 7 7/13
Trinidad and Tobago 6-12 7 8 5-11 7 12-16 5 8/12
Uruguay 6-15 10 10 6-11 6 12-17 6 10/12
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 5-14 10 9 6-11 6 12-16 5 9/11
Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2010: Reaching the Marginalized, Paris, 2010.
a Cycle durations as per the 1997 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).
b Ages at which school attendance or the right to an education can be enforced until completion of the educational cycle. The last column shows how many grades of the primary 
and secondary education cycles are compulsory within the age range shown in the first column.
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Table III.4 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): INDICATORS OF EDUCATION COVERAGE AND PUBLIC EDUCATION SPENDING, 1990 AND 2008
(Percentages and dollars at constant 2000 prices)
Total percentage studying Percentage in public-sector establishments
Public-sector students as 
percentage of school-age 
population
Public spending per student 
(primary and secondary) a
1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008
Argentina 84.6 b 97.2 78.9 b 74.9 66.7 b 72.8 893 2 348
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 64.1 89.9 89.1 b 89.9 57.1 b 80.8 119 193
Brazil 50.7 98.7 85.1 b 87.6 43.1 b 86.5 750 937
Chile 78.1 94.9 60.0 45.3 46.9 43.0 517 1890
Colombia 76.4 93.3 78.0 78.4 59.6 73.1 196 645
Costa Rica 74.0 94.2 b 94.0 91.2 69.6 85.9 450 1 072
Dominican Republic 61.8 81.9 78.8 b 78.8 48.7 b 64.5 151 409
Ecuador 82.7 b 90.5 85.6 b 70.5 70.8 b 63.8 92 171
El Salvador 48.9 86.1 78.3 87.1 38.3 75.0 176 249
Guatemala 53.3 b 82.6 77.0 b 75.9 41.0 b 62.7 99 241
Honduras 69.1 79.8 b 93.6 86.6 64.7 69.1 117 345
Mexico 83.0 95.3 92.5 89.3 76.8 85.1 478 1 275
Nicaragua 70.0 b 84.2 86.1 82.7 60.3 69.6 58 62
Panama 79.0 89.1 90.4 87.5 71.4 78.0 462 573
Paraguay 69.9 82.4 83.8 81.5 58.6 67.2 57 244
Peru 86.5 93.5 86.5 78.9 74.8 73.8 57 339
Uruguay 81.2 b 90.7 83.7 86.4 68.0 78.4 695 1 099
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 63.4 88.0 84.1 80.0 53.3 70.4 247 694
Simple average 70.9 89.6 83.6 80.7 59.4 72.2 311.9 710.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS) and ECLAC/Organization of 
Ibero-American States for Education, Science and Culture (OIS), “Metas Educativas 2021: estudio de costos”, Project documents, No. 327 (LC/W.327), Santiago, Chile 
[online] http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/0/40520/metas-educativas-2021.pdf, 2010.
a In 2000 dollars.
b Estimates based on data from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute of Statistics (UIS).
3. The rise in per-student spending and associated factors
The factors noted above (economic growth, fiscal measures, 
population growth and ageing and the rise in education 
coverage, among others) caused public spending per 
primary and secondary school student to rise unevenly. 
On the one hand, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico 
increased their public spending per student by US$ 600 
or more over the whole period, and all the countries of 
Latin America, including Uruguay, topped US$ 1,000 
per student. 
In Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama and 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia, on the other hand, 
the increase over practically two decades was less than 
US$ 150 per student. According to the information 
available, Nicaragua saw no significant increase in 
spending per student between 1990 and 2008. Within the 
group of countries where there has been little increase in 
funding, Panama spends over US$ 500 per student and 
El Salvador and Guatemala about US$ 250 (see figure 
III.13). On average, spending on students attending 
public establishments more than doubled in the region, 
rising by 4.7% a year.
Figure III.13 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PUBLIC SPENDING PER 
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL STUDENT, 1990 AND 2008 a
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of data from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS) and ECLAC/
Organization of Ibero-American States for Education, Science and Culture 
(OIS), “Metas Educativas 2021: estudio de costos”, Project documents, No. 327 
(LC/W.327), Santiago, Chile [online] http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/
xml/0/40520/metas-educativas-2021.pdf, 2010.
a Ranked in order of spending per student in 2008.
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An examination of the timing of the rise in public 
spending per student (1990-2000 and 2000-2008) shows 
that the majority of the countries increased their spending 
the most between 2000 and 2008, even though this was 
the shorter time period. The exceptions are Chile, Mexico, 
Panama and Paraguay, which recorded greater progress 
in the 1990s (see figure III.14). This is mainly because 
most of the countries increased coverage more in the 
earlier period. On average, coverage increased by about 
14 percentage points between 1990 and 2000, compared 
with a further 5 percentage points between 2000 and 2008 
(see table III.4). This meant that much of the extra public 
education spending went to incorporating new students, 
which limited the growth of average spending per student. 
Since the progress of the 1990s (and earlier decades), extra 
spending has largely gone into improving the conditions 
that directly or indirectly affect the education process: 
better infrastructure, equipment, teaching material and 
teacher pay, among other things.
Figure III.14 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): TIMING OF THE RISE IN PUBLIC 
SPENDING PER STUDENT, 1990-2000 AND 2000-2008 a


























































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of data from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS) and ECLAC/
Organization of Ibero-American States for Education, Science and Culture 
(OIS), “Metas Educativas 2021: estudio de costos”, Project documents, No. 327 
(LC/W.327), Santiago, Chile [online] http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/
xml/0/40520/metas-educativas-2021.pdf, 2010.
a Ranked by total change between 1990 and 2008.
The rise in public education spending per student 
can also be examined in terms of the positive or negative 
impact of different factors. The factors considered in the 
present analysis are:
Economic and budgetary factors: economic growth, • 
the macroeconomic priority given to public spending, 
the fiscal priority given to public spending on 
primary and secondary education, and the ratio 
between daily spending per student and the total 
number of students (additional expenditure of public 
resources because of school repetition).9
Demographic and educational factors: population • 
growth, population ageing (school-age population 
ratio), greater access to education and the extent to 
which education services have been privatized.
The interaction between the two groups of factors.• 
In the first place, while economic growth and budgets 
have been the main drivers of the rise in public spending per 
student, demographic factors and the expansion of public 
education systems have tended to restrain this spending, as 
noted earlier, largely because increasing numbers of people 
have gained access to education services. Thus, the average 
increase in the region has been the result of an absolute 
expansion of public education spending (largely thanks to 
economic growth, as will be seen later) that would have taken 
the level up to just under US$ 850 per student (compared 
with the actual level of US$ 710 at present) and a population 
and public education coverage effect that has reduced 
spending per student by just under US$ 170. Nonetheless, 
the greater weight of economic and budgetary factors, and 
the favourable interaction between the two groups of factors, 
allowed spending to increase by some US$ 400 per student 
between 1990 and 2008 (see figure III.15).
Figure III.15 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): GROUPS OF FACTORS 
ASSOCIATED WITH CHANGES IN PUBLIC SPENDING  
PER STUDENT 
(Dollars at constant 2000 prices)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of data from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS) and ECLAC/
Organization of Ibero-American States for Education, Science and Culture 
(OIS), “Metas Educativas 2021: estudio de costos”, Project documents, No. 327 
(LC/W.327), Santiago, Chile [online] http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/
xml/0/40520/metas-educativas-2021.pdf, 2010.
9 The differences in these spending levels only relate to secondary 
school students who are not in the age group that is supposed to 
be attending that level. This effect was recorded only for spending 
differences and not for the number of people covered, to avoid 
double counting of the effect produced by repeaters.
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In all the countries analysed, economic and budgetary 
factors made the greatest contribution to the change in 
spending per student. This is particularly striking in 
Argentina, Chile, Mexico and, to a lesser extent, Costa 
Rica, Paraguay and Uruguay. In Brazil, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama and the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, these factors barely sufficed to 
counteract the negative contribution of population and 
coverage factors. With the exception of Nicaragua, 
where progress was slightly less, all countries increased 
educational coverage by 20 percentage points or more 
(see table III.4).
Again, it is interesting to note that Chile, Ecuador 
and Peru were the countries where the number of 
public-sector students increased the least (by 3.6%, 2.1% 
and 7.1%, respectively). All three made great progress 
with educational coverage, but this went with a large 
expansion of the private-sector presence in the education 
sector. This was largely responsible for the limited effect 
of demographic factors on the increase in spending per 
student in these countries.
There can be no doubt that budget-related economic 
factors did the most to drive up spending per student and 
that the demographic dynamic and the rise in education 
coverage in general constrained this expansion.
Economic growth has been one of the economic 
and budgetary factors contributing most to the rise in 
spending per student. This has been particularly true of 
Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
Honduras, Panama, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
and Uruguay, as figure III.16 shows. In some countries, 
much of the increase in spending per student has been 
due to rising public budgets, bringing an inertial increase 
in education budgets (Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia and Uruguay). But in others the specific effort 
made to increase education budgets was also important 
(the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay 
and Peru). Broadly speaking, the second most important 
factor (after economic growth) in the rise in spending per 
student was the greater fiscal priority given to education 
spending. Lastly, a relatively small proportion of resources 
need to be spent on retaining secondary school students 
and helping those who fall behind to complete the cycle, 
whether by repeating grades or by leaving the system 
and returning to it later.
In general, increasing educational coverage incorporates 
students from lower-income groups. Because it is harder 
for them to keep up, this tends to push per-student spending 
up at the expense of expansion in countries that have made 
greater efforts with education. Between 1990 and 2008 
some countries succeeded in reducing the proportion of 
students lagging behind, even in a context of expanding 
education coverage. This led to an average increase of 
about US$ 11 a year per student. Argentina, Brazil, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua and the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia increased the proportion of additional 
spending for over-age students at the secondary level, the 
result being a loss of about US$ 10 per student. Brazil 
is the country where the rise in the number of secondary 
school students who lag behind their age group has had 
the greatest impact, entailing additional spending of some 
US$ 1 billion a year.
Figure III.16 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY 
FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH CHANGES IN SPENDING  
PER STUDENT a






















































































































Macroeconomic priority of public spending Fiscal priority of education 
spending a
Additional spending on repeaters
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of data from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS) and ECLAC/
Organization of Ibero-American States for Education, Science and Culture 
(OIS), “Metas Educativas 2021: estudio de costos”, Project documents, No. 327 
(LC/W.327), Santiago, Chile [online] http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/
xml/0/40520/metas-educativas-2021.pdf, 2010.
a Ranked by the contribution of economic growth to the rise in spending 
per student.
Taken together, demographic factors affecting 
education coverage and the roles of public and private 
agents in providing education have restrained the rise 
in spending per student, even though not all the factors 
considered have pushed in the same direction or had the 
same weight. First, natural population growth, which is 
still strong in most of the region’s countries, has played 
Social Panorama of Latin America • 2010 151
the largest part in limiting the increase in resources per 
student. To put it another way, the considerable rise in 
education spending over the past two decades has been 
mainly extensive in character (rise in the number of 
students) and has been a major complicating factor for 
public investment in education (increased resources per 
student). This is also reflected in the negative impact 
of rising public education coverage, as can be seen 
in figure III.17. Population growth has been the most 
important factor in all the countries except the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
and Uruguay. In Brazil, El Salvador and Uruguay, the 
rise in public education coverage has been the most 
important factor.
Lastly, two factors that have operated in favour of 
higher spending per student are population ageing (which 
has caused the school-age proportion of the population to 
shrink, particularly in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico) 
and the rise of private-sector involvement in the provision 
of education services (especially in Argentina and Chile). 
Table III.5 provides an overview of the different weight 
of all these factors.
Figure III.17 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): INCREASE IN SPENDING 
PER STUDENT AS DETERMINED BY DEMOGRAPHIC AND 
EDUCATIONAL FACTORS a



















































































































Privatization of education services
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of data from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS) and ECLAC/
Organization of Ibero-American States for Education, Science and Culture 
(OIS), “Metas Educativas 2021: estudio de costos”, Project documents, No. 327 
(LC/W.327), Santiago, Chile [online] http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/
xml/0/40520/metas-educativas-2021.pdf, 2010.
a Ranked by the contribution of population growth in holding down spending per 
student.
Table III.5 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): CONTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS  
TO THE RISE IN SPENDING PER STUDENT, 1990-2008
(Dollars at constant 2000 prices)
Contribution of economic and budgetary factors































Argentina 1 153 436 101 -5 -339 218 -235 82 45 1 454
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 104 75 9 -5 -69 8 -56 -2 9 74
Brazil 457 -117 509 -33 -230 203 -628 -25 52 188
Chile 988 -501 754 39 -313 142 -248 316 197 1 373
Colombia 228 63 264 23 -135 67 -89 -2 30 449
Costa Rica 643 17 280 1 -330 121 -194 23 63 622
Dominican Republic 258 -5 114 9 -93 37 -85 0 23 79
Ecuador 73 70 -71 0 -42 22 -12 25 13 72
El Salvador 146 347 -227 -2 -78 46 -133 -23 -5 258
Guatemala 112 135 26 0 -82 7 -84 2 27 142
Honduras 150 43 141 -22 -105 13 -35 18 25 227
Mexico 428 25 428 -6 -232 212 -126 32 37 797
Nicaragua 38 -9 -5 -20 10 -11 2 -2 4
Panama 566 127 -470 21 -183 85 -63 17 13 112
Paraguay 63 82 102 0 -66 12 -27 5 17 282
Peru 135 46 115 11 -57 33 -16 18 -2 187
Uruguay 485 335 -342 6 -67 87 -101 -29 29 404
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 241 57 330 17 -180 77 -170 24 53 447
Simple average of the countries 348 68 114 3 -145 78 -128 27 35 398
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS) and ECLAC/Organization of 
Ibero-American States for Education, Science and Culture (OIS), “Metas Educativas 2021: estudio de costos”, Project documents, No. 327 (LC/W.327), Santiago, Chile 
[online] http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/0/40520/metas-educativas-2021.pdf, 2010.
a Primary and secondary education spending.
b Cost for secondary students who are not in the right age group for their level.
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4. Resources needed to achieve universal primary and  
 secondary education
As was seen in previous pages, Latin America has experienced 
a remarkable expansion in public-sector education spending 
over the past decades. Much of this increase has gone to 
extending education coverage. However, some of the extra 
funding has also gone to improving the operating conditions 
of education systems, something that is expressed in the 
growth of spending per student. Both processes have been 
buoyed by substantial economic growth in this period, by 
measures to increase the public budget and the education 
budget, by the relative decline in the school-age population 
and, in some countries, by the greater involvement of the 
private sector in providing education services.
For all the progress made with education coverage, a 
large percentage of the region’s population has yet to be 
incorporated and kept in the formal education system: a total 
of almost seven million children and adolescents, chiefly 
from the lowest-income sectors of each country.
Given the major advances made, the extra investment 
required is not very onerous from a budgetary standpoint. 
However, the situation is somewhat more complicated in 
the region’s poorest countries, which are also the ones with 
the largest proportions of children and young people outside 
the education system. Assuming that the entire school-age 
population currently outside the education system is to be 
covered from public funds, effective universalization of 
educational access would entail redistributing public resources 
within the education system or expanding its budget.
Redistributing resources to cover the whole school-age 
population would mean cutting per-student spending by 
some US$ 66 a year on average. The largest proportional 
reductions in funding per student would be in the 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras and Paraguay, 
ranging between US$ 51 and US$ 88 a year per student 
 (see figure III.18.A).
Lastly, if the method chosen to universalize primary 
and secondary education is an increase in budgetary 
funding, the average budget increase would represent 
only 0.4% of 2008 GDP. This increase is affordable for 
most of the countries and would bring average public-
sector education spending up to about 4.6% of GDP 
for the 18 countries analysed. In view of international 
normative standards and the scope for budget increases, 
most of the countries ought to be in a position to carry 
out this expansion. The exceptions are Honduras and the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, where education spending 
is already well in excess of 6.5% of GDP (see figure 
III.18.B). In any event, with gradual budget increases 
over the coming years and, in some cases, with a little 
international assistance, it is possible for the region to 
achieve universal access to and completion of primary 
and secondary education. Noteworthy among other 
initiatives to increase national budgets in combination 
with international financial and technical assistance is 
“Educational Goals for 2021: the education we want for 
the bicentennial generation”, a project recently approved 
by the governments of the Ibero-American countries that 
sets financial targets and lays down goals for different 
areas of the education system.
Figure III.18 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF UNIVERSALIZING PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
A. Universalization with lower annual 
spending per student
(dollars at constant 2000 prices)
B. Universalization with no change in 
current spending per student
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS) and ECLAC/Organization of 
Ibero-American States for Education, Science and Culture (OIS), “Metas Educativas 2021: estudio de costos”, Project documents, No. 327 (LC/W.327), Santiago, Chile 
[online] http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/0/40520/metas-educativas-2021.pdf, 2010.
Social Panorama of Latin America • 2010 153
Box III.2 
ESTIMATING EXPENDITURE PER STUDENT
Expenditure per student is public-sector 
education spending divided by the 
number of students attending public 
establishments. Both spending and the 
number of students can be expressed, in 
turn, as a series of ratios whose impact on 
changes in spending and student numbers, 
and thus on spending per student, can 
then be identified. The following formula 
expresses this identity, budgetary priorities 
and the ratios between educational 
coverage and population:




































is total public spending as a percentage of GDP in year t, an indicator of the macroeconomic priority given to public 
spending overall;
represents (gross) public spending on primary and secondary education as a proportion of all public spending in 
year t, an indicator of the fiscal priority given to public-sector education spending (primary and secondary);
is public spending on primary and secondary education (not including grade repetition) as a proportion of (gross) 
public spending on primary and secondary education in year t, a proxy for internal efficiency (or lack of it) in the 
education system (school repetition);
Coverage and population indicators
is the school-age population as a share of the whole population in year t, an indicator of educational dependency 
(demographic dividend);
represents students as a share of the school-age population in year t, an indicator of educational access 
or coverage, and
represents public-sector students as a share of all students in year t, an indicator of the commercialization 
or otherwise of education services.
 Viewed over time, fluctuations in a 
country’s spending per student depend on 
changes in spending and in the number 
of students, and can be analysed by way 
of these. To estimate the influence of 
the economic factor (spending) and the 
demographic factor (students) on changes 
in expenditure per student, the methodology 
used to explain changes in poverty (Datt and 
Ravallion, 1992) was used. This consists in 
estimating expenditure per student by taking 
public spending in the final period and the 
number of students in the initial period; the 
difference between this estimate and the 
initial spending per student observed is 
interpreted as the (economic) expenditure 
effect. Similarly, an estimate of spending 
per student is calculated by considering 
public spending in the initial period and the 
number of students in the final period; in 
this case, the difference is interpreted as 
the (demographic) student effect.
This procedure can be expressed 
using the following formula:
where ExS is expenditure per student in 
the starting period (t) or final period (t+1), 
PSE is public spending on primary and 
secondary education in the initial and final 
periods (t, t+1) and PubStu is the number 
of primary and secondary school students 
in public establishments in the initial and 
final periods (t, t+1). This procedure has 
the drawback of generating a residual 
(R) which does not have an analytical 
interpretation for each factor, as it is the 
interaction between them.
Changes in public spending and the 
number of students can be cast in the 
form of an expression that shows different 
budgetary priorities and education coverage 
indicators. The effects are calculated in the 
present chapter using the full formula for 
spending per student, i.e., by conducting 
separate and joint analyses of the effects 
of budgetary priorities and coverage 
indicators on spending per student.
To deal with the residual, Kakwani 
(1997) developed a procedure that allows 
this to be removed from the two-factor 
analysis. It consists in averaging out the 
effects calculated with two base years, the 
initial base year and the final base year. 
This procedure does not completely do 
away with the residual when the analysis 
includes three or more effects, although it 
does reduce it significantly by comparison 
with analyses of factors of change involving 
just one base year. The calculations in the 
present chapter were carried out using 
this procedure.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Gaurav Datt and Martin Ravallion, “Growth and redistribution components 
of changes in poverty measures”, Journal of Development Economics, vol. 38, No. 2, 1992; Nanak Kakwani, “On measuring growth and inequality components of 
changes in poverty with application to Thailand”, Discussion Paper, University of New South Wales, 1997; and ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2009 
(LC/G.2423-P), Santiago, Chile, 2009. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.09.II.G.135.
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5. The distributive impact of public-sector education spending
This section will analyse the distribution of public-sector 
education spending used to finance public-sector schools 
not run by the private sector, although in some cases there 
might be some private financing from households. The 
procedure involves imputing expenditure per student at 
each level, expressed in monthly values, to those reporting 
they attend public-sector schools in household surveys. 
This is then expressed in per capita terms by household 
and compared with the per capita income distribution of 
the different income groups. The distribution of spending 
is analysed in accordance with the ranking by disposable 
per capita income before this transfer in kind.
In the first place, taking a simple average for 
15 countries in the region, public-sector education spending
is slightly progressive in absolute terms and far more 
progressive than per capita income distribution, as can 
be seen in figure III.19.A.
Furthermore, primary education spending is the 
most progressive in the region. This is largely because 
virtually universal coverage has been achieved at this 
level in the great majority of the countries, even though 
the private sector only serves an average of just over 17% 
of students. Next in progressiveness comes preschool 
education spending.10 This level is not compulsory in most 
of the countries, however, which means that coverage 
is fairly low, especially in low-income sectors, while 
high-income families generally use private services at 
this level.
10 Given the information available in household surveys, in most of 
the countries it was only possible to analyse the distribution of 
preschool spending for children aged 4 and 5.
Figure III.19 
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC EDUCATION SPENDING BY INCOME STRATA  
AND COMPARISON WITH PER CAPITA INCOME a
(Cumulative percentages)
























A. Public education spending B. Preschool and primary education spending
C. Secondary education spending (lower and upper) D. Tertiary education spending 
(vocational and university)






























































































































































Cumulative percentage of populationCumulative percentage of population
Cumulative percentage of populationCumulative percentage of population
Per capita income Post-secondary and tertiary education
Equidistribution
Per capita income Lower secondary education
Upper secondary education Equidistribution
Per capita income Preschool education
Primary education Equidistribution
Per capita income Public education spending
Equidistribution
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective 
countries and information from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS).
a Simple averages.
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Spending on secondary education is less progressive. 
At the lower secondary level, it remains progressive in 
absolute terms (see figure III.19.C) because attendance 
remains compulsory in all the countries and access 
levels are high. However, by the last years of secondary 
education, which is not compulsory in all the countries 
(see table III.3), access for the lowest-income strata falls 
off sharply and by more than in the other socio-economic 
groups (see figure III.20). This makes the distribution of 
public spending at this level less progressive. Moreover, 
the private-sector share of secondary education services 
is higher: an average of 25% of students, most of them 
from high-income strata, go to private schools.
Figure III.20 
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): ACCESS  
TO PUBLIC EDUCATION a 

































Total Quintile I 
(poorest)
Quintile II Quintile III Quintile IV Quintile V
(richest)
Preschool Primary Lower secondary Upper secondary Tertiary
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the respective countries and information from the UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics (UIS).
a Simple average of the countries, taking the percentage of people in households 
where some member is attending a public education establishment, and not the 
percentage of households, to obtain statistics comparable with those for per capita 
income distribution.
Lastly, for spending on post-secondary education 
(especially university education) to be progressive, 
coverage must obviously be expanded towards young 
people in lower socio-economic strata. In any case, it is 
less regressive than per capita income, albeit not in all 
countries. This spending is even more regressive than income 
distribution in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, 
and is almost as regressive in Nicaragua and Paraguay 
(see table III.6). Access to post-secondary education is 
very low in all these countries and is largely confined to 
the high-income strata.
The fact that spending on post-secondary 
education, and university education in particular, is 
highly regressive is often used as an argument for 
reducing public spending at this level and redirecting 
it to lower levels, where it can be targeted better on the 
lower-income strata. Given that what operate in education 
systems are really self-targeting mechanisms, however, 
it is precisely the existence of publicly funded higher 
education that gives lower-income sectors a chance of 
genuine social mobility. Consequently, public-sector efforts 
should be oriented towards enabling a larger and larger 
proportion of low-income students to continue their post-
secondary studies and making spending at this level more 
progressive. Witness the fact that spending is considerably 
less regressive in countries where higher education has 
greater coverage. The evidence speaks for itself. The more 
children and young people are incorporated at all education 
levels and universal progression to upper cycles is attained, 
the larger the egalitarian redistributive impact of spending 
on education. There are, then, no policies with a greater 
egalitarian impact than those that achieve universal coverage. 
The data reflected herein show that greater coverage at all 
education levels is associated with the most redistributive 
impact of spending on those levels.
Table III.6 
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): GINI CONCENTRATION RATIO FOR PER CAPITA PERSONAL INCOME  
DISTRIBUTION AND EDUCATION SPENDING BY LEVEL
Country Year Per capita  income















Argentina 2008 0.519 -0.298 -0.432 -0.304 -0.102 0.120 -0.228
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2007 0.572 -0.174 -0.222 -0.176 -0.026 0.308 -0.045
Brazil 2008 0.595 -0.360 -0.397 -0.290 -0.106 0.472 -0.265
Chile 2006 0.525 -0.201 -0.210 -0.191 -0.129 0.303 -0.150
Colombia 2008 0.574 -0.289 -0.327 -0.234 -0.128 0.335 -0.169
Costa Rica 2008 0.475 -0.245 -0.296 -0.199 -0.047 0.453 -0.115
Dominican Republic 2008 0.550 0.022 0.151 0.121 0.273 0.442 0.269
El Salvador 2008 0.493 -0.142 -0.240 -0.091 0.092 0.506 -0.127
Guatemala 2006 0.587 -0.246 -0.211 0.109 0.272 0.692 0.074
Honduras 2007 0.583 -0.124 -0.183 0.067 0.233 0.592 0.080
Mexico 2008 0.519 -0.232 -0.263 -0.163 0.018 0.333 -0.109
Nicaragua 2005 0.538 … -0.223 0.035 0.177 0.529 0.021
Paraguay 2008 0.531 -0.116 -0.295 -0.106 0.008 0.510 -0.115
Peru 2008 0.476 -0.249 -0.327 -0.214 -0.114 0.251 -0.205
Uruguay 2008 0.446 -0.460 -0.462 -0.346 -0.044 0.434 -0.215
Simple average of the countries 0.532 -0.222 -0.263 -0.132 0.025 0.419 -0.086
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective 
countries and information from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS).
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Appendix 
Table III.A-1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING  




1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009 a
Argentina 19.1 20.1 21.1 20.0 21.0 21.8 19.4 19.6 22.1 24.2
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) b … … 12.9 14.6 16.2 16.3 17.4 17.0 16.2 …
Brazil 16.6 16.1 19.5 19.4 21.6 21.2 22.1 22.4 24.1 26.2
Chile 12.0 12.4 12.2 12.8 14.3 15.1 14.8 13.2 12.2 15.3
Colombia c 5.9 7.0 10.2 13.6 12.2 11.1 11.1 11.9 12.4 13.5
Costa Rica 15.6 15.2 15.8 16.8 16.4 18.0 18.7 17.6 17.2 19.3
Cuba 27.6 32.8 28.5 23.1 22.4 23.7 26.5 31.0 34.5 40.8
Dominican Republic 3.8 5.4 5.7 5.4 5.6 6.8 6.5 6.8 8.0 …
Ecuador d 7.4 8.0 6.1 5.6 4.9 4.9 5.5 6.2 6.4 …
El Salvador e … 2.9 5.4 6.3 8.2 10.0 10.8 11.1 11.3 …
Guatemala 3.7 4.6 4.6 4.8 6.7 6.8 7.3 7.3 7.5 7.6
Honduras 6.3 6.3 5.5 5.5 6.2 8.4 9.5 9.9 10.0 11.4
Jamaica f 8.4 8.0 8.2 9.0 … 9.5 8.3 8.6 … …
Mexico 6.5 8.1 8.8 8.5 9.2 9.7 10.2 10.2 11.2 12.5
Nicaragua 6.6 6.5 7.2 6.5 7.6 8.1 9.3 10.8 11.4 12.3
Panama 7.5 9.3 8.3 8.8 9.7 9.5 8.3 8.0 9.2 9.8
Paraguay 3.2 6.6 7.8 8.7 9.1 8.0 8.9 7.7 11.3 8.9
Peru g 3.9 5.1 6.5 6.9 8.5 8.8 9.5 9.2 8.2 7.8
Trinidad and Tobago h 6.9 7.3 6.6 6.4 … 9.1 9.7 9.9 8.7 12.1
Uruguay 16.8 18.9 20.2 21.3 20.0 21.6 21.8 19.6 21.2 21.7
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 8.8 9.2 7.8 8.6 8.8 11.6 11.7 11.7 13.4 …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean i 9.5 10.6 11.0 11.1 11.7 12.4 12.7 12.8 13.6 14.4
Latin America and 
the Caribbean j 12.2 12.8 14.4 14.3 15.3 15.5 15.7 15.9 17.2 18.4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social expenditure database.
a The figures for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama are from 2009. 
b The 1994-1995 figures are from 1995 and the 2006-2007 figures from 2006.
c Preliminary figures. Figures from 2000 onward are from the Ministry of Finance and are not comparable with earlier ones. The data in the earlier series are from the National 
Planning Department (DNP) and the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE).
d The 2006-2007 figure is from 2006.
e The 1992-1993 figure is from 1993.
f The 1996-1997 figure is from 1996 and the 2004-2005 figure from 2004.
g The figures from 1990 to 1998 are budgetary central government data, while those from 1999 onward are general government data. The 1998-1999 figure is from 1999.
h The 1996-1997 figure is from 1996.
i Simple average of the countries. Includes estimates for countries without available information.
j Weighted average of the countries. Includes estimates for countries without available information.
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Table III.A-2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): PER CAPITA PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING 
(Dollars at constant 2000 prices)
Country
Period
1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009 a
Argentina 1 166 1 409 1 551 1 547 1 683 1 635 1 299 1 527 1 997 2 387
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) b … … 122 143 164 165 177 179 178 …
Brazil 554 537 697 713 784 785 827 883 1 009 1 165
Chile 381 458 501 595 686 747 758 734 732 945
Colombia c 129 160 249 338 295 264 270 309 355 401
Costa Rica 486 516 566 606 651 727 773 775 856 1006
Cuba 864 779 632 563 568 661 772 1028 1395 1793
Dominican Republic 69 109 121 127 146 188 188 201 276 …
Ecuador d 99 107 82 76 65 66 78 98 106 …
El Salvador e … 53 104 128 175 222 248 266 290 …
Guatemala 49 62 64 70 100 105 113 114 124 127
Honduras 67 71 61 63 70 97 114 127 139 162
Jamaica f 294 284 298 324 … 331 294 309 … …
Mexico 358 457 492 482 559 621 644 673 784 889
Nicaragua 45 42 47 45 57 63 73 90 100 110
Panama 229 317 287 315 377 371 328 345 457 559
Paraguay 45 95 115 128 129 107 116 105 162 135
Peru g 64 85 125 140 172 179 201 211 214 229
Trinidad and Tobago h 303 312 294 304 … 588 728 874 909 1 318
Uruguay 841 1 034 1 180 1 317 1 289 1 314 1 173 1 232 1 524 1 740
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 433 480 388 430 426 549 474 547 708 …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean i 315 357 380 403 435 466 459 506 601 697
Latin America and 
the Caribbean j 440 481 557 573 623 642 637 691 813 917
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social expenditure database.
a The figures for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama are from 2009. 
b The 1994-1995 figures are from 1995 and the 2006-2007 figures from 2006.
c Preliminary figures. Figures from 2000 onward are from the Ministry of Finance and are not comparable with earlier ones. The data in the earlier series are from the National 
Planning Department (DNP) and the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE).
d The 2006-2007 figure is from 2006.
e The 1992-1993 figure is from 1993.
f The 1996-1997 figure is from 1996 and the 2004-2005 figure from 2004.
g The figures from 1990 to 1998 are budgetary central government data while those from 1999 onward are general government data. The 1998-1999 figure is from 1999.
h The 1996-1997 figure is from 1996.
i Simple average of the countries. Includes estimates for countries without available information.
j Weighted average of the countries. Includes estimates for countries without available information.
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Table III.A-3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING  




1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009 b
Argentina 62.2 63.4 65.7 65.5 64.3 62.8 66.2 64.2 63.9 62.8
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) c … … 36.6 44.1 50.0 42.8 49.4 48.1 49.1 …
Brazil 48.9 47.2 58.6 51.0 55.8 62.1 70.4 73.2 73.4 73.6
Chile 61.2 63.0 64.5 65.5 66.4 68.4 68.1 67.3 66.3 67.0
Colombia d 28.8 32.2 36.5 … … … … 74.8 71.5 69.5
Costa Rica 38.9 41.2 38.2 42.0 40.7 40.5 37.8 36.1 36.0 35.6
Cuba 35.6 34.7 39.4 45.7 44.8 47.0 51.4 53.0 52.4 53.4
Dominican Republic 43.1 44.3 50.6 45.6 43.3 49.9 47.9 46.2 48.6 …
Ecuador e 42.8 48.5 33.7 27.6 21.7 20.9 25.2 28.5 27.9 …
El Salvador f … 22.2 23.2 28.1 32.5 38.6 39.5 45.8 45.7 …
Guatemala 29.9 33.3 41.3 42.7 45.1 47.3 50.4 53.8 51.8 54.1
Honduras 40.7 36.6 40.6 40.5 39.5 45.4 49.9 52.8 53.6 50.0
Jamaica g 26.8 23.2 20.6 19.2 … 17.1 17.3 16.3 … …
Mexico 41.3 50.2 53.1 52.3 59.4 61.3 57.8 58.6 59.3 68.7
Nicaragua 34.0 38.5 39.9 37.0 37.1 38.4 42.0 47.9 50.2 53.8
Panama 38.1 50.6 48.6 39.6 46.4 42.5 39.1 39.3 42.1 41.6
Paraguay 39.9 42.9 43.3 47.1 44.5 38.3 48.5 41.6 57.1 55.0
Peru h 33.0 35.0 39.4 39.6 0.0 52.2 52.3 52.3 53.1 51.2
Trinidad and Tobago i 40.6 40.6 42.8 40.7 … 43.5 44.6 37.9 29.4 34.4
Uruguay 62.3 67.7 70.8 70.8 67.3 68.1 61.4 61.8 67.5 75.4
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 32.8 40.1 35.3 35.4 36.6 37.8 38.6 41.0 44.0 …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean j 40.0 42.9 44.8 44.6 45.5 47.3 48.9 49.4 50.4 51.0
Latin America and 
the Caribbean k 44.1 46.5 51.8 50.7 54.6 57.3 60.2 61.8 62.3 63.9
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social expenditure database.
a Official public spending totals are taken from the functional classifications of public spending in the countries, but it is possible that they may differ from other officially reported 
figures based on classifications of other types.
b The figures for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama are from 2009. 
c The 1994-1995 figures are from 1995 and the 2006-2007 figures from 2006.
d Preliminary figures. Figures from 2000 onward are from the Ministry of Finance and are not comparable with earlier ones. The data in the earlier series are from the National 
Planning Department (DNP) and the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE). Discontinued series. The 1994-1995 figure is from 1994 and the 2004-2005 figure 
from 2005.
e The 2006-2007 figure is from 2006.
f The 1992-1993 figure is from 1993.
g The 1996-1997 figure is from 1996 and the 2004-2005 figure from 2004.
h The figures from 1990 to 1999 are budgetary central government data, while those from 2000 onward are general government data.
i The 1996-1997 figure is from 1996.
j Simple average of the countries. Includes estimates for countries without available information. 
k Weighted average of the countries. Includes estimates for countries without available information. 
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Table III.A-4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING ON EDUCATION  




1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009 a
Argentina 3.6 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.7 5.1 4.2 4.5 5.3 6.0
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) b … … 5.5 5.9 6.0 5.8 6.6 6.6 6.3 …
Brazil 3.4 2.8 5.1 4.3 5.5 5.0 4.7 4.6 5.0 5.7
Chile 2.3 2.4 2.6 3.0 3.6 3.9 4.0 3.6 3.3 4.3
Colombia c 2.4 2.9 3.0 4.2 4.1 3.3 3.8 3.2 3.0 3.1
Costa Rica 3.9 4.2 4.2 4.6 4.4 5.1 5.7 5.5 5.2 5.9
Cuba 10.8 11.9 9.0 7.3 7.7 9.1 11.1 13.3 14.6 18.4
Dominican Republic 0.9 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.2 2.5 2.6 1.8 2.3 …
Ecuador d 2.8 3.0 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.6 2.6 2.6 …
El Salvador e … 1.8 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.4 3.5 3.2 3.1 …
Guatemala 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.5 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.2
Honduras 3.6 3.6 3.1 3.3 3.8 5.2 6.0 6.6 6.7 7.5
Jamaica f 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.9 … 5.8 4.5 4.7 … …
Mexico 2.6 3.5 3.9 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.0 3.8 4.0 4.1
Nicaragua 2.6 2.2 2.8 2.9 3.4 3.7 4.4 4.7 5.1 5.5
Panama 3.6 3.7 3.5 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.1 3.8 4.0 3.9
Paraguay 1.3 2.9 3.6 4.2 4.4 4.3 4.0 3.9 4.5 4.1
Peru g 1.6 2.0 2.7 2.5 2.9 2.8 3.0 3.0 2.6 2.6
Trinidad and Tobago h 3.2 3.3 3.0 3.0 … 3.9 4.4 4.4 3.8 5.0
Uruguay 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.9 4.3
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 3.5 4.0 3.8 3.2 4.0 5.1 5.1 5.0 5.5 …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean i 3.2 3.5 3.6 3.7 4.0 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.7 5.1
Latin America and 
the Caribbean j 3.2 3.4 4.2 3.9 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.6 5.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social expenditure database.
a The figures for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama are from 2009. 
b The 1994-1995 figures are from 1995 and the 2006-2007 figures from 2006.
c Preliminary figures. The figures from 2000 onward are from the Ministry of Finance and are not comparable with earlier ones. The data in the earlier series are from the National 
Planning Department (DNP) and the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE).
d The 2006-2007 figure is from 2006.
e The 1992-1993 figure is from 1993.
f The 1996-1997 figure is from 1996 and the 2004-2005 figure from 2004.
g The figures from 1990 to 1998 are budgetary central government data, while those from 1999 onward are general government data. The 1998-1999 figure is from 1999.
h The 1996-1997 figure is from 1996.
i Simple average of the countries. Includes estimates for countries without available information.
j Weighted average of the countries. Includes estimates for countries without available information.
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Table III.A-5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING ON HEALTH  




1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009 a
Argentina 4.3 4.6 4.9 4.6 4.9 5.0 4.4 4.5 4.9 5.3
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) b … … 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.2 …
Brazil 3.3 2.4 4.1 3.8 3.8 4.1 4.0 4.3 4.6 5.0
Chile 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.9 3.0 2.8 2.9 3.7
Colombia c 0.9 1.1 2.6 2.9 3.3 2.2 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.9
Costa Rica 4.9 4.5 4.7 4.7 4.8 5.2 5.7 5.0 5.0 5.8
Cuba 5.0 6.6 5.6 4.9 5.4 5.6 5.7 6.5 8.5 10.5
Dominican Republic 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.4 …
Ecuador d 1.4 1.6 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.3 …
El Salvador e … 1.1 2.6 2.8 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.6 …
Guatemala 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3
Honduras 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.8 3.2 3.0 2.8 3.1
Jamaica f 2.2 2.4 2.2 2.3 … 2.2 2.2 2.4 … …
Mexico 3.0 3.4 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.8 2.8
Nicaragua 2.8 2.5 2.8 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.3 3.3 3.6 3.7
Panama 1.6 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.3 2.1 2.2
Paraguay 0.3 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.2 2.1 1.5
Peru g 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.2
Trinidad and Tobago h 2.6 2.8 2.2 2.0 … 2.1 2.3 2.6 2.3 3.4
Uruguay 2.9 3.0 3.4 2.5 3.2 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.8 4.5
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 1.6 1.7 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.8 …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean i 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.2
Latin America and 
the Caribbean j 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.3 3.6 3.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social expenditure database.
a The figures for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama are from 2009. 
b The 1994-1995 figures are from 1995 and the 2006-2007 figures from 2006.
c Preliminary figures. Figures from 2000 onward are from the Ministry of Finance and are not comparable with earlier ones. The data in the earlier series are from the National 
Planning Department (DNP) and the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE).
d The 2006-2007 figure is from 2006.
e The 1992-1993 figure is from 1993.
f The 1996-1997 figure is from 1996 and the 2004-2005 figure from 2004.
g The figures from 1990 to 1998 are budgetary central government data while those from 1999 onward are general government data. The 1998-1999 figure is from 1999.
h The 1996-1997 figure is from 1996.
i Simple average of the countries. Includes estimates for countries without available information.
j Weighted average of the countries. Includes estimates for countries without available information.
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Table III.A-6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (20 COUNTRIES): PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING ON SOCIAL SECURITY  




1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009 a
Argentina 9.6 9.9 10.3 9.8 9.9 10.3 9.7 9.2 10.1 11.1
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) b … … 1.5 2.8 3.9 5.6 5.8 5.1 4.7 …
Brazil 8.5 9.7 10.0 10.6 11.7 11.2 12.0 12.1 12.8 13.6
Chile 7.7 7.6 7.1 7.1 7.6 7.9 7.5 6.5 5.8 6.9
Colombia c 2.3 2.6 4.0 5.4 3.8 4.8 4.9 6.0 7.0 7.9
Costa Rica 4.9 4.7 5.2 5.8 5.7 6.1 5.5 5.3 5.2 5.5
Cuba 7.0 9.9 8.6 7.0 7.0 6.5 7.1 8.2 8.7 9.2
Dominican Republic 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 1.1 0.9 2.1 2.2 …
Ecuador d 3.2 3.4 2.2 2.0 1.5 1.7 1.7 2.2 2.3 …
El Salvador e … 0.0 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.1 2.2 2.5 2.3 …
Guatemala 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.2
Honduras 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.8
Jamaica f 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 … 0.4 0.4 0.4 … …
Mexico 0.1 0.1 1.3 1.5 1.9 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.4 3.7
Panama 1.2 2.2 1.5 1.0 1.9 1.6 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.6
Paraguay 1.2 2.3 2.4 2.7 3.1 2.1 3.3 2.5 4.3 2.9
Peru g 1.3 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.6 4.0 4.5 4.4 3.8 3.3
Trinidad and Tobago h 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 … 1.4 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.8
Uruguay 11.2 13.1 13.9 15.3 12.6 13.7 13.6 11.7 12.0 11.0
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 2.0 2.1 2.3 3.0 2.5 3.7 4.1 4.1 4.6 …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean i 3.2 3.7 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.6 4.7
Latin America and 
the Caribbean j 4.8 5.4 6.0 6.4 6.6 6.7 6.9 6.9 7.3 8.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social expenditure database.
a The figures for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama are from 2009. 
b The 1994-1995 figures are from 1995 and the 2006-2007 figures from 2006.
c Preliminary figures. Figures from 2000 onward are from the Ministry of Finance and are not comparable with earlier ones. The data in the earlier series are from the National 
Planning Department (DNP) and the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE).
d The 2006-2007 figure is from 2006.
e The 1992-1993 figure is from 1993.
f The 1996-1997 figure is from 1996 and the 2004-2005 figure from 2004.
g The figures from 1990 to 1998 are budgetary central government data, while those from 1999 onward are general government data. The 1998-1999 figure is from 1999.
h The 1996-1997 figure is from 1996.
i Simple average of the countries. Includes estimates for countries without available information. Nicaragua is not included.
j Weighted average of the countries. Includes estimates for countries without available information. Nicaragua is not included.
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Table III.A-7 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING ON HOUSING  




1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009 a
Argentina 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.1 1.5 1.9 1.9
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) b … … 2.6 2.6 2.9 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.0 …
Brazil 1.4 1.3 0.4 0.8 0.6 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.7 2.0
Chile 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
Colombia c 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5
Costa Rica 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.1
Cuba 4.8 4.4 5.3 4.0 2.3 2.6 2.6 3.0 2.8 2.8
Dominican Republic 1.8 2.8 2.9 2.1 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.1 …
Ecuador d 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 …
El Salvador e … 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.8 2.1 1.7 2.0 2.3 …
Guatemala 0.1 0.6 0.8 1.3 1.9 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.2 1.9
Honduras 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 … …
Jamaica f 1.5 1.2 1.6 1.4 … 1.1 1.2 1.1 … …
Mexico 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.8 2.1 1.9
Nicaragua 1.2 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.6 2.7 2.8 3.1
Panama 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.9 1.7 1.3 1.0 0.8 1.5 1.6
Paraguay 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4
Peru g 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.8
Trinidad and Tobago h 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 … 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.8
Uruguay 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.9
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 1.7 1.4 0.6 1.3 0.9 1.3 0.9 1.0 1.6 …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean i 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6
Latin America and 
the Caribbean j 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social expenditure database.
a The figures for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama are from 2009. 
b The 1994-1995 figures are from 1995 and the 2006-2007 figures from 2006.
c Preliminary figures. Figures from 2000 onward are from the Ministry of Finance and are not comparable with earlier ones. The data in the earlier series are from the National 
Planning Department (DNP) and the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE).
d The 2006-2007 figure is from 2006.
e The 1992-1993 figure is from 1993.
f The 1996-1997 figure is from 1996 and the 2004-2005 figure from 2004.
g The figures from 1990 to 1998 are budgetary central government data, while those from 1999 onward are general government data. The 1998-1999 figure is from 1999.
h The 1996-1997 figure is from 1996.
i Simple average of the countries. Includes estimates for countries without available information. 
j Weighted average of the countries. Includes estimates for countries without available information.
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Table III.A-8 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): PER CAPITA PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING ON EDUCATION
(Dollars at constant 2000 prices) 
Country
Period
1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009 a
Argentina 218 278 311 328 374 382 281 349 480 588
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) b … … 52 58 61 59 67 69 69 …
Brazil 114 93 181 157 200 183 175 180 208 252
Chile 73 90 105 139 175 195 206 198 195 268
Colombia c 51 66 72 106 100 78 94 83 85 93
Costa Rica 123 142 151 164 176 206 234 241 261 305
Cuba 338 283 200 178 196 253 324 442 589 808
Dominican Republic 17 26 33 41 57 70 74 52 79 …
Ecuador d 37 40 36 35 33 28 37 41 44 …
El Salvador e … 31 39 51 64 76 81 77 79 …
Guatemala 24 27 27 27 38 44 45 45 49 54
Honduras 39 41 34 37 43 61 72 84 94 107
Jamaica f 144 142 147 175 … 201 159 170 … …
Mexico 143 196 219 207 233 250 255 250 276 291
Nicaragua 17 14 19 20 26 30 35 39 45 49
Panama 109 128 122 145 160 164 162 165 199 222
Paraguay 18 41 53 62 63 57 53 53 64 63
Peru g 27 33 51 50 58 57 64 68 68 75
Trinidad and Tobago h 139 142 134 142 … 264 330 386 399 550
Uruguay 123 135 143 187 195 185 175 205 281 349
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 174 210 188 161 194 243 207 233 290 …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean i 95 105 111 118 134 147 149 163 191 227
Latin America and 
the Caribbean j 115 126 163 156 183 184 177 186 218 247
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social expenditure database.
a The figures for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama are from 2009. 
b The 1994-1995 figures are from 1995 and the 2006-2007 figures from 2006.
c Preliminary figures. The figures from 2000 onward are from the Ministry of Finance and are not comparable with earlier ones. The data in the earlier series are from the National 
Planning Department (DNP) and the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE).
d The 2006-2007 figure is from 2006.
e The 1992-1993 figure is from 1993.
f The 1996-1997 figure is from 1996 and the 2004-2005 figure from 2004.
g The figures from 1990 to 1998 are budgetary central government data, while those from 1999 onward are general government data. The 1998-1999 figure is from 1999.
h The 1996-1997 figure is from 1996.
i Simple average of the countries. Includes estimates for countries without available information. 
j Weighted average of the countries. Includes estimates for countries without available information. 
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Table III.A-9 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): PER CAPITA PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING ON HEALTH
(Dollars at constant 2000 prices) 
Country
Period
1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009 a
Argentina 261 320 362 356 392 378 294 349 439 520
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) b … … 31 33 34 30 32 34 35 …
Brazil 110 80 145 138 138 150 148 171 193 223
Chile 59 80 95 112 129 144 153 157 172 227
Colombia c 19 24 63 72 79 52 43 51 54 58
Costa Rica 153 154 168 171 189 210 235 220 248 303
Cuba 157 157 125 119 135 156 166 215 345 459
Dominican Republic 14 20 21 25 31 44 39 36 50 …
Ecuador d 19 21 11 12 10 11 15 19 21 …
El Salvador e … 20 50 57 70 75 77 82 93 …
Guatemala 13 15 14 13 18 18 18 17 20 22
Honduras 26 27 24 22 22 32 39 39 39 44
Jamaica f 77 85 79 84 … 78 77 87 87 …
Mexico 162 189 129 122 142 146 147 166 193 198
Nicaragua 19 17 18 18 20 23 26 28 31 33
Panama 49 66 63 66 79 90 79 98 106 …
Paraguay 4 16 18 20 20 16 18 17 31 23
Peru g 15 15 24 29 0 28 32 31 32 34
Trinidad and Tobago h 115 119 99 94 … 136 170 234 242 372
Uruguay 146 164 201 155 207 211 185 205 271 358
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 77 87 55 57 68 69 65 76 94 …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean i 73 81 85 84 95 100 98 111 133 159
Latin America and 
the Caribbean j 106 108 123 120 129 133 126 144 168 187
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social expenditure database.
a The figures for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama are from 2009. 
b The 1994-1995 figures are from 1995 and the 2006-2007 figures from 2006.
c Preliminary figures. The figures from 2000 onward are from the Ministry of Finance and are not comparable with earlier ones. The data in the earlier series are from the National 
Planning Department (DNP) and the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE).
d The 2006-2007 figure is from 2006.
e The 1992-1993 figure is from 1993.
f The 1996-1997 figure is from 1996 and the 2004-2005 figure from 2004.
g The figures from 1990 to 1998 are budgetary central government data, while those from 1999 onward are general government data. The 1998-1999 figure is from 1999.
h The 1996-1997 figure is from 1996.
i Simple average of the countries. Includes estimates for countries without available information. 
j Weighted average of the countries. Includes estimates for countries without available information.
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Table III.A-10 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (20 COUNTRIES): PER CAPITA PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING  
ON SOCIAL SECURITY AND ASSISTANCE
(Dollars at constant 2000 prices) 
Country
Period
1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009 a
Argentina 586 697 758 755 795 773 650 716 910 1 095
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) b … … 15 28 40 57 59 54 52 …
Brazil 283 322 357 389 423 413 448 477 538 603
Chile 244 279 291 331 366 392 386 364 345 424
Colombia c 49 58 97 135 92 114 119 157 201 235
Costa Rica 152 160 187 208 226 248 227 234 260 288
Cuba 217 234 191 171 178 181 206 273 349 402
Dominican Republic 5 7 7 12 16 31 27 62 75 ...
Ecuador d 43 46 29 27 21 24 24 35 38 …
El Salvador e … 1 15 18 24 25 50 60 60 …
Guatemala 11 13 12 12 15 18 21 19 18 20
Honduras 3 4 3 3 4 2 3 3 6 11
Jamaica f 21 15 15 12 … 13 14 14 … …
Mexico 7 6 71 86 116 146 149 142 166 264
Panama 37 76 54 35 72 64 48 47 78 …
Paraguay 17 33 36 40 44 27 43 33 62 44
Peru g 23 36 48 57 0 82 95 102 99 95
Trinidad and Tobago h 3 4 4 5 … 90 133 129 132 195
Uruguay 558 717 807 948 812 833 732 734 861 883
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 100 108 113 149 122 175 165 192 241 …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean i 118 142 156 171 173 185 180 192 225 252
Latin America and 
the Caribbean j 197 233 278 301 320 321 311 334 396 470
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social expenditure database.
a The figures for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama are from 2009. 
b The 1994-1995 figures are from 1995 and the 2006-2007 figures from 2006.
c Preliminary figures. Figures from 2000 onward are from the Ministry of Finance and are not comparable with earlier ones. The data in the earlier series are from the National 
Planning Department (DNP) and the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE).
d The 2006-2007 figure is from 2006.
e The 1992-1993 figure is from 1993.
f The 1996-1997 figure is from 1996 and the 2004-2005 figure from 2004.
g The figures from 1990 to 1998 are budgetary central government data, while those from 1999 onward are general government data. The 1998-1999 figure is from 1999.
h The 1996-1997 figure is from 1996.
i Simple average of the countries. Includes estimates for countries without available information. Nicaragua is not included.
j Weighted average of the countries. Includes estimates for countries without available information. Nicaragua is not included. 
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Table III.A-11 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (21 COUNTRIES): PER CAPITA PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING  
ON HOUSING AND OTHER ITEMS
(Dollars at constant 2000 prices)
Country
Period
1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2005 2006-2007 2008-2009 a
Argentina 102 116 121 108 121 103 74 114 168 184
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) b … … 25 26 30 19 20 22 22 …
Brazil 47 42 15 29 23 39 57 56 70 87
Chile 7 9 10 13 17 17 14 16 19 27
Colombia c 10 12 16 25 25 22 14 18 15 16
Costa Rica 58 61 61 64 60 64 77 81 88 109
Cuba 154 105 118 96 59 72 77 99 112 123
Dominican Republic 34 57 61 49 44 44 49 52 72 …
Ecuador d 0 1 6 3 2 6 3 4 3 …
El Salvador e … 1 1 5 18 47 40 47 58 …
Guatemala 2 8 12 20 30 25 30 34 37 33
Honduras 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 1 … …
Jamaica f 53 43 59 52 … 40 44 38 38 …
Mexico 47 67 74 67 69 81 93 116 149 136
Nicaragua 8 11 10 8 12 12 13 23 25 27
Panama 35 49 49 68 67 52 40 36 76 …
Paraguay 6 5 9 6 4 7 3 3 6 6
Peru g 0 0 0 0 0 13 11 10 15 24
Trinidad and 
Tobago h 46 47 58 64 … 98 95 126 137 199
Uruguay 15 19 29 29 76 85 81 88 112 150
Venezuela 
(Bolivarian 
Republic of) 83 76 32 63 43 63 38 46 82 …
Latin America and 
the Caribbean i 34 36 37 38 40 43 41 49 64 74
Latin America and 
the Caribbean j 44 47 38 43 41 48 53 62 80 87
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), social expenditure database.
a The figures for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama are from 2009. 
b The 1994-1995 figures are from 1995 and the 2006-2007 figures from 2006.
c  Preliminary figures. Figures from 2000 onward are from the Ministry of Finance and are not comparable with earlier ones. The data in the earlier series are from the National 
Planning Department (DNP) and the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE).
d The 2006-2007 figure is from 2006.
e The 1992-1993 figure is from 1993.
f The 1996-1997 figure is from 1996 and the 2004-2005 figure from 2004.
g The figures from 1990 to 1998 are budgetary central government data while those from 1999 onward are general government data. The 1998-1999 figure is from 1999.
h The 1996-1997 figure is from 1996.
i Simple average of the countries. Includes estimates for countries without available information. 
j Weighted average of the countries. Includes estimates for countries without available information.
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Table III.A-12 
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SPENDING ON EDUCATION, BY EDUCATION 
 LEVEL AND PER CAPITA INCOME QUINTILE, AROUND 2008
(Percentages)
Preschool education Upper secondary education
Country
Personal per capita income quintile
Total
Personal per capita income quintile
Total
Year





















Argentina 2008 34.8 26.9 19.1 14.3 4.9 100.0 Argentina 2008 23.9 22.9 21.2 18.8 13.3 100.0
Bolivia 
(Plurinational 
State of) 2007 25.9 27.8 20.0 17.5 8.8 100.0
Bolivia 
(Plurinational 
State of) 2007 16.2 23.2 23.6 24.0 13.0 100.0
Brazil 2008 38.9 27.6 18.9 10.5 4.1 100.0 Brazil 2008 19.5 25.3 26.0 19.3 9.8 100.0
Chile 2006 29.7 25.0 18.9 16.9 9.5 100.0 Chile 2006 24.5 24.4 20.5 18.2 12.4 100.0
Colombia 2008 32.5 28.1 20.7 13.5 5.2 100.0 Colombia 2008 22.4 24.9 23.3 19.8 9.6 100.0
Costa Rica 2008 32.0 26.8 18.7 13.9 8.6 100.0 Costa Rica 2008 20.0 19.8 24.8 21.8 13.6 100.0
Dominican 
Republic 2008 13.4 23.8 22.6 21.9 18.3 100.0
Dominican 
Republic 2008 9.5 14.1 17.4 22.6 36.3 100.0
El Salvador 2008 24.3 24.6 22.2 18.9 10.0 100.0 El Salvador 2008 10.9 19.9 22.9 27.7 18.7 100.0
Guatemala 2006 31.3 24.4 20.6 16.4 7.3 100.0 Guatemala 2006 4.2 12.0 27.9 25.4 30.5 100.0
Honduras 2007 26.1 22.3 20.2 18.5 12.8 100.0 Honduras 2007 6.1 13.9 23.4 30.4 26.3 100.0
Mexico 2008 31.7 23.9 20.3 16.6 7.5 100.0 Mexico 2008 14.9 22.1 23.6 23.0 16.3 100.0
Nicaragua 2005 … … … … … … Nicaragua 2005 8.7 18.0 21.2 27.1 25.0 100.0
Paraguay 2008 20.8 20.6 29.8 21.4 7.4 100.0 Paraguay 2008 16.2 22.8 21.0 23.3 16.8 100.0
Peru 2008 31.4 24.8 22.3 14.6 6.8 100.0 Peru 2008 21.2 26.0 22.4 19.6 10.8 100.0
Uruguay 2008 47.3 26.7 16.4 7.7 1.9 100.0 Uruguay 2008 15.4 24.7 26.3 22.9 10.7 100.0
Simple average 30.0 25.3 20.8 15.9 8.1 100.0 Simple average 15.6 20.9 23.0 22.9 17.5 100.0
Primary education Vocational and university education
Country
Personal per capita income quintile
Total
Personal per capita income quintile
Total
Year





















Argentina 2008 45.4 28.2 14.2 8.2 3.9 100.0 Argentina 2008 14.7 16.1 19.9 23.3 25.9 100.0
Bolivia 
(Plurinational 
State of) 2007 28.7 26.6 21.5 15.2 8.1 100.0
Bolivia 
(Plurinational 
State of) 2007 3.5 14.2 19.0 30.2 33.0 100.0
Brazil 2008 42.7 27.0 16.9 9.6 3.7 100.0 Brazil 2008 3.2 8.4 13.2 22.7 52.4 100.0
Chile 2006 31.1 23.8 19.0 15.7 10.3 100.0 Chile 2006 8.8 10.8 16.9 26.7 36.7 100.0
Colombia 2008 36.4 27.6 19.1 12.0 4.8 100.0 Colombia 2008 4.9 10.4 18.5 29.9 36.3 100.0
Costa Rica 2008 34.4 27.1 19.8 12.6 6.1 100.0 Costa Rica 2008 3.8 6.7 15.6 25.0 48.9 100.0
Dominican 
Republic 2008 14.3 18.0 16.6 20.2 30.9 100.0
Dominican 
Republic 2008 3.9 8.2 12.8 26.9 48.3 100.0
El Salvador 2008 29.5 27.6 21.5 14.3 7.1 100.0 El Salvador 2008 2.3 6.6 11.2 25.9 54.0 100.0
Guatemala 2006 28.0 25.8 22.4 16.6 7.2 100.0 Guatemala 2006 0.6 2.3 5.9 13.8 77.4 100.0
Honduras 2007 26.8 25.3 21.9 17.2 8.7 100.0 Honduras 2007 1.6 3.2 10.5 21.2 63.5 100.0
Mexico 2008 32.9 26.0 19.8 13.7 7.5 100.0 Mexico 2008 5.1 11.3 18.4 28.6 36.7 100.0
Nicaragua 2005 30.8 24.7 20.3 15.7 8.5 100.0 Nicaragua 2005 1.1 5.5 12.5 27.1 53.7 100.0
Paraguay 2008 32.6 29.2 19.3 13.9 5.0 100.0 Paraguay 2008 3.1 5.8 11.1 25.1 54.9 100.0
Peru 2008 37.6 25.7 19.8 11.5 5.4 100.0 Peru 2008 7.2 13.9 20.3 29.5 29.0 100.0
Uruguay 2008 48.0 26.6 15.2 7.6 2.5 100.0 Uruguay 2008 1.9 8.1 16.3 29.9 43.8 100.0
Simple average 33.3 26.0 19.2 13.6 8.0 100.0 Simple average 4.4 8.8 14.8 25.7 46.3 100.0
Lower secondary education Total public spending on education
Country
Personal per capita income quintile
Total
Personal per capita income quintile
Total
Year





















Argentina 2008 36.2 26.8 17.6 13.3 6.1 100.0 Argentina 2008 32.9 24.4 17.6 14.6 10.5 100.0
Bolivia 
(Plurinational 
State of) 2007 24.9 26.4 23.7 16.4 8.6 100.0
Bolivia 
(Plurinational 
State of) 2007 19.6 22.8 21.4 20.7 15.6 100.0
Brazil 2008 32.3 28.4 21.8 12.4 5.1 100.0 Brazil 2008 33.1 26.3 20.0 12.8 7.8 100.0
Chile 2006 30.0 23.6 18.3 18.0 10.2 100.0 Chile 2006 27.4 23.3 19.3 17.6 12.5 100.0
Colombia 2008 29.1 26.9 21.8 15.6 6.6 100.0 Colombia 2008 27.1 24.5 20.6 17.1 10.7 100.0
Costa Rica 2008 26.3 26.4 23.3 17.3 6.7 100.0 Costa Rica 2008 25.5 22.6 20.5 17.0 14.4 100.0
Dominican 
Republic 2008 16.4 14.5 20.6 23.4 25.1 100.0
Dominican 
Republic 2008 9.5 13.9 16.1 23.5 36.9 100.0
El Salvador 2008 21.4 22.8 23.0 21.9 10.9 100.0 El Salvador 2008 24.0 24.4 21.4 18.3 11.8 100.0
Guatemala 2006 8.8 19.4 24.8 27.5 19.5 100.0 Guatemala 2006 17.9 18.5 18.7 17.5 27.4 100.0
Honduras 2007 13.2 19.0 24.3 25.1 18.5 100.0 Honduras 2007 17.0 17.9 19.5 20.4 25.2 100.0
Mexico 2008 26.4 24.8 21.6 16.4 10.8 100.0 Mexico 2008 24.3 23.0 20.9 18.3 13.5 100.0
Nicaragua 2005 13.4 20.9 25.1 22.8 17.8 100.0 Nicaragua 2005 17.6 20.3 20.8 22.1 19.2 100.0
Paraguay 2008 20.8 24.1 25.1 20.3 9.7 100.0 Paraguay 2008 23.7 24.3 20.6 18.5 12.9 100.0
Peru 2008 26.2 28.2 23.0 16.4 6.2 100.0 Peru 2008 28.2 25.8 21.6 16.1 8.3 100.0
Uruguay 2008 35.6 30.2 19.9 11.1 3.2 100.0 Uruguay 2008 31.4 24.2 19.0 15.1 10.3 100.0
Simple average 24.1 24.2 22.3 18.5 11.0 100.0 Simple average 23.9 22.4 19.9 18.0 15.8 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective 
countries and information from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS).
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Chapter IV
The generational economy, transfer 
systems and inequality in Latin  
America and the Caribbean
A. The generational economy
As part of a look at the intergenerational reproduction of inequality throughout the life cycle, 
this chapter takes the observed differences between generations and examines how public 
and private transfers target two periods of life: youth and old age. In this framework, analyses 
based on National Transfer Accounts for a set of countries in the region are provided as a 
basis for comparing the generational nature of such transfers in countries of Latin America 
and in developed countries. 
A generational and life-cycle approach like the one 
described in this edition of the Social Panorama of Latin 
America, is essential for any analysis of how to achieve 
greater equality in Latin America and the Caribbean. This 
is particularly important because the region is experiencing 
considerable demographic changes that have significant 
impacts on the age structure of the population, particularly 
with the rising proportion of adults and older persons. 
This is shifting the relative sizes of the potentially active 
segment (adults) and the potentially dependent one (children, 
young people and older persons) and is thus changing 
the mix of investments in human capital (education) and 
consumption of health care, social security, and personal 
care for dependent persons.  
In the region, with its high levels of inequality 
(ECLAC, 2010a), public and private mechanisms for 
funding and meeting the needs and consumption of 
dependent persons have profound consequences in terms 
of generations, gender and geography. All this contributes 
to the intergenerational transmission of poverty and can 
be worsened by trends such as population ageing. For 
example, if population ageing requires increasing public 
transfers to older population segments, rising pension and 
health care costs for these segments can eat into transfers 
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to younger groups that are not yet independent in terms of 
income generation and need public or private investment 
to develop skills. This chapter takes a critical look at a key 
dimension of this hard-to–solve equation discussed in earlier 
chapters of this edition of the Social Panorama on childhood 
and youth as stages of the life cycle: financing consumption 
via public and private transfers to differing age groups. 
The life cycle includes two major periods of economic 
dependency —one at the beginning, the other at the end— 
during which consumption exceeds labour income. This 
economic life cycle is present in all modern economies. 
Children and older persons have consumption needs ranging 
from the most basic, such as food, clothing and housing, 
to more complex ones, such as education in the case of 
children and health care in the case of older adults. There 
are variations, but the consumption needs of these two 
groups are mainly met through large flows of economic 
resources from the working-age population. Some of these 
flows are direct, as in the case of parents providing for 
their children. Others are more indirect, such as transfers 
through governments, charitable organizations and other 
economic and social institutions. Other mechanisms are 
still more complex, like savings from labour income that 
are subsequently converted, through direct investments 
or financial institutions, into the financial flows needed 
to meet the needs of older persons. The generational 
economy is the total of all these flows.
In all societies, intergenerational flows —public 
or private— tend to be large-scale transfers and usually 
have a major impact on social equality or inequality and 
on economic growth. The degree of development of a 
particular generation of young people depends mostly on 
the resources it receives from older generations, particularly 
in terms of education and health care. Older persons 
depend for their well-being on factors that include the 
savings they may have built up, family support, and social 
programmes funded by current generations of taxpayers. 
Economic growth is closely related to the accumulation 
of capital for two purposes: to help support older persons 
and to transfer wealth to future generations. 
Relative consumption varies widely throughout the 
life cycle, so intergenerational transfers are not age-
neutral. Changes in the age structure therefore tend to 
have a major impact on intergenerational resource flows. 
For example, during the demographic transition there is a 
period when the workforce grows more rapidly than the 
population groups that depend on it, not only because of 
falling fertility rates but also owing to women’s growing 
labour-force participation.1 All other things being equal, 
1 The demographic transition is the shift from a mainly rural and 
agricultural society, with high fertility and mortality rates to 
predominately urban and industrial society with low fertility and 
mortality rates.
this situation produces a demographic dividend, freeing 
resources that can then be used for bettering family 
well-being or for investing in human and physical capital 
in order to promote long-term economic growth and 
development (Bloom and Williamson, 1998; Bloom, 
Canning and Sevilla, 2003).2
With the passage of time, and following a sustained 
period of low fertility rates, working-age population 
growth begins to slow while the older segments start 
to grow more quickly, partly owing to falling mortality 
rates among older adults. Population ageing considerably 
increases the burden borne by families and governments in 
providing health care and pensions to older adults. Most 
of the Latin American countries are now in the favourable 
stage of the demographic dividend, but many of them will 
very soon face the challenges of population ageing, as 
the developed countries have been doing for some time 
(Saad, Miller and Martínez, 2009; Saad and others, 2009; 
ECLAC/CELADE, 2008; ECLAC, 2008c; Rosero and 
Robles, 2008; Mejía, Vélez and García, 2010).
Intergenerational flows do not necessarily change 
direction smoothly (as an ever-increasing share goes 
to older persons), and these shifts are not necessarily 
conducive to economic progress or generational equity. 
The speed and intensity of change can shake hallowed 
practices, entrenched political systems and obsolete and 
inflexible economic systems. The problems are tending 
to worsen in Latin America, where a number of countries 
are likely to experience headlong population ageing with 
relatively low levels of development, low income levels and 
relatively undeveloped political and financial institutions 
that, in industrialized societies, have been instrumental 
in dealing with population ageing. Furthermore, since 
income distribution is still extremely unequal in most of 
the Latin American countries, population ageing is very 
likely to take place against a background of persistently 
high levels of inequality. 
Having a full picture of the generational economy 
makes it easier to design and assess the public policies 
that are needed to face the challenges of population ageing 
—all the more so with the benefit of the experience of 
countries which have been dealing with those challenges 
over a longer period. Intergenerational transfers clearly 
2 The demographic dividend is referred to both in this chapter and 
in the one on social spending. It is a stage in the demographic 
transition when the productive population increases in proportion 
to the dependent population as the ratio of children falls, the share 
of working-age persons climbs and the ratio of older persons is 
only just beginning to increase. Such is the situation in most Latin 
American countries, although there are some differences in the 
timing of the beginning and end of the demographic dividend period. 
The period ends when the relative weight of the older population 
increases to a point that the ratio of the working-age population to 
the dependent population is no longer favourable. 
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help to improve the socio-economic well-being of specific 
population subgroups. In many cases, the transfers are 
substitutes for the accumulation of wealth during the 
life cycle. In others, they may influence childbearing 
decisions, with considerable impacts on fertility rates. 
Financial equity between generations hinges on historical 
development and future changes in private and public 
transfer systems. As for public transfers, their structure 
generally reflects the emphasis placed by each society 
on human capital in relation to consumption.
Despite the major implications of intergenerational 
transfers for economic growth and for combating inequality 
and poverty, the ensemble of reallocations between age 
groups have not been analysed comprehensively. As a 
rule, the components of the generational economy have 
been studied separately. The National Transfer Accounts 
system provides the first comprehensive approach to overall 
measurement of aggregate financial flows between age 
groups and across time (see box IV.1). The accounts include 
flows relating to capital accumulation and to transfers, 
distinguishing those passing through public institutions 
from those taking place privately. They estimate all 
aggregate flows in accordance with the System of National 
Accounts (SNA) of the United Nations. Estimates are 
mostly based on analyses of household surveys relating 
to income, spending, assets, workforce and transfers, in 
addition to detailed administrative records available from 
various government bodies.
Box IV.1 
THE NATIONAL TRANSFER ACCOUNTS SYSTEM
The national transfer accounts system 
was created as part of an international 
project led by professors Ronald Lee, of 
the University of California at Berkeley, 
and Andrew Mason, of the East-West 
Center. The project began in 2004 with 
three participating countries (Brazil, 
Chile and the United States) as well as 
Taiwan Province of China. There are now 
over 30 participating countries across 
all the continents. They vary in terms 
of demographic configuration, levels of 
development, support systems for older 
adults, ways of investing in educating 
children and young people, and savings 
patterns. Comparisons between their 
accounts underline these differences 
and define the economic implications 
of population ageing under different 
institutional structures.
Through the Latin American and 
Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) - 
Population Division, ECLAC has since 
2007 been coordinating a regional project 
on national transfer accounts for Latin 
America and the Caribbean as part of the 
global project. This project receives financial 
support from the International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC) of Canadaa and 
the University of California at Berkeley. 
The first phase of the project has recently 
been completed, with the participation of 
five countries (Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Mexico and Uruguay). The second phase 
has begun with three additional participants: 
Argentina, Colombia and Jamaica. b
This study uses data on national 
transfer accounts available for 22 countries, 
which are listed below with the abbreviations 
used in the figures and the year to which 
the estimates relate.
Country Abbreviation Year 
Germany DEU 2003
Austria AUT 2000
Brazil BRA 1996, 2003
Chile CHL 1997, 2007
China CHN 2002
Costa Rica CRI 2004
Slovenia SVN 2004
Spain ESP 2000














a “Intergenerational Transfers, Population Aging and Social Protection in Latin America”, project, No. 104231 [online] http://www.idrc.ca.
b Project on intergenerational transfers, population aging and social protection in Latin America (see http://www.cepal.cl/celade/proyecto_transferencias).
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the national transfer accounts project [online] 
http://www.ntaccounts.org.
While the national transfer accounts are not without 
limitations (see box IV.2), the system is grounded in 
wide-ranging research in the field of intergenerational 
transfers. Following the pioneering work of Samuelson 
(1958) and Willis (1988), Lee and his colleagues 
established a theoretical framework on transfers which 
has been applied in a number of contexts (Bommier 
and Lee, 2003; Lee, 1994a and 1994b). “Generational 
accounting” was developed as well, and has been used 
in several countries to project public-sector accounts 
into the future (Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff, 
1991; Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Leibfritz, 1999). And 
considerable progress has been made in modelling private 
and family transfers (Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff, 
2000; Frankenberg, Lillard and Willis, 2002; Lillard and 
Willis, 1997; McGarry and Schoeni, 1997).
Family transfers play a particularly vital role because, 
in the case of children, they are almost universally the 
main source of income. Family transfers to older persons 
generally have a profound effect on intergenerational 
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Box IV.2 
METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL TRANSFER ACCOUNTS
Although the national transfer accounts 
system provides a fairly comprehensive 
conceptual and methodological framework 
for assessing how economic resources are 
allocated among different age groups and 
generations, its empirical estimates are 
subject to implicit assumptions which may 
affect the findings. Differences between 
countries in terms of data availability and 
quality may impair the comparability of 
the analyses. As a result, a number of 
methodological challenges need to be 
explained.
The first challenge is that the national 
transfer accounts system uses a fixed age 
matrix of economic profiles. Estimates 
of relationships between economic 
and demographic variables therefore 
do not take into account changes in 
economic behaviour caused by exogenous 
demographic variations, such as fertility 
or mortality rates (Shultz, 2009). A clear 
example of this methodological limitation is 
the non-inclusion of any changes in family 
transfers to children (such as education and 
health care) which may result from smaller 
family size or longer life expectancy. While 
national transfer accounts should have 
a more flexible age matrix that includes 
endogenous effects, the evidence shows 
that pure composition effects captured 
in the framework of the system are too 
significant to be disregarded. 
The second problem is that the accounts 
use average flows between age groups to 
estimate how resources are allocated during 
the life cycle. Nonetheless, in societies 
with high levels of inequality, as in the 
case of Latin America, average flows may 
be masking substantial differences within 
socio-economic groups. Recently, some of 
the countries participating in the national 
transfer accounts project —including Brazil, 
Chile, South Africa and Uruguay— began to 
produce estimates which do take account 
of socio-economic levels (see section C 
of this chapter). A further methodological 
problem is how to incorporate the effects of 
social mobility into estimates of inter- and 
intragenerational transfers. 
A third issue is that the accounts do 
not consider time transfers. As a result, 
their accounting system fails to include 
unpaid activities that often replace other 
types of financial flows. Since women 
generally bring less into the household 
in monetary terms but spend much of 
their time caring for children and older 
persons, estimates of transfers by gender 
are probably biased. A research group in 
the project is working on this issue. The 
main methodological problem facing them 
is how to, on the basis of surveys, identify 
and assign a cost to unpaid activities so 
that they are comparable internationally 
(data on time transfers are not available 
for all countries).
Lastly, the lack of sufficient information 
prevents most of the countries taking part 
in the global National Transfer Accounts 
project from having longer time series 
for the accounts as would be necessary 
in order to construct the cohorts’ real 
experience. Current estimates use synthetic 
cohorts, which might entail biased age 
profiles if the events examined were to 
vary between cohorts.
equity (Mason and Miller, 2000). Advances in modelling 
household resource allocation have been vitally important 
for estimating intergenerational transfers within the 
household and their interaction with alternative transfer 
systems and for studying how population ageing affects 
this system (Bourguignon, 1999; Bourguignon and 
Chiappori, 1992; Deaton, 1997; Lazear and Michael, 
1988, Mason and others, 2009). 
With a robust, well-defined conceptual framework, 
a broad set of analyses, and the growing availability of 
household surveys, it has been possible to estimate a 
complete set of National Transfer Accounts for a significant 
group of countries (see box IV.1). This chapter uses that 
information to analyse the role of public and private 
intergenerational transfers in a number of Latin American 
contexts, focusing on their impact on inequality and the 
potential effects of current demographic changes on 
these transfers in the near future. Thus, the information 
provided here is essential for moving forward in the areas 
covered by the two previous chapters concerning social 
spending on education (that is, on the current young 
generation) and the ability of public policies to sustain, 
over the long run, investment designed to reduce gaps 
and improve in educational system achievements.
The remainder of this chapter is organized into 
four sections. Following this introduction, section 
B provides an international comparison of national 
transfer accounts, underlining the particularities of the 
Latin American countries in terms of the economic life 
cycle, consumption and labour income by age group, 
and public and private transfers. Section C analyses 
how public transfers help to satisfy the consumption 
needs of children and older persons from different 
socio-economic subgroups in Brazil and Chile, in 
order to assess the impact of those transfers on the 
reduction of inequality in each of the countries. Lastly, 
section D summarizes the main conclusions arising 
out of the previous sections and offers some general 
recommendations on the use of National Transfer 
Accounts as a tool for guiding public policies. It also 
sets out specific public-policy recommendations based 
on the results of this study.    
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, on the basis of information from studies of national transfer accounts.
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B. National transfer accounts: Latin America  
 in the international context
Consumption profiles based on age vary significantly among the countries participating in the 
global National Transfer Accounts project. In middle-income countries consumption varies 
very little during adulthood and consumption by children is slightly lower than for the average 
adult. In high-income countries, consumption by children is relatively higher compared with 
medium-income countries and consumption levels rise with age. This is because middle-
income countries invest less in education and because, in higher-income countries, public 
pension systems provide greater coverage and spending on health care for older people is 
higher. Corroborating the findings on consumption, the countries of Latin America present 
relatively low levels of public investment in children and young people.
1. The economic life cycle
In modern societies, the economic life cycle comprises 
three stages: a surplus stage (when labour income 
exceeds consumption) between two dependency or deficit 
stages (when consumption exceeds labour income). The 
deficit stages involve massive resource flows from the 
working-age population towards dependent age groups. 
These flows between age groups and generations —via 
the family, the State, and financial markets— define the 
generational economy. Falling family sizes and rising 
longevity are altering the age structure of the Latin 
American population. This is having a profound impact on 
intergenerational flows and, consequently, on economic 
growth and inequality in the region, including the economic 
well-being of children and older persons. 
While the general economic life-cycle pattern 
shown in figure IV.1 is observed in all the countries 
participating in the global project on National Transfer 
Accounts, there are some significant differences which 
merit further examination. The general characteristics 
of the two main components of the economic life-
cycle (consumption and labour income) should be 
considered first.
Figure IV.1 
COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE GLOBAL NATIONAL 
TRANSFER ACCOUNTS PROJECT: AVERAGE LABOUR  
INCOME AND AVERAGE PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION  
RELATIVE TO PER CAPITA LABOUR INCOME IN  
THE 30-49 AGE GROUP, AROUND 2000 a
(Percentages)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason, “National Transfer Accounts 
Version 1.0”, Berkeley, Center for the Economics and Demography of Aging, 
University of California/East-West Center, October 2010.
a Simple average of 22 countries participating in the global national transfer accounts 
project: in Latin America, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico and Uruguay; in Asia, 
China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, Republic of Korea and Thailand; in 
Africa, Kenya and Nigeria; in Europe, Austria, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Slovenia, 
Spain and Sweden; and the United States. Per capita consumption includes private 
and public consumption. Per capita labour income includes fringe benefits and self-
employed income.
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(a) Consumption profile by age group
The per capita consumption profile includes both 
private and public consumption (the latter being public-
sector transfers in kind). There is a wide variety of 
consumption profiles among the countries participating 
in the global National Transfer Accounts project, in terms 
of both the shape and the relative height of the curves 
(Tung, 2011). In the case of private consumption, in 
most countries the curves have a classical shape with a 
single peak, where consumption rises with age, reaches a 
maximum level and then decreases. But in some countries 
the curves have multiple peaks at different ages. In the 
case of public consumption, while public programmes 
usually target the young and the old, their relative scale 
tends to vary with the size of the economy and the types 
of institutional arrangements available.
Figure IV.2 shows per capita consumption by age 
group relative to per capita consumption between ages 
30 and 49 for the countries participating in the global 
National Transfer Accounts project, distributed between 
two groups: high-income and middle-income, according 
to the World Bank classification.3 For the middle-
income countries, relative consumption begins at 0.43 
at birth, reaches 1 at around age 20 and remains more 
or less at that level throughout life. Very little variation 
in consumption is observed during adult life, whereas 
children’s consumption is, as expected, somewhat lower 
than that of the average adult.
For the high-income countries, the consumption pattern 
differs from that of middle-income countries in at least two 
major respects. First, children’s consumption is relatively 
higher because during the first 15 years of life relative 
consumption in the high-income economies is between 15% 
and 33% higher than in the middle-income group. This is 
mostly due to the countries’ investment in human capital. 
According to Becker’s hypothesis on the quantity-quality 
trade-off in fertility (Becker, Murphy and Tamura, 1990), 
lower fertility levels entail lower dependency ratios in 
households and, as a result, higher private investment per 
child.4 Lee and Mason (2009) found a negative correlation 
between fertility levels and human-capital investment per
3 The middle-income countries are those whose per capita GDP 
was between US$ 996 and US$ 12,195 in 2009. The high-income 
countries had per capita GDP exceeding US$ 12,195. Of the 
economies participating in the global project on National Transfer 
Accounts, the high-income ones are the European countries, Japan, 
the Republic of Korea and the United States. The other participating 
economies are middle-income ones. 
4 The dependency ratio is the ratio of persons of economically dependent 
age (children and older persons) to working-age persons. 
child in the countries participating in the global project on 
national transfer accounts. This may help to explain the 
differences shown in figure IV.2. The higher investment 
in education observed in the higher-income economies is 
largely due to the leading role played by the State in this 
area. Data from the project, for example, show that public 
consumption as a proportion of children’s total consumption 
in Europe is 62% above the level in Latin America.
Figure IV.2 
COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE GLOBAL NATIONAL TRANSFER 
ACCOUNTS PROJECT: PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION BY AGE  
IN MIDDLE- AND HIGH-INCOME ECONOMIES, RELATIVE TO  
PER CAPITA LABOUR INCOME IN THE 30-49 AGE GROUP,  
AROUND 2000 a
(Percentages)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason, “National Transfer Accounts 
Version 1.0”, Berkeley, Center for the Economics and Demography of Aging, 
University of California/ East-West Center, October 2010.
a Per capita consumption in middle-income economies is calculated as a simple average 
of Brazil, Chile, China, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines, Thailand 
and Uruguay. Per capita consumption in high-income economies is calculated as a 
simple average of Austria, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United States.
Figure IV.2 also shows higher consumption levels 
at more advanced ages in high-income countries. At 
age 85, for example, consumption in that group of countries 
is approximately 25% higher than at age 45. This pattern 
differs widely from that seen in the middle-income 
countries, where consumption is fairly stable throughout 
adulthood, for two reasons. First, public-sector pensions 
are practically universal in the high-income countries, 
where they make up a significant part of the resources 
used for older persons’ consumption. Second, public and 
private spending on health care at more advanced ages 
tends to be much greater in the richer countries compared 
with the middle-income ones. Data from the National 
Transfer Accounts project show that average per capita 
spending on health care at age 80 in the high-income 
countries (approximately 20% of per capita GDP per 
worker) is almost triple the relative spending observed 
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in the middle-income countries (around 7% of per capita 
GDP per worker).
There are a number of possible reasons for this 
difference in health care. First, there have been changes 
in medical procedures for chronic illnesses such as 
cancer, heart disease and diabetes, with increasingly 
aggressive and costly forms of treatment. Second, 
much long-term care for older persons in the middle-
income countries is given within the household by 
family members (and is therefore not taken into account 
financially), whereas in the high-income countries such 
care is provided in institutions or by health workers 
in the home (and is therefore taken into account). The 
expectation of rising health-care costs among older 
persons amplifies the impact of demographic ageing 
on health-care spending. In a recent study, CELADE-
Population Division of ECLAC forecasts that as the 
ratio of older persons in the population rises and the 
intensity of health-care consumption among those 
older adults grows, there can be profound changes 
in the supply of services by the region’s health-care 
systems and a significant rise in health-care spending. 
The rise may amount to three percentage points of GDP 
by 2040 in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Mexico and Panama (ECLAC/CELADE, 2010). 
Some projections show that in a number of the region’s 
countries, the fiscal burden for funding health care will 
probably be greater than for pensions (Miller, Mason 
and Holz, 2009). While much of the public debate in 
Latin America has focused on pensions, these studies 
draw attention to the urgent need to include public 
health-care funding in the discussions.
Figure IV.2 highlights the differences between the 
two groups of countries in terms of consumption by 
children and older persons. The figures are still more 
striking when these two population groups’ per capita 
consumption is compared directly. In figure IV.3, which 
shows the distribution of the participating countries for 
which data are available on per capita consumption among 
the 0-19 and 65-and-over age groups (in relation to per 
capita consumption in the 20-64 age group), Brazil, Chile, 
Costa Rica and Mexico stand out for their low levels of 
consumption among children and young people (values 
to the left of the median), reflecting the low general levels 
of investment in human capital in Latin America. This 
situation reflects the concentration of poverty among 
children in those societies, which could also partly explain 
the relatively low levels of consumption observed among 
children in Germany and the United States, which are 
close to Brazil’s level in figure IV.3.
Figure IV.3 
ECONOMIES PARTICIPATING IN THE GLOBAL NATIONAL TRANSFER 
ACCOUNTS PROJECT: PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION BY OLDER 
PERSONS AND THE YOUNG, RELATIVE TO PER CAPITA 




























































Per capita consumption among persons aged 0-19
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason, “National Transfer Accounts 
Version 1.0”, Berkeley, Center for the Economics and Demography of Aging, 
University of California/ East-West Center, October 2010.
a Per capita consumption includes private and public consumption. The dotted line 
shows the median for the variable on each axis. The key to country and territory 
abbreviations is in box IV.1.
On the other hand, following the pattern seen in 
figure IV.2, relative consumption by older persons in 
most Latin American countries is proportionate to adults’ 
consumption (value close to 1 in figure IV.3). In Brazil, 
however, relative consumption among older persons is 
almost double the level among children and young people. 
Only three of the participating countries surpass Brazil in 
terms of consumption by older persons: Japan, Sweden 
and the United States. In these three countries, higher 
consumption is due mostly to generous public-sector 
spending on health care for older persons.
On the bottom right-hand side of figure IV.3, China 
and the Republic of Korea stand out for their high levels 
of consumption among children and young people, 
reflecting their commitment to education. At the same 
time, the relatively low per capita consumption among 
persons aged 65 and over reflects the lack of more general 
pensions systems and public health-care programmes, 
and, consequently, how much consumption by older 
persons depends on family transfers. Co-residence of 
older persons and adult children in the family home tends 
to be quite high in these societies. Another factor may be 
the widespread practice whereby health care is provided 
to older persons within the home by family members. 
As mentioned above, this is not taken into account in the 
national transfer accounts system. 
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(b) The age profile of labour income
As has already been stated, the economic life 
cycle is defined by age patterns in consumption and 
labour income. In the framework of the National 
Transfer Accounts system, labour income is the sum of 
wages and fringe benefits plus part of self-employed 
income. Figure IV.4 shows the profile of average 
labour income by age for the countries participating 
in the global National Transfer Accounts project, in 
relation to per capita labour income in the 30-49 age 
group. As might be expected, the curve is bell-shaped: 
it rises gradually with age, reaches a peak around age 
35-55 and then falls with advancing age. There are, 
however, considerable variations between countries, 
as has been widely illustrated in the economic 
literature. The factors responsible for these include 
changes in individual productivity according to age, 
preferences regarding consumption and leisure, and 
institutional factors such as the existence of State 
pension programmes and each society’s commitment 
to education. Other factors, such as age and gender 
discrimination in the labour market, may also be 
producing differentiated effects on rates of activity 
and wages among the countries participating in the 
global National Transfer Accounts project.
Figure IV.4 
COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE GLOBAL NATIONAL TRANSFER 
ACCOUNTS PROJECT: AVERAGE PER CAPITA LABOUR  
INCOME BY AGE, RELATIVE TO PER CAPITA LABOUR  









































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason, “National Transfer Accounts 
Version 1.0”, Berkeley, Center for the Economics and Demography of Aging, 
University of California/ East-West Center, October 2010.
a Per capita labour income includes fringe benefits and self-employed income. Uses 
the simple average of 22 countries participating in the global National Transfers 
Accounts project: in Latin America, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico and Uruguay; in 
Asia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, Republic of Korea and Thailand; in 
Africa, Kenya and Nigeria; in Europe, Austria, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Slovenia, 
Spain and Sweden; and the United States.  
No clear regional pattern appears from the analysis 
of labour income age profiles for the participating 
countries, but there is considerable regional variation 
in the typical ages for entering and exiting the labour 
market. In order to illustrate these differences, an 
estimate was first made of modal ages at which the 
variance of labour income is the greatest between the 
countries considered, that is, 21 and 57 years. Second, 
for each country, labour income at those two modal ages 
was calculated against labour income in the 30-49 age 
group. The results are shown in figure IV.5. Inasmuch 
as per capita labour income is calculated by dividing 
total labour income for a given age group by the total 
population in that age group, this indicator reflects 
not only labour income per worker but also workforce 
activity rates by age. 
Dividing figure IV.5 into four quadrants according 
to the median per capita labour income at ages 21 and 
57 in the countries participating in the global National 
Transfer Accounts project reveals that most high-income 
countries are in the upper left-hand quadrant, meaning 
that they have low incomes at age 21 and high incomes 
at 57. This reflects, on the one hand, longer education 
periods for young people and, on the other hand, the fact 
that adults stay longer in the labour market, probably 
owing to the gradual rise of the minimum retirement 
age. Four countries (Brazil, Kenya, Slovenia and Spain) 
stand out because of relatively low incomes both at 
age 21 and at age 57. Brazil is particularly noteworthy 
because gradual improvements in the State education 
system have prompted children and young people to 
stay in the educational system longer, and a generous 
State pension system has been developed. The remaining 
Latin American countries present no distinctive patterns, 
with most of them grouped around the average levels of 
labour income (see figure IV.5).
A related question is the duration of economic 
independence through the life cycle, in other words, how 
long labour income exceeds consumption. To analyse 
this issue, figure IV.6 shows the ages at which economic 
independence begins and ends in a number of countries 
participating in the global National Transfer Accounts 
project.5 The results show that the median duration of 
economic independence for the sample of the countries 
is only 32 years. Aside from Uruguay, the countries of 
Latin America have the shortest periods of economic 
independence, ranging from around 20 years in Brazil 
and Mexico to 28 years in Chile and Costa Rica. A 
number of microeconomic factors are involved, such
5 The results are ordered by country from top to bottom according 
to the length of the period of economic independence.
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as high levels of income inequality and the relatively low 
rates of labour-market participation by women in the 
countries of Latin America compared with other countries 
participating in the National Transfer Accounts project. 
However, this situation reflects mainly the high aggregate 
levels of consumption in relation to labour income, resulting 
from low levels of savings (as in the case of Brazil) and 
from dependence on natural resources to finance current 
consumption (as in the case of petroleum in Mexico and 
copper in Chile) (Tung, 2011).
Figure IV.5 
COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE GLOBAL NATIONAL 
TRANSFER ACCOUNTS PROJECT: PER CAPITA LABOUR 
INCOME AT AGE 21 AND AGE 57, RELATIVE TO 
PER CAPITA LABOUR INCOME IN THE 




















































Per capita labour income at age 21
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason, “National Transfer Accounts 
Version 1.0”, Berkeley, Center for the Economics and Demography of Aging, 
University of California/ East-West Center, October 2010.
a The dotted line shows the median for the variable on each axis.
Figure IV.6 
COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE GLOBAL NATIONAL 
TRANSFER ACCOUNTS PROJECT: DURATION OF  









































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason, “National Transfer Accounts 
Version 1.0”, Berkeley, Center for the Economics and Demography of Aging, 
University of California/ East-West Center, October 2010.
a Economic independence is defined as the period during which labour income exceeds 
consumption. The countries are ordered from low to high (values in parentheses 
beside country name abbreviations). The figure shows the ages of onset and end 
of independence.
2. Financing consumption throughout the life cycle: 
 intergenerational transfers
A sizeable part of the life cycle is generally spent in 
economic dependency, so sources of support other than 
labour income are needed to help to meet consumption 
needs during the life cycle. In the framework of the 
National Transfer Accounts system, there are three 
main reallocation mechanisms between age groups 
and generations: public transfers, family transfers 
and asset-based reallocations. Figure IV.7 shows net 
public transfers, that is, the difference between benefits 
received and taxes paid, as a percentage of per capita 
labour income in the 30-49 age group, for 19 of the 
countries participating in the global National Transfer 
Accounts project. During the working-age period, when 
individuals reach the highest surplus in their life cycle 
and therefore have the greatest capacity to pay taxes and 
contribute to the public sector, net public transfers are 
negative. Taxes are generally low in the case of older 
persons, lower still for children and young people, and 
considerably higher in the case of working-age adults 
because of how economic activities are taxed. Taxes that 
depend heavily on labour income lead to higher flows 
of public transfers from working-age adults; higher 
property taxes tend to increase flows of public transfers 
from older adults. Taxes on consumption, on the other 
hand, tend to be distributed more equitably among the 
age groups. Since the combination of income sources 
varies between countries, there are also differences in 
the flows of public transfers among age groups. The 
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general pattern, however, is that public transfers mostly 
come from the working-age population. 
Figure IV.7 
COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE GLOBAL NATIONAL 
TRANSFER ACCOUNTS PROJECT: AVERAGE PER CAPITA 
NET PUBLIC TRANSFERS, BY AGE, RELATIVE TO PER CAPITA 
LABOUR INCOME IN THE 30-49 AGE GROUP, AROUND 2000 a
(Percentages)









































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason, “National Transfer Accounts 
Version 1.0”, Berkeley, Center for the Economics and Demography of Aging, 
University of California/ East-West Center, October 2010.
a  Per capita net public transfers are calculated as the difference between benefits 
received from the State and taxes paid. They are expressed as a percentage of per 
capita labour income in the 30-49 age group in the respective countries. Simple 
average of 22 countries participating in the global national transfer accounts project: 
in Latin America, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico and Uruguay; in Asia, China, 
India, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, Republic of Korea and Thailand; in Africa, Kenya 
and Nigeria; in Europe, Austria, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Slovenia, Spain and 
Sweden; and the United States.  
Children and older persons tend to be net beneficiaries 
of public transfers. Health care is generally the main 
source of public transfers towards those aged under 
five. In the 5-to-15 age group, public education becomes 
the main component. As for older persons, as might 
be expected, social security and health care make up 
almost all public transfers. Benefits are generally the 
lowest for the working-age population, higher for 
children and young people, and significantly higher in 
the case of older persons. The high levels of per capita 
net benefits among children and older persons are the 
combined result of higher levels of transfers and low 
levels of taxation.
After analysing the typical pattern of net transfers 
on the basis of the simple average of the participating 
countries, the impact of each government’s taxation 
and public spending policies on per capita benefits 
received by children and young people from birth to 
age 19 was compared with benefits received by older 
persons (65 and over). As can be seen in figure IV.8, 
the countries vary widely in this regard. Per capita 
net transfers received by children and young people 
as a percentage of the per capita labour income of 
adults aged 30-49 range from 6% in China to 29% 
in Finland. In the case of older persons, the range is 
from -2% in Thailand (showing that older persons in 
that country pay more in taxes than they receive in 
benefits) to 87% in Brazil, where a wide-reaching 
pension programme, including non-contributory 
pensions, is in place.
Figure IV.8 
COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE GLOBAL NATIONAL 
TRANSFER ACCOUNTS PROJECT: PER CAPITA NET PUBLIC 
TRANSFERS TO YOUNG PEOPLE (AGED 0 TO 19) AND OLDER 
PERSONS (65 AND OVER), RELATIVE TO PER CAPITA LABOUR 












































Per older person (aged over 65)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason, “National Transfer Accounts 
Version 1.0”, Berkeley, Center for the Economics and Demography of Aging, 
University of California/ East-West Center, October 2010.
a Per capita net public transfers are calculated as the difference between benefits 
received from the State and taxes paid. They are expressed as a percentage of per 
capita labour income in the 30-49 age group in the respective countries. The dotted 
line shows the median for the variable on each axis. 
Corroborating the findings for consumption, the 
countries of Latin America show relatively low levels 
of public investment in children and young people. 
In Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica, these low levels of 
investment in children and young people are combined 
with high levels of public transfers to older persons. 
Brazil is an extreme example of a system of public 
transfers skewed towards older persons, owing to the 
high volume of pensions going to that age group (around 
12% of GDP). In Brazil, average net public transfers to 
children and young people are one ninth of the average 
level going to older persons.
As can be seen in figure IV.8, the ratio of net public 
transfers to older adults and to children and young people 
is much more balanced in the high-income countries 
than in the countries of Latin America. Governments 
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in Europe, Japan and the United States spend on older 
persons (as a percentage of labour income) approximately 
the same as the Latin American countries do, but they 
invest twice as much on children and young people. 
In considering these results it is important to take into 
account that the sample of Latin American countries 
participating in the global National Transfer Accounts 
project does not include the region’s poorest countries, 
where the public sector plays a smaller part in supporting 
consumption by children and young people and by 
older persons. 
As a general pattern, figure IV.8 shows a strong 
positive correlation between public transfers to young 
people and transfers to older persons. The simple 
correlation between the two transfers is 0.55, rising to 
0.73 if the atypical result from Brazil is discounted. This 
cross-cutting evidence is consistent with the approach 
which considers government action to be the result of 
intergenerational cooperation. It generally coincides 
with the ideas of Becker and Murphy (1988), who held 
that generations cooperate through the public sector to 
deal with low levels of income security in old age and 
to ensure the necessary investment in education during 
youth. The countries of Latin America, however, are 
clear exceptions to this pattern. In most Asian countries 
net public transfers are relatively low both for young 
people and for older adults. In most European countries 
and in Japan, both types of transfers are relatively high. 
But in most Latin American countries the transfers are 
significantly lower for the young than for older persons. 
Turra and Queiroz (2005) suggest that these imbalances 
in the Latin American countries may be more closely 
related to high levels of income inequality than to the 
political influence of older persons.
Figure IV.9, which expands the analysis presented 
in figure IV.8 by including all sources of support 
available during the economic life cycle, shows clearly 
that family transfers are the main source of support 
for consumption by children and young people in the 
Asian economies, except for Japan (between 68% and 
79%). The same occurs in the Latin American countries 
(68% to 77%), although in this case overdependence 
on family transfers may be more harmful to the well-
being of children and young people than in Asia because 
income inequality among Latin American families is 
greater. In Europe, Japan and the United States, family 
transfers are relatively lower (39% to 63%), owing 
to more significant public-sector investment, as has 
already been mentioned.
In many economies, older persons continue to work 
up to quite advanced ages and their labour income is an 
important source of support for their consumption needs. 
Examples include Indonesia (44%) and the Philippines 
(39%). In European countries such as Austria and 
Germany, on the other hand, the labour income of older 
persons represents a very small fraction of consumption 
(2% to 3%). The Latin American countries are between 
these two extremes. As a percentage of consumption, 
the labour income of older persons in these countries 
ranges from a low of 18% in Brazil to a high of 26% 
in Mexico. Net public transfers are the main source of 
support for older persons in both Europe (59% to 94%) 
and Latin America, except Mexico (49% to 89%). In 
Mexico, income from assets, particularly State-owned 
assets, is the main source of support for older persons 
(71%). The use of assets for consumption by older 
persons varies considerably among the participating 
countries, from 2% in Hungary to 81% in Indonesia. 
Family transfers are a large part of consumption in 
some economies, particularly in Asia; one example 
of this is Thailand (30%). In most of the participating 
countries, however, net family transfers are downward, 
from older persons to younger family members. This 
pattern is particularly strong in Brazil (-31%), Mexico 
(-19%) and Uruguay (-11%).
Noteworthy in figure IV.10 is the negative value of 
net private transfers in countries where public transfers 
play a major part in consumption by older persons, such 
as Austria, Brazil, Costa Rica, Spain, Sweden, United 
States and Uruguay. At first sight, these findings might 
suggest a substitution effect between public-sector 
transfers and family support for older persons in high-
income countries and in Latin America. Nonetheless, 
the negative correlation between net public-sector and 
private-sector transfers to older persons is quite weak 
among the countries participating in the global national 
transfer accounts project (r=- 0.22, excluding the atypical 
values for Brazil).
180 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
Figure IV.9 
COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE GLOBAL NATIONAL 
TRANSFER ACCOUNTS PROJECT: SOURCES OF SUPPORT  
FOR YOUNG PEOPLE (AGED 0 TO 19) RELATIVE TO PER  



































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason, “National Transfer Accounts 
Version 1.0”, Berkeley, Center for the Economics and Demography of Aging, 
University of California/ East-West Center, October 2010.
Figure IV.10 
COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE GLOBAL NATIONAL 
TRANSFER ACCOUNTS PROJECT: SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR 
































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason, “National Transfer Accounts 
Version 1.0”, Berkeley, Center for the Economics and Demography of Aging, 
University of California/ East-West Center, October 2010.
3. The fiscal impact of population ageing
The age patterns in intergenerational transfers, particularly 
public transfers, can be used to assess the impacts of 
demographic change in terms of fiscal risks in the 
different regions of the world. Population ageing is 
likely to reduce the support ratio, that is, the ratio of 
net contributors to net beneficiaries, in countries where 
public transfers to older persons predominate. On the 
other hand, in countries where public transfers to children 
are more significant, demographic change may bring 
about fiscal relief. Table IV.1 shows the direction of 
net public transfers between age groups in a number of 
countries participating in the global national transfer 
accounts project, based on the aggregate and per capita 
values of transfers to older persons relative to children 
and young people.
The results in table IV.1 generally reflect those 
obtained from previous analyses. As mentioned above, 
in the Latin American countries participating in the 
global National Transfer Accounts project, public 
investment on children and young people is relatively 
low, while public transfers to older adults are relatively 
high. It is therefore unsurprising that the ratio of net 
public transfers to older persons in relation to young 
people is above one in all the Latin American countries, 
particularly in Brazil (9.53), Chile (3.99) and Costa 
Rica (3.90), where these values are the highest of all 
the participating countries. Since population ageing in 
the Latin American countries is still not very advanced, 
this pattern of public transfers skewed towards older 
persons is mitigated by an age structure that is still 
relatively young. Consequently, the aggregate average 
of net public transfers to older persons as a ratio of 
transfers to young people in the Latin American countries 
(0.77) is significantly lower than in Europe and Japan 
(1.84). As the demographic transition progresses in 
the Latin American countries, however (and if there 
are no major changes in the pattern of age transfers), 
it can be expected that these countries will come to 
spend relatively more on older persons, in aggregate 
terms, than the developed countries.
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Table IV.1 
COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE GLOBAL NATIONAL TRANSFER ACCOUNTS PROJECT: AGE-GROUP DIRECTION  
OF NET PUBLIC TRANSFERS, AROUND 2000
Ratio of total net public transfers 
received by older persons to those 
received by young people
Ratio of the population of older 
persons to that of young people
Ratio of per capita net public transfers 
received by older persons to those 
received by young people
Germany 2.56 0.88 2.91
Sweden 2.38 0.72 3.33
Austria 2.32 0.67 3.48
Japan 1.67 1.02 1.65
Hungary 1.65 0.73 2.26
Spain 1.62 0.79 2.05
Slovenia 1.58 0.73 2.16
Uruguay 1.39 0.42 3.29
Finland 1.34 0.67 1.99
Brazil 1.21 0.13 9.53
Chile 0.79 0.20 3.93
China 0.73 0.23 3.11
United States 0.63 0.44 1.42
Costa Rica 0.55 0.15 3.67
Republic of Korea 0.26 0.25 1.07
Mexico 0.23 0.12 1.90
Indonesia 0.01 0.15 0.08
Philippines -0.01 0.07 -0.09
Thailand -0.03 0.21 -0.16
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason, “National Transfer Accounts Version 1.0”, 
Berkeley, Center for the Economics and Demography of Aging, University of California/ East-West Center, October 2010; Latin American and Caribbean Demographic 
Centre (CELADE) - Population Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2008 and United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, 
New York, 2008.
Changes in the age structure of the population 
throughout the demographic transition have a fiscal impact 
because older persons and children and young people are 
net recipients of public benefits, whereas working-age 
adults are net contributors (see figure IV.7). At the early 
stages of population ageing, during the demographic 
dividend period, the working-age population grows more 
quickly than the younger population. These changes 
decrease the tax burden for governments. In the case of 
federal systems such Brazil and the United States, this is 
felt more strongly at the state and local government level, 
which are traditionally the main sources of funding for 
publicly-funded education. This weakening of tax burdens 
does not necessarily imply a real reduction in taxes. In 
many countries, in fact, the funding of State education 
has remained unchanged or even increased, leading to 
wider coverage and higher investment per student. As 
the countries continue to move through the demographic 
transition, the demographic dividend period comes to an 
end and the older adult population begins to grow more 
quickly than the working-age population. From that 
point onward, governments face decades of continuously 
increasing fiscal pressure caused by population ageing.
The age profiles of public transfers can be used as 
a first approximation for assessing fiscal pressures by 
calculating the fiscal support ratio, which is the ratio of 
aggregate taxation to benefits. In the absence of asset-
based government reallocations, such as loans and debt 
repayments, that ratio should be equal to 1, with total 
aggregate tax receipts equal to total aggregate benefits paid. 
As the population ages, the fiscal support ratio drops as 
the number of contributors falls in relation to the number 
of beneficiaries of public transfers. Changes in the fiscal 
support ratio indicate, in relative terms, the amount by 
which taxes should rise or benefits fall in order to return 
to the initial fiscal position.
Table IV.2 shows changes in the fiscal support ratio 
over a period of 100 years (1950-2050) for a selected 
group of countries participating in the global National 
Transfer Accounts project. The estimates are based on 
the age profiles of public transfer flows observed in each 
country around 2005, applied to population estimates and 
projections by age from 1950 to 2050. The reference year 
is 2010, and countries are ranked in the table according 
to the size of the fiscal adjustment needed by 2050 as a 
result of population ageing.
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Table IV.2 
COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE GLOBAL NATIONAL TRANSFER ACCOUNTS PROJECT: FISCAL SUPPORT RATIO, 1950-2050
Country 
Fiscal support ratio Most favourable demographic period
1950 2010 2020 2030 2050 Year Fiscal support ratio
Brazil 1.00 1 0.94 0.86 0.69 2000 1.02
Chile 0.94 1 0.93 0.83 0.72 2004 1.01
Slovenia 1.01 1 0.91 0.81 0.72 2002 1.04
Spain 0.94 1 0.96 0.87 0.73 2010 1.00
Austria 1.08 1 0.93 0.83 0.74 1950 1.08
Japan 0.91 1 0.92 0.87 0.74 1976 1.15
Germany 1.11 1 0.94 0.84 0.75 1950 1.11
Costa Rica 0.89 1 0.97 0.91 0.76 2012 1.00
Hungary 1.06 1 0.97 0.93 0.77 1950 1.06
China 0.93 1 0.94 0.87 0.80 2007 1.00
Republic of Korea 0.76 1 0.97 0.89 0.80 2008 1.00
Finland 1.08 1 0.92 0.87 0.83 1991 1.11
Mexico 0.85 1 1.02 0.99 0.86 2019 1.02
Sweden 1.15 1 0.96 0.90 0.86 1950 1.15
United States 0.99 1 0.96 0.92 0.89 2006 1.00
Uruguay 1.08 1 1.00 0.98 0.90 1959 1.09
Thailand 0.66 1 1.04 1.04 1.04 2039 1.04
Indonesia 0.79 1 1.06 1.10 1.08 2033 1.10
Philippines 0.87 1 1.06 1.11 1.16 2050 1.16
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason, “National Transfer Accounts Version 1.0”, Berkeley, 
Center for the Economics and Demography of Aging, University of California/ East-West Center, October 2010; Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) - 
Population Division of ECLAC, population estimates and projections, 2008 and United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, New York, 2008.
Of the countries taking part in the global National 
Transfer Accounts project, Brazil is expected to feel the 
strongest fiscal impact associated with population ageing. 
In combination with the current tax and benefits policies, 
population ageing in Brazil will bring the fiscal support 
ratio down by 31% by 2050. This means a cut of 31% in 
benefit transfers by 2050 or a 45% increase in taxation, 
or a combination of both. Brazil is not alone in facing 
this situation of growing fiscal pressure. In Europe, the 
reduction in the fiscal support ratio by 2050 will vary 
between 14% in Sweden and 28% in Slovenia. In the 
other Latin American countries, the fall will range from 
10% in Uruguay to 28% in Chile. In the United States, 
the fiscal support ratio is expected to be down 11% by 
2050 (a little less than in Sweden and somewhat more 
than in Uruguay). In Asia, the three countries where the 
fiscal impacts are expected to be the most severe are 
Japan (with a 26% decline in the fiscal support ratio) 
and China and the Republic of Korea (with declines of 
about 20%).
These figures demonstrate that population ageing 
is a worldwide phenomenon that is not restricted to the 
developed countries. Consequently, it should not come 
as a surprise that some of the most serious fiscal impacts 
of population ageing will be felt outside Europe. A major 
issue in several of those countries is that not only will 
the fiscal support ratio tend to decline rapidly in future, 
but also that this decline will represent a sharp departure 
from earlier decades, when the fiscal support ratio 
remained stable or even rose. This is true, for example, 
for Brazil, Chile, China, the Republic of Korea, Slovenia, 
Spain and the United States, which reached the stage of 
lowest fiscal pressure during the 2000s with rising fiscal 
pressure thereafter in response to demographic changes 
(see table IV.2). There is another group of countries where 
the fiscal support ratio will increase because under their 
current tax and expenditure policies, older persons are net 
contributors or their fiscal costs are only moderate. This 
is true for Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand.
The scale and direction of demographic effects on 
fiscal risks will depend on how public policies change in 
the future. Rather than relying on the fiscal support ratio, 
data from national transfer accounts can easily be combined 
with more realistic assumptions as to future changes in 
public benefits policies, in order to provide governments 
with medium- and long-term fiscal projections. Some 
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projections prepared for Latin American countries (for 
example, Miller, Mason and Holz (2009), for 10 countries; 
Miller and Castanheira (2010), for Brazil) show that the 
fiscal impact of population ageing in the region will be 
similar to that for Europe.  
All these fiscal projections are based on assumptions 
regarding future public-policy changes. As fiscal pressures 
increase in countries where net public transfers by age are 
skewed upward, society can be expected to respond by 
seeking to reform pension and health-care programmes 
and to increase investment in education, in order to foster 
economic growth and promote equality. In countries where 
public transfers to children currently predominate, as in 
the case of Indonesia and some Latin American countries 
which are not yet part of the global National Transfer 
Accounts project, population ageing together with changes 
in family structures may, in the future, necessitate public 
welfare programmes for older persons, reversing the age 
orientation of net public transfers and increasing the fiscal 
pressure on governments.
C. Public transfers by age and educational  
 level in Brazil and Chile
A look at Brazil and Chile shows that public transfers towards older persons are proportionately 
higher and that family transfers are the principal component of transfers to children and young 
people. This bias is found at all socio-economic levels but is significantly more pronounced 
in the highest-level group. Overall, public spending on children exhibits greater absolute 
progressivity that diminishes with age and then turns regressive, with greater benefits for 
groups at higher socio-economic levels. Despite public-sector involvement, total investment 
in education is quite unequal among different socio-economic groups. This is due especially 
to enormous gaps in spending on education between high- and low-income families. 
1. Public transfers and inequality
In recent years, the role of government in allocating 
resources among population subgroups has been the 
focus of numerous empirical and theoretical analyses. 
In cases of market failure, government interventions are 
needed to ensure income equality and redistribution, to 
provide insurance against certain types of risk and to 
generate public goods. To a great extent, the multiple 
functions and goals of government are complementary. 
For example, policies to combat poverty can lead to 
improved distribution of income. Government actions, 
however, are subject to faulty information, and this may 
lead to unexpected adverse effects. Policymakers might 
also favour private interests that might not be consistent 
with public interest principles.
To understand the role of government it is necessary 
to understand the incidence of public transfers in 
different population groups. As was seen at length 
in section B, the incidence of public transfers by age 
group is no longer unknown territory, thanks to recent 
research mainly associated with the National Transfer 
Accounts project. And researchers are increasingly 
interested in issues relating to income-linked public 
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transfers (for example, Barro and others, 2006; Breceda, 
Rigolini and Saavedra, 2009; Lindert, Skouflas and 
Shapiro, 2006). National Transfer Accounts provide 
answers regarding the fiscal effects of ageing and 
intergenerational equity but yield little information 
on differences between socio-economic groups and 
the effects of ageing on their well-being. As a result, 
CELADE-Population Division of ECLAC is working 
to expand the analytical framework of these accounts 
in order to measure resource flows, not only between 
age groups but also between socio-economic groups. 
This section presents the preliminary results of this 
exercise for Brazil and Chile.
Latin America is an interesting context for 
identifying associations between intergenerational 
transfers, population ageing and social inequality that 
have not yet been fully explored. Compared with other 
emerging regions, Latin America has a relatively large 
public sector and a rapidly ageing population, combined 
with one of the world’s highest levels of inequality in 
income distribution. There has been much research on 
the causes of income inequality and poverty in Latin 
America. For example, in a thorough study on Brazil, 
Barro and others (2006) examine the reasons for the 
rapid reduction of inequality in recent years. The authors 
report that nearly half of the considerable change in the 
Gini coefficient between 2001 and 2004 (from 0.593 
to 0.569) was due to improvements in social security 
programmes for the poorest (in particular, the launch of 
conditional cash transfer programmes) and to narrowing 
gaps in educational levels among workers. This suggests 
that, in the long term, greater investment in education to 
promote equal opportunities among workers as well as 
increasing the progressivity of public taxes and spending 
could have a positive effect on income distribution on 
an even more significant scale.
In another study for Brazil, Wajnman and Turra 
(2010) use microsimulation modelling to analyse 
inequality over a much longer period (1983 to 2008). 
They believe that changes in the proportion of adults 
per household as a result of transitions in fertility and 
mortality, as well as changes in living arrangements, 
have contributed a good deal (around 22%) to improving 
income distribution over the period under consideration. 
Over those 25 years, demographic effects were not as 
important as the impacts of social policies geared towards 
income transfer, such as social security and, particularly, 
cash transfers targeting the poorest, such as the Bolsa 
Família programme.
There are currently many studies in Brazil and other 
Latin American countries highlighting the importance of 
public transfers (particularly social security benefits) for 
poverty reduction in certain age groups. Many of these 
studies use simple hypothetical analyses to compare 
poverty rates with and without public benefits. Turra, 
Marri and Wajnman (2008), using household data for 
2005, show that the incidence of poverty among people 
aged 60 and over in Brazil would increase by some 
4% to 64% in the case of men, and by 16% to 83% in 
the case of women, if pension income were not taken 
into account. Cotlear and Tornarolli (2009) compare 
poverty rates with and without pensions for two major 
age groups (60 and over, and under 15) for a number of 
Latin American countries. They report that Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Uruguay are the countries where 
pensions have the greatest impact on poverty among 
older persons. Public transfers have only a minor impact 
on poverty levels in Colombia, Mexico and Paraguay. 
The impacts tend to be greater in rural areas, where 
non-contributory pensions account for a major part of 
household income. 
In a more recent document, Turra and Rocha (2010) 
use an age-period-cohort model to distinguish effects 
associated with historical changes (cohort effects) and 
contemporaneous changes (period effects) on poverty 
rates among children and older persons in Brazil. The 
findings suggest that poverty reduction in these two 
dependent age groups happens in two different ways. 
Among older people, period effects predominate and 
are probably associated with the expansion of social 
benefits (public pensions), which is consistent with 
the National Transfer Accounts estimates presented 
above. As for children, the long-term effects related to 
gradual changes in the cohorts’ life trajectories (such 
as changes in parents’ educational levels and in the 
support relationship within the household) played a 
preponderant role during most of the observation period. 
This explains why poverty reduction has been slower 
among children. In the 2000s, period effects accelerated 
poverty reduction, coinciding with increases in the real 
minimum wage, and the development and expansion of 
the Bolsa Família programme.
Ros (2009), in a broad study comparing 12 Latin 
American countries, uses cross-sectional data to estimate 
the relative contribution of changes in the demographic 
dependency ratio, income inequality, levels of public 
social spending and economic growth to the recent 
drops in poverty rates. The results show that, on average, 
reductions in the demographic dependency ratio have a 
much greater positive impact on poverty levels than other 
factors do. The declines in poverty (and consequently 
in income inequality) in smaller households (with low 
proportions of dependent children) are probably larger in 
the early stages of the demographic transition. In countries 
where the fertility rate has already fallen to low levels, 
there is little scope for additional direct impacts from 
185Social Panorama of Latin America • 2010
the demographic transition. Unfortunately, Ros (2009) 
does not distinguish the effects of social spending and 
the other independent variables by age or cohort. The 
results of the analysis are therefore not comparable with 
those of other studies in that regard (for example, Turra 
and Rocha, 2010).
Despite researchers’ growing interest in issues 
relating to public transfers by age and income level, few 
studies look at the role of intergenerational transfers 
relating to age and socio-economic level at the same 
time, although research in this area has been growing. 
Turra and Queiroz (2005), for example, analysed 
intergenerational transfer systems in Brazil by socio-
economic level, finding different patterns for public 
and private transfers in different subgroups defined 
by the educational level of the head of household. 
The analysis showed that consumption by children 
of higher socio-economic levels depends mainly on 
private transfers, whereas consumption by children at 
lower socio-economic levels depends more on public 
transfers, particularly in education. In contrast, it was 
public transfers, mainly social security and health-
care benefits, that contributed the most to funding 
consumption by older persons regardless of socio-
economic level.
Turra, Holz and Cotlear (2009) observed the 
incidence of public spending by five-year age groups 
and by income quintile on social sectors in Brazil and 
Chile. They found interesting patterns in absolute 
progressivity (social spending by socio-economic 
group) in both countries. Their findings show that 
public spending is neutral in the case of education, 
slightly progressive in the case of health care (more 
favourable to the low-income quintiles) and strongly 
regressive in the case of public pensions (favouring 
higher-income quintiles). This last shows that in Brazil 
and Chile there is a strong correlation between spending 
targeting older persons and spending targeting wealthy 
people, which is consistent with the idea that, although 
all older persons receive something from the public 
sector, there is still much inequality in the distribution 
of resources to that age group.
The remainder of this section will discuss the 
incidence of public spending by age group and socio-
economic level in Brazil and Chile, assessing the results 
by sectoral composition (social security, education and 
health care). The analysis complements the existing 
literature by looking jointly at social spending and 
taxation and presenting a comparative analysis of two 
Latin American countries.
2. Public transfers by age and educational level
Section B grouped the population by age and examined 
the resource flows between age groups, using data from 
the National Transfer Accounts project. This section will 
extend the National Transfer Accounts methodology 
in order to estimate resource flows between socio-
economic groups, dividing the population by age and by 
the educational level of the head of household, in order 
to analyse transfers from the public sector among these 
groups.6 Household survey microdata are combined 
with administrative records to estimate per capita age 
profiles for public transfers at each socio-economic level 
(for an explanation of the methodology, see box IV.3). 
Unfortunately, such estimates in the National Transfer 
Accounts project are not yet more widely available, 
which is why the findings in this section are restricted 
to the cases of Brazil and Chile.
6 The educational categories were: (a) no formal schooling; (b) 1 to 
8 years of schooling; (c) 9 to 15 years of schooling; and (d) 16 or 
more years of schooling.
Figure IV.11 shows the distribution of the population 
of Brazil and Chile by age and level of education of 
the head of household. The major transformation that 
has occurred in these societies is evident. Around 
30% of older persons in Brazil live in households 
where the head of household has no formal education. 
Among Brazilian children, however, this proportion 
is only 15%. In Chile, 60% of older persons live in 
households where the head of household has fewer 
than eight years of formal education, but only 35% of 
Chilean children live in such households. As population 
ageing progresses in these societies, the distribution 
of workers (and, eventually, of older persons) by 
level of education will shift markedly towards higher 
educational levels, with profound economic and 
social consequences.
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Figure IV.11 
POPULATION BY AGE GROUP AND YEARS OF SCHOOLING  































































































































16 years or more9 to 15 years  1 to 8 years  Less than 1 year
A. Brazil, 2003
B. Chile, 2006
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of data from the Brazilian National Household Survey (PNAD), 2003, in 
the case of Brazil, and from the National Socio-economic Survey (CASEN) 
2006, in the case of Chile.
While inequality in these societies has been well 
documented using measurements such as poverty rates 
and income levels, data from National Transfer Accounts 
can show inequality in per capita consumption throughout 
the life cycle. Figure IV.12 shows annual per capita 
consumption by age and by the level of education of 
the head of household in Brazil and Chile, in relation to 
consumption by the group with the highest educational 
level (those with 16 or more years of schooling). In both 
countries, those living in households headed by a person 
with nine to 15 years’ schooling consume, on average, 
less than half (40% to 50%) of what is consumed by 
members of households where the head of household has 
at least 16 years’ schooling. The differences are sharper 
still at lower educational levels. In Brazil, those living 
in households whose head has no formal education 
consume a fifth of what is consumed by those living 
in households whose head has 16 years or more of 
schooling. This difference is greater still in Chile, with 
the first group consuming only a tenth of the amount 
consumed by individuals in households whose head 
has 16 or more years of formal education. These major 
differences persist throughout the life cycle, underscoring 
the impact of education on the opportunities available 
to people throughout their lives.
Figure IV.12 
ANNUAL PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION BY AGE GROUP AND YEARS 
OF SCHOOLING OF THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD RELATIVE TO 










































































































16 years or more9 to 15 years  1 to 8 years  Less than 1 year
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of data from the Family Budgets Survey (POF), 2006/2007, in the case 
of Brazil, and the Budgeting and Expenditure Survey (EPG), 2006/2007, in 
the case of Chile.
a Per capita private consumption includes consumption in the areas of health care, 
education, durables and others.
Understanding the role of public transfers in this 
unequal pattern of consumption during the life cycle 
requires examination of the benefits received and the 
taxes paid by age and educational level. The analysis 
begins by looking at the absolute incidence of public 
spending by age and educational level. The results for 
Brazil and Chile are shown in figure IV.13. As discussed 
in section B, public transfers for older persons are 
substantial in both countries, and especially in Brazil. 
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In the four educational groups considered, older persons 
receive the highest benefits. For example, at the lowest 
educational level, the per capita benefits in the 80-84 age 
group in Brazil are five times higher than in the 10-14 
age group. This bias towards public spending targeting 
older persons is significantly greater for the group with 
the highest education level, where per capita benefits 
in the 80-84 age group are 45 times higher than in the 
10-14 age group. The results for Chile show that in the 
group with the lowest level of education, the ratio is three 
times more benefits for older persons than for young 
people. As in Brazil, the difference tends to increase 
along with socio-economic level and is 15 times larger 
for the group with the highest level of education.
Figure IV.13 
PER CAPITA PUBLIC SOCIAL BENEFITS BY AGE GROUP AND 












































































16 years or more9 to 15 years  1 to 8 years  Less than 1 year
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of data from the Brazilian National Household Survey (PNAD), 2003, 
in the case of Brazil, and the Household Quality of Life Survey, 2006, in the 
case of Chile.
a Per capita public social benefits include public spending on education, health care 
and pensions.
The same data show how spending on each age 
group is distributed according to educational levels. 
Figure IV.14 shows per capita public spending by age 
and educational group in relation to the highest-educated 
group. In both countries, absolute progressivity is greater 
for children. In Brazil, per capita public spending on 
children in the lowest-educated group is 3.5 to 4.5 times 
higher than for children in the highest-educated group. In 
Chile the gap is narrower but still considerable, ranging 
from 1.5 to 2.4 times. With rising educational levels, 
absolute progressivity diminishes and public spending 
eventually becomes regressive, with higher benefits for 
the groups with the most years of schooling. In Brazil, 
the turning point where spending becomes regressive is 
at age 45. In the 80-84 age group, benefits in comparison 
with the group with the highest educational level stand 
at 0.26 for the lowest-educated group and around 0.6 
for the second-highest group. The turning point occurs 
somewhat later in Chile, in the 50-54 age group, and public 
spending on older persons is generally less regressive 
than in Brazil. The ratios in Chile are between 0.42 and 
0.71 in the 80-84 age group.
Figure IV.14 
PER CAPITA PUBLIC SOCIAL BENEFITS BY AGE GROUP 
AND YEARS OF SCHOOLING OF THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD, 
RELATIVE TO PER CAPITA BENEFITS RECEIVED BY 































































9 to 15 years  1 to 8 years  Less than 1 year
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of data from the Brazilian National Household Survey (PNAD), 2003, in 
the case of Brazil, and the National Socio-economic Survey (CASEN) 2006, 
in the case of Chile.
Note: Per capita public social benefits include public spending on education, health 
care and pensions.
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For the life cycle as a whole, the educational 
levels attained during childhood and youth clearly help 
determine the share of public spending received later 
in life. It is not only a matter of regressive distribution 
of university education in the corresponding age group; 
this regressivity is more strongly reflected later in the 
life cycle, especially because the attainment of higher 
educational levels by young people will lead to greater 
access to social security during their working lives 
and thus to higher returns from social security when 
they are older. Chapter III showed the high incidence 
of social security in public social spending, which 
means greater resources not only for older persons 
but also for those who received more education when 
younger. Chapter II showed the strong correlation 
between household socio-economic level and children’s 
educational achievement level. Thus, there is a vicious 
circle of inequality throughout the life cycle, since the 
poorer children and young people will receive less 
education, will obtain less well-paid and more informal 
employment, and will receive a lower proportion of 
social security benefits later in life.
What explains these differences? In order to 
form a fuller picture, public transfers received by 
each educational and age group were broken down 
into three areas: education, health care and social 
security. Figure IV.15 shows per capita public education 
benefits by age and educational group in relation to 
the highest-educated group. In the 5-14 age group 
in Brazil, individuals at the lowest educational level 
receive 2.5 to 4 times more public education transfers 
than those in the highest educational level; this pattern 
has already been described (see Turra and Queiroz, 
2005). There is a turning point in the 15-19 age group, 
where the incidence of per capita public spending in 
the richest group becomes higher. The pattern in Chile 
is very similar.
The reason for this pattern is that children from 
the lowest socio-economic level generally depend on 
publicly-funded education at the primary and secondary 
levels, whereas children from the higher socio-economic 
levels usually attend private primary and secondary 
schools. Levels of investment in education for these 
children are considerably higher at early stages of 
the life cycle. It is therefore unsurprising that these 
children are much more likely to attend publicly-funded 
universities, which select their students on the basis of 
competitive examinations. Governments invest heavily 
in public universities. In Brazil, for example, public 
spending per student at the university level is 14 times 
higher than at the primary education level.
Figure IV.15 
PER CAPITA PUBLIC EDUCATION BENEFITS BY AGE GROUP 
AND YEARS OF SCHOOLING OF THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD, 
RELATIVE TO PER CAPITA BENEFITS RECEIVED BY THE  























































16 years or more9 to 15 years  1 to 8 years  Less than 1 year
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of data from the Brazilian National Household Survey (PNAD), 2003, in 
the case of Brazil, and the National Socio-economic Survey (CASEN) 2006, 
in the case of Chile.
a  Per capita public education benefits include public spending on preschool, primary, 
secondary and tertiary education.
Despite strong public-sector participation in education, 
there are wide differences in education investment (public 
and private) between the different educational groups. 
Figure IV.16 shows total per capita spending on education 
in Brazil and Chile for the four educational groups. In 
both countries, the amount invested in the education of a 
child in the highest socio-economic group is, on average, 
more than twice that invested in a child from the second-
highest socio-economic group —and more than triple 
that invested in a child from the lower socio-economic 
groups. These major differences in education investment 
are probably an important factor in lifelong inequality for 
these children, perpetuating the high levels of inequality 
observed in these societies.
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Figure IV.16 
TOTAL PER CAPITA EDUCATION SPENDING, BY AGE GROUP AND 
YEARS OF SCHOOLING OF THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD a
A. Brazil, 2003
(reais at 2003 prices)
B. Chile, 2006 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of data from the Brazilian National Household Survey (PNAD), 2003 
and Family Budgets Survey (POF), 2006/2007, in the case of Brazil, and the 
National Socio-economic Survey (CASEN) 2006, in the case of Chile.
a Total per capita education spending includes public and private spending on preschool, 
primary, secondary and tertiary education.
As for the progressivity of public spending 
on health care, the conclusions are different (see 
figure IV.17). While in public education there is a clear 
tipping point towards a more regressive system during 
adulthood, spending on the public health-care system is 
progressive at almost all ages. In Brazil, children and 
older persons in the group with the lowest educational 
level mostly depend on the public health-care system and 
the per capita benefits are always higher for the groups 
with the lowest educational level. Some caution is needed 
when working with these estimates because they do not 
break down costs according to the type of health care. 
People in the groups with the most education tend to 
demand more expensive treatments in the public health-
care sector than those in the lowest education group, so 
the system may be less progressive than the observations 
seem to indicate. The public health-care system in Chile 
appears less progressive than that of Brazil. In fact, in the 
highest age groups (85 and over), those from the group 
with the highest level of education receive more in public 
health-care benefits than any other group. 
Figure IV.17 
PER CAPITA PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE BENEFITS BY AGE GROUP 
AND YEARS OF SCHOOLING OF THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD, 
RELATIVE TO PER CAPITA BENEFITS RECEIVED BY THE  

















































































































16 years or more9 to 15 years  1 to 8 years  Less than 1 year
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of data from the Brazilian National Household Survey (PNAD), 2003, in 
the case of Brazil, and the National Socio-economic Survey (CASEN) 2006, 
in the case of Chile.
a Per capita health-care benefits include public spending on hospital and non-hospital 
health services.
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Lastly, figure IV.18 contrasts per capita public spending 
on social security among the various education groups. The 
generosity of the pay-go pension scheme in Brazil, particularly 
for to the highest education groups, is the reason why public 
transfers are higher not only among the older people but also 
among the richest. These differences may be due to higher 
labour income during people’s working lives (a determining 
factor for benefits) among those with higher educational 
levels, in addition to the high proportion of public-sector 
professionals who belong to this group (and who therefore 
3. Net public transfers and taxation
The following analysis focuses on tax incidence: in particular, 
the capacity of each age group and socio-economic group 
to contribute to total government tax receipts. Although 
the relative capacity to pay taxes is generally measured 
in relation to income, this analysis will estimate taxes 
in relation to private consumption, which offers a better 
measurement of capacity at ages when income is close to 
zero, such as during childhood. Figure IV.19 shows that 
there are no great differences in rates of taxation (as a 
percentage of private consumption) by socio-economic 
level up to age 19. This is because most taxes paid at that 
age are taxes on consumption. Among older persons the 
rate of taxation drops sharply in all educational groups 
in both countries, contrasting with increases in social 
spending on those age groups. The strong net fiscal impact 
of older persons is therefore the product of rising public 
benefits and falling rates of taxation. In Brazil and Chile, 
adults pay the majority of taxes. Among adults, groups 
with high educational levels pay significantly higher taxes 
than those with low educational levels; this is mostly due 
to taxes on labour income and on capital. In the 60-64 
age group, the category with the highest educational level 
in Brazil pays, in relative terms, three times more than 
the group with the lowest level. There are also marked 
differences in Chile, although they appear to be smaller 
for intermediate educational groups owing to the low 
relative weight of income taxes as a proportion of the 
total taxes that they pay.
enjoy an income replacement rate close to 100%). Social 
security benefits for older persons are also regressive in Chile, 
although less markedly so than in Brazil. With time, public 
pensions are expected to decrease significantly for the highest 
education group, as workers in this group retire under the 
new pension system of State-mandated private retirement 
accounts. Pension benefits are more progressive among 
younger people (aged under 50), particularly in Chile. This 
is probably due to a higher level of non-contributory benefits 
received by groups having lower educational levels.
Figure IV.18 
PER CAPITA PUBLIC PENSION BENEFITS BY AGE GROUP AND YEARS OF SCHOOLING OF THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD,  

















































































1 to 8 years  Less than 1 year
Age
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the Brazilian National Household Survey (PNAD), 2003, in the case of 
Brazil, and the National Socio-economic Survey (CASEN) 2006, in the case of Chile.
a Per capita public spending on pensions includes contributory and non-contributory pensions from all public-sector institutions (including the armed forces).
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Figure IV.19 
RATE OF TAXATION: PER CAPITA TAXES RELATIVE TO  
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16 years or more9 to 15 years  1 to 8 years  Less than 1 year
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of data from the Brazilian National Household Survey (PNAD), 
2003 and Family Budgets Survey (POF), 2006/2007, in the case of Brazil, 
and the National Socio-economic Survey (CASEN) 2006 and Budgeting and 
Expenditure Survey (EPG), 2006/2007, in the case of Chile.
a Total taxation includes taxes on income, capital and consumption. The rate of 
taxation is the result of dividing total per capita taxes by pewr capita consumption 
for each age group.
To show the fiscal impact on the various socio-
economic groups, figure IV.20 compares net transfers 
(public benefits received minus taxes paid), by age group 
and level of education of the head of household. In both 
countries, the group with the lowest level of education 
is a net recipient of public transfers at all ages; that is, 
it receives more in benefits than it pays in taxes. Social 
spending in both countries is funded by of working-age 
adults in the highest educational groups, through their net 
tax payments. As the transition towards higher educational 
levels continues in the two countries, the distribution of 
the working-age population will tend towards higher 
educational levels, and the same will occur in relation to 
the population of older persons as new, better-educated 
cohorts grow older. The fiscal impact of this change is 
clearly apparent in the data. If the current structure of 
taxes and benefits remains, the educational change in the 
working-age population will tend to boost tax receipts; 
the educational change in the highest age groups will tend 
to increase the payout of social benefits.
Figure IV.20 
PER CAPITA NET PUBLIC TRANSFERS BY AGE GROUP AND 
YEARS OF SCHOOLING OF THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD a
B. Chile, 2006
(pesos at 2006 prices)
A. Brazil, 2003
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16 years or more9 to 15 years  1 to 8 years  Less than 1 year
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of data from the Brazilian National Household Survey (PNAD), 
2003 and Family Budgets Survey (POF), 2006/2007, in the case of Brazil, 
and the National Socio-economic Survey (CASEN) 2006 and Budgeting and 
Expenditure Survey (EPG) 2006/2007, in the case of Chile.
a Per capita net public transfers are calculated as the difference between benefits 
received from the State and taxes paid.
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D. Conclusions
The international review of the generational economy presented in the foregoing sections has 
identified a number of particular characteristics of the economies of Latin America. One of 
the most notable concerns the low levels of consumption among children and young people 
associated with low levels of public investment in these population groups. The analysis showed 
that in the highest-income economies the State plays a fundamental part in providing support 
to children and young people and that public transfers make up almost half of consumption 
by these age groups. Support is provided mostly in the form of publicly-funded education. 
Naturally, this may not be the only possible route to the high investment levels needed in 
modern economies. In many Asian countries, education is mainly funded by families, with 
relatively low levels of State participation. This route to development, however, appears to be 
open only to economies with low levels of income inequality, where a sizeable middle class 
has the means to pay for quality education for its children. 
In the case of Latin America, the high levels of inequality 
that still persist in these societies call for strong State 
involvement to provide the necessary investment for 
the development of young people. That investment, as 
mentioned earlier in this document, should take account 
not only of aspects related to formal education, but also 
the full spectrum of the development of children and 
young people, including investment in families in order 
to provide a favourable environment for development. 
Investment in education can help reduce inequality and 
can also help prepare for rapid population ageing, which 
is imminent. In a recent study, Lee and Mason (2009) 
found that investments in education can compensate for 
the negative economic effects of population ageing. It 
seems clear that the current inaction of the governments of 
the region will have considerable long-term consequences 
when they are faced with growing fiscal and economic 
pressure resulting from population ageing in a context 
of considerable social inequality.
 National transfer accounts are a particularly useful 
instrument for contributing to public policy discussions 
and increasing governments’ capacity to take action, 
providing a comprehensive and consistent measurement of 
the considerable and increasingly vital role of governments 
in the provision of financial support to young people and 
older persons. They also enable governments to monitor 
the impact of their policies and evaluate the effects of all 
taxation and public expenditure programmes. National 
transfer accounts also provide governments with a 
comprehensive view of the functions of other economic 
agents (the financial market, the family, civil society) in 
providing support to young people and older persons. 
The fact that the National Transfer Accounts project 
involves a diverse group of countries provides space for 
an international exchange of experience, for example, in 
terms of public policies and their impact on the well-being 
of young people and older persons.
National transfer accounts are also a flexible tool that 
can encompass other key social dimensions in addition 
to age. This is true, for example, of the methodology 
which is being developed for measuring the generational 
economy by socio-economic levels. Section C of this 
chapter showed the usefulness of this approach in 
the case of Brazil and Chile. The levels of inequality 
present in those two economies are well known, but 
National Transfer Accounts show that reality in a new 
light, underlining the major differences in terms of 
consumption and investment in the education of young 
people, as well as the long-term consequences of low 
investment in education.
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Socio-economic levels for individuals are 
measured by the level of education of the 
head of household. This measurement is 
strongly correlated with the household’s 
overall socio-economic level, and is 
preferred to other indicators (such as 
income or wealth) because it provides 
better comparability between age groups. 
Levels of education are classified into four 
categories: no formal education, 1 to 8 
years’ education, 9 to 15 years’ education 
and 16 or more years of education. Since 
a relatively high number of observations 
are needed to avoid stochastic errors in the 
estimates, economic flows are calculated 
by five-year age groups. 
In the case of Brazil, household 
surveys are used: the Brazilian National 
Household Survey (PNAD) for 2003 and 
the Family Budgets Survey (POF) for 
2002-2003. PNAD has been applied every 
year in Brazil (except in census years) 
since the late 1970s; it contains a broad 
and comparable set of demographic and 
economic variables. In 2003, 384,834 people 
in 133,255 households were interviewed 
for PNAD. The sample is representative 
of the population at the national level, 
except for the population of rural areas 
in the country’s northern states. POF is 
a household budget survey conducted in 
1987-1988, 1995-1996, 2002-2003 and 
then in 2008-2009. The 2002-2003 POF 
comprises data from a representative 
sample of the total population comprising 
48,470 households interviewed over a 
period of 12 months.
In the case of Chile, data from two 
household surveys are combined: the 
National Socio-economic Survey (CASEN) 
2007 and the Budgeting and Expenditure 
Survey (EPG) 2006/2007. CASEN is a 
nationwide representative survey which 
has been conducted every two years 
since 1985. It includes a complete set 
of socio-economic variables and is used 
for producing estimates of poverty and 
inequality in Chile. The sample for 2007 
comprised 268,673 persons in 73.720 
households. EPG is a household budget 
survey conducted in the principal regional 
capitals in Chile; it has been conducted 
every 10 years since 1987.
In addition to the household survey 
data, administrative information is used for 
both countries, yielding aggregate values for 
total taxation and public spending on health 
care, education and social security.
Public health-care spending is allocated 
on the basis of usage rates by age group 
and socio-economic level from PNAD 
(Brazil) and CASEN (Chile). PNAD reflects 
individual persons who report having 
made use of hospital and non-hospital 
medical services provided by the public 
sector during the reference period. It is 
assumed that the users generate the 
same per capita cost within each type of 
health care. Administrative information 
from the Ministry of Health is therefore 
used to determine total public spending in 
these two broad categories. In Chile, rates 
of use are estimated by type of care (for 
example, hospitalization or surgery) and 
by financial modality (without payment or 
with co-payment). Then the average cost 
is assigned to each type of care, using 
administrative data.
Public spending on education in Brazil 
and Chile is estimated on the basis of 
enrolment rates by age group and socio-
economic level for children and adults who 
report, in PNAD and CASEN, that they 
are enrolled in publicly-funded schools. 
To allocate spending in accordance with 
administrative data, the calculation takes into 
account variations in the cost per student 
by level of education and the distribution 
of students between the levels.
Pension profiles by age group and 
socio-economic level are estimated on the 
basis of data from PNAD and CASEN, in 
relation to amounts received in the form 
of benefits during the reference period. 
Unfortunately, in neither country is it 
possible to distinguish between types of 
benefits (for example, survivor’s and old 
age benefits), or between social security 
systems (such as general pension systems 
and systems for public employees). To 
control for discrepancies between the 
weighted amount of benefits and the 
actual cost of these programmes, the 
data are adjusted to reproduce the official 
aggregate values.
Estimating taxation profiles by age 
group and socio-economic level involves 
several steps. First, taxes are classified 
in accordance with the category to which 
they refer. Then, for Brazil, it is assumed 
that (i) taxes on wages and income 
are applied to taxable labour income, 
and they are estimated by applying the 
2003 rate to the information on labour 
income (PNAD); (ii) taxes on gains are 
on capital income, estimated using data 
on owners of assets (POF); (iii) taxes 
on production and consumption are on 
private consumption, estimated using 
individual and household-level data on 
private consumption (POF); (iv) property 
taxes are on taxable property estimated 
on the basis of information on vehicle 
and dwelling ownership (POF); and 
(v) other taxes are on taxable labour 
income. Social security contributions are 
estimated directly from PNAD. 
The method for Chile is basically 
the same, although some changes were 
made to capture specific characteristics 
of the Chilean taxation system and the 
availability of data. It is therefore assumed 
that (i) capital taxes refer to a combination 
of information from entrepreneurs and 
owners of assets (CASEN); (ii) other 
taxes on production are on labour and 
capital income estimated on the basis of 
survey data (CASEN); (iii) local taxes are 
estimated on the basis of information from 
entrepreneurs and the owners of assets, 
such as real estate (CASEN); (iv) taxes on 
consumption are estimated using individual 
and household-level information on private 
consumption (EPG); and (v) taxes on 
wages, pensions and social contributions 
apply to formal workers and recipients of 
public social security.
On the basis of the classifications 
described above, and using aggregate 
values from administrative data, taxation 
profiles by age group and socio-economic 
group were adjusted to the official aggregate 
for each type of tax.
Box IV.3 
METHODOLOGICAL NOTES ON ESTIMATING NATIONAL TRANSFER ACCOUNTS BY  
AGE GROUP AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC LEVEL
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from national transfer accounts studies.
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Lastly, national transfer accounts provide a basis 
for governments’ long-term fiscal projections. Generally 
speaking, these projections anticipate the significant 
economic changes which will be brought about by the 
slow but inexorable advance of various social forces, such 
as population ageing, the epidemiological transition or 
changes in educational levels.7 
Long-term projections are important for governments 
for at least two key reasons. First, policy options with greater 
rates of return (such as investment in public education) 
tend to take a relatively long time between implementing
7 The epidemiological transition is a change, largely caused by 
population ageing, where acute illnesses, more common among 
children, give way to chronic and degenerative diseases, more 
common among older persons, as main causes of morbidity and 
mortality. For further details, see ECLAC/CELADE (2010). 
the policy and obtaining the results. Approaches 
essentially based on short-term policies are more at 
risk from mistaken or less effective decision-making, 
which generally fails to take account of the full scope 
of longer-term investments such as those designed 
to increase skills development. Second, a long-term 
approach fosters marginal changes and corrections in 
policy that are politically more feasible to implement. 
These avoid imposing an unfair burden on any particular 
generation and enable smooth fiscal and public-spending 
policy transitions.
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Chapter V
Public transfers early in the life cycle:  
a major challenge in the effort to  
combat inequality across time
A. Social deficits associated with life-cycle stages 
Poverty in Latin America is highly concentrated in the early stages of life. The large share 
of family spending that goes on child and youth development and the low share of public 
transfers to these generations combine with stratified educational attainments and learning to 
foster the intergenerational reproduction of inequality and social vulnerability. Three types of 
measures are proposed to address this: cash transfers to households with children aged 0 to 
14 to improve the environment for child socialization (nutrition, housing, clothing); funding 
to cover the ongoing costs of extending the education and care system to uncovered 0- to 
17-year-olds; and a range of cash transfers combined with employment and training services 
targeting vulnerable young people who are on their way to becoming emancipated adults  
(15 to 24 years of age).
If progress is to be made with the equality agenda, it is essential 
for the State to lead the way in several areas. As noted earlier 
in this document, it basically falls to the State to decouple 
children’s and young people’s educational attainments and 
learning from their socio-economic background and to 
foster greater convergence of these attainments throughout 
society. The State must also seek to close labour market 
gaps and reduce vulnerability to various risks through active 
employment and wage policies and by means of clearly 
redistributive public transfers throughout the life cycle.
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The welfare State model shows that universal, 
non-market-based policies achieve the greatest 
systemic impact in terms of progressive redistribution of 
opportunities and assets and of access to well-being. This 
can also include selective transfers to more vulnerable 
groups, where the guiding principle is not targeting but 
precisely the development of more egalitarian conditions 
in society as a whole.1
This chapter presents options for public transfers 
to vulnerable sectors during childhood and youth and 
provides cost estimates for the universalization of education 
coverage, based on evidence given in preceding chapters. 
In Latin America, States and the transfers they make have 
little influence on the consumption structures of families 
with children and adolescents. As seen in chapter IV, 
which discusses generational balances and transfers, the 
consumption needs of 0- to 19-year-olds in countries such 
as Finland, Hungary, Japan and Norway are met almost 
equally by family transfers and State transfers. In countries 
like Germany and Spain, 35% to 40% of this age group’s
1 ECLAC (2009), Filgueira (2007 and 2009), Filgueira, Papadópulos 
and Tobar (2005) and Kaztman (1999) discuss the role of the State 
in providing certain basic goods outside the market and offer 
descriptions of welfare regimes in Latin America.
consumption needs are met by the State. By contrast, 
in Latin America (for those countries on which data are 
available) the average is no more than 20%. Indeed, in all 
the Latin American countries reviewed, more than 70% 
of consumption by people in this age group (including 
types of consumption that are vital to the development of 
capabilities, such as nutrition, health care and education) 
is provided for by their families or their own labour. These 
transfers are therefore patterned on the unequal structure 
of primary family income or on the earnings of children 
and young people who work.
It should thus come as no surprise that inequality 
persists despite public transfers targeting families with 
children and young people. This constraint is compounded 
by education systems, which absorb a large share of the 
public transfers targeting the youngest population segment, 
but are ineffective in reversing underlying structures of 
inequality. In short, the region faces enormous challenges 
in the effort to harness the redistributive role of the State 
and its capacity to combat inequality over time.
Table V.1 
LATIN AMERICA: MEASURES PROPOSED TO COMBAT INEQUALITY EARLY IN THE LIFE CYCLE
Life-cycle stage Problem to be addressed or prevented Type of transfer
Early childhood 
(ages 0 to 4 or 5)
Inequities strongly determined early in life, inability 
of households to provide certain basic resources 
such as nutrition, early cognitive development and 
psychosocial development.
Cash transfers to vulnerable households equivalent to 1 poverty 
line per child aged 0 to 4 and 1.5 poverty lines in the case of single-
parent households.
Investment in the care and education systems equivalent to the 
current monthly operating cost at the level concerned, times the 
number of children at the official age for that cycle who are not 
attending.
Cash transfers to vulnerable households equivalent to 0.5 poverty 
lines per child aged 5 to 14 and 0.75 poverty lines for single-parent 
households.
Intermediate stage 
(ages 4 or 5 to 14)
Persistence and entrenchment of inequality, regressive 
distribution of learning and attainment.
Investment in the education system equivalent to the current 
monthly operating cost at the level concerned, times the number 
of children at the official age for that cycle who are not attending 
school, to cover the cost of incorporating non-attending children. 
Although no estimate is provided, these costs should vary (increase) 
by educational attainment equalization goal (repetition, timely 
completion, learning, digital literacy).
Should be accompanied by heavy investment in primary and lower 
secondary education (starting with the former) to extend full school 
day coverage.
Start of emancipation
(ages 15  to 29)
Incomplete, low-quality emancipation process, 
crystallization of the tendency towards exclusion 
and intergenerational transmission.
Cash transfers to individuals in vulnerable households equivalent 
to the current monthly cost of upper secondary education. These 
transfers should operate as an incentive subsidy for institutional 
reaffiliation in education or vocational training (estimated for the 
population aged 15 to 24).
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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Given this situation, the countries should at least reflect 
on the advisability of implementing measures to address the 
predicament of the younger generations and their inadequate 
share of State transfers geared towards maintaining basic 
standards of well-being regardless of market status or 
family affiliation. Right from birth, a significant proportion 
of children in vulnerable households are set upon a life 
path that is very likely to reproduce their social status of 
origin and transmit it to ensuing generations. 
This idea is supported by the existence of three 
segmentation dynamics operating throughout childhood 
and youth that have been examined in preceding chapters 
and will now be summarized.
(i) Firstly, while progress has been made, the 
multidimensional methodology for measuring poverty 
shows that as of around 2007, 17.9% of children in 
Latin America were living in extreme poverty and 
45% in total poverty (with less severe deprivations). 
In six countries of the region, between about a third 
and half of all children lived in extreme poverty (at 
least one severe deprivation). Only in four countries 
was the figure below 10%.
Poverty means that children’s socialization has to 
take place in households with multiple deficiencies, at the 
very ages when they depend most on family resources. 
Because the market is the only mechanism available 
for obtaining needed resources, but is inaccessible to 
families, these resources must be secured either by 
redistributing income via transfers to these households 
that enable them to access market services, or by the 
State providing benefits and services directly. 
(ii) Secondly, chapter II of this publication shows that 
education systems in the region’s countries have not 
established themselves as powerful mechanisms for 
the equalization of opportunities. The very advances 
made with coverage, access and progression through 
cycles of education over the past few decades have 
gone together with greater stratification of learning and 
attainment by the socio-economic, ethnic and territorial 
(rural versus urban, and urban segregation) status of 
pupils’ households of origin. Chapter II showed that 
in addition to tremendous gaps in attainment between 
countries, there are striking inequalities between groups 
of children and young people within each country in 
terms of access to early childhood education (which 
is vital for early stimulation and preparation for 
subsequent cycles), the rate of progression through 
primary and secondary education, completion of the 
secondary cycle, access to post-secondary education 
and the quality of education available.
The following considerations concerning age 
subgroups are germane to the approach taken to education 
in the present chapter. To date, access to early childhood 
care and stimulation has generally been via private 
spending and the market. This limits the options of the 
vulnerable population at a key stage of development in 
terms of nutrition, psychomotor skills, protection and 
cognitive development. Virtually universal coverage at 
the primary school level is good news for the region, but 
the system is not addressing inequalities accumulated 
during the preschool stage or the socio-economic and 
educational conditions of children’s households of origin. 
This means that a high percentage of children from this 
age group in vulnerable sectors suffer from educational 
underperformance and low learning attainment and have 
no access to the language of ICT, making their progress 
through the system little more than a formality in some 
cases (Kaztman, 2010). So, while broadening coverage 
is a prerequisite for dealing with these issues, it must be 
accompanied by measures such as lengthening the school 
day and achieving greater quality convergence between 
private and publicly funded education.
Segregation and segmentation increase throughout 
secondary education. Completing secondary education 
is a vital gateway to greater employment opportunities 
that enable individuals to break free of poverty and 
exclusion and achieve upward social mobility. Moreover, 
this cycle is important because it is where the first steps 
towards emancipation are taken. Staying in the education 
system during this stage thus helps to keep young people 
from making a premature and unsatisfactory transition 
to autonomy. 
(iii) Thirdly, chapter I showed that the paths to emancipation 
and adulthood vary significantly between young people 
from different socio-economic strata. Premature and 
ill-prepared emancipation is common in low socio-
economic strata, whereas the socialization patterns 
of higher strata and the availability of material 
resources there favour the postponement of labour 
market entry, family formation and parenthood. 
Furthermore, the proportion of young people who 
are neither in school nor working is far higher in the 
lower socio-economic strata, with the resulting risks 
of social exclusion. For this group, the challenge is 
to create mechanisms that can reverse situations of 
disaffiliation through training or work.
Taken together, these points highlight the need to 
address a sequence of asset accumulation shortfalls that 
originate early in life (early childhood and the preschool 
cycle), structuring different attainment trajectories and 
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routes out of primary and secondary education and 
crystallizing and intensifying with emancipation and 
adulthood (end of the education cycle, emancipation 
from the household of origin, first job, family formation 
and reproduction). These incipient exclusion circuits thus 
need to be “switched off” in order to pre-empt irreversible 
processes of disaffiliation and marginalization that so 
starkly perpetuate the intergenerational reproduction 
of inequalities. To be consistent with the generational, 
life-cycle character of these issues, measures to address 
them must also be tailored to the different stages in life. 
That is what this chapter proposes.2
2 Risks associated with issues of sanitation and access to preventive 
and curative health care at different stages of the life cycle are not 
discussed in this chapter and are not among the subjects addressed 
in this issue of the Social Panorama.
This set of measures would comprise the following:
(i) Cash transfers equivalent to one poverty line for 
children aged 0 to 4, half a poverty line for children 
aged 5 to 14 and the equivalent of one month’s current 
upper secondary expenditure for young people aged 
15 to 24 who are neither in school nor working.3
(ii) A budgetary top-up at each educational level equivalent 
to current spending at that level for each child or 
young person of the official age for that cycle who 
is not attending school.4
The following sections of this chapter assess the cost 
and impact of these measures.5
3 Although the baseline age group for the emancipation stage is 15 
to 29, it was thought best to base the estimates on a modal group 
of the most disadvantaged socio-economic strata in the 15 to 24 
age range.
4 In this case, the amount allocated should be adjusted to reflect the 
level completed by the non-attending child or young person. For 
example, the cost calculated for a non-attending young person 
aged 15 to 17 will be equivalent to the monthly operating cost at 
the upper secondary level. Nonetheless, this young person might 
not have completed the lower secondary cycle. 
5 See ECLAC (2010a) for a direct precursor of this exercise.
B. Poverty, inequality and cash transfers:  
 costs and impacts
The simplest way to express gaps in well-being within 
countries is to start with the monetary gaps for poverty 
and indigence and the aggregate amounts that would be 
required to remedy them, as proportions  of current GDP, 
if they could be allocated perfectly to households below 
the poverty and indigence lines. This calculation cannot be 
used to break down the factors affecting the well-being gap 
(demography, distribution, employment and social spending), 
but it does provide an approximate absolute value for the 
population deemed to be poor and extremely poor. It also 
shows the magnitude of the additional expenditure that, if 
perfectly allocated to the relevant households, would be 
needed to eliminate these gaps.
1. Costing the measures
Activating and completing the proposed transfers involves varying levels of financial effort 
for the countries. In one group of countries, the costs are affordable at around 2% of GDP. For 
another they represent approximately 5% of GDP, while the third group would have to cope 
with a far higher fiscal burden necessitating a more gradual approach and additional sources of 
funding. This transfer regime would bring the poverty rate down by nearly 10 percentage points 
in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay, by nearly 30% in Nicaragua and by 25% in 
Guatemala. This means that in some countries poverty would fall to some two thirds of its current 
rate. Poverty would be nearly halved in countries with the highest poverty rates at present. 
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Table V.2 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): POVERTY AND INDIGENCE GAPS 
Country
Indigence
Year of  
measurement
Gap per person 
(in local currency)
Total annualized amount 
(millions of current dollars)
Indigence gap 
(percentage of GDP) 
Chile 2006 8 054.2 94.7 0.1
Uruguay 2008 413.7 27.3 0.1
Argentina 2006 52.5 358.3 0.2
Costa Rica 2008 10 855.2 62.6 0.2
Mexico 2008 228.5 2 848.4 0.3
Brazil 2008 41.9 3 850.2 0.3
Peru 2008 35.5 500.5 0.4
Panama 2008 17.1 93.2 0.4
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 2008 106.6 1 636.6 0.5
Ecuador 2008 14.1 423.1 0.8
Colombia 2005 39 620.5 1 788.4 1.2
El Salvador 2004 12.7 195.4 1.2
Dominican Republic 2008 782.8 578.4 1.3
Paraguay 2008 98 172.1 472.9 2.8
Guatemala 2006 147.1 874.8 2.9
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2007 88.9 417.0 3.2
Nicaragua 2005 158.9 185.1 3.8





Gap per person 
(in local currency)
Total annualized amount 
(millions of current dollars)
Indigence gap 
(percentage of GDP) 
Chile 2006 14 386.9 723.0 0.5
Uruguay 2008 903.8 238.8 0.7
Argentina 2006 108.4 2 138.9 1.0
Costa Rica 2008 17 406.6 298.6 1.0
Panama 2008 33.4 373.0 1.6
Mexico 2008 545.1 21 020.0 1.9
Brazil 2008 91.8 29 944.3 2.1
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 2008 187.2 8 007.7 2.6
Peru 2008 82.2 3 332.0 2.6
Ecuador 2008 29.8 2 114.4 3.9
Dominican Republic 2008 1 695.3 2 455.2 5.4
Colombia 2005 83 667.6 8 755.2 6.1
El Salvador 2004 27.5 1 059.1 6.7
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2007 186.6 1 517.7 11.6
Paraguay 2008 216 177.7 1 963.2 11.6
Guatemala 2006 334.7 3 752.6 12.4
Nicaragua 2005 376.5 850.1 17.4
Honduras 2007 787.6 2 604.3 21.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys from the countries concerned and GDP series. 
All cash transfer systems should take account of two 
factors that prevent them from being fully targetable. 
First, poverty is a discrete cut-off point on the household 
income scale at a given moment in time. The rationale for a 
guaranteed partial income system is to create a basic floor 
that does not depend on the labour market but provides 
a permanent cushion against economic and life cycles 
(even though it does not ensure an exit from poverty) and 
substantially mitigates economic privation.  
Second, the amounts allocated to each household 
are not calculated for each specific case. In other words, 
households’ individual or per capita income shortfall relative 
to the poverty line can be measured by a household survey, 
but this cannot be the basis for allocating the exact amount 
that would bring each household above the poverty line. 
What can be allocated is a standard amount that would bring 
some households above the poverty line and not others. 
In other words, a basic guaranteed partial income system 
for households with children and adolescents seeks not to 
remove poverty surgically but to decrease its likelihood 
systemically, prevent it from becoming permanent in 
individual households and lessen its structural severity. 
The mechanisms that are most direct and easiest to 
evaluate in terms of impacts and costs are income transfers 
for children aged 0 to 14 and transfers or subsidies for 
jobs and training for young people aged 15 to 24 who are 
neither in education nor working. In both cases, the cost 
and impact of these transfers is estimated on the basis 
that they are limited to the vulnerable population (those in 
households whose per capita income is below 1.8 poverty 
lines). As figure V.1 shows, the cost of such a system is 
easily affordable for one group of countries, represents a 
major effort for a second and requires a longer-term effort 
or more diversified funding sources for a third.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)200
Figure V.1 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): COST OF ALL CASH 
TRANSFERS TARGETING THE VULNERABLE POPULATION,  
BY AGE GROUP, AROUND 2008 a
(Percentages of GDP)
0.71 0.54 0.99 1.03 1.59 1.54
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of household surveys from the countries 
concerned and GDP series. 
a Data relate to 2004 for El Salvador, 2005 for Nicaragua, 2006 for Argentina, Chile 
and Guatemala and 2007 for Honduras and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. 
For Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay and, to 
a lesser extent, Brazil and Panama, the additional costs 
are manageable and affordable over a short period of 
time, representing some 2% of GDP. For the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador and Mexico, the effort is considerable (some 
5 percentage points of GDP or more). For Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia, lastly, it would clearly entail an unaffordable 
fiscal commitment. In such cases, a very selective, 
gradualist strategy would be needed for progress to be 
made with these schemes, and the option of mobilizing 
additional international cooperation resources should 
be considered.
These differences should come as no surprise, as 
the three country groups are situated very differently in 
terms of GDP and current levels of social spending and 
public revenue. For the countries with a higher degree of 
economic and social development, the transfers proposed 
here constitute a strategy for creating universal basic 
minimum incomes that fit in with an existing income 
transfer structure. For the intermediate countries it is a 
more ambitious undertaking that involves setting up a 
system of transfers to vulnerable population segments 
which was formerly non-existent or rudimentary. For 
the least developed countries, lastly, the proposal entails 
the creation of a welfare system from scratch or upon 
very partial foundations. 
The proposed transfers are costly. Coverage is not 
universal, although it is not limited to the poor as it 
encompasses a considerable proportion of the population 
and households (between 30% of the population in 
countries with fewer vulnerable people and nearly 80% 
in the poorest countries). These percentages are even 
greater when the child and adolescent population alone 
is considered, exceeding 50% of children aged 0 to 14 
in all cases. 
2. Impacts
Implementing and completing this transfer system would 
have very significant impacts in terms of poverty reduction, 
bringing the poverty rate down by nearly 10 percentage points 
in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay, by 
close to 30% in Nicaragua and by 25% in Guatemala. This 
means that the poverty rate would come down to some two 
thirds of its current level in countries like Chile and Uruguay 
and fall by more than half in the poorest countries.
The measures proposed would also reduce the poverty 
gap for people who would not actually exit poverty despite 
receiving the benefit. For those who did not exit poverty, 
the gap would narrow by between 20% and almost 45%. 
Where inequality is concerned, lastly, the Gini coefficient 
would come down by between 7% (in Brazil) and 24% 
(in Honduras).
These impacts would bring about substantial changes 
in the region’s societies: childhood and adolescence would 
no longer be the most vulnerable period or the one in 
which inequalities were reproduced and entrenched. These 
effects do not take account of improvements in poverty 
and inequality that would anyway be expected over time 
thanks to economic growth itself and the measures analysed 
here, or of their consequences for the life cycle and the 
intergenerational reproduction of well-being.
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C. Poverty, inequality, the education cycle  
 and the life cycle
Taking aim at inequality and poverty requires initiatives on at least three critical fronts: extending 
coverage in early childhood by means of early childhood care and education systems (between 
ages 0 and 4); completing the universalization of coverage at basic and lower secondary 
education ages (0 to 14); and working towards universal coverage among adolescents and 
young people of upper secondary age (15 to 17). All these targets, and the additional cost 
per student in each country and cycle, are within the reach of all of the region’s countries.  
In 15 of the 18 countries reviewed, the cost does not exceed one percentage point of GDP. 
It can be seen that this would signify an enormous increase in coverage at both ends of the 
education cycle (preschool and upper secondary), especially for the poor and vulnerable. 
Figure V.2 









































































































































Current poverty   Poverty after transfers
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys from the countries concerned and GDP 
projections.
a Data relate to 2005 for Nicaragua, 2006 for Argentina, Chile and Guatemala and 2007 for Honduras and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. 
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As already discussed here and in earlier issues of this 
publication (ECLAC, 2008a and ECLAC, 2009), addressing 
inequality and poverty via the education system involves, 
at the least, extending coverage in early childhood with 
early childhood care and stimulation systems (0 to 4 years 
of age), completing the universalization of basic and lower 
secondary education coverage (5 to 14) and working towards 
universal coverage for adolescents and young people in the 
upper cycle of secondary education (15 to 17).
How much would achieving these goals cost the 
countries of the region? Unlike the cash transfers discussed 
earlier, whose threshold for evaluation and determination 
of benefit levels is an officially decreed amount (the 
poverty line), the amounts involved here derive from a 
concrete situation, namely average expenditure per pupil 
by education systems in each country. This per capita cost 
estimation basis yields cost units that vary widely from 
country to country. For example, the chapter on social 
spending reports that public expenditure per primary and 
secondary pupil in the region’s countries ranges from a 
low of US$ 62 to a high of more than US$ 2,000. 
In countries where the cost is low, of course, the additional 
cost pressure from incorporating children and young people 
not currently enrolled will likewise be lower. In this case, 
the cost will not reflect the real effort required. Instead, it 
will underestimate that effort because the system in question 
does not currently invest enough per pupil. Where the per 
capita cost of the education system is sufficiently high, 
raising the level of expenditure, while necessary, should not 
be as pressing a requirement because there is likely to be 
some scope for making the current spending structure more 
efficient. In short, a low estimate of the cost of incorporating 
the unenrolled can actually mask inadequate investment per 
student. Conversely, an estimate that might seem high could 
be manageable within the margin provided by the current 
spending level. Again, basing estimates on per capita cost 
means that the current coverage of each education system 
must be considered. Hence, countries facing major coverage 
challenges will have to spend heavily to incorporate children 
and young people who are not currently enrolled. 
The estimates do not take account of the additional 
investments that expanding coverage would require. The 
cost per reincorporated child or young person is calculated 
by dividing total expenditure by the number of students 
enrolled. This amount includes investments planned for the 
period under review but not those that might be called for 
by a specific education quality improvement policy (such as 
the cost of lengthening the school day). The figure presented 
here, then, is the minimum cost of completing coverage at 
constant investment rates, because only current expenditure 
per pupil is considered. Creating the infrastructure and 
improved conditions that would turn system coverage 
into a real force for equality will require substantially 
heavier outlays. The cost of training human resources for 
educational services is not considered either.
A look at the results of the estimates shows that the 
additional costs estimated from spending per current pupil 
are affordable for all the countries in the region. Indeed, 
as figure V.3 shows, in 15 of the 18 countries reviewed 
they do not exceed one percentage point of GDP.
Figure V.3 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): COST OF INCORPORATING 
CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 0 TO 17 INTO THE 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of household surveys from the countries 
concerned and GDP series. 
a Data relate to 2004 for El Salvador, 2005 for Nicaragua, 2006 for Argentina, Chile 
and Guatemala and 2007 for Honduras and the Plurinational State of Bolivia.
These estimated costs cover the minimum required to 
ensure the system can operate with the new students. Figure 
V.4 shows, as an example, that the cost of universalizing 
primary education is almost marginal when compared with the 
percentage of students in each country who do not follow the 
extended school day, based on enrolment in publicly funded 
urban schools. It follows that the cost in infrastructure and 
human resources of extending the school day is far higher 
than that of universalizing coverage for the age group in this 
cycle. Extending the school day is one of the pending items 
on our countries’ agenda. This at least is what studies in this 
area seem to suggest, although findings vary (ANEP, 2005; 
Raczynski, 2001; García-Huidobro and Concha, 2009). 
1. Costing the measures
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Figure V.4 
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): COST OF UNIVERSALIZING SCHOOL ENROLMENT FOR CHILDREN AGED 6 TO 11 AND PERCENTAGE  
OF CHILDREN IN PUBLICLY FUNDED URBAN SCHOOLS WHO ARE NOT YET IN ALL-DAY EDUCATION, AROUND 2008  a















































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys from the countries concerned, special 
tabulations of microdata from the Second Regional Comparative and Explanatory Study (SERCE) and GDP series. 
a The data used to calculate costs are from 2004 in El Salvador, 2005 in Nicaragua and 2006 in Argentina, Chile and Guatemala.
2. Impacts
The impacts of the estimated spending required to 
incorporate children and young people into the education 
system differ in their logic from those of direct cash 
transfers. The challenge of incorporation is not equivalent 
to the cost. In other words, it would be difficult to relate 
incorporation directly to increased spending as its cause. 
It is a goal with political and social ramifications that 
transcend the financial aspect. Because the basic costs 
of incorporation are being discussed here, what can be 
examined are the gains they would deliver by bringing in 
children and young people who are not currently attending 
any educational establishment.  
Incorporation does not guarantee that everyone will 
progress satisfactorily or complete their schooling when 
they should, since what is considered is the official age 
of those who are not attending school irrespective of the 
level they have reached in the event of incorporation or 
re-enrolment. If a 15-year-old is not in school, in other 
words, what is estimated is the impact of incorporating 
that pupil, even if it is not at the appropriate level. The 
child might not be incorporated into the upper secondary 
cycle, despite being of the official age for this, if he or 
she has not completed the lower secondary cycle. This 
consideration aside, the first thing is to incorporate the 
child, and this means having resources available to expand 
coverage. The internal dynamics of the system that go to 
the heart of inequality can be addressed later.
Looking at either end of the education cycle (preschool 
and upper secondary) shows how enormously this would 
expand coverage, especially for the poor and vulnerable. Table 
V.3 shows the percentages of children and young people not 
attending school at these critical levels, by income decile, 
highlighting the coverage “gained” for all population deciles 
and the coverage resulting from a more gradual incorporation 
strategy limited to vulnerable households.
For the early childhood level, which is the most critical 
in the majority of countries, even gradual incorporation 
would benefit a very substantial portion of the corresponding 
age group in a large number of countries. In countries 
like El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, 
between three fourths and nearly 9 out of 10 children in 
the vulnerable deciles would be incorporated. 
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Table V.3 
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): NUMBER OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE NOT ATTENDING UPPER SECONDARY SCHOOL  
(AGES 15 TO 17) AND PRESCHOOL (AGES 3 TO 5), BY INCOME DECILE AND VULNERABILITY STATUS, AROUND 2008 a
(Percentages of each age group)
Country Education level
Income decile
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
Argentina Preschool 55.6 55.0 43.6 45.6 38.4 41.4 30.1 28.9 25.4 24.3
Upper secondary 25.2 25.5 23.1 20.9 18.5 13.4 11.8 7.8 10.7 4.6
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
Preschool 63.7 38.1 36.1 23.6 48.9 48.1 33.8 33.0 29.7 36.9
Upper secondary 32.7 16.2 15.5 17.3 13.5 11.8 11.5 9.0 7.1 14.7
Brazil Preschool 39.1 40.7 38.1 33.5 34.7 31.1 28.4 23.5 19.3 12.2
Upper secondary 22.3 19.4 20.5 20.3 17.9 17.6 14.0 12.7 8.2 5.9
Chile Preschool 43.4 44.7 44.3 38.3 36.1 37.3 35.0 35.4 32.9 23.1
Upper secondary 14.0 11.9 9.7 12.6 7.8 7.9 8.0 4.3 2.5 2.9
Colombia Preschool 56.1 55.5 56.4 51.6 53.8 50.3 44.8 43.6 36.1 24.3
Upper secondary 22.2 21.1 20.5 19.6 19.4 20.1 18.1 15.3 13.8 8.9
Costa Rica Preschool 71.7 67.1 69.3 72.2 76.2 67.1 70.2 67.0 48.0 30.9
Upper secondary 34.9 23.6 14.3 22.3 16.8 17.9 21.6 16.8 16.4 11.9
Ecuador Preschool 29.2 23.9 16.8 11.6 20.3 4.8 5.6 3.6 0.1 2.9
Upper secondary 29.7 33.7 30.1 31.7 30.5 25.2 24.8 19.4 15.3 8.8
El Salvador Preschool 73.9 65.0 71.9 64.1 63.6 63.6 55.8 51.7 46.4 36.4
Upper secondary 57.9 54.1 49.4 57.4 46.7 42.7 34.7 34.3 30.4 18.7
Guatemala Preschool 93.6 89.5 90.9 91.1 92.5 87.2 86.1 89.5 92.7 84.8
Upper secondary 71.0 71.8 67.8 57.4 64.7 54.6 52.1 41.0 29.5 17.7
Honduras Preschool 84.3 85.5 82.1 84.3 83.0 83.1 83.2 79.2 75.2 67.5
Upper secondary 63.6 67.8 58.5 51.3 47.4 38.4 38.7 35.0 24.8 17.1
Mexico Preschool 35.5 38.5 29.8 37.5 33.8 30.4 28.0 26.4 23.7 19.3
Upper secondary 47.8 46.3 42.0 42.0 37.6 42.7 28.7 30.0 17.4 12.3
Nicaragua Preschool 77.7 69.2 77.2 68.1 70.2 66.4 56.3 64.0 59.8 48.0
Upper secondary 48.5 48.1 45.2 43.5 51.2 27.2 32.8 29.0 23.5 9.7
Panama Preschool 29.3 32.8 33.7 31.7 22.7 21.3 19.9 12.5 7.1 2.4
Upper secondary 44.9 35.4 28.9 25.9 19.8 20.1 19.3 13.1 8.0 5.2
Paraguay Preschool 68.6 50.8 58.2 46.0 53.8 29.1 30.8 22.1 20.4 10.1
Upper secondary 53.5 40.8 27.4 27.2 32.1 28.2 13.6 23.8 11.9 16.0
Uruguay Preschool 33.3 30.8 30.4 30.3 27.1 27.0 22.8 17.3 12.7 6.6
Upper secondary 44.1 41.6 34.9 32.3 27.1 25.6 17.2 15.8 11.6 3.6
Venezuela  
(Bolivarian Republic of)
Preschool 41.5 42.1 39.9 35.4 35.6 32.7 28.5 26.7 25.1 23.4
Upper secondary 19.5 17.7 19.5 18.9 18.0 14.4 16.4 16.2 14.0 12.2
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys from the countries concerned. 
a Data relate to 2004 for El Salvador, 2005 for Nicaragua, 2006 for Argentina, Chile and Guatemala and 2007 for Honduras and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. For preschool age 
(3 to 5) in countries for which data on the entire age group was not available, the earliest age for the level was used, this being 5 in Ecuador, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay and 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia. The income data used to define deciles in the vulnerable population are from around 2007. The shaded areas indicate vulnerability (per capita 
income of 1.8 poverty lines or less). 
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D. Funding from an intertemporal perspective
This exercise should be treated with care because it does 
not consider alternative costs in other strategic social 
areas such as health care, social security or housing. What 
are discussed here are orders of magnitude for social 
investment in the younger generations and the fiscal 
leeway needed to address these challenges. The primary 
aim is to help define priorities and timing, not to map out 
a strict predetermined spending path.
The region’s countries have already allocated all 
their fiscal receipts to the various spending items, so 
implementing an additional transfer and coverage scheme 
is difficult (Jiménez, 2009). Generally speaking, their 
ability to address these shortcomings depends on the 
performance of the variables mentioned (growth, tax 
revenues, reallocation of spending and mobilization of 
external resources). 
Figure V.6 shows the fiscal space available to the 
countries over the next 10 years to cover the additional 
cost of the proposed measures. The economic growth rate 
is therefore assumed to be somewhat greater than 2% 
and, in countries whose GDP offers potential room for 
expanding the tax burden, the impact of that expansion (in 
annual increments) is shown. This projection does not take 
into account resources that might come from retargeting 
spending or from external cooperation. As can be seen, 
most of the countries could reach the break-even point 
before the end of the period, with a sizeable surplus after 
covering the deficit.
In the most optimistic scenarios (GDP growth combined 
with an expanding tax burden where this is possible), the 
countries of Latin America fall into three groups. The first 
comprises those whose revenues, measured in points of 
GDP, should be very close to (or exceed) the level required 
to fund the proposed measures by the end of 2012. This 
group includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Panama and Uruguay (Mexico lies between this group 
and the next on the basis of GDP growth alone, but would 
fall squarely into the first group if its tax burden were 
to increase). A second group, including the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador and Peru, should be in a position to afford them 
by about 2014 or 2015. El Salvador is not expected to 
raise the requisite funding until about 2018. Even if the 
different variables combine to broader fiscal capacity in the 
most optimistic scenario, the other countries (Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia) are not expected to have enough revenue by the 
end of the period to cover the costs (except Paraguay, and 
then only in the very last year). These countries therefore 
need to mobilize external resources.
Provision of the resources needed to implement the transfer scheme and support services 
would differ in timing from country to country, depending on GDP performance, the tax 
burden, public spending goals and access to complementary resources such as international 
cooperation. Assuming GDP growth and an expanding tax burden in cases where this is 
possible, the countries of Latin America break down into three broad groups. The first 
comprises countries whose revenues, measured in points of GDP, should be very close to 
(or exceed) the level required to fund the proposed measures by the end of 2012. A second 
group should be in a position to afford them by about 2014. The other countries would not 
have enough revenue to meet the costs involved by the end of the period and would therefore 
need complementary sources of funding. 
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Figure V.5 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): TOTAL COST OF CASH 
TRANSFERS TO VULNERABLE POPULATIONS AND 
INCORPORATION OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG  
PEOPLE AGED 0 TO 17 INTO EDUCATION  
SYSTEMS, AROUND 2008 a
(Percentages of GDP)
2.17 2.25 2.77 2.79 4.02
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of special tabulations of household surveys from the countries 
concerned and GDP series. 
a Data relate to 2004 for El Salvador, 2005 for Nicaragua, 2006 for Argentina, Chile 
and Guatemala and 2007 for Honduras and the Plurinational State of Bolivia.
Figure V.6 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): FISCAL DEFICIT OR SURPLUS 
AVAILABLE TO FUND THE TRANSFER SYSTEM AND ENHANCED 
CARE AND EDUCATION SERVICES IN SCENARIOS  
OF GROWING GDP AND A GROWING TAX BURDEN
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of special tabulations of household surveys from the countries concerned, 
GDP projections and data from the Latin American and Caribbean Institute 
for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) for actual tax burdens.
Lastly, it is worth taking at least an exploratory 
look at the other potential source of funding for these 
measures: the reorientation of social expenditure itself. 
Once again, the countries that would be best positioned 
to take advantage of this potential fiscal space are those 
where the least additional effort is needed. In other 
words, the less the additional effort needed over and 
above current expenditure, the greater the likelihood that 
fiscal margin can be found within the social spending 
budget itself. 
One final requirement is to consider the relative 
cost of monetary measures and services measures and 
to determine differentiated baselines for each group 
of countries based on their capacity to afford these 
costs, as just discussed. In less developed countries, 
it is most realistic to start by universalizing education 
system coverage, which costs far less in these countries, 
while having more modest basic transfer amounts. The 
more developed countries can address themselves to all 
the proposed measures at once. Table V.4 summarizes 
the balance between coverage and transfers for the 
country groups, the costs they can afford and the 
potential impact on poverty reduction and expansion 
of educational coverage.
Figure V.7 
LATIN AMERICA: ADDITIONAL COSTS OF THE TRANSFERS AND 
EDUCATIONAL SERVICES MODEL, 2007-2008 a





























































































































Additional cost Social expenditure
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of cost estimates, GDP series and social expenditure.
a Both figures (social expenditure and additional cost) are expressed as percentages 
of GDP.
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Table V.4 
LATIN AMERICA: MEASURES, COSTS AND IMPACTS OF EQUALITY STRATEGIES, BY FISCAL CAPACITY 
Countries in first group a Countries in second group b Countries in third group c
Measures proposed All proposed coverage and 
income transfer measures: cash 
transfers to households with 
children aged 0 to 14, coverage 
of education and care services 
(ages 0 to 17) and cash transfers 
coordinated with employment and 
training services (ages 15 to 24)
Cash transfers to households with 
children aged 0 to 4 and 15 to 24
All coverage measures
All coverage measures
Cash transfers to households 
with children aged 0 to 4; half 
the benefit or half the coverage
Estimated cost Between 2.5% and 3.5% of GDP Between 2.9% and 4.2% of GDP Between 2.5% and 5.6% of GDP
Estimated aggregate effects on poverty Drop in poverty rate of between 
13.5 and 8.7 percentage points. 
Drop of between 70% and 50% 
from original poverty level
Drop in poverty rate of between 
6.6 and 11.9 percentage points. 
Drop of between 30% and 16.6% 
from original poverty level
Drop in poverty rate of between 
2.8 and 4.0 percentage points. 
Drop of between 4% and 8% 
from original poverty level
Percentage of preschool-age children 
who would be brought into the system
Between 24% and 64% Between 30% and 47% Between 59% and 90% 
Percentage of upper secondary 
school-age children who would 
be brought into the system
Between 8% and 25% Between 17% and 35% Between 36% and 53% 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of continuous household surveys and GDP data.
a Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Panama and Uruguay.
b Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru.
c El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Plurinational State of Bolivia.
These costs can be met in a period of 10 years in all 
the countries reviewed (except Nicaragua, which can raise 
95% of the resources needed). The impact on poverty is 
lower in the less developed countries, but the poverty gap 
can be expected to narrow considerably and the educational 
gains to translate over time into lower levels of poverty 
and inequality. To plan for these differentiated measures 
is not utopian, although their viability, given the fiscal 
revenue-raising and prioritization efforts proposed here, 
is certainly quite surprising.
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Argentina 1990 5 832.7 5 690.1 7.4 1 343.9
1999 7 852.3 7 598.8 14.3 -1.8 1990-1999 3.4 3.3 0.0 15.0
2002 6 433.7 6 147.0 19.7 41.0 2002 -11.8 -13.3 -19.4 -19.5
2008 9 884.9 9 926.2 7.9 7.2 2008 5.7 7.0 8.8 15.3
2009 9 869.6 9 823.1 8.7 7.7 2009 -0.2 -1.0 11.7 15.3
Bahamas 1990 17 373.3 … … …
1999 17 694.8 … 7.8 … 1990-1999 0.2 … … …
2002 17 790.8 … 9.1 … 2002 0.9 … … …
2008 18 349.3 … 8.7 … 2008 -2.8 … … …
2009 17 357.2 … 14.2 … 2009 -5.4 … … …
Barbados 1990 8 673.5 … 14.7 3.4
1999 9 928.2 … 10.4 2.9 1990-1999 1.5 … … …
2002 9 790.9 … 10.3 0.9 2002 0.7 … … …
2008 11 468.2 … 8.1 7.3 2008 0.5 … … …
2009 11 012.2 … 10.0 4.4 2009 -4.0 … … …
Belize 1990 2 775.3 … … …
1999 3 024.1 … 12.8 … 1990-1999 1.0 … … …
2002 3 476.7 … 10.0 … 2002 2.7 … … …
2008 3 949.7 … 8.2 … 2008 1.7 … … …




1990 869.8 901.0 7.3 18.0
1999 1 005.6 1 026.6 7.2 3.1 1990-1999 1.6 1.5 2.1 10.2
2002 1 010.5 1 058.0 8.7 2.5 2002 0.4 3.6 3.3 4.7
2008 1 173.3 1 502.5 6.7 11.8 2008 4.3 6.1 -7.4 -1.5
2009 1 191.9 1 453.4 7.9 0.3 2009 1.6 -3.3 … 8.2
Brazil 1990 3 356.1 3 280.6 4.3 2 101.3
1999 3 600.2 3 491.3 7.6 8.9 1990-1999 0.8 0.7 0.2 3.1
2002 3 743.8 3 635.4 11.7 12.5 2002 1.2 1.4 -2.1 4.2
2008 4 465.9 4 463.0 7.9 5.9 2008 4.1 4.5 2.1 3.9
2009 4 416.0 4 399.1 8.1 4.3 2009 -1.1 -1.4 1.3 7.4
Chile 1990 3 081.3 2 951.8 7.8 27.3
1999 4 747.1 4 576.1 10.1 2.3 1990-1999 4.9 5.0 4.0 5.5
2002 5 055.1 4 834.7 9.8 2.8 2002 1.0 1.7 2.0 2.9
2008 6 262.0 6 903.9 7.8 7.1 2008 2.6 0.2 -0.2 -0.1
2009 6 106.1 6 712.8 9.7 -1.4 2009 -2.5 -2.8 4.8 5.4
Colombia 1990 2 167.6 2 077.2 10.5 32.4
1999 2 337.2 2 297.7 19.4 9.2 1990-1999 0.8 1.1 2.6 -0.1
2002 2 396.9 2 364.6 18.1 7.0 2002 0.8 0.8 3.0 0.7
2008 2 983.3 3 097.9 11.5 7.7 2008 0.9 2.3 -2.0 -1.6
2009 2 951.4 2 971.3 13.0 2.0 2009 -1.1 -4.1 1.1 3.1
Costa Rica 1990 3 123.1 3 034.9 5.4 27.3
1999 4 078.2 3 734.3 6.2 10.1 1990-1999 3.0 2.3 2.2 1.1
2002 4 049.3 3 961.9 6.8 9.7 2002 0.8 2.1 4.1 -0.6
2008 5 206.4 4 857.5 4.8 13.9 2008 1.5 2.0 -2.0 -1.3
2009 5 084.3 4 687.8 7.6 4.0 2009 -2.3 -3.5 7.7 4.0




























Cuba b 1990 3 340.9 … 5.4 …
1999 2 613.0 2 695.0 6.3 … 1990-1999 -2.7 …. -9.4 …
2002 2 873.8 2 889.2 3.3 … 2002 1.2 1.3 9.3 5.3
2008 4 362.9 … 1.6 … 2008 4.1 … 0.1 -1.6
2009 4 426.2 … 1.7 … 2009 1.4 … 4.1 1.2
Dominican 1990 1 828.4 1 794.8 ... 79.9
Republic 1999 2 657.1 2 801.7 13.8 5.1 1990-1999 4.2 5.1 … 2.6
2002 2 885.0 3 031.6 16.1 10.5 2002 4.2 4.9 … -0.5
2008 3 688.1 3 663.0 14.1 4.5 2008 3.8 3.5 … -6.5
2009 3 764.0 3 802.8 14.9 5.7 2009 2.1 3.8 … 7.0
Ecuador 1990 1 311.3 1 155.6 6.1 49.5
1999 1 288.1 1 223.5 14.4 60.7 1990-1999 -0.2 0.6 3.7 2.1
2002 1 397.9 1 371.7 9.2 9.4 2002 2.2 3.5 10.9 0.9
2008 1 782.2 2 039.0 6.9 8.8 2008 6.1 10.4 … 8.5
2009 1 770.0 1 905.4 8.5 4.3 2009 -0.7 -6.6 … 3.6
El Salvador 1990 1 572.1 1 614.2 10.0 19.3
1999 2 176.3 2 391.9 6.9 -1.0 1990-1999 3.7 4.5 … 0.1
2002 2 280.4 2 587.2 6.2 2.8 2002 1.9 -0.7 … -1.8
2008 2 672.9 3 044.2 5.5 5.5 2008 2.0 0.4 … 0.2
2009 2 566.1 2 936.8 7.1 -0.2 2009 -4.0 -3.5 … 9.5
Guatemala 1990 1 289.6 1 265.6 … 59.6
1999 1 513.5 1 571.7 … 4.9 1990-1999 1.8 2.4 5.4 -7.4
2002 1 549.7 1 701.2 … 6.3 2002 1.3 4.7 -0.9 0.3
2008 1 687.3 1 838.7 … 9.4 2008 0.8 -1.3 -2.6 -10.2
2009 1 655.8 1 824.2 … -0.3 2009 -1.9 -0.8 0.1 5.1
Haiti 1990 515.7 556.8 … 26.1
1999 430.9 517.1 … 9.7 1990-1999 -2.0 -0.8 … -7.3
2002 408.1 490.4 … 14.8 2002 -1.8 -2.1 … -8.9
2008 389.1 482.6 … 17.0 2008 -0.8 -6.0 … -12.9
2009 393.8 504.4 … 2.1 2009 1.2 4.5 … 28.0
Honduras 1990 1 061.4 1 022.5 7.8 36.4
1999 1 113.5 1 246.6 5.3 10.9 1990-1999 0.5 2.2 … -1.1
2002 1 179.2 1 216.4 6.1 8.1 2002 1.7 0.8 … 2.1
2008 1 450.6 1 512.1 4.1 10.8 2008 1.9 -1.6 … 0.2
2009 1 394.9 1 522.1 4.9 3.0 2009 -3.8 0.7 … 70.4
Jamaica 1990 3 516.5 … 15.3 29.8
1999 3 489.4 … 15.7 6.8 1990-1999 -0.1 … … …
2002 3 508.6 … 14.2 7.3 2002 0.2 … … …
2008 3 703.2 … 10.6 16.9 2008 -1.4 … … …
2009 3 588.9 … 11.4 10.2 2009 -3.1 … … …
Mexico 1990 5 393.6 5 235.6 2.7 29.9
1999 6 121.8 6 043.8 3.7 12.3 1990-1999 1.4 1.6 0.7 -4.1
2002 6 320.4 6 265.3 3.9 5.7 2002 -0.5 0.1 1.9 0.7
2008 7 094.6 7 269.3 4.9 6.5 2008 0.5 0.6 2.2 -2.1
2009 6 563.1 6 657.3 6.7 3.6 2009 -7.5 -8.4 0.6 -1.5
Nicaragua 1990 682.1 577.4 7.6 13 490.2
1999 753.7 799.8 10.7 7.2 1990-1999 1.1 3.7 3.1 0.8
2002 778.4 812.8 11.6 4.0 2002 -0.6 0.7 3.5 3.7
2008 894.2 899.1 8.0 12.7 2008 1.4 -2.1 -3.8 7.6
2009 869.8 908.9 10.5 1.8 2009 -2.7 1.1 6.5 16.8




























Panama 1990 2 941.5 3 017.0 20.0 0.8
1999 3 910.6 3 814.7 13.6 1.5 1990-1999 3.2 2.6 0.7 1.7
2002 3 902.0 3 939.5 16.5 1.9 2002 0.4 2.8 -3.0 -1.2
2008 5 687.8 5 019.2 6.5 6.8 2008 8.9 6.1 -0.6 2.7
2009 5 732.4 5 203.9 7.9 1.9 2009 0.8 3.7 -0.4 -2.4
Paraguay 1990 1 400.1 1 396.7 6.6 44.0
1999 1 401.2 1 453.4 9.4 5.4 1990-1999 0.0 0.4 1.3 -1.3
2002 1 299.3 1 293.2 14.7 14.6 2002 -2.0 -4.8 -5.0 -0.7
2008 1 521.4 1 614.3 7.4 7.5 2008 3.9 8.6 -0.7 -2.5
2009 1 437.5 1 495.4 8.2 1.9 2009 -5.5 -7.4 4.3 0.7
Peru 1990 1 649.1 1 594.5 8.3 7 646.8
1999 2 023.8 2 019.4 9.2 3.7 1990-1999 2.3 2.7 0.6 2.3
2002 2 098.0 2 075.9 9.4 1.5 2002 3.6 3.4 4.6 -0.2
2008 2 923.9 2 987.9 8.4 6.6 2008 8.5 6.2 2.2 2.5
2009 2 915.7 2 962.0 8.4 0.2 2009 -0.3 -0.9 0.3 -2.9
Suriname 1990 1 848.8 … 15.8
1999 1 648.6 … 14.0 … 1990-1999 -1.3 … … …
2002 1 748.8 … 10.0 … 2002 1.2 … … …
2008 2 142.0 … … … 2008 3.3 … … …
2009 2 167.3 … … … 2009 1.2 … … …
Trinidad and 1990 4 337.9 … 20.1 9.5
Tobago 1999 5 913.2 … 13.2 3.4 1990-1999 3.5 … … …
2002 7 025.6 … 10.4 4.3 2002 7.5 … … …
2008 10 963.9 … 4.6 14.5 2008 1.9 … … …
2009 10 820.2 … 5.3 1.3 2009 -1.3 … … …
Uruguay 1990 4 925.4 4 975.1 8.5 128.9
1999 6 326.0 6 270.1 11.3 4.2 1990-1999 2.8 2.6 1.4 -5.3
2002 5 325.4 5 371.8 17.0 25.9 2002 -11.0 -10.4 -10.7 -10.1
2008 8 035.7 7 727.7 7.9 9.2 2008 8.2 8.6 3.6 10.8
2009 8 238.3 7 974.1 7.7 5.9 2009 2.5 3.2 … …
Venezuela 1990 4 737.6 4 431.4 10.4 36.5
(Bolivarian 1999 4 631.5 4 112.9 15.0 20.0 1990-1999 -0.3 -0.8 -3.9 -0.8
Republic of) 2002 4 276.5 3 999.0 15.8 31.2 2002 -10.5 -10.3 -11.0 -5.4
2008 5 773.5 7 298.5 7.3 31.9 2008 3.0 9.0 -4.5 -6.4
2009 5 493.2 6 149.5 7.8 26.9 2009 -4.9 -15.7 … …
Latin America c
1990 3 535.8 3 428.8 … 1 376.8
1999 4 004.0 3 899.2 11.0 9.7 1990-1999 1.4 1.4 2.0 2.5
2002 3 992.1 3 900.5 11.1 12.2 2002 -1.7 -1.6 -1.3 0.6
2008 4 923.8 5 067.7 7.3 8.4 2008 3.0 3.7 -0.5 0.1
2009 4 777.5 4 841.9 8.2 4.7 2009 -3.0 -4.5 3.1 9.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the countries.
a Real per capita gross national income.
b Simple average of December-to-December variations for each year.
c The aggregate figure for Latin America was calculated by weighting the figures for all the countries for which information was available for each indicator.
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Table A-2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL POPULATION BY COUNTRY OR TERRITORY, 1980-2020
(Thousands at mid-year) 
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Latin America
Argentina  28 094  30 305  32 581  34 835  36 896  38 747  40 738  42 676  44 486
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)  5 355  5 964  6 669  7 482  8 317  9 182  10 031  10 854  11 638
Brazil  121 618  136 124  149 527  161 620  174 167  186 110  195 498  202 954  209 090
Chile  11 174  12 102  13 179  14 395  15 412  16 294  17 133  17 914  18 606
Colombia  26 881  29 984  33 186  36 436  39 763  43 046  46 299  49 385  52 278
Costa Rica  2 347  2 697  3 076  3 475  3 929  4 327  4 639  4 962  5 255
Cuba  9 823  10 064  10 564  10 885  11 075  11 189  11 203  11 213  11 193
Dominican Republic  5 808  6 487  7 179  7 888  8 560  9 237  9 899  10 515  11 077
Ecuador  7 961  9 099  10 272  11 397  12 305  13 060  13 773  14 550  15 349
El Salvador  4 660  4 996  5 326  5 724  5 942  6 057  6 192  6 381  6 616
Guatemala  7 014  7 935  8 908  10 004  11 229  12 709  14 376  16 195  18 076
Haiti  5 691  6 388  7 109  7 837  8 578  9 295  10 089  10 918  11 752
Honduras  3 634  4 236  4 901  5 589  6 234  6 898  7 621  8 392  9 141
Mexico  69 321  76 808  83 906  91 621  98 957  105 001  110 675  115 735  120 099
Nicaragua  3 250  3 709  4 137  4 658  5 100  5 455  5 822  6 189  6 529
Panama  1 949  2 176  2 411  2 670  2 950  3 231  3 508  3 773  4 027
Paraguay  3 198  3 702  4 248  4 799  5 349  5 904  6 460  7 007  7 533
Peru  17 324  19 519  21 765  23 927  25 997  27 833  29 495  31 197  32 881
Uruguay  2 914  3 009  3 106  3 218  3 318  3 324  3 372  3 430  3 493
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)  15 091  17 317  19 731  22 078  24 402  26 724  29 043  31 291  33 412
Latin America  353 109  392 620  431 779  470 537  508 479  543 622  575 867  605 531  632 530
The Caribbean
Anguilla   7   7   8   10   11   14   15   17   18
Antigua and Barbuda   72   68   62   68   77   84   89   93   97
Aruba   61   64   63   80   91   101   107   109   111
Bahamas   210   234   256   281   305   325   346   366   384
Barbados   249   254   260   258   252   253   257   260   262
Belize   144   165   190   220   252   282   313   344   375
Cayman Islands   17   21   26   33   40   53   57   59   61
Dominica   73   72   69   69   68   67   67   67   67
Grenada   89   100   96   100   101   103   104   107   108
Guyana   776   771   749   759   756   764   761   754   745
Jamaica  2 133  2 296  2 364  2 466  2 568  2 668  2 730  2 786  2 834
Montserrat   12   11   11   10   5   6   6   6   6
Netherlands Antilles   174   182   191   191   181   186   201   207   210
Puerto Rico  3 197  3 378  3 528  3 701  3 819  3 913  3 998  4 074  4 135
Saint Kitts and Nevis   43   42   41   43   46   49   52   56   59
Saint Lucia   118   127   138   147   157   165   174   182   190
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines   100   104   107   108   108   109   109   110   110
Suriname   366   376   407   436   467   500   524   547   568
Trinidad and Tobago  1 082  1 176  1 219  1 265  1 295  1 318  1 344  1 368  1 384
Turks and Caicos Islands   8   9   12   15   19   31   33   35   36
United States Virgin Islands   98   105   103   107   109   110   109   108   106
The Caribbean a  29 860  32 063  34 384  36 640  38 650  40 566  42 312  43 958  45 470
Latin America and the Caribbean b  362 655  402 103  442 310  482 265  521 228  556 512  588 649  618 486  645 543
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Database on Social Statistics and Indicators (BADEINSO) [online]. Information from the Latin 
American and Caribbean Demographic Centre - Population Division of ECLAC, 2008 revision. Population Database and United Nations, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects, 2008 revision; Population database, published on CD-ROM.
a Includes 24 economies: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, 
Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Turks and Caicos Islands and United States Virgin Islands.  
b Includes 46 economies: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Cayman 
Islands, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), French Guiana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Puerto Rico, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States Virgin Islands and Uruguay. 
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Table A-3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GLOBAL FERTILITY RATES BY COUNTRY AND FIVE-YEAR PERIOD, 1980-2020
(Children per woman) 
Country 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020
Latin America
Argentina 3.15 3.05 2.90 2.63 2.35 2.25 2.16 2.08
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 5.30 5.00 4.80 4.32 3.96 3.50 3.09 2.75
Brazil 3.80 3.10 2.60 2.45 2.25 1.90 1.70 1.60
Chile 2.67 2.65 2.55 2.21 2.00 1.94 1.89 1.85
Colombia 3.68 3.24 3.00 2.75 2.55 2.45 2.30 2.19
Costa Rica 3.53 3.37 2.95 2.58 2.28 1.96 1.97 1.85
Cuba 1.85 1.85 1.65 1.61 1.63 1.50 1.54 1.57
Dominican Republic 4.15 3.65 3.31 2.98 2.83 2.67 2.48 2.32
Ecuador 4.70 4.00 3.40 3.10 2.82 2.58 2.38 2.22
El Salvador 4.80 4.20 3.73 3.30 2.60 2.35 2.22 2.13
Guatemala 6.10 5.70 5.45 5.00 4.60 4.15 3.71 3.29
Haiti 6.21 5.70 5.15 4.62 4.00 3.54 3.19 2.91
Honduras 6.00 5.37 4.92 4.30 3.72 3.31 2.95 2.66
Mexico 4.25 3.63 3.19 2.67 2.40 2.21 2.04 1.89
Nicaragua 5.85 5.00 4.50 3.60 3.00 2.76 2.55 2.37
Panama 3.52 3.20 2.87 2.79 2.70 2.56 2.41 2.29
Paraguay 5.20 4.77 4.31 3.88 3.48 3.08 2.76 2.51
Peru 4.65 4.10 3.57 3.10 2.80 2.60 2.38 2.22
Uruguay 2.57 2.53 2.49 2.30 2.20 2.12 2.03 1.96
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 3.96 3.65 3.25 2.94 2.72 2.55 2.39 2.26
Latin America 3.95 3.44 3.04 2.74 2.50 2.27 2.09 1.98
The Caribbean
Aruba 2.36 2.30 2.17 2.00 1.82 1.74 1.75 1.80
Bahamas 3.16 2.62 2.60 2.40 2.11 2.02 1.95 1.88
Barbados 1.92 1.75 1.60 1.50 1.50 1.53 1.58 1.63
Belize 5.40 4.70 4.35 3.85 3.35 2.94 2.65 2.41
Grenada 4.23 4.14 3.46 2.81 2.43 2.30 2.20 2.10
Guyana 3.26 2.70 2.55 2.50 2.43 2.33 2.22 2.13
Jamaica 3.55 3.10 2.84 2.67 2.53 2.40 2.28 2.17
Netherlands Antilles 2.36 2.30 2.28 2.12 2.09 1.98 1.91 1.86
Puerto Rico 2.46 2.26 2.18 2.02 1.84 1.83 1.85 1.85
Saint Lucia 4.20 3.65 3.15 2.60 2.10 2.05 1.90 1.85
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3.64 3.10 2.85 2.55 2.24 2.13 2.05 1.97
Suriname 3.70 3.00 2.60 2.80 2.60 2.42 2.29 2.19
Trinidad and Tobago 3.22 2.80 2.10 1.73 1.61 1.64 1.69 1.74
United States Virgin Islands 3.70 3.09 3.09 2.50 2.23 2.15 2.06 1.98
The Caribbean a 3.40 3.12 2.83 2.63 2.51 2.37 2.30 2.22
Latin America and the Caribbean b 3.93 3.42 3.02 2.73 2.50 2.26 2.09 1.98
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Database on Social Statistics and Indicators (BADEINSO) [online]. Information from the Latin 
American and Caribbean Demographic Centre - Population Division of ECLAC, 2008 revision. Population Database and United Nations, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects, 2008 revision; Population database, published on CD-ROM.
a  Includes 24 economies: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, 
Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Turks and Caicos Islands and United States Virgin Islands.
b  Includes 46 economies: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Cayman 
Islands, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), French Guiana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Puerto Rico, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States Virgin Islands and Uruguay.
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Table A-4 
LATIN AMERICA: POVERTY AND INDIGENCE LEVELS, 1990-2009
(Percentages) 
Country Year

















Argentina 1990 … … 21.2 … … … … 5.2 … …
1999 … 23.7 19.7 28.5 … … 6.7 4.8 8.8 …
2002 … 45.4 41.5 49.6 … … 20.9 18.6 23.3 …
2006 … 21.0 19.3 22.8 … … 7.2 6.7 7.9 …
2009 … 11.3 9.6 13.3 … … 3.8 3.1 4.5 …
Bolivia 1989 … 52.6 … … … … 23.0 … … …
(Plurinational 1999 60.6 48.7 45.0 63.9 80.7 36.4 19.8 17.5 29.0 64.7
State of) 2002 62.4 52.0 48.0 58.2 79.2 37.1 21.3 18.8 25.0 62.9
2007 54.0 42.4 40.6 44.9 75.8 31.2 16.2 15.4 17.4 59.0
Brazil 1990 48.0 41.2 … … 70.6 23.4 16.7 … … 46.1
1999 37.5 32.9 … … 55.3 12.9 9.3 … … 27.1
2002 37.8 34.4 55.7 12.6 10.0 26.4
2008 25.8 22.8 … … 41.2 7.3 5.5 … … 16.5
2009 24.9 22.1 … … 39.3 7.0 5.5 … … 15.2
Chile 1990 38.6 38.5 32.1 43.5 38.8 13.0 12.5 9.3 14.9 15.6
1998 21.7 20.7 14.6 25.0 27.5 5.6 5.1 3.3 6.4 8.6
2003 18.7 18.5 12.4 22.7 20.0 4.7 4.4 2.8 5.6 6.2
2006 13.7 13.9 10.4 16.0 12.3 3.2 3.2 2.3 3.7 3.5
2009 11.5 11.7 8.3 13.8 10.4 3.6 3.5 2.7 3.9 4.4
Colombia 1991 56.1 52.7 … … 60.7 26.1 20.0 … … 34.3
1999 54.9 50.6 43.1 53.1 61.8 26.8 21.9 19.6 22.7 34.6
2002 b 54.2 48.7 36.0 52.3 69.6 19.9 15.4 8.6 17.3 32.8
2008 b 46.1 40.0 22.6 44.8 65.3 17.9 13.1 3.9 15.7 32.7
2009 b 45.7 39.7 22.1 44.7 64.5 16.5 12.4 4.1 14.7 29.2
Costa Rica 1990 26.3 24.9 22.8 27.7 27.3 9.9 6.4 4.9 8.4 12.5
1999 20.3 18.1 17.5 18.7 22.3 7.8 5.4 4.3 6.5 9.8
2002 20.3 17.5 16.8 18.0 24.3 8.2 5.5 5.5 5.6 12.0
2008 16.4 15.6 13.9 22.3 17.5 5.5 4.3 3.7 6.4 7.3
2009 18.9 18.5 16.7 25.4 19.5 6.9 5.4 4.9 7.3 9.1
Dominican
Republic 2002 47.1 42.4 … … 55.9 20.7 16.5 … … 28.6
2008 44.3 42.0 … … 49.1 22.6 19.5 … … 29.0
2009 41.1 39.3 … … 44.7 21.0 19.4 … … 24.3
Ecuador 1990 … 62.1 … … … … 26.2 … … …
1999 … 63.5 … … … … 31.3 … … …
2002 … 49.0 … … … … 19.4 … … …
2008 42.7 39.0 … … 50.2 18.0 14.2 … … 25.6
2009 42.2 40.2 … … 46.3 18.1 15.5 … … 23.3
El Salvador 1995 54.2 45.8 34.7 55.1 64.4 21.7 14.9 8.8 20.1 29.9
1999 49.8 38.7 29.8 48.7 65.1 21.9 13.0 7.7 19.0 34.3
2001 48.9 39.4 32.1 47.7 62.4 22.1 14.3 9.9 19.2 33.3
2004 47.5 41.2 33.2 48.6 56.8 19.0 13.8 8.4 18.8 26.6
2009 47.9 42.3 32.6 49.5 57.6 17.3 12.8 7.3 16.8 25.2
Guatemala 1989 69.4 53.6 … … 77.7 42.0 26.4 … … 50.2
1998 61.1 49.1 … … 69.0 31.6 16.0 … … 41.8
2002 60.2 45.3 … … 68.0 30.9 18.1 … … 37.6
2006 54.8 42.0 … … 66.5 29.1 14.8 … … 42.2
Honduras 1990 80.8 70.4 59.9 79.5 88.1 60.9 43.6 31.0 54.5 72.9
1999 79.7 71.7 64.4 78.8 86.3 56.8 42.9 33.7 51.9 68.0
2002 77.3 66.7 56.9 74.4 86.1 54.4 36.5 25.1 45.3 69.5
2007 68.9 56.9 47.8 64.0 78.8 45.6 26.2 18.0 32.5 61.7
Mexico 1989 47.7 42.1 … … 56.7 18.7 13.1 … … 27.9
1998 46.9 38.9 … … 58.5 18.5 9.7 … … 31.1
2002 39.4 32.2 … … 51.2 12.6 6.9 … … 21.9
2008 34.8 29.2 … … 44.6 11.2 6.4 6.4 19.8 19.8
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Table A-4 (concluded)
Country Year

















Nicaragua 1993 73.6 66.3 58.3 73.0 82.7 48.4 36.8 29.5 43.0 62.8
1998 69.9 64.0 57.0 68.9 77.0 44.6 33.9 25.8 39.5 57.5
2001 69.3 63.8 50.8 72.1 77.0 42.4 33.4 24.5 39.1 55.1
2005 61.9 54.4 48.7 58.1 71.5 31.9 20.8 16.4 23.7 46.1
Panama 1991 … 32.7 … … … … 11.5 … … …
1999 … 20.8 … … … … 5.9 … … …
2002 36.9 26.2 … … 54.6 18.6 9.0 … … 34.6
2008 27.7 17.0 … … 46.3 13.5 4.7 … … 28.8
2009 26.4 16.3 … … 43.9 11.1 4.6 … … 22.3
Paraguay 1990 … … 43.2 … … … … 13.1 … …
1999 60.6 49.0 39.5 61.3 73.9 33.9 17.4 9.2 28.0 52.8
2001 61.0 50.1 42.7 59.1 73.6 33.2 18.4 10.4 28.1 50.3
2008 58.2 52.5 48.8 58.2 66.1 30.8 22.1 18.9 27.2 43.1
2009 56.0 48.2 43.9 54.9 67.1 30.4 19.0 15.8 23.9 46.6
Peru 1997 47.6 33.7 … … 72.7 25.1 9.9 … … 52.7
1999 48.6 36.1 … … 72.5 22.4 9.3 … … 47.3
2001 c 54.8 42.0 … … 78.4 24.4 9.9 … … 51.3
2008 c 36.2 23.5 … … 59.8 12.6 3.4 … … 29.7
2009 c 34.8 21.1 … … 60.3 11.5 2.8 … … 27.8
Uruguay 1990 … 17.9 11.3 24.3 … … 3.4 1.8 5.0 …
1999 … 9.4 9.8 9.0 … … 1.8 1.9 1.6 …
2002 … 15.4 15.1 15.8 … … 2.5 2.7 2.2 …
2008 13.7 14.0 15.2 13.1 9.4 3.4 3.5 4.6 2.7 2.4
2009 10.4 10.7 12.8 9.1 5.9 1.9 2.0 3.1 1.1 1.3
Venezuela 1990 39.8 38.6 29.2 41.2 46.0 14.4 13.1 8.0 14.5 21.3
(Bolivarian 1999 49.4 … … … … 21.7 … … … …
Republic of) d 2002 48.6 … … … … 22.2 … … … …
2008 27.6 … … … … 9.9 … … … …
Latin America e 1980 40.5 29.5 … … 59.8 18.6 10.6 … … 32.7
1990 48.3 41.4 … … 65.4 22.5 15.3 … … 40.4
1999 43.9 37.2 … … 63.7 18.7 12.1 … … 38.2
2002 44.0 38.4 … … 61.8 19.4 13.5 … … 37.8
2007 34.1 28.9 … … 52.1 12.6 8.1 … … 28.2
2008 33.0 27.6 … … 52.3 12.9 8.3 … … 29.5
2009 33.1 27.8 … … 52.8 13.3 8.8 … … 30.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of household survey data from the respective countries.
a Includes persons below the indigence line or living in extreme poverty.
b  Figures from the National Planning Department (DNP) and the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) of Colombia. The values shown for 2002 on are not strictly 
comparable with those for earlier years owing to methodological changes made by DNP and DANE.
c  Figures from the Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI) of Peru. 
d  From 1997, the sample design for the survey does not permit urban-rural breakdown. Figures therefore correspond to the national total.
e  Estimate for 18 countries of the region plus Haiti.
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Table A-5 
LATIN AMERICA: POVERTY AND INDIGENCE LINES (PL AND IL)









IL PL IL PL IL PL IL PL
Currency in use Dollars
Argentina 1990 c September A 255 928 511 856 … … 5 791.0 44.2 88.4 … …
1999 September $  72  143 … …  1.0 71.6 143.3 … …
2002 October $  99  198 … …  3.6 27.5 55.0 … …
2006 2nd semester $  138  276 … …  3.1 45.1 90.2 … …




1989 October Bs  68  137 … …  2.9 23.8 47.5 … …
1999 Oct.-Nov. Bs  167  333  130  228  5.9 28.0 56.1 21.9 38.3
2002 Oct.-Nov. Bs  167  334  133  234  7.4 22.6 45.2 18.1 31.6
2007 Year Bs  232  449  180  307  7.9 29.6 57.2 22.9 39.1
Brazil 1990 September Cr$ 3 109 6 572 2 634 4 967  75.5 41.2 87.0 34.9 65.8
1999 September R$  51  126  43  91  1.9 26.7 66.2 22.7 48.1
2002 September R$  63  155  54  114 3.35 18.9 46.3 16.3 34.0
2008 September R$  96  225  84  177 1.80 53.2 125.3 46.7 98.6
2009 September R$  100  238  88  188 1.82 54.8 130.7 48.2 103.4
Chile 1990 November Ch$ 9 297 18 594 7 164 12 538  327.4 28.4 56.8 21.9 38.3
1998 November Ch$ 18 944 37 889 14 598 25 546  463.3 40.9 81.8 31.5 55.1
2003 November Ch$ 21 856 43 712 16 842 29 473  625.5 34.9 69.9 26.9 47.1
2006 November Ch$ 23 549 47 099 18 146 31 756  527.4 44.7 89.3 34.4 60.2
2009 November Ch$ 31 422 56 383 24 213 38 638  507.8 61.9 111.0 47.7 76.1
Colombia 1991 August Col$ 18 093 36 186 14 915 26 102  645.6 28.0 56.1 23.1 40.4
1999 August Col$ 69 838 139 716 57 629 100 851 1 873.7 37.3 74.6 30.8 53.8
2002 Year Col$ 79 941 204 086 58 820 134 958 2 504.2 31.9 81.5 23.5 53.9
2008 Year Col$ 124 310 292 973 92 449 195 775 1 967.7 63.2 148.9 47.0 99.5
2009 Year Col$ 128 600 305 781 95 319 204 448 2 166.8 59.4 141.1 44.0 94.4
Costa Rica 1990 June ¢ 2 639 5 278 2 081 3 642  89.7 29.4 58.9 23.2 40.6
1999 June ¢ 10 708 21 415 8 463 14 811  285.3 37.5 75.1 29.7 51.9
2002 June ¢ 14 045 28 089 11 132 19 481  358.1 39.2 78.5 31.1 54.4
2008 June ¢ 31 325 58 245 24 423 40 165  519.7 60.3 112.1 47.0 77.3
2009 June ¢ 34 514 63 099 26 910 43 626  576.7 59.9 109.4 46.7 75.7
Dominican  
Republic
2002 September RD$  793 1 569  714 1 285  18.8 42.2 83.5 38.0 68.4
2008 September RD$ 2 091 4 010 1 882 3 263  35.0 59.7 114.5 53.8 93.2
2009 September RD$ 2 080 3 933 1 872 3 206  36.2 57.5 108.6 51.7 88.6
Ecuador 1990 November S/. 18 465 36 930 … …  854.8 21.6 43.2 … …
1999 October S/. 301 716 603 432 … … 15 656.8 19.3 38.5 … …
2002 November US$  35  69 … …  1.0 34.6 69.1 … …
2008 November US$  49  91  34  57  1.0 48.7 90.6 34.3 56.5
2009 November US$  50  94  36  59  1.0 50.4 94.2 35.6 58.7
El Salvador 1995 Jan.-Dec. ¢  254  508  158  315  8.8 29.0 58.1 18.0 35.9
1999 Jan.-Dec. ¢  293  586  189  378  8.8 33.5 66.9 21.6 43.2
2001 Jan.-Dec. ¢  305  610  197  394  8.8 34.9 69.7 22.5 45.0
2009 Year ¢  417  829  270  536  8.8 47.7 94.8 30.8 61.2
Guatemala 1989 April Q  64  127  50  88  2.7 23.6 47.1 18.7 32.7
1998 Dec.97-Dec.98 Q  260  520  197  344  6.4 40.7 81.5 30.8 54.0
2002 Oct.-Nov. Q  334  669  255  446  7.7 43.6 87.2 33.3 58.2
2006 Mar.-Sep. Q  467  935  362  633  7.6 61.5 123.0 47.6 83.3










IL PL IL PL IL PL IL PL
Currency in use Dollars
Honduras 1990 August L  115  229  81  141  4.3 26.5 52.9 18.6 32.6
1999 August L  561 1 122  395  691  14.3 39.3 78.6 27.7 48.4
2002 August L  689 1 378  485  849  16.6 41.6 83.3 29.3 51.3
2007 August L  945 1 872  665 1 155  18.9 50.0 99.1 35.2 61.1
Mexico 1989 3rd quarter $ 86 400 172 800 68 810 120 418 2 510.0 34.4 68.8 27.4 48.0
1998 3rd quarter MN$  537 1 074  385  674  9.5 56.8 113.6 40.7 71.3
2002 3rd quarter MN$  742 1 484  530  928  9.9 75.0 150.1 53.6 93.8
2008 Aug.-Nov. 08 MN$ 1 006 1 955  719 1 227  11.6 87.1 169.3 62.2 106.3
Nicaragua 1993 21 Feb.-12 Jun. C$  167  334  129  225  4.6 36.6 73.3 28.2 49.4
1998 15 Apr.-31 Aug. C$  275  550  212  370  10.4 26.4 52.7 20.3 35.5
2001 30 Apr.-31 Jul. C$  369  739  284  498  13.4 27.6 55.2 21.3 37.2
2005 Jul.-Oct. C$  491  981  378  661  16.9 29.1 58.2 22.4 39.2
Panama 1991 August B 35.0 70.1 … …  1.0 35.0 70.1 … …
1999 July B 40.7 81.4 … …  1.0 40.7 81.4 … …
2002 July B 40.7 81.4 31.5 55.0  1.0 40.7 81.4 31.5 55.0
2008 July B 54.8 103.1 42.4 70.5  1.0 54.8 103.1 42.4 70.5
2009 July B 57.4 105.8 44.5 72.6  1.0 57.4 105.8 44.5 72.6
Paraguay 1990 d Jun., Jul., Aug. G 43 242 86 484 … … 1 207.8 35.8 71.6 … …
1999 Jul.-Dec. G 138 915 277 831 106 608 186 565 3 311.4 42.0 83.9 32.2 56.3
2001 Sep.00-Aug. 01 G 155 461 310 922 119 404 208 956 3 718.3 41.8 83.6 32.1 56.2
2008 Oct.-Dec. G 295 998 562 817 226 691 379 950 4 712.7 62.8 119.4 48.1 80.6
2009 Oct.-Dec. G 312 371 580 796 239 191 393 347 4 786.9 65.3 121.3 50.0 82.2
Peru 1997 4th quarter N$  103  192  83  128  2.7 42.2 84.3 31.6 55.3
1999 4th quarter N$  109  213  89  141  3.5 31.2 61.2 25.5 40.5
2001 4th quarter N$  117  230  102  159  3.5 34.0 66.8 29.5 46.0
Uruguay 1990 2nd semester NUr$ 41 972 83 944 … … 1 358.0 30.9 61.8 … …
1999 Year $  640 1 280 … …  11.3 56.5 112.9 … …
2002 Year $  793 1 586 … …  21.3 37.3 74.6 … …
2008 Year $ 1 588 2 957 1 223 2 013  21.0 75.8 141.1 58.4 96.1




1990 2nd semester Bs 1 924 3 848 1 503 2 630  49.4 39.0 77.9 30.4 53.2
1999 e 2nd semester Bs 48 737 95 876 … …  626.3 77.8 153.1 … …
2002 e 2nd semester Bs 80 276 154 813 … … 1 161.0 69.2 133.4 … …
2008 e 2nd semester Bs 301 540 525 958 … … 2 147.0 140.5 245.0 … …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a National currencies:
 Argentina: (A) Austral; ($) Peso
 Bolivia (Plurinational State of): (Bs) Boliviano
 Brazil: (Cr$) Cruzeiro; (R$) Real
 Chile: (Ch$) Peso
 Colombia: (Col$) Peso
 Costa Rica: (¢ ) Colón
 Dominican Republic: (RD$) Peso
 Ecuador: (S/.) Sucre, 1990-2001. Since 2002, United States dollar (US$).
 El Salvador: (¢ ) Colón
 Guatemala: (Q) Quetzal
 Honduras: (L) Lempira
 Mexico: ($) Peso; (MN$) New Peso
 Nicaragua: (C$) Córdoba
 Panama: (B/.) Balboa
 Paraguay: (G/.) Guaraní
 Peru: (N$) Peso
 Uruguay: (Nur$) New Peso; ($) Peso
  Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of): (Bs) Bolívar
b International Monetary Fund (IMF) “rf” series.
c Greater Buenos Aires.
d Asunción.
e National total.
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Table A-6 




Total 15 to 24 years
25 to 34 
years




15 to 24 
years
25 to 34 
years




Argentina a 1990 b 76 62 97 97 55 38 41 52 52 19
1999 74 53 94 97 59 44 36 62 61 27
2002 72 48 93 96 60 46 35 64 67 27
2006 75 54 94 96 64 50 38 67 69 34




1997 82 60 94 99 83 60 46 66 73 56
1999 81 59 94 98 82 62 48 67 75 61
2002 83 64 94 98 85 62 46 72 75 58
2007 82 61 94 99 82 62 44 69 77 62
Brazil 1990 84 81 96 95 63 44 47 54 52 22
1999 82 75 95 94 64 54 52 67 66 33
2002 81 73 94 94 63 56 53 69 68 33
2008 80 72 95 94 63 58 54 73 71 36
2009 80 71 95 94 62 58 54 74 72 36
Chile 1990 74 51 94 95 58 33 27 44 42 18
1998 75 46 93 96 64 39 30 54 50 23
2003 73 42 92 96 64 42 30 58 56 27
2006 73 43 92 95 65 43 30 61 59 29
2009 71 43 91 94 62 42 30 64 59 28
Colombia 1991 85 71 97 98 76 44 40 57 52 25
1999 81 64 97 97 71 50 44 66 63 26
2002 82 67 97 97 70 54 49 68 67 31
2008 79 58 95 96 68 51 39 67 66 32
2009 81 61 96 97 71 54 43 70 70 36
Costa Rica 1990 83 74 96 96 64 33 35 41 39 12
1999 82 68 96 96 64 39 37 48 49 18
2002 79 63 97 96 63 41 35 54 53 22
2008 78 60 96 97 66 45 38 62 57 25
2009 77 58 96 96 64 45 36 62 58 27
Cuba c 2002 65 40 82 86 47 35 19 46 54 18
2008 68 43 89 94 48 41 31 59 62 20
Dominican  
Republic
2002 75 54 91 94 68 39 29 54 54 22
2008 75 56 90 93 66 40 29 52 57 24
2009 73 50 90 93 66 39 26 53 56 24
Ecuador 1990 a 80 56 95 98 78 43 33 54 56 31
1999 a 82 64 97 98 76 54 45 65 67 36
2002 a 81 60 96 98 74 53 40 65 67 41
2008 82 62 96 98 78 52 40 63 65 42
2009 80 60 95 98 77 51 39 63 65 43
El Salvador 1995 82 70 95 96 75 42 32 55 57 29
1999 78 65 93 94 70 44 34 58 59 31
2001 79 67 93 95 70 44 33 59 61 32
2009 79 63 95 96 71 46 32 61 63 34
Guatemala 1989 90 82 98 98 84 28 28 32 32 22
1998 88 79 97 98 84 46 41 49 55 38
2002 91 85 96 98 86 49 45 54 59 39
2006 88 80 97 98 84 47 41 54 57 39
Honduras 1990 87 78 96 97 81 32 26 39 42 25
1999 87 78 98 97 81 44 36 52 57 34
2002 85 75 96 97 80 38 30 46 49 29
2007 83 70 95 97 80 40 28 51 52 33
Mexico 1989 79 64 94 94 73 30 26 38 35 21
1998 82 68 94 94 73 41 37 48 48 31
2002 81 65 94 95 75 43 34 51 54 32
2008 81 65 96 97 71 45 36 55 58 32





Total 15 to 24 years
25 to 34 
years




15 to 24 
years
25 to 34 
years




Nicaragua 1993 77 62 89 91 70 36 24 47 51 26
1998 85 77 95 94 77 43 31 56 56 31
2001 86 79 97 96 77 46 36 55 61 36
2005 84 74 95 95 79 44 32 53 59 34
Panama 1991 a 72 52 95 96 48 48 39 66 65 20
1999 a 77 61 97 96 58 50 42 67 68 26
2002 80 63 97 97 67 45 34 61 61 24
2008 82 67 98 98 69 47 34 62 65 31
2009 81 65 97 97 69 48 34 63 65 34
Paraguay 1990 d 84 69 97 99 75 50 51 63 58 27
1999 85 73 96 96 80 48 39 59 60 38
2001 85 76 96 97 77 53 46 64 64 42
2008 85 73 97 97 78 54 46 64 67 45
2009 85 77 96 96 76 56 50 67 67 45
Peru 1997 85 70 97 98 83 64 54 73 76 53
1999 78 61 91 94 76 58 48 67 69 49
2001 79 61 92 95 75 58 45 69 72 48
2008 84 68 94 97 80 65 55 74 78 57
2009 84 68 94 97 81 66 54 75 80 58
Uruguay 1990 a 75 68 98 97 54 44 47 69 64 21
1999 a 73 67 96 97 50 50 50 74 74 26
2002 a 72 63 96 96 51 50 47 76 76 28
2008 75 61 95 96 59 54 45 78 78 36




1990 79 59 93 96 74 35 23 48 49 20
1999 83 66 97 97 74 47 35 60 63 30
2002 84 67 97 97 74 55 42 69 71 37
2008 79 56 95 97 72 50 31 65 69 37
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a Urban total.
b Greater Buenos Aires.
c National Statistical Office (ONE) of Cuba, on the basis of tabulations of the National Occupation Survey.
d Asunción metropolitan area.
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Table A-7 
LATIN AMERICA: BREAKDOWN OF THE EMPLOYED ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION  
BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY, 1990-2009
(Population aged 15 and over, in percentages)
Country Year Employers
Wage or salary earners















Argentina c 1990 d 5.4 69.0 … 69.0 6.9 56.4 5.7 25.6 23.0
1999 4.4 72.6 15.5 57.1 9.1 42.2 5.8 23.0 18.6
2002 4.0 73.1 21.7 51.3 10.3 35.1 6.0 22.9 18.4
2006 4.1 75.8 16.2 59.5 9.4 42.8 7.4 20.1 16.2




1989 e 2.2 54.0 17.9 36.1 4.3 26.0 5.8 43.8 41.0
1999 2.8 29.8 6.6 23.2 4.1 17.2 1.9 67.3 66.1
2002 4.3 30.4 6.7 23.7 2.6 18.8 2.3 65.3 63.9
2007 5.2 36.2 8.3 27.9 2.5 22.1 3.3 58.5 57.9
Brazil 1990 4.7 65.5 … 65.5 11.8 48.0 5.6 29.9 28.8
1999 4.1 58.8 11.1 47.7 8.8 31.5 7.4 37.1 35.5
2002 4.2 61.9 11.0 50.9 3.9 39.3 7.7 33.8 32.4
2008 4.5 65.8 11.3 54.5 6.1 41.2 7.2 29.7 27.1
2009 4.3 66.4 11.6 54.8 6.4 40.5 7.8 29.3 26.7
Chile 1990 2.6 73.0 … 73.0 11.4 55.3 6.3 24.5 22.9
1998 4.0 74.6 … 74.6 15.3 53.8 5.5 21.4 17.1
2003 3.9 74.6 9.3 65.3 11.0 48.0 6.2 21.4 16.3
2006 3.1 75.7 9.8 65.9 10.3 50.0 5.6 21.3 17.0
2009 3.1 76.3 11.6 64.7 12.6 47.2 4.8 20.6 17.7
Colombia 1991 5.1 58.6 6.6 52.0 3.9 43.9 4.2 36.3 34.9
1999 4.0 53.6 6.8 46.7 4.3 38.1 4.4 42.4 40.6
2002 4.9 49.8 6.4 43.4 3.2 35.2 5.0 45.3 43.1
2008 4.8 44.5 5.2 39.2 3.6 32.0 3.6 45.8 42.9
2009 5.0 42.8 4.6 38.3 3.2 31.4 3.7 47.7 44.9
Costa Rica 1990 5.3 70.0 17.0 53.0 3.6 45.1 4.3 24.7 23.4
1999 8.1 71.0 13.0 58.0 5.8 46.7 5.4 20.9 19.7
2002 7.9 68.3 14.0 54.3 9.2 40.7 4.3 23.8 21.6
2008 7.5 72.9 14.1 58.8 11.8 42.3 4.7 19.6 17.2
2009 7.2 72.7 15.6 57.1 11.1 41.1 4.9 20.1 17.7
Dominican  
Republic
2002 3.2 53.1 12.0 41.1 5.9 30.9 4.3 43.8 42.2
2008 4.0 51.9 11.2 40.7 6.8 28.0 5.9 44.1 42.1
2009 4.8 50.8 12.2 38.6 6.0 27.0 5.6 44.3 41.9
Ecuador 1990 c 5.0 58.9 17.5 41.4 4.5 32.4 4.5 36.1 34.5
1999 c 8.8 59.1 10.7 48.4 7.0 36.0 5.4 32.1 31.5
2002 c 6.9 58.4 11.5 46.9 6.4 36.0 4.5 34.7 32.9
2008 5.2 54.9 8.0 46.8 5.6 37.8 3.4 40.0 38.6
2009 4.1 53.4 8.1 45.3 5.3 36.7 3.4 42.5 41.1
El Salvador 1995 6.1 56.8 8.7 48.1 4.6 39.5 3.9 37.0 36.4
1999 4.4 59.8 9.1 50.7 6.1 39.7 4.9 35.8 35.1
2001 4.6 56.4 8.5 48.0 5.1 38.2 4.7 39.0 38.1
2009 4.1 55.4 7.6 47.8 5.1 38.2 4.6 40.5 39.2
Guatemala 1989 1.5 48.6 7.3 41.3 2.8 34.6 3.8 49.9 48.7
1998 3.2 49.8 4.5 45.4 3.7 39.3 2.4 47.0 45.9
2002 6.5 43.5 3.6 39.9 3.6 33.8 2.5 50.0 49.2
2006 3.5 48.5 5.0 43.5 4.5 35.8 3.2 48.1 47.0
Honduras 1990 1.0 48.2 8.5 39.7 2.4 33.3 4.0 50.8 50.0
1999 4.6 46.1 6.6 39.6 3.8 32.2 3.6 49.3 48.9
2002 2.8 46.5 5.6 40.9 4.0 34.3 2.6 50.7 49.5
2007 2.3 47.5 6.5 41.0 6.6 31.6 2.8 50.2 41.2
LATIN AMERICA: BREAKDOWN OF THE EMPLOYED ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY, 
1990-2009
(Population aged 15 and over, in percentages)
 
231Social Panorama of Latin America • 2010
Country Year Employers
Wage or salary earners















Mexico 1989 3.0 67.0 … 67.0 6.2 58.1 2.7 30.0 28.9
1998 4.7 62.0 10.9 51.1 4.3 43.3 3.5 33.4 32.0
2002 3.9 65.7 11.2 54.5 4.5 45.5 4.5 30.3 29.1
2008 5.0 72.1 11.3 60.8 6.5 49.8 4.5 23.0 21.8
Nicaragua 1993 0.5 50.9 14.2 36.7 4.2 26.9 5.5 48.6 41.6
1998 3.6 52.5 … 52.5 9.3 37.5 5.7 43.9 43.0
2001 5.0 49.8 9.0 40.8 2.7 34.1 4.0 45.2 44.2
2005 4.5 48.5 7.8 40.7 3.6 33.5 3.6 47.0 46.3
Panama 1991 c 3.0 78.6 30.1 48.5 9.0 32.1 7.4 18.4 17.2
1999 c 3.2 76.7 21.1 55.6 12.1 37.4 6.1 20.1 18.9
2002 2.9 62.0 16.1 45.9 4.6 35.7 5.6 35.1 34.0
2008 3.1 65.2 14.6 50.7 5.4 39.9 5.4 31.6 30.5
2009 3.1 63.9 14.6 49.2 5.6 38.7 4.9 33.1 31.8
 
Paraguay 1990 f 8.9 68.4 11.9 56.5 4.3 41.7 10.5 22.7 21.2
1999 5.2 46.4 8.0 38.4 3.2 28.4 6.8 48.4 47.2
2001 5.8 44.9 7.1 37.8 3.4 26.8 7.6 49.3 47.8
2008 5.0 50.4 8.8 41.6 4.1 30.1 7.5 44.6 43.0
2009 5.5 48.1 8.4 39.7 3.4 29.6 6.7 46.3 44.5
Peru 1997 5.7 40.9 9.4 31.5 2.4 27.3 1.8 53.3 52.7
1999 5.9 40.0 8.6 31.4 2.1 26.7 2.6 54.1 53.2
2001 5.1 40.2 8.9 31.2 4.2 24.7 2.3 54.7 53.0
2008 5.6 42.2 9.1 33.1 5.2 25.3 2.6 52.2 50.8
2009 5.5 42.3 9.4 32.9 5.3 25.2 2.4 52.2 50.5
Uruguay 1990 c 5.8 74.2 21.8 52.4 9.7 35.8 6.9 20.1 19.3
1999 c 4.0 72.4 16.2 56.1 6.5 42.1 7.5 23.6 20.6
2002 c 3.7 70.5 17.3 53.2 5.9 37.4 9.9 25.8 21.8
2008 4.8 71.1 14.3 56.8 5.9 42.1 8.7 24.1 20.3
2009 4.8 71.4 13.9 57.5 6.2 42.4 8.9 23.7 20.0
Venezuela 
(Bolivarian Republic of) 
1990 7.5 66.6 19.3 47.2 5.0 36.4 5.8 25.9 25.0
1999 5.1 57.9 14.9 43.0 4.9 36.1 2.0 36.9 35.3
2002 5.4 54.7 13.8 40.8 3.9 34.3 2.6 39.9 38.2
2008 4.0 58.1 17.9 40.2 5.2 33.2 1.7 37.9 35.8
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a The figures for Brazil (1990), Chile (1990, 1998), Mexico (1989) and Nicaragua (1998) include public sector wage-earners.
b Includes professional and technical workers.
c Urban total. 
d Greater Buenos Aires.
e Eight departmental capitals plus El Alto.
f Asunción metropolitan area.
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Table A-8 
LATIN AMERICA: URBAN POPULATION EMPLOYED IN LOW-PRODUCTIVITY SECTORS OF THE LABOUR MARKET, 1990-2009
(Percentages of the total urban employed population)




Unskilled self-employed workers b
Employers












Argentina d 1990 44.1 3.8 11.7 0.4 11.4 5.7 23.0 6.9 16.1
1999 40.7 3.2 15.0 1.0 13.9 5.3 17.3 5.0 12.2
2002 42.1 2.9 16.1 1.1 15.0 5.6 17.5 6.8 10.7
2006 39.7 2.7 14.3 1.0 13.3 7.5 15.2 5.0 10.1




1989  e 62.1 2.2 13.7 1.6 12.1 5.4 40.8 9.7 29.8
1999 62.9 2.6 12.7 1.0 11.7 2.7 44.9 12.1 30.2
2002 65.3 3.4 13.9 0.7 13.2 3.7 44.3 12.5 28.3
2004 70.0 4.2 18.2 1.4 16.8 4.6 43.0 10.9 28.2
2007 62.7 5.4 15.2 0.5 14.7 5.3 36.8 8.5 25.2
Brazil f 1990 48.0 … 20.9 4.4 16.5 5.8 21.3 3.5 15.8
1999 46.7 2.3 10.1 1.7 8.3 8.5 25.8 5.1 16.1
2002 46.0 2.3 10.6 0.6 10.0 8.6 24.6 6.7 13.7
2008 40.2 2.4 10.1 0.8 9.3 7.8 20.0 5.9 10.7
2009 41.1 2.4 10.3 0.9 9.4 8.4 19.9 6.1 10.7
Chile 1990 38.9 0.8 10.3 0.9 9.4 7.0 20.9 5.7 14.0
1998 34.2 2.6 10.7 1.0 9.7 5.8 15.1 4.1 10.1
2003 32.9 2.4 9.0 0.8 8.2 6.5 14.9 4.8 9.3
2006 30.6 1.7 7.2 0.7 6.5 5.8 15.9 4.8 10.1
2009 30.0 1.1 7.1 0.8 6.3 5.0 16.8 4.1 11.9
Colombia 1991 … … … … … 5.3 27.1 6.4 19.9
1999 … … … … … 5.2 35.5 7.5 26.6
2002 … … … … … 5.5 39.1 8.1 28.0
2008 59.3 3.9 11.5 0.3 11.1 4.0 39.8 8.4 29.4
2009 60.5 4.1 11.2 0.3 10.9 4.2 40.9 8.2 30.2
Costa Rica 1990 36.6 4.4 10.4 0.8 9.6 4.3 17.5 6.4 10.1
1999 41.2 6.0 13.1 1.4 11.7 5.1 17.1 4.4 11.8
2002 40.2 6.3 12.2 1.4 10.8 4.0 17.7 4.7 12.2
2008 36.9 5.7 11.6 1.6 10.0 4.4 15.2 3.4 11.2




2002 54.1 3.2 14.0 1.7 12.3 4.3 32.6 7.4 21.9
2008 49.9 3.4 5.7 0.6 5.1 5.6 35.2 8.2 22.9
2009 50.0 3.5 5.9 0.4 5.6 5.8 34.8 7.6 23.0
Ecuador 1990 53.7 3.7 11.7 0.6 11.1 4.3 34.0 7.8 23.9
1999 58.3 7.2 14.9 1.6 13.2 5.4 30.9 5.6 23.3
2002 55.8 4.9 14.1 0.9 13.3 4.4 32.3 6.9 23.2
2008 56.9 4.9 16.0 1.1 14.9 4.2 31.8 5.2 24.6
2009 56.5 3.6 15.9 1.0 14.9 4.1 32.8 5.6 24.6
 
El Salvador 1995 50.6 5.0 10.5 0.2 10.3 4.3 30.9 8.1 20.2
1999 51.7 4.2 14.5 0.8 13.7 4.2 28.8 6.5 19.8
2001 53.7 4.5 14.3 0.8 13.5 4.2 30.7 6.4 22.3
2009 56.4 4.0 14.7 0.8 13.9 4.6 33.1 6.1 23.7
Guatemala 1989 53.3 2.1 14.5 0.8 13.7 6.6 30.0 7.2 14.8
1998 63.4 3.7 22.3 2.4 19.9 3.8 33.6 8.1 20.5
2002 55.2 5.6 13.7 0.8 12.9 3.8 32.2 8.2 18.8
2006 56.1 4.5 15.2 1.2 14.1 3.9 32.5 7.5 19.4
Honduras 1990 52.5 1.1 13.6 0.7 12.9 6.5 31.3 8.7 18.5
1999 54.1 5.3 12.0 1.0 11.0 4.6 32.2 7.1 21.4
2002 55.7 3.7 14.0 1.2 12.9 4.0 34.0 9.5 19.7
2007 42.9 3.0 10.3 1.1 9.2 3.8 25.8 9.1 12.7
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Unskilled self-employed workers b
Employers












Mexico g 1989 … … … … … 2.7 18.6 2.9 12.5
1998 43.6 3.6 15.8 1.0 14.8 4.1 20.0 3.1 16.2
2002 46.8 3.3 18.3 1.3 16.9 4.7 20.6 4.1 15.9
2008 43.3 3.5 20.2 1.8 18.4 4.6 15.0 2.7 12.0
Nicaragua 1993 48.9 0.6 13.5 1.7 11.8 6.3 28.5 7.7 17.0
1998 59.4 3.1 16.3 1.8 14.5 6.5 33.5 4.4 25.2
2001 58.3 3.8 16.7 0.7 16.0 4.5 33.3 5.5 24.1
2005 57.6 4.7 14.7 0.6 14.0 4.1 34.1 7.8 22.5
Panama 1991 32.3 1.8 5.9 0.8 5.1 7.4 17.2 3.9 11.5
1999 33.9 2.2 7.0 0.8 6.2 6.0 18.8 4.3 13.7
2002 38.2 2.3 8.8 0.7 8.1 6.7 20.4 4.4 15.0
2008 35.6 2.7 7.9 0.7 7.2 6.3 18.7 3.8 14.1
2009 35.4 2.5 7.7 0.6 7.1 5.5 19.6 4.3 14.4
Paraguay 1990  h 54.7 6.9 16.4 1.1 15.3 10.0 21.4 5.3 15.5
1999 58.5 5.1 15.8 1.0 14.9 9.0 28.6 5.3 20.7
2001 60.9 6.6 14.6 1.4 13.1 10.2 29.5 5.3 21.2
2008 55.7 5.3 14.2 1.2 13.0 9.1 27.1 4.9 19.4
2009 58.5 5.1 17.4 1.5 16.0 8.4 27.6 5.5 18.6
Peru 1997 60.8 5.0 13.1 0.5 12.7 2.3 40.3 5.6 30.4
1999 63.8 4.7 14.7 0.5 14.2 3.5 40.9 5.4 31.5
2001 62.2 4.2 14.6 1.0 13.6 3.2 40.2 5.2 29.3
2008 59.0 4.7 12.9 1.0 11.9 3.3 38.1 5.1 28.3
2009 57.6 4.9 12.2 1.0 11.2 3.1 37.4 5.0 28.0
Uruguay 1990 40.8 3.9 10.6 1.1 9.4 6.9 19.4 5.6 13.5
1999 41.4 2.4 10.9 0.6 10.4 7.5 20.6 7.0 12.6
2002 45.7 2.4 11.6 0.6 11.0 9.9 21.8 8.1 12.5
2008 42.7 2.9 11.9 0.6 11.3 9.0 19.0 6.1 11.3




1990 39.1 4.9 6.6 0.2 6.4 6.3 21.4 4.1 15.3
1999 53.8 3.9 12.5 0.5 12.1 2.0 35.3 6.7 23.7
2002 56.5 4.2 11.5 0.4 11.1 2.6 38.2 6.5 26.4
2008 49.8 3.1 9.3 0.5 8.8 1.7 35.8 7.0 24.1
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a Refers to establishments employing up to five persons. In the case of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Panama (up to 2002), the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia (1999 and 2002) and Uruguay (1990) establishments with up to four employees were counted.
b Refers to own-account and unpaid family workers without professional or technical skills.
c Includes persons employed in agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing.
d Greater Buenos Aires. 
e Eight departmental capitals plus El Alto.
f Up to 1990, the category of “microenterprises” referred to wage-earners with no employment contract. Since 1993, however, this category refers to wage-earners in establishments 
employing up to five persons.
g The 1994 survey does not contain information on the size of the establishments employing wage-earners.
h Asunción metropolitan area. 
i From 1997 on, the sample design for the survey does not permit urban-rural breakdown. Figures therefore correspond to the national total.
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Table A-9 
LATIN AMERICA: OPEN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BY SEX AND AGE IN URBAN AREAS,  
AROUND 1990, 1999, 2002, 2008 AND 2009 a 
Country Sex
Age groups














































































Total 5.9 14.7 19.0 … 9.1 13.0 24.3 33.8 … 21.8 4.9 12.0 15.4 … 8.3 4.1 11.6 18.1 … 5.7 3.8 12.9 14.1 … 6.0
Males 5.7 13.4 18.5 … 8.1 11.5 22.8 31.7 … 19.5 5.0 11.3 15.3 … 7.5 3.9 8.0 14.8 … 4.4 4.2 12.7 16.7 … 5.6




Total 9.4 4.5 4.4 … … 17.4 9.5 7.1 … … 8.5 4.7 5.6 … … 5.1 2.5 3.1 … … 6.6 1.9 1.9 … …
Males 9.5 3.8 3.2 … … 18.2 7.9 5.3 … … 7.5 3.3 3.4 … … 5.5 1.5 2.1 … … 8.5 2.6 2.2 … …
Females 9.1 5.3 5.8 … … 16.5 11.6 9.5 … … 9.9 6.4 8.4 … … 4.6 3.6 4.2 … … 3.8 0.9 1.5 … …
Brazil Total 3.8 9.6 9.3 7.1 8.3 6.9 18.3 17.9 15.5 17.8 3.8 9.2 9.0 7.3 8.6 2.1 6.1 6.0 4.4 5.3 1.2 4.3 4.2 2.8 3.5
Males 3.9 7.8 7.5 5.2 6.1 6.9 15.1 14.6 11.9 13.9 4.0 6.9 6.4 4.6 5.8 2.4 4.7 4.6 2.8 3.6 1.5 4.1 4.1 2.3 2.8
Females 3.5 12.1 11.9 9.6 11.0 6.8 23.0 22.4 20.5 23.1 3.4 12.3 12.3 10.5 12.0 1.5 7.8 7.8 6.2 7.2 0.5 4.5 4.5 3.5 4.5
Chile Total 8.3 9.9 10.4 … 10.2 16.5 21.3 22.0 … 24.9 7.9 9.6 10.7 … 11.3 5.1 7.1 7.8 … 7.2 5.2 6.1 7.2 … 5.6
Males 7.7 9.0 9.6 … 8.9 15.0 19.5 21.0 … 22.4 7.2 8.7 9.4 … 10.4 4.8 6.3 7.1 … 5.9 5.4 6.3 7.3 … 4.8
Females 9.6 11.3 11.7 … 12.2 19.0 24.0 23.6 … 28.3 9.4 11.1 12.6 … 12.7 5.7 8.6 9.1 … 9.0 4.5 5.6 6.9 … 7.0
Colombia Total 7.2 16.3 15.6 11.3 12.1 14.9 30.6 28.2 22.8 23.4 6.9 16.0 15.5 11.9 12.2 3.3 11.4 10.9 7.7 8.7 2.4 7.9 8.9 6.2 7.1
Males 4.8 12.5 12.6 8.9 9.4 10.2 23.9 23.0 18.1 18.3 4.2 11.6 11.5 8.9 8.7 2.2 8.3 8.5 5.4 5.8 2.2 7.6 8.7 5.9 6.7
Females 11.4 22.0 19.8 14.8 15.8 22.4 39.8 35.2 29.6 30.8 11.0 22.0 20.7 16.0 16.8 5.2 15.5 14.1 10.8 12.2 2.8 8.6 9.4 6.9 7.8
Costa Rica Total 4.5 5.9 6.4 4.9 7.8 8.3 12.7 14.1 11.0 17.9 3.7 5.3 5.2 4.8 7.4 2.4 3.1 3.7 2.8 5.0 2.4 2.3 2.9 2.2 3.3
Males 4.0 4.8 5.6 4.1 6.6 7.6 10.9 12.4 9.6 15.5 3.0 4.1 4.5 3.5 5.8 2.0 2.4 2.9 2.3 3.7 2.5 2.1 2.8 2.1 3.1
Females 5.8 8.0 7.9 6.3 9.9 10.0 16.0 17.3 13.4 22.1 5.3 7.5 6.4 6.6 9.8 3.0 4.5 5.0 3.7 6.9 2.1 2.7 3.2 2.4 3.7
Cuba b Total 5.4 6.3 2.3 1.6 … … … 6.4 3.8 … … … 3.4 2.2 … … … 1.7 1.5 … … … 0.8 0.7 …
Males 3.6 4.3 1.9 1.5 … … … 6.1 3.5 … … … 2.8 1.9 … … … 1.3 1.4 … … … 0.6 0.7 …
Females 8.5 9.6 2.9 1.8 … … … 6.8 4.1 … … … 4.2 2.6 … … … 2.3 1.6 … … … 1.1 0.6 …
Dominican  
Republic
Total … … 6.4 4.7 5.7 … … 12.5 9.4 13.3 … … 8.3 5.6 5.9 … … 3.7 3.6 3.2 … … 2.3 1.3 2.6
Males … … 4.5 3.3 4.1 … … 9.0 6.2 8.4 … … 5.4 4.6 4.7 … … 2.3 1.6 2.0 … … 2.0 1.4 2.4
Females … … 10.1 7.3 8.6 … … 19.5 15.4 23.1 … … 12.7 7.3 7.9 … … 6.1 6.7 5.1 … … 2.9 1.1 2.9
Ecuador Total 6.1 14.2 9.1 6 6.5 13.5 25.9 17.4 13.8 14.1 6.4 13.6 9.2 5.9 8.3 2.7 9 5.9 3.4 3.7 1.3 8.3 5.2 2.8 2.7
Males 4.2 10.5 5.8 4.3 5.2 11.2 20.0 12.0 11.0 11.7 3.2 8 4.7 3.8 6 1.7 5.5 3.1 1.4 2.3 1.3 8.6 4.3 2.3 2.5
Females 9.2 19.5 13.9 8.3 8.4 17.2 33.9 25.5 18.2 18.1 11.3 21.3 15.3 8.6 11.6 4.5 13.6 9.8 6 5.4 1.4 7.7 6.7 3.7 3
El Salvador Total … 6.8 7.0 … 7.4 … 12.5 11.2 … 13.8 … 6.1 6.3 … 6.7 4.7 5.2 … 5.0 … 3.5 5.2 … 4.9
Males … 8.3 8.2 … 9.1 … 14.0 12.2 … 14.4 … 6.9 7.3 … 8.1 6.3 5.9 … 6.4 … 5.0 6.5 … 7.3
Females … 4.6 5.3 … 4.9 … 9.9 9.4 … 12.5 … 5.1 4.9 … 5.0 2.7 4.3 … 3.3 … 0.9 3.3 … 1.2
Guatemala Total 2.1 1.9 3.4 … … 3.8 3.3 5.3 … … 2.1 2.3 2.6 … … 0.9 1.4 2.0 … … 0.8 0.5 2.5 … …
Males 1.7 2.2 2.9 … … 3.0 3.7 3.9 … … 1.7 2.4 2.4 … … 0.7 1.8 1.1 … … 0.8 0.7 3.2 … …
Females 3.3 1.4 4.2 … … 6.0 2.5 7.7 … … 3.1 2.1 3.0 … … 1.5 0.8 3.1 … … 1.0 0.2 1.1 … …
Honduras Total 4.2 3.4 3.9 … … 7.0 5.7 6.0 … … 4.4 3.2 4.2 … … 2.7 2.3 2.8 … … 2.0 1.6 2.1 … …
Males 3.8 3.4 3.6 … … 5.7 5.2 4.9 … … 3.5 3.0 3.5 … … 2.9 2.5 2.8 … … 2.5 2.1 2.3 … …
Females 5.3 3.4 4.7 … … 10.7 6.6 8.4 … … 6.2 3.4 5.4 … … 2.1 2.1 2.8 … … 0.6 0.7 1.4 … …
Mexico Total 2.6 2.5 2.9 4.5 … 6.5 5.6 6.7 9.8 … 1.9 2.1 3.0 4.2 … 0.7 1.2 1.2 2.3 … 0.5 0.8 1.3 2.5 …
Males 2.6 2.7 3.4 5.3 … 6.2 5.8 7.6 11.1 … 1.9 2.3 3.4 4.7 … 0.9 1.4 1.3 2.7 … 0.6 1.0 1.7 3.5 …
Females 2.7 2.1 2.1 3.1 … 7.4 5.2 4.9 7.7 … 1.8 1.7 2.3 3.5 … 0.2 0.7 1.0 1.7 … 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.5 …
















































































Nicaragua Total … 11.4 11.0 … … … 16.9 17.4 … … … 8.5 8.9 … … … 10.7 9.0 … … … 8.0 6.3 … …
Males … 10.5 10.0 … … … 13.9 15.0 … … … 7.4 8.2 … … … 11.5 8.4 … … … 8.1 5.9 … …
Females … 13.1 12.7 … … … 24.1 22.5 … … … 10.2 9.9 … … … 9.5 9.8 … … … 7.8 7.1 … …
Panama Total 20.0 13.6 13.5 5.6 6.6 38.8 28.3 27.5 13.6 15.2 21.7 13.5 14.3 6.2 7.2 10.4 8.4 8.8 3.2 4.6 8.1 5.9 5.5 1.8 2.7
Males 17.9 11.4 10.6 4.4 5.1 37.0 24.3 22.9 10.9 11.9 17.8 9.7 10.2 4.2 5.0 8.4 6.5 5.9 2.2 3.2 9.1 6.8 5.2 1.7 2.5
Females 22.8 16.7 18.5 7.5 8.9 41.0 33.6 36.6 19.3 21.6 26.5 19.0 20.4 9.1 10.3 12.7 10.5 13.3 4.6 6.5 6.4 4.5 6.2 2.1 3.0
Paraguay c Total 6.3 6.6 7.6 5.6 6.5 15.5 11.9 13.8 11.8 13.4 4.8 5.3 7.3 4.5 5.4 2.3 4.4 4.4 2.6 3.2 1.4 4.4 3.9 3.2 3.4
Males 6.2 6.1 6.7 4.4 5.6 14.7 10.8 11.7 8.7 10.7 5.0 4.0 6.1 2.5 3.6 3.2 4.5 3.0 2.1 3.6 2.0 4.5 4.5 3.6 3.6
Females 6.5 7.5 8.9 7.5 7.9 16.5 13.9 17.3 16.8 17.9 4.7 7.3 9.0 7.4 7.9 1.1 4.3 6.3 3.4 2.5 0.0 4.1 2.9 2.5 3.1
Peru Total … 5.3 5.0 4.2 3.9 … 11.3 8.9 9.5 8.6 … 4.3 4.9 4.2 4.1 … 2.9 3.4 2.2 2.2 … 2.8 3.4 2.0 2.1
Males … 5.0 4.7 3.7 3.8 … 10.4 8.5 8.6 8.6 … 3.8 4.0 3.2 3.6 … 2.5 2.7 1.6 1.4 … 3.2 3.7 1.9 2.2
Females … 5.6 5.4 4.9 4.1 … 12.6 9.4 10.7 8.6 … 4.9 6.0 5.5 4.8 … 3.4 4.2 2.8 3.1 … 2.2 2.9 2.1 1.9
Uruguay Total 8.9 11.2 16.9 7.5 7.3 24.4 25.8 37.9 20.9 20.2 8.2 10.0 16.4 7.3 7.5 4.3 7.2 12.1 4.6 4.4 3.5 6.1 9.6 3.7 3.5
Males 7.3 8.6 13.4 5.3 5.2 22.2 21.4 32.0 16.7 16.1 6.0 7.2 12.7 4.1 4.5 2.5 3.7 7.8 2.4 2.1 3.0 4.9 7.7 2.6 2.5
Females 11.1 14.5 21.1 10.1 9.8 27.5 32.0 46.1 26.7 25.8 11.0 13.5 20.8 11.0 10.7 6.4 11.2 16.8 7.2 6.9 4.4 7.7 12.1 5.1 4.8
Venezuela  
(Bolivarian Republic of) d
Total 10.2 14.5 16.2 6.9 … 19.3 25.7 28.2 13.6 … 11.3 14.7 16.3 7.4 … 5.9 10.2 11.1 4.6 … 4.5 7.8 9.9 3.9 …
Males 11.2 13.6 14.4 6.5 … 19.9 22.2 24.4 12.3 … 12.3 12.8 13.5 6.5 … 6.9 10.1 9.9 4.3 … 5.5 9.4 10.4 4.3 …
Females 8.4 16.1 18.8 7.4 … 18.0 32.6 34.5 15.9 … 9.6 17.7 20.4 8.7 … 4.0 10.4 12.9 5.0 … 1.7 4.7 9.0 3.2 …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries.
a For the exact years of the surveys in each country, see table A-5.
b Based on special tabulations of data from the National Occupation Survey supplied by the National Statistical Office of Cuba. The figures for 1990-1999 relate to total unemployment 
(urban and rural); those for 2003-2008 relate to urban unemployment.
c Total for urban areas, except that the figure for 1990 relates to the Asunción metropolitan area.
d The sample design in the surveys conducted since 1997 does not distinguish between urban and rural areas. The figures therefore refer to the nationwide total.
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Table  A-10 
LATIN AMERICA: AVERAGE INCOME OF THE EMPLOYED ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION  
BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY, URBAN AREAS, 1990-2009
(Multiples of the relevant per capita poverty line)
Country Year  Total Employers
























Argentina c 1990 6.5 20.6 4.7 … 4.7 9.4 4.5 3.6 2.5 8.4 7.6
1999 7.0 23.8 5.6 6.9 5.3 9.3 5.2 3.6 2.4 8.5 7.0
2002 4.7 20.9 3.5 3.3 3.5 6.7 3.1 2.1 1.7 5.9 4.3
2006 6.0 21.0 4.8 5.7 4.6 7.4 4.9 3.4 1.7 7.8 6.6




1989 d 4.5 16.3 3.7 4.1 3.5 7.7 3.6 2.8 1.5 4.8 4.5
1999 3.8 8.2 4.2 4.7 4.0 7.4 3.9 2.5 2.0 2.8 2.7
2002 3.6 7.3 4.1 5.2 3.8 7.7 4.1 2.5 2.1 2.6 2.4
2007 3.8 7.7 4.1 5.4 3.7 8.8 3.9 2.5 1.9 2.4 2.4
Brazil  1990 e 4.9 16.1 4.2 … 4.2 8.2 3.8 2.7 1.0 4.3 3.9
1999 4.7 14.8 4.1 6.6 3.5 6.9 3.2 f 2.1 1.4 4.2 3.7
2002 4.5 14.3 4.0 6.6 3.4 11.1 3.3 f 2.2 1.4 3.8 3.3
2008 5.0 15.0 4.6 7.7 3.9 8.0 3.9 2.6 1.7 4.2 3.4
2009 5.1 15.0 4.7 7.9 4.0 7.9 4.1 2.7 1.8 4.1 3.3
Chile 1990 4.7 24.8 3.8 … 3.8 7.4 3.5 2.4 1.4 5.4 5.0
1998 7.4 34.0 5.6 … 5.6 11.7 4.3 3.0 2.2 8.7 6.5
2003 7.4 36.7 5.7 7.6 5.3 12.4 4.0 2.9 2.4 7.8 5.9
2006 6.8 28.0 5.6 7.8 5.3 11.8 4.2 3.1 2.4 8.3 6.3
2009 7.7 34.4 6.4 9.0 5.9 11.9 4.6 3.4 2.7 8.9 6.6
Colombia 1991 2.9 7.4 2.8 3.9 2.5 5.3 2.4 … 1.2 2.7 2.4
1999 3.4 9.5 3.7 6.3 3.2 6.8 2.8 … 2.1 2.3 2.0
2002 3.9 11.8 3.7 6.5 3.2 7.2 2.9 … 1.8 3.2 2.7
2008 4.4 12.0 4.4 8.1 3.8 7.9 4.1 2.2 1.9 3.6 3.1
2009 4.2 10.9 4.2 8.1 3.8 7.9 4.1 2.1 1.8 3.3 2.8
Costa Rica 1990 5.3 6.8 5.4 7.3 4.5 9.0 4.4 3.2 1.5 4.2 3.9
1999 6.1 10.5 6.0 8.8 5.1 9.7 4.8 3.7 1.8 4.8 4.4
2002 6.6 10.2 6.9 9.5 6.0 9.7 5.9 3.7 2.0 4.0 3.4
2008 6.0 12.2 5.9 8.9 5.0 8.0 4.6 3.3 1.7 4.0 3.1
2009 6.3 10.7 6.3 9.4 5.3 8.8 5.0 3.1 1.7 4.1 3.2
Dominican  
Republic
2002 4.3 15.6 4.0 4.7 3.7 7.0 3.7 2.6 1.3 3.6 3.4
2008 4.9 17.9 3.0 3.8 2.8 4.4 2.8 1.6 1.1 6.3 5.6
2009 5.4 21.1 3.2 4.2 2.8 4.8 2.8 1.9 1.2 6.9 6.1
Ecuador 1990 3.1 4.8 3.3 4.1 2.9 6.1 2.9 2.3 0.8 2.3 2.3
1999 3.1 7.6 2.8 3.8 2.6 4.5 2.9 1.7 0.9 2.2 2.2
2002 3.7 8.7 3.4 4.7 3.1 5.0 3.4 2.2 1.5 3.0 2.8
2008 4.1 11.6 3.8 6.4 3.3 5.3 3.4 2.3 1.9 3.1 2.9
2009 4.0 11.4 3.9 6.6 3.3 5.7 3.4 2.3 2.2 2.9 2.7
El Salvador 1995 3.7 9.2 3.6 5.3 3.1 6.9 2.9 2.1 1.0 2.7 2.5
1999 4.4 9.6 4.5 6.9 4.0 8.3 3.7 2.4 2.1 3.0 2.8
2001 4.4 10.5 4.4 6.7 3.9 8.2 3.8 2.4 2.0 3.2 3.0
2009 3.6 8.3 3.8 6.5 3.3 6.1 3.3 2.1 2.0 2.4 2.2
Guatemala 1989 3.8 17.7 3.1 4.8 2.6 5.2 2.7 1.8 1.4 4.0 3.7
1998 3.8 16.0 3.3 4.5 3.1 5.3 3.5 2.1 1.3 2.9 2.7
2002 4.0 11.0 3.5 5.6 3.2 5.5 3.3 1.7 1.7 3.1 2.8
2006 3.9 17.0 2.8 4.7 2.5 4.3 2.7 1.5 1.3 3.7 3.4
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Table A-10 (concluded)
Country Year  Total Employers
























Honduras 1990 3.0 16.4 3.1 4.9 2.6 6.5 2.8 1.6 0.8 2.0 1.8
1999 2.1 5.1 2.1 2.9 1.9 3.1 2.1 1.2 0.5 1.6 1.5
2002 2.5 5.1 2.7 4.3 2.4 5.3 2.3 1.4 0.8 1.6 1.5
2007 2.8 5.8 3.2 5.2 2.7 5.0 2.4 1.5 1.3 1.8 1.4
Mexico 1989 4.5 21.7 3.4 … 3.4 6.8 3.1 … 1.4 5.8 5.4
1998 4.2 18.0 3.5 5.1 3.1 6.7 3.1 1.9 1.2 3.7 3.3
2002 4.3 15.8 3.6 5.3 3.2 6.9 3.3 2.1 1.4 4.5 4.1
2008 4.0 17.0 3.3 5.2 2.9 5.8 3.0 1.9 1.3 3.9 3.4
Nicaragua 1993 3.8 8.6 3.3 3.4 3.3 6.2 3.1 2.4 2.1 4.5 3.8
1998 3.5 11.3 3.2 … 3.2 6.3 2.7 2.0 1.7 2.9 2.7
2001 3.6 14.4 3.1 4.5 2.7 5.4 3.0 1.9 1.5 2.7 2.6
2005 3.1 9.9 3.0 4.3 2.7 4.6 2.9 1.7 1.6 2.2 2.1
Panama 1991 5.7 14.9 5.8 7.8 4.6 9.8 4.2 2.7 1.3 3.4 3.0
1999 6.3 11.9 6.7 9.0 5.8 11.3 4.9 2.8 2.1 3.8 3.4
2002 6.3 17.8 6.3 8.9 5.3 9.1 5.8 3.1 1.6 4.6 4.3
2008 6.0 19.2 5.4 7.5 4.8 7.3 5.0 3.1 1.9 5.7 5.3
2009 6.3 19.3 5.8 7.8 5.1 8.2 5.3 3.4 2.0 5.9 5.1
Paraguay 1990 g 3.5 10.3 2.5 3.4 2.3 4.1 2.8 1.9 0.8 3.9 3.7
1999 3.5 8.9 3.3 4.8 2.9 6.7 3.1 2.1 1.6 2.5 2.3
2001 3.3 8.6 3.2 5.2 2.7 4.5 3.3 2.0 1.5 2.2 1.8
2008 2.8 6.4 2.7 3.9 2.5 4.1 2.7 1.9 1.3 2.0 1.8
2009 2.8 6.1 2.7 3.9 2.5 4.4 2.7 2.1 1.4 2.0 1.8
Peru 1997 3.5 7.9 3.9 4.1 3.9 7.3 4.2 2.4 2.1 2.3 2.2
1999 3.5 7.3 4.0 4.6 4.0 9.5 4.5 2.0 2.9 2.1 2.0
2001 3.2 6.9 3.5 4.0 3.5 6.4 3.6 2.0 1.8 2.2 2.1
2003 3.0 7.8 3.2 3.9 3.2 5.7 3.2 1.8 1.8 2.0 1.9
2008 3.6 7.8 4.0 4.7 3.9 6.2 4.1 2.1 1.8 2.3 2.2
2009 3.9 7.6 4.4 5.0 4.3 6.6 4.6 2.2 2.0 2.4 2.2
Uruguay 1990 4.5 17.9 3.7 4.0 3.5 5.0 3.8 2.5 1.5 3.4 3.4
1999 5.5 14.1 5.3 6.7 4.9 11.2 4.9 3.2 2.1 4.4 3.9
2002 4.3 10.6 4.4 5.8 3.9 7.9 4.3 2.6 2.0 3.3 2.5
2008 4.3 11.8 4.2 5.8 3.7 7.0 4.1 2.2 1.8 3.1 2.3




1990 4.5 11.9 3.7 4.0 3.6 6.6 3.6 2.5 2.1 4.5 4.3
1999 3.5 9.2 3.1 3.7 3.0 6.4 2.9 2.0 1.4 3.4 3.2
2002 3.4 9.9 3.0 4.5 2.4 4.8 2.5 1.7 1.2 3.2 3.1
2008 3.9 7.5 4.0 5.2 3.5 5.1 3.6 2.6 1.8 3.4 3.2
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household survey conducted in the respective countries.
a Figures for Argentina (1990-1997), Brazil (1990), Chile (1990, 1994 and 1998), Mexico (1989, 2004-2006) and Nicaragua (1998) include public-sector wage-earners. In addition, 
in the case of non-professional, non-technical workers, the figures for the following countries include establishments with up to four employees: Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Chile (1996), the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Panama (up to 2002), the Plurinational State of Bolivia (1999 and 2002) and Uruguay (1990). Where no information is available 
on the size of establishments, no figures are given for the total number of employed in low-productivity sectors.
b Includes professional, technical and own-account workers.
c Greater Buenos Aires.
d Eight departmental capitals plus El Alto.
e No information is available on the size of establishments for 1990. Therefore the figure given for Brazil in the column for establishments employing more than five persons refers 
to wage-earners who have an employment contract (“carteira”), while the column for establishments employing up to five persons refers to workers who do not have such 
contracts.
f Includes non-technical and non-professional private sector workers employed in establishments of undeclared size.
g Asunción metropolitan area.
h From 1997 on, the sample design for the survey does not permit urban-rural breakdown. Figures therefore correspond to the national total.
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Table A-11 




Disparity in labour income by years of schooling a Wage disparity by years of schooling b
Total 0 to 3 years
4 to 6 
years









Total 0 to 3 years
4 to 6 
years









Argentina c 1990 65 66 … 66 63 51 84 80 … 83 68 63
1999 65 64 82 58 63 51 86 71 -.- 63 79 67
2002 59 62 81 55 61 46 76 -.- -.- 56 70 61
2006 65 63 49 48 57 63 80 56 69 59 73 70




1989 d 59 62 68 76 78 46 69 44 59 63 93 49
1999 63 64 65 66 71 66 77 -.- 67 36 80 65
2002 61 62 67 75 66 60 77 39 83 95 74 60
2007 63 62 53 59 74 65 83 56 67 73 71 71
Brazil 1990 56 46 46 50 49 49 76 65 60 61 54 52
1999 65 59 51 55 56 56 85 76 67 67 62 57
2002 67 59 53 56 57 57 86 78 69 68 65 58
2008 68 62 55 58 59 59 85 80 71 70 67 62
2009 68 60 57 59 61 58 85 79 73 72 69 61
Chile 1990 62 60 60 71 63 49 79 82 62 83 77 55
1998 66 70 63 65 70 54 83 79 65 74 80 63
2003 64 68 68 64 69 53 81 69 71 67 79 63
2006 70 71 73 65 67 62 86 76 75 75 76 71
2009 65 70 66 67 68 55 82 81 75 72 74 67
Colombia 1991 69 57 60 70 72 64 85 84 79 82 80 68
1999 75 66 71 75 73 70 90 82 85 85 82 74
2002 72 66 70 67 69 63 98 90 93 88 83 73
2008 73 68 61 65 65 67 94 94 84 79 80 74
2009 75 61 59 63 66 71 95 86 83 80 77 76
Costa Rica 1990 72 53 62 65 73 66 83 73 79 75 79 66
1999 70 49 62 57 65 68 88 87 84 74 75 71
2002 75 63 56 60 72 72 85 74 71 74 79 69
2008 70 68 57 63 62 65 88 70 74 78 72 75
2009 76 48 55 60 66 71 95 72 68 76 80 78
Dominican  
Republic
2002 72 56 56 62 69 66 89 79 64 73 82 78
2008 61 48 58 45 53 58 83 72 68 72 82 67
2009 62 73 51 51 47 57 84 82 71 68 67 70
Ecuador 1990 66 49 57 68 79 57 78 67 64 87 78 56
1999 67 63 62 62 71 60 98 75 73 78 93 72
2002 67 73 69 66 70 57 87 96 90 78 80 64
2008 69 67 63 66 70 62 95 84 76 84 81 74
2009 71 65 65 75 70 64 93 77 78 87 81 72
El Salvador 1995 62 62 55 63 68 63 89 76 67 74 84 72
1999 76 81 76 78 81 70 96 78 86 86 91 74
2001 73 80 69 69 82 69 99 83 79 82 91 79
2009 81 87 84 77 76 79 105 88 90 89 85 84
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Table A-11 (concluded)
Country Year
Disparity in labour income by years of schooling a Wage disparity by years of schooling b
Total 0 to 3 years
4 to 6 
years









Total 0 to 3 years
4 to 6 
years









Guatemala 1989 68 59 78 71 80 57 97 66 83 89 88 68
1998 55 62 53 58 56 53 72 54 60 67 69 62
2002 56 56 63 68 58 56 79 82 71 81 71 67
2006 58 80 53 72 63 44 82 87 67 77 77 57
Honduras 1990 59 47 50 58 69 54 98 71 73 74 83 63
1999 65 60 62 59 66 66 88 83 83 65 77 74
2002 76 66 69 67 77 65 95 87 84 81 83 64
2007 81 65 66 71 80 76 103 91 83 85 87 77
Mexico 1989 55 62 52 70 62 46 76 83 73 83 79 62
1998 58 67 66 68 65 47 76 72 83 80 82 55
2002 62 57 60 59 61 61 80 69 76 71 76 69
2008 62 65 64 65 66 53 83 76 71 71 80 71
Nicaragua 1993 77 95 73 71 91 58 83 85 81 74 78 65
1998 65 67 80 67 52 54 88 70 81 71 59 68
2001 69 84 76 60 80 52 90 87 88 69 78 62
2005 71 73 68 68 71 60 96 89 91 79 81 66
Panama 1991 78 47 55 69 82 69 89 60 72 82 86 73
1999 78 61 56 63 75 71 89 -.- 75 75 81 71
2002 76 57 51 53 78 64 93 97 72 74 85 70
2008 74 62 52 58 69 65 97 -.- 77 78 89 75
2009 78 74 52 58 77 69 96 85 73 85 88 73
Paraguay 1990 e 55 69 55 60 65 42 83 -.- 72 80 77 58
1999 72 62 77 62 73 63 96 91 90 69 92 70
2001 68 63 63 73 64 63 102 75 83 99 97 65
2008 71 54 65 66 57 75 92 70 95 87 68 75
2009 75 56 61 69 68 79 97 80 88 76 84 81
Peru 1997 59 70 64 60 72 52 77 59 62 57 81 63
1999 64 65 60 102 67 61 81 58 58 66 71 73
2001 67 80 82 67 70 62 80 51 78 75 77 67
2008 61 67 61 60 60 63 71 53 63 63 68 63
2009 63 65 63 63 60 64 77 53 59 60 69 69
Uruguay 1990 44 50 41 40 42 37 73 67 67 71 61 57
1999 68 63 60 62 62 55 78 63 66 72 69 58
2002 73 82 67 63 66 59 82 69 70 71 73 61
2008 68 54 56 56 60 58 80 51 61 63 68 63




1990 66 63 58 68 61 62 87 89 81 84 78 71
1994 70 63 61 70 63 66 87 92 79 95 70 74
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of special tabulations of data from household survey conducted in the respective countries.
a Refers to the income differential in the total employed population. This differential is calculated as the quotient of average female income and average male income, multiplied by 100.
b Refers to the income differential in total income among wage-earners. This differential is calculated as the quotient of average female income and average male income multiplied 
by 100.
c Greater Buenos Aires.
d Eight departmental capitals plus El Alto.
e Asunción metropolitan area.
… No data.
-.- Insufficient observations.
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Table A-12 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): INDICATORS OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING,  
1990-1991 AND 2007-2008 a
Country Coverage c
Public social spending b
Per capita (in dollars 
at 2000 prices) Percentage of GDP


























Argentina e CG 687 861 821 1 133 11.3 10.6 11.0 11.8 60.3 66.5 61.3 59.8
GG 1 090 1 500 1 512 2 108 17.9 18.5 20.2 21.9 62.7 65.9 63.2 63.6
NFPS 1 166 1 620 1 635 2 276 19.1 20.0 21.8 23.6 62.2 65.1 62.8 63.3
Bolivia  
(Plurinational State of) f
CG 47 104 122 … 5.2 10.3 12.0 … 34.4 33.5 35.4 …
NFPS … 156 165 178 … 15.5 16.3 16.2 … 46.9 42.8 49.1
Brazil g FG consolidated 309 434 453 598 9.2 11.8 12.2 13.7 52.3 64.4 60.6 80.5
554 753 785 1 083 16.6 20.5 21.2 24.7 48.9 50.5 62.1 73.5
Chile CG 381 635 747 818 12.0 13.2 15.1 13.2 61.2 65.7 68.4 66.3
Colombia h CG 129 320 264 376 5.9 12.8 11.1 12.6 28.8 … 68.6 70.9
Costa Rica SP 486 636 727 951 15.6 16.9 18.0 18.4 38.9 41.9 40.5 36.2
Cuba CG 864 532 661 1 656 27.6 21.6 23.7 37.4 35.6 42.9 47.0 54.6
Dominican Republic i CG 69 134 188 288 3.8 5.4 6.8 8.1 43.1 43.2 49.9 46.9
Ecuador j CG 99 71 66 106 7.4 5.1 4.9 6.4 42.8 25.0 20.9 27.9
El Salvador k GG … 153 222 290 … 7.3 10.0 11.1 … 30.7 38.6 46.8
Guatemala CG 49 86 105 120 3.7 5.8 6.8 7.1 29.9 44.8 47.3 51.0
Honduras CG 67 63 97 150 6.3 5.4 8.4 10.4 40.7 38.3 45.4 51.3
Jamaica l CG 294 … 331 309 8.4 … 9.5 8.6 26.8 … 17.1 16.3
Mexico BCG 358 521 621 856 6.5 8.8 9.7 12.1 41.3 54.9 61.3 64.1
Nicaragua BCG 45 44 63 107 6.6 6.2 8.1 12.0 34.0 35.0 38.4 52.7
Panama CG 229 365 371 506 7.5 9.7 9.5 9.3 38.1 42.4 42.5 41.5
NFPS 496 645 680 … 16.2 17.2 17.4 … 40.0 41.6 44.3 …
Paraguay BCG 45 126 107 165 3.2 8.6 8.0 11.1 39.9 46.4 38.3 59.5
Peru BCG 64 151 158 … 3.9 7.3 7.7 … 33.0 40.8 45.0 …
GG … … 179 224 … … 8.8 8.0 … … 52.2 52.5
Trinidad and Tobago m CG 303 … 588 1 135 6.9 … 9.1 10.5 40.6 … 43.5 33.4
Uruguay n CG-consolidated 841 1 316 1 314 1 686 16.8 20.5 21.6 21.8 62.3 68.7 68.1 73.4
GG … … 1 272 … … … 20.9 … … … 62.8 …
NFPS … … 1 364 … … … 22.4 … … … 64.4 …
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) o
BCG-approved 433 457 549 708 8.8 9.0 11.6 13.4 32.8 36.6 37.8 44.0
BCG-executed … … 483 614 … … 10.2 10.8 … … 43.5 41.8
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the Commission’s social expenditure database.
a Includes public spending on education, health and nutrition, social security, employment and social welfare, housing, water and sewerage systems.
b The figures are simple averages for the relevant bienniums. 
c CG: central government; GG: general government; NFPS: non-financial public sector; FG: federal government; PS: public sector/total public sector; BCG: budgetary central 
government.
d For most countries, the figure shown for total public spending is the official statistic provided by the country; no consideration is given to whether debt servicing is included or 
excluded.
e Includes the spending of the national government, provincial governments and the central government of Buenos Aires, as well as municipal governments.
f In the Plurinational State of Bolivia, in the case of the NFPS, the figure listed for 2006-2007 is the 2006 figure from the new 2002-2006 series published by the country. As such, 
it is not comparable to those of previous years.
g The data up to 1999 are an estimate of consolidated social spending, which includes federal, state and municipal spending.
h The figures for the 2006-2007 biennium correspond to the new series published since 2002 and are not comparable to those of previous years.
i The figures listed for 2007-2008 are the 2007 figures.
j The figures of the series remain unchanged. Social security spending is under review. The figure listed for 2006-2007 is the 2006 figure.
k The figures listed for 2007-2008 are those for 2007.
l Old series with no data for 1997 and 1998. The data shown for 2007-2008 are those for 2004. New series under review.
m In Trinidad and Tobago, the Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG) series begins in 2000 and is not comparable with earlier series; the figures for 2007-2008 
are preliminary.
n In Uruguay, the figures from 2000-2001 correspond to the series published by the Ministry of Social Development (MIDES) and are not comparable with those of previous years.
o Corresponds to the budget law, which it includes the amendments introduced yearly on 31 December. The figures shown for approved central government budget for 2007-2008 
are those for 2006.
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Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Target 1.A Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people 
whose income is less than one dollar a day
Indicator 1.1
Proportion of population below  




Share of poorest quintile in 
national consumption
Level Level Level Level Level Level
1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008
Latin America and the Caribbean c 22.5 12.9 8.6 4.4 3.2 3.5
Latin America c 22.5 12.9 8.6 4.4 3.2 3.5
Argentina d 8.2 5.8 1.6 2.6 4.2 3.7
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 39.5 32.4 9.7 4.5 3.2 4.3
Brazil 23.4 7.3 9.7 3.3 2.1 2.6
Chile 13.0 3.7 4.4 1.1 3.5 4.1
Colombia 26.1 22.9 13.8 8.3 2.0 2.9
Costa Rica 10.1 5.5 4.8 2.2 4.3 4.4
Cuba … … … … … …
Dominican Republic … 22.6 8.8 8.8 3.2 2.9
Ecuador d 26.2 14.2 9.2 4.7 4.8 4.4
El Salvador 27.7 18.2 9.1 8.1 3.4 3.4
Guatemala 41.8 29.3 18.5 11.3 2.7 2.8
Haiti
Honduras 60.9 47.1 31.5 23.9 2.3 1.9
Mexico 18.7 11.2 5.9 3.2 3.9 4.0
Nicaragua 51.4 33.8 24.3 12.3 2.1 3.5
Panama 16.2 13.5 5.2 1.6 3.2 4.6
Paraguay 35.0 30.8 3.6 5.7 5.2 5.0
Peru 25.0 12.6 10.1 4.0 3.0 4.0
Uruguay d 3.4 3.5 0.9 0.9 4.8 4.9
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 14.4 9.9 5.0 3.5 4.3 5.2
The Caribbean c … … … … … …
Anguilla … … … … … …
Antigua and Barbuda … … … … … …
Aruba … … … … … …
Bahamas … … … … … …
Barbados … … … … … …
Belize e 13.4 … … … … …
British Virgin Islands … … … … … …
Cayman Islands … … … … … …
Dominica … … … … … …
French Guiana … … … … … …
Grenada … … … … … …
Guadaloupe … … … … … …
Guyana e 5.8 7.7 … … … …
Jamaica e 2 2 … … … …
Martinica … … … … … …
Montserrat … … … … … …
Netherlands Antilles … … … … … …
Puerto Rico … … … … … …
Saint Kitts and Nevis … … … … … …
Saint Lucia e 20.9 … … … … …
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines … … … … … …
Suriname e 15.5 … … … … …
Trinidad and Tobago e 4.2 … … … … …
Turks and Caicos Islands … … … … … …
United States Virgin Islands … … … … … …
Source:  United Nations, Achieving the Millennium Development Goals with Equality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Progress and Challenges (LC/G.2460), Santiago, Chile, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, August 2010.
a The indicators are presented in numerical order; those for which there is no information have not been included.
b Does not include the Dominican Republic. Figures for 1990 are not comparable with those for 2000 on.
c Weighted averages.
d The figures refer to urban areas.
e Corresponds to the proportion of the population with income below one purchasing power parity (PPP) dollar per day. Data available on the official United Nations site for Millennium 
Development Goals Indicators [online] http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Default.aspx.
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Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Target 1B Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all,  
including women and young people
Indicator 1.4






Proportion of employed 
people living below 
$ 1 (PPP) per day
Indicator 1.7
Proportion of own-
account and contributing 
family workers in 
total employment b
Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level
1992-1997 2003-2008 1990 2008 1990 2008 1990 2008
Latin America and the Caribbean b 0.3 2.2 54.3 59.5 17.8 3.5 32.0 31.1
Latin America b 0.3 2.2 54.5 59.6 3.2 3.5 32.0 31.2
Argentina c 3.5 6.0 52.5 57.0 4.2 3.7 25.6 19.3
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 0.1 1.1 53.5 58.7 3.2 4.3 43.7 36.0
Brazil -0.5 1.8 61.1 63.7 2.1 2.6 28.9 29.1
Chile 5.8 2.7 47.7 53.1 3.5 4.1 24.5 21.3
Colombia 0.9 1.7 58.6 56.9 2.0 2.9 44.6 45.6
Costa Rica 1.8 3.0 54.7 57.9 4.3 4.4 24.3 19.5
Cuba … … 53.0 56.0 … … … …
Dominican Republic 1.4 4.1 52.9 54.5 3.2 2.9 41.7 43.8
Ecuador c -1.4 2.3 57.1 61.1 4.8 4.4 35.6 36.2
El Salvador 3.5 1.0 55.8 55.5 3.4 3.4 36.2 35.3
Guatemala 3.9 -1.1 56.5 64.9 2.7 2.8 48.0 44.5
Haiti -6.1 -1.7 56.0 55.9 … …
Honduras -0.4 4.0 56.1 58.0 2.3 1.9 49.6 48.9
Mexico -0.6 1.5 52.1 59.4 3.9 4.0 29.4 22.6
Nicaragua 0.8 -0.2 49.6 60.4 2.1 3.5 46.5 44.9
Panama 0.6 4.2 48.1 60.3 3.2 4.6 33.8 30.7
Paraguay -1.2 0.3 61.4 63.8 5.2 5.0 22.9 26.4
Peru 2.4 4.0 67.9 71.3 3.0 4.0 52.4 51.4
Uruguay c 3.0 6.9 52.6 58.8 4.8 4.9 20.1 24.9
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) -1.2 2.5 51.6 60.8 4.3 5.2 25.7 37.5
The Caribbean b 0.9 2.0 47.3 51.2 … … 32.2 27.1
Anguilla … … … … … … … …
Antigua and Barbuda … … … … … … 14.6
Aruba … … … … … … 3.9 …
Bahamas -0.6 0.0 63.0 66.6 … … … …
Barbados -0.9 1.9 56.9 66.9 … … 11.7 …
Belize d -1.2 0.9 47.6 56.8 … … … 23.5
British Virgin Islands … … … … … … … …
Cayman Islands … … … … … … … …
Dominica … … … … … … 29.1 …
French Guiana … … … … … … … …
Grenada … … … … … … … …
Guadaloupe … … 44.5 43.1 … … … …
Guyana d 5.1 1.6 51.7 58.9 … … … …
Jamaica d 1.7 0.1 61.5 58.2 … … 42.3 35.4
Martinica … … 46.2 42.5 … … … …
Montserrat … … … … … … 12.6 …
Netherlands Antilles … … 49.0 53.5 … … 8.1 11.2
Puerto Rico … … 38.1 42.4 … … … …
Saint Kitts and Nevis … … … … … … 12.1 …
Saint Lucia d … … … … … … 23.5 …
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines … … … … … … 20.2 …
Suriname -0.3 4.3 44.6 44.7 … … 15.6 …
Trinidad and Tobago -2.4 5.7 45.0 61.5 … … 21.7 15.6
Turks and Caicos Islands … … … … … … … …
United States Virgin Islands … … … … … … … …
Source:  United Nations, Achieving the Millennium Development Goals with Equality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Progress and Challenges (LC/G.2460), Santiago, Chile, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, August 2010.
a The indicators are presented in numerical order; those for which there is no information have not been included.
b Weighted averages.
c The figures refer to urban areas.
d Simple averages.
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Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Target 1.C Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger 
Target 1.8
Prevalence of underweight children  
under five years of age
Target 1.9
Proportion of population below minimum  
level of dietary energy consumption
Level Level Level Level
1989-1999 1996-2008 1990-1992 2004-2006
Latin America and the Caribbean b 8.6 6.3 10.7 7.3
Latin America b 8.6 6.3 10.7 7.3
Argentina c 1.9 3.8 <=5 <=5
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 11.2 5.9 24 23
Brazil 7.0 4.6 10 6
Chile 0.9 0.6 7 <=5
Colombia 10.1 6.9 15 10
Costa Rica 2.8 4.0 <=5 <=5
Cuba … … 5 <=5
Dominican Republic 10.3 4.3 27 21
Ecuador c 14.6 8.6 24 13
El Salvador 11.2 8.6 9 10
Guatemala 26.6 22.7 14 16
Haiti 26.8 22.2 63 58
Honduras 18.0 11.4 19 12
Mexico 7.5 5.0 <=5 <=5
Nicaragua 11.0 6.9 52 21
Panama 6.1 6.8 18 17
Paraguay 3.7 4.2 16 12
Peru 10.8 7.6 28 13
Uruguay c 4.4 6.0 5 <=5
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 7.7 4.6 10 12
The Caribbean b 7.6 5.9 11.9 7.2
Anguilla … … … …
Antigua and Barbuda … 1.6 … 27
Aruba … … … …
Bahamas … … 9 6
Barbados … … … …
Belize 6.2 6.1 7 …
British Virgin Islands … … … …
Cayman Islands … … … …
Dominica … … 4 …
French Guiana … … … …
Grenada … … 9 23
Guadaloupe … … … …
Guyana 18.3 12.4 21 6
Jamaica 4.6 4.0 11 5
Martinica … … … …
Montserrat … … … …
Netherlands Antilles … … 14 5
Puerto Rico … … … …
Saint Kitts and Nevis … … 13 15
Saint Lucia … … 8 8
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines … … 22 6
Suriname … … 13 7
Trinidad and Tobago … 5.9 11 10
Turks and Caicos Islands … … … …
United States Virgin Islands … … … …
Source:  United Nations, Achieving the Millennium Development Goals with Equality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Progress and Challenges (LC/G.2460), Santiago, Chile, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, August 2010.
a The indicators are presented in numerical order; those for which there is no information have not been included.
b Weighted averages.
c The figures refer to urban areas.
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Achieve universal primary education
Target 2.A Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able  
to complete a full course of primary schooling
Indicator 2.1 
Net enrolment ratio in  
primary education
Indicator 2.2 
Proportion of pupils starting grade 
1 who reach last grade of primary
Indicator 2.3
Literacy rate of 15-24 year-
olds, women and men
Level Level Level Level Level Level
1991 2007 1992 2004-2008 1991 2007
Latin America and the Caribbean b 88.2 95.0 83.9 93.1 92.0 97.1
Latin America b 88.2 95.0 83.9 93.1 90.9 95.9
Argentina … 99.1 97.1 97.8 98.3 99.1
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) … 95.0 67.1 96.4 93.9 99.4
Brazil 85.4 93.5 82.2 94.7 91.8 97.8
Chile 89.4 94.5 95.5 98.7 98.4 99.1
Colombia 69.5 93.5 85.6 93.6 90.5 98.0
Costa Rica 87.6 … 84.6 94.1 97.4 98.0
Cuba 97.6 99.5 … … 96.2 100.0
Dominican Republic 54.6 82.4 76.3 88.3 87.5 96.0
Ecuador 99.2 92.6 89.8 96.2 96.2 95.4
El Salvador … 95.6 69.0 76.1 84.9 93.6
Guatemala … 96.8 52.2 62.6 76.0 85.5
Haiti 22.0  … … … 54.8 81.7
Honduras 87.6 97.2 61.7 79.2 79.7 93.9
Mexico 98.6 99.4 86.7 95.7 95.4 98.2
Nicaragua 69.0 93.4 60.2 70.8 68.2 87.0
Panama … 98.9 89.3 94.6 95.1 96.3
Paraguay 92.8 93.1 78.3 95.0 95.6 98.8
Peru … 99.7 85.4 93.9 95.4 97.4
Uruguay 92.4 97.8 96.2 96.7 98.6 98.8
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 88.9 92.1 88.3 93.5 95.4 98.4
The Caribbean b 94.1 90.8 … … 94.0 97.2
Anguilla … 95.3 … … … …
Antigua and Barbuda … 74.0 … … … …
Aruba … 99.2 … … … 99.3
Bahamas 90.3 90.8 … … … …
Barbados 84.3 … … … 99.8 99.8
Belize 94.4 99.7 … … 76.4 84.2
British Virgin Islands … 97.1 … … … …
Cayman Islands … 95.6 … … … 98.9
Dominica … 73.3 … … … …
French Guiana … … … … … …
Grenada … 96.0 … … … …
Guadaloupe … … … … … 99.8
Guyana 95.4 98.5 … … … …
Jamaica 97.1 85.5 … … 91.2 94.3
Martinica … … … … … 99.7
Montserrat … 96.2 … … … …
Netherlands Antilles … … … … 97.0 98.2
Puerto Rico … … … … 96.1 97.7
Saint Kitts and Nevis … 90.4 … … … …
Saint Lucia 96.4 93.5 … … … …
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines … 97.5 … … … …
Suriname 82.1 90.1 … … … 95.2
Trinidad and Tobago 91.1 96.9 … … 99.3 99.5
Turks and Caicos Islands … 80.7 … … … …
United States Virgin Islands … … … … … …
Source:  United Nations, Achieving the Millennium Development Goals with Equality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Progress and Challenges (LC/G.2460), Santiago, Chile, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, August 2010.
a The indicators are presented in numerical order; those for which there is no information have not been included.
b Weighted averages.
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Promote gender equality and empower women
Target 3.A Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005,  
and in all levels of education no later than 2015
Indicator 3.1
Ratio of girls to 
boys in primary 
education 
Indicator 3.1








Share of women in 
wage employment in the 
non-agricultural sector
Indicator 3.3
Proportion of seats held 
by women in national  
parliament
Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level Level
1991 2007 1991 2007 1991 2007 1990-2002 1991-2007 1990-1992 2007
Latin America and the Caribbean b 0.98 1.00 1.05 1.05 1.08 1.27 36.2 41.8 11.9 22.2
Latin America b 0.98 1.00 1.05 1.05 1.08 1.27 36.3 41.7 12.0 22.8
Argentina … … … … … … 37.1 45.0 6.3 40.0
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 0.92 1.01 … 0.99 … 0.84 35.2 38.6 9.2 16.9
Brazil … 1.00 … 1.10 1.11 1.29 35.1 41.6 5.3 9.0
Chile 0.98 0.99 1.07 1.03 … 1.01 34.7 37.4 7.5 15.0
Colombia 1.02 1.00 1.19 1.11 1.07 1.09 41.8 48.5 4.5 8.4
Costa Rica 0.99 … 1.06 … … … 37.2 41.1 10.5 36.8
Cuba 0.97 1.00 1.15 1.02 1.40 1.85 41.7 43.7 33.9 43.2
Dominican Republic 1.00 1.01 … 1.22 … … 31.0 38.8 7.5 19.7
Ecuador 0.99 1.01 … 1.02 … 1.22 34.1 36.6 4.5 27.6
El Salvador 1.01 1.02 1.22 1.03 … 1.09 45.6 48.6 11.7 19.0
Guatemala 0.87 0.96 … … … 1.00 36.8 43.0 7.0 12.0
Haiti 0.95 … 0.94 … … … 44.2 … 3.6 4.1
Honduras 1.04 1.02 1.23 … 0.79 … 33.3 33.4 10.2 23.4
Mexico 0.97 1.00 0.99 1.03 0.74 0.98 36.5 39.4 12.0 23.2
Nicaragua 1.06 1.01 1.20 1.15 0.96 … … 38.6 14.8 18.5
Panama … 0.99 … … … 1.59 45.4 43.1 7.5 16.7
Paraguay 0.97 … 1.05 … … … 41.0 40.2 5.6 12.5
Peru 0.97 1.00 0.94 1.01 … … 37.2 42.9 5.6 29.2
Uruguay 0.99 1.00 … 1.11 … 1.75 42.3 45.5 6.1 12.1
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 1.03 1.00 1.38 1.14 35.2 41.4 10.0 18.6
The Caribbean b 0.99 0.99 1.07 1.06 1.35 2.34 44.4 43.6 9.3 15.1
Anguilla … … … … … … 42.8 48.8 … …
Antigua and Barbuda … 0.98 … … … … … 50.6 0.0 10.5
Aruba … 0.99 … 1.04 … 1.41 43.9 45.9 … …
Bahamas 1.03 1.03 … 1.06 … … 49.6 48.8 4.1 12.2
Barbados 1.00 … … … 1.24 … 46.8 48.7 3.7 10.0
Belize 0.98 1.01 1.15 1.09 … … 33.9 37.6 0.0 0.0
British Virgin Islands … 1.01 … 1.12 … … 49.9 49.1 … …
Cayman Islands … 1.05 … 1.26 … … 50.0 49.3 … …
Dominica … 1.06 1.02 … … 39.7 43.8 10.0 18.8
French Guiana … … … … … … 36.1 38.2 … …
Grenada 0.85 1.00 1.16 1.00 … … 40.4 42.6 20.0 13.3
Guadaloupe … … … … … … 46.6 45.7 … …
Guyana 0.99 … 1.06 … … 2.12 38.5 34.7 36.9 30.0
Jamaica 0.99 0.98 1.06 1.05 0.74 … 46.2 45.8 5.0 13.3
Martinica … … … … … … 45.4 48.1 … …
Montserrat … 1.08 … 1.01 … … 43.4 … … …
Netherlands Antilles … … 1.19 … … 42.7 49.9 … …
Puerto Rico … … … … … … 46.5 41.5 … …
Saint Kitts and Nevis 1.02 1.02 1.11 0.91 … … … … 6.7 6.7
Saint Lucia 0.94 0.95 1.45 1.15 1.35 2.34 51.8 47.5 0.0 11.1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0.98 0.97 1.24 … … … … … 9.5 18.2
Suriname 1.03 0.98 1.16 … … … 39.5 38.1 7.8 25.5
Trinidad and Tobago 1.00 0.99 1.04 1.07 0.78 … 35.6 43.9 16.7 26.8
Turks and Caicos Islands … … … … … … 43.1 40.7 … …
United States Virgin Islands … … … … … … … … … …
Source:  United Nations, Achieving the Millennium Development Goals with Equality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Progress and Challenges (LC/G.2460), Santiago, Chile, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, August 2010.
a The indicators are presented in numerical order; those for which there is no information have not been included.
b Weighted averages.
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Reduce child mortality 
Target 4.A Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate
Indicator 4.1
Under-five mortality rate  
(per 1 000 live births)
 Indicator 4.2
Infant mortality rate  
(per 1 000 live births)
Indicator 4.3














Latin America and the Caribbean b 55.5 26.2 42.7 20.4 76.3 93.0
Latin America b 55.9 26.3 43.0 20.4 76.4 93.4
Argentina 30.1 14.9 25.8 12.9 93.0 99.0
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 114.6 57.1 82.6 42.6 53.0 81.0
Brazil 60.1 27.6 47.5 22.5 78.0 99.0
Chile 19.1 8.5 16.3 7.0 97.0 91.0
Colombia 42.5 25.3 31.5 18.7 82.0 95.0
Costa Rica 18.4 11.2 16.0 9.7 90.0 90.0
Cuba 18.9 7.7 15.6 4.8 94.0 99.0
Ecuador 65.5 24.4 49.9 20.0 60.0 99.0
El Salvador 64.8 24.6 47.1 20.0 98.0 98.0
Dominican Republic 64.2 31.3 55.3 28.0 96.0 96.0
Guatemala 85.5 36.5 61.0 27.6 68.0 93.0
Haiti 137.3 68.2 92.7 46.6 31.0 58.0
Honduras 70.8 40.2 48.0 27.2 90.0 89.0
Mexico 44.2 18.9 36.3 15.6 75.0 96.0
Nicaragua 75.9 23.8 56.5 20.0 82.0 99.0
Panama 35.9 22.9 28.3 17.5 73.0 89.0
Paraguay 57.8 37.0 44.8 31.0 69.0 80.0
Peru 85.1 30.7 57.8 18.5 64.0 99.0
Uruguay 24.3 15.8 21.4 12.7 97.0 96.0
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 31.6 21.1 25.0 16.4 61.0 55.0
The Caribbean b 32.9 21.5 25.7 17.1 74.7 85.0
Anguilla ... ... ... ... ... ...
Antigua and Barbuda ... ... ... ... 89.0 99.0
Aruba 21.2 17.4 18.3 14.9 ... ...
Bahamas 24.7 11.2 16.6 8.0 86.0 96.0
Barbados 17.8 10.1 15.1 9.5 87.0 75.0
Belize 38.5 19.8 30.6 15.9 86.0 96.0
British Virgin Islands ... ... ... ... ... ...
Cayman Islands ... ... ... ... ... ...
Dominica ... ... ... ... 88.0 96.0
French Guiana 26.3 14.4 22.5 13.0 ... ...
Grenada 40.5 14.1 33.0 12.8 85.0 98.0
Guadaloupe 20.4 8.7 15.6 6.7 ... ...
Guyana 90.2 52.4 64.9 40.3 73.0 96.0
Jamaica 33.9 27.1 27.8 22.5 74.0 76.0
Martinica 12.4 7.7 9.8 6.5 ... ...
Montserrat ... ... ... ... ... ...
Netherlands Antilles ... 13.4 16.1 12.4 ... ...
Puerto Rico 14.9 8.7 12.7 6.9 … …
Saint Kitts and Nevis ... ... ... ... 99.0 99.0
Saint Lucia 24.4 15.1 18.5 12.0 82.0 94.0
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 39.3 26.8 32.3 22.3 96.0 99.0
Suriname 49.4 30.4 36.5 21.7 65.0 85.0
Trinidad and Tobago 35.2 32.1 28.7 25.1 70.0 91.0
Turks and Caicos Islands ... ... ... ... ... ...
United States Virgin Islands 18.3 9.7 15.8 8.8 ... ...
Source:  United Nations, Achieving the Millennium Development Goals with Equality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Progress and Challenges (LC/G.2460), Santiago, Chile, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, August 2010.
a The indicators are presented in numerical order; those for which there is no information have not been included.
b Weighted averages.
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Table A-23 





Target 7.C Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable  
access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation
Target 7.D By 2020, to have achieved  
a significant improvement in the lives  
of at least 100 million slum dwellers
Indicator 7.8
Proportion of population using  
an improved drinking water  
source (national)
Indicator 7.9
Proportion of population  
using an improved sanitation  
facility (national)
Indicator 7.10














Latin America and the Caribbean b 84.2 91.0 68.0 77.8 37.1 25.5
Latin America b 84.1 91.0 67.8 77.7 37.2 25.4
Argentina 94.0 96.0 81.0 91.0 30.5 26.2
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 72.0 86.0 33.0 43.0 70.0 50.4
Brazil 83.0 91.0 71.0 77.0 45.0 29.0
Chile 91.0 95.0 84.0 94.0 4.0 9.0
Colombia 89.0 93.0 68.0 78.0 26.0 17.9
Costa Rica 96.0 98.0 94.0 96.0 11.9 10.9
Cuba 91.0 91.0 98.0 98.0 ... ...
Dominican Republic 84.0 95.0 68.0 79.0 56.4 17.6
Ecuador 73.0 95.0 71.0 84.0 28.1 21.5
El Salvador 69.0 84.0 73.0 86.0 44.7 28.9
Guatemala 79.0 96.0 70.0 84.0 65.8 42.9
Haiti 52.0 58.0 29.0 19.0 84.9 70.1
Honduras 72.0 84.0 45.0 66.0 24.0 34.9
Mexico 88.0 95.0 56.0 81.0 23.1 14.4
Nicaragua 70.0 79.0 42.0 48.0 80.7 45.5
Panama 90.0 92.0 72.0 74.0 30.8 23.0
Paraguay 52.0 77.0 60.0 70.0 36.8 17.6
Peru 75.0 84.0 55.0 72.0 60.4 36.1
Uruguay 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 ... ...
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 89.0 83.0 83.0 68.0 40.7 32.0
The Caribbean b 90.2 93.8 83.5 85.2 23.7 43.3
Anguilla 60.0 60.0 99.0 99.0 40.6 36.7
Antigua and Barbuda 91.0 91.0 96.0 95.0 6.9 4.8
Aruba 100.0 100.0 ... ... ... ...
Bahamas 96.0 97.0 100.0 100.0 ... ...
Barbados 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.0 ... ...
Belize 91.0 91.0 47.0 47.0 54.2 47.3
British Virgin Islands 98.0 98.0 100.0 100.0 ... ...
Cayman Islands ... ... ... ... ... ...
Dominica 97.0 97.0 83.0 84.0 16.6 14.0
French Guiana 84.0 84.0 78.0 78.0 12.9 10.5
Grenada 95.0 95.0 97.0 97.0 6.9 6.0
Guadaloupe 98.0 98.0 64.0 64.0 6.9 5.4
Guyana 83.0 93.0 69.0 81.0 4.9 33.7
Jamaica 92.0 93.0 83.0 83.0 29.2 60.5
Martinica ... ... ... ... 2.0 1.6
Montserrat 100.0 100.0 96.0 96.0 ... ...
Netherlands Antilles ... ... ... ... ... ...
Puerto Rico ... ... ... ... ... ...
Saint Kitts and Nevis 99.0 99.0 96.0 96.0 ... ...
Saint Lucia 98.0 98.0 89.0 89.0 11.9 11.9
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines ... ... ... ... ... ...
Suriname 91.0 92.0 92.0 82.0 6.9 3.9
Trinidad and Tobago 88.0 94.0 93.0 92.0 34.7 24.7
Turks and Caicos Islands 100.0 100.0 96.0 96.0 ... ...
United States Virgin Islands ... ... ... ... ... ...
Source:  United Nations, Achieving the Millennium Development Goals with Equality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Progress and Challenges (LC/G.2460), Santiago, Chile, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, August 2010.
a The indicators are presented in numerical order; those for which there is no information have not been included.
b Weighted averages.
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Table A-24 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROGRESS TOWARDS THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS a
Country or territory
Goal 8
Develop a global partnership for development
Target 8.F In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies,  
especially information and communications technologies
Indicator 8.14
Telephone lines per  
100 population
Indicator 8.15
Cellular subscribers per  
100 population
Indicator 8.16














Latin America and the Caribbean b 6.2 17.8 12.1 66.7 3.9 25.8
Latin America b 6.0 17.7 12.1 66.3 3.8 25.6
Argentina 9.3 24.0 17.6 102.2 7.1 25.9
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2.7 7.1 7.0 34.2 1.4 10.5
Brazil 6.3 20.5 13.3 63.1 2.9 35.2
Chile 6.6 20.7 22.1 83.7 16.5 31.0
Colombia 6.9 17.2 5.4 73.5 2.1 26.2
Costa Rica 9.2 32.2 5.4 33.8 5.8 33.6
Cuba 3.2 9.3 0.1 1.8 0.5 11.6
Dominican Republic 4.8 9.3 8.5 56.5 4.0 17.2
Ecuador 4.8 13.5 3.9 75.6 1.5 13.2
El Salvador 2.5 15.8 11.8 89.5 1.1 11.1
Guatemala 2.1 10.5 7.7 76.0 0.7 10.2
Haiti 0.7 1.1 0.7 26.1 0.3 10.4
Honduras 1.8 11.6 2.4 58.9 1.2 6.0
Mexico 6.4 18.5 14.1 62.5 5.1 20.8
Nicaragua 1.2 4.4 1.8 37.9 1.0 2.8
Panama 9.0 14.8 13.9 90.1 6.6 22.3
Paraguay 2.7 6.4 15.0 76.6 0.7 8.7
Peru 2.6 9.6 4.9 55.3 3.1 27.4
Uruguay 13.4 28.9 12.3 90.0 10.5 29.0
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 7.5 18.4 22.3 86.1 3.4 20.7
The Caribbean b 17.0 23.8 15.9 87.5 7.2 32.9
Anguilla 30.5 47.0 19.3 107.0 22.3 34.0
Antigua and Barbuda 25.2 45.7 28.8 135.4 6.5 72.3
Aruba 28.2 37.2 16.3 140.4 15.2 23.1
Bahamas 27.4 40.1 10.5 112.9 4.4 36.2
Barbados 28.1 50.0 10.7 87.8 3.8 59.4
Belize 9.3 11.8 6.9 41.1 6.2 11.1
British Virgin Islands 39.3 55.3 ... 37.8 ... 18.9
Cayman Islands 46.9 92.9 27.0 76.6 44.4 46.6
Dominica 16.2 26.7 1.5 53.3 7.7 37.2
French Guiana ... ... ... ... ... ...
Grenada 15.8 26.7 4.2 44.6 4.1 21.8
Guadaloupe ... ... ... ... ... ...
Guyana 2.2 14.7 5.4 37.5 6.7 25.8
Jamaica 4.4 13.6 14.2 98.9 3.1 55.3
Martinica ... ... ... ... ... ...
Montserrat 34.5 71.7 12.5 89.0 ... 30.0
Netherlands Antilles 24.7 46.1 … 110.6 1.1 ...
Puerto Rico 27.8 26.2 24.2 84.8 10.4 25.1
Saint Kitts and Nevis 23.9 59.3 3.0 23.7 6.7 34.7
Saint Lucia 12.4 32.6 1.6 65.7 5.2 66.7
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 12.0 19.0 2.0 91.8 3.0 47.3
Suriname 9.1 18.0 9.5 70.8 2.7 9.6
Trinidad and Tobago 13.6 23.1 12.6 113.2 7.8 16.0
Turks and Caicos Islands 24.8 14.8 ... 99.6 ... ...
United States Virgin Islands 45.6 64.1 31.6 71.8 13.5 26.9
Source:  United Nations, Achieving the Millennium Development Goals with Equality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Progress and Challenges (LC/G.2460), Santiago, Chile, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, August 2010.
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